

*Where Cities Meet*  
*The Urbanization of New Jersey*

# THE NEW JERSEY HISTORICAL SERIES

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Volume 22

The New Jersey Historical Series

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# *Where Cities Meet*

*The Urbanization of New Jersey*



JOHN E. BEBOUT  
RONALD J. GRELE

1964

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To our colleagues at  
THE URBAN STUDIES CENTER  
Rutgers—The State University



## FOREWORD

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Many tracks will be left by the New Jersey Tercenary celebration, but few will be larger than those made by the New Jersey Historical Series. The Series is a monumental publishing project, the product of a remarkable collaborative effort between public and private enterprise.

New Jersey has needed a series of books about itself. The 300th anniversary of the State is a fitting time to publish such a series. It is to the credit of the State's Tercenary Commission that this series has been created.

In an enterprise of such scope, there must be many contributors. Each of these must give considerably of himself if the enterprise is to succeed. The New Jersey Historical Series, the most ambitious publishing venture ever undertaken about a state, was conceived by a committee of Jerseymen—Julian P. Boyd, Wesley Frank Craven, John T. Cunningham, David S. Davies, and Richard P. McCormick. Not only did these men outline the need for such an historic venture; they also aided in the selection of the editors of the series.

Both jobs were well done. The volumes speak for themselves. The devoted and scholarly services of Richard M. Huber and Wheaton J. Lane, the editors, are a part of every book in the series. The editors have been aided in their work by two fine assistants, Elizabeth Jackson Holland and Bertha DeGraw Miller.

To D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. my special thanks for recognizing New Jersey's need and for bringing their skills and publishing wisdom to bear upon the printing and distributing of the New Jersey Historical Series.

My final and most heartfelt thanks must go to John E. Bebout and Ronald J. Grele, who accepted my invitation to write *Where Cities Meet: The Urbanization of New Jersey*, doing so at great personal sacrifice and without thought of material gain. We are richer by their scholarship. We welcome this important contribution to an understanding of our State.

*January, 1964*

RICHARD J. HUGHES  
*Governor of the  
State of New Jersey*



## PREFACE

---

New Jersey is many things to many people. To Walt Whitman it was the seashore. To a writer in the *Monmouth Democrat* in 1844 it was the destined "garden spot" whence the teeming millions of New York and Philadelphia would be fed. To John Cotton Dana it was "more than a good motor road from Philadelphia to New York." To millions of people it has been a haven from oppression and a place of opportunity. To Woodrow Wilson it was the "mediating state." To the demographer it is "the most urban state."

The history of the urbanization of New Jersey should take account of these and many other images, for little that has been thought, said, or done to make New Jersey what it is, is irrelevant to the story of its development as the center of the great new city which stretches from Maine to Virginia along the northeastern coast of the United States.

We have tried in this little book to give as balanced a treatment of this story as limitations of space, knowledge, and our own evident biases permit. We have learned a great deal in the process. We have argued and disagreed with ourselves, with each other, and with innumerable friendly critics and other victims of our efforts to ferret out information and to test out ideas.

To all those people, who have contributed more than they can know, we give our most sincere thanks. It would be impossible to identify them all by name because they are too numerous and because some of our


most helpful contacts have been of a hit-and-run nature. We owe a particular debt to all of our colleagues in the Urban Studies Center of Rutgers—The State University. Our special gratitude goes to Mrs. Patricia Meldrum and Mrs. Virginia Whitney for their untiring and skillful help in many phases of the writing of this book. We are especially grateful to Mrs. Katharine Lesnick and Miss Linda Lake for their invaluable work on the proofs and the index.

Next, we wish to acknowledge the very great contributions of those who read the manuscript from beginning to end and gave us, in writing or in extended conversation, the benefit of their knowledge and judgment: Edward B. Wilkens, David S. Davies, Ernest C. Reock, Ernest Erber, Philip H. Burch, Jr., Harry F. Stark, B. Budd Chavooshian, director, and the staff of the Division of State and Regional Planning, particularly Donald H. Stansfield, Eugene J. Schneider, Alan W. Steiss, Anthony J. Catanese, and Anton F. Gross. We also owe a special debt to Alexander L. Crosby, who, with a rare combination of skill, compassion, and ruthlessness, helped us trim the manuscript to bring it within permissible and, we hope, reasonable bounds.

We give special thanks to the editors of the New Jersey Historical Series, Richard M. Huber and Wheaton J. Lane, for their encouragement, permissiveness, and especially for their patience.

JOHN E. BEBOUT  
RONALD J. GRELE

*New Brunswick, New Jersey*  
*June, 1964*



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# I

## THE SETTING AND THE THEME

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IN THE BEGINNING was the plain, lying between two great rivers and sloping south and east to the Atlantic. The plain was crossed by other rivers and was backed in the northwest by rolling hills with nesting lakes and ponds. There were marshes and forests, coastal and river harbors, fish in sea and stream, fertile land, untouched minerals—especially iron, zinc, clay, silica, limestone and traprock—and a few Indians, the game they hunted, and the trails they had made.

Across the eastern river was the colonial city of New York, sheltering barely one thousand souls, and soon across the western river would be Philadelphia. To the northeast were the towns of New England, and beyond the ocean were the cities, towns, and country places of the Old World.

When the Duke of York in June, 1664, created New Jersey by granting the land between the Hudson and the Delaware to John, Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret, the only European settlers were a few hundred Dutch and Swedish colonials along the rivers.

Three hundred years later, New Jersey has become the most urban state in the world's mostly highly developed urban-industrial nation. The cities of New York and Philadelphia have become the nuclei of two vast metropolitan settlements that have stretched out to meet each other on the Jersey plains. Many smaller cities have been founded along the rivers and highways, and they have

steadily tended to grow together as farmland and forest have been claimed for houses and factories. The result is that, disregarding invisible municipal boundary lines, it is possible to envision the emergence of a veritable "City of New Jersey." Shaped roughly like a dumbbell, this city lies across the State from northeast to southwest. The handle of the dumbbell in the narrow center thickens from year to year.

Cities are also running together along the shore from Sandy Hook to Cape May to form what is becoming virtually a single 125-mile resort city and vacation trading post. The northern end of this seacoast city merges with the broad section of the inland city, while its southern segment appears destined soon to be connected with the bulging southern portion by a spur reaching from Camden to Atlantic City.

Since the seacoast city is tightly linked by highways and rails to New York and Philadelphia, and since it is attracting year-round residents who commute by automobile to newly-built plants on the fringe of development, it is essentially an extension of the "City of New Jersey." As more and more farms and pine lands of central Jersey are taken for urban and industrial use, this identification will become more evident.

No one early in New Jersey's history could have foreseen the intense urbanization of today without envisioning the modern industrial age which has created the northeastern megalopolis, the linear city that stretches from southern Maine to Washington and beyond. This development made New Jersey's present posture inevitable—for the State lies at the strategic center of that largest of all super-cities, linking and sharing the destinies of its two greatest metropolitan centers.

What this position has meant to New Jersey is tersely stated in the 1961 *Life Pictorial Atlas of the World*: "While all the states in this area have been greatly affected, nowhere has the growth of the urban belt blotted out so much of the countryside as in New Jersey." The *Atlas* also notes that the "15-mile wide strip between New



York and Philadelphia is the most heavily traveled section of land in the United States."

Because of these and other facts New Jersey has become known as "the most urban state." The 1950 census showed that 86.6 per cent of the State's population lived in urbanized municipalities of more than 2500, the highest percentage in any state. By 1960 the urban population had risen to 88.6 per cent, still the peak for the nation.

New Jersey's population density of 806.7 persons per square mile was outranked in 1960 only by Rhode Island, with a density of 812.4, but more recent census estimates put New Jersey first by two persons per square mile.

In 1960 New Jersey contained eight of the nation's twelve most densely populated urban places of 25,000 or more in population. These New Jersey cities, their rank, and their population densities per square mile were:

<i>Density rank</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Population</i>
1	Union City	40,138
2	Hoboken	37,262
3	West New York	32,315
7	Jersey City	21,239
8	East Orange	19,315
9	Irvington	19,155
11	Passaic	17,407
12	Newark	17,170

New Jersey's urban eminence is further buttressed by the U.S. Census finding that within a 50-mile radius of New Brunswick there are 15,920,787 people, or 8.9 per cent of the total population of the United States. The only other place with more people in a 50-mile radius is White Plains, New York, which is crowded by just 34,000 more. This reflects the fact that since 1950 Middlesex County, in which New Brunswick is located, has been the fastest growing county in the New Jersey part of the New York Metropolitan Region. Moreover, the Regional Plan Association predicts especially rapid growth in this part of the region in the next twenty years.

All these astonishing figures actually understate the urbanization of New Jersey. The fact is that urban influences affect the living conditions, community problems, and civic life of people everywhere in the State—including the remnant of 52,000 farm people. Urbanization today is essentially an outgrowth of the nineteenth century industrial revolution and the current technological revolution. These two movements have affected a larger proportion of the people of New Jersey than of any other state, and more completely dominate their means of livelihood and their way of life. And the end is not yet. Population and economic projections point uniformly to increasing urbanization.

Acceptance of these facts on urbanization does not necessarily clear up a certain amount of confusion among many citizens regarding their own connection with urban New Jersey, its problems and prospects. A poll would doubtless show that many residents do not think they are as urban as the Census Bureau says. The image of the cow pasture across the road is cherished long after eviction of the handsome Holsteins by development houses. Moreover, there are still many cow pastures and other open areas, some of them close to or even surrounded by intense development. According to the Division of State and Regional Planning, only 19 per cent of the total land area of the State is in residential use. Another 10 per cent is "developed," including state parks and forests and other publicly owned land. Farm land accounts for 25 per cent, 35 per cent if wooded areas in farms are included. The remaining 36 per cent is "undeveloped," including 6 per cent in salt marshes, a type of area that is no longer immune to modern development techniques. These proportions and the heavy concentration of homes and factories in certain areas explain why one who flies high enough over the State still sees, for the most part, a land of forests, farms, meadows, and gleaming lakes. The fact remains that within the narrow boundaries of the State, partly hidden by the trees, is a teeming, essentially urban, population about equal to

the combined populations of the seven mountain states of Montana, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, Nevada, and Arizona, which occupy an area about 95 times the size of New Jersey.

Part of the problem of comprehending the urban condition of the State and many of its inhabitants derives from the fact that we have no proper common language for discussing modern urbanism. The old words—city, town, village, country, urban, suburban, rural—conjure up images of past conditions. They do not fit the current scene, and hence the urge to coin such bothersome terms as exurban, rurban, conurbation, megalopolis, urban region, spread city, strip city, and the “City of New Jersey.”

Semantic confusion is heightened by legal caprice. Thus in New Jersey the whole State is divided into 567 incorporated municipalities, all enjoying substantially the same powers under the General Municipalities Act and similar options as to form of government. For purely historic reasons these municipalities are variously designated as cities, towns, boroughs, villages, and townships. But these labels are not a guide to the size or density of the population.

Five contiguous municipalities in a little cluster in Essex County are designated the City of Orange (35,789), the Borough of Glen Ridge (8322), the Town of West Orange (39,895), the Village of South Orange (16,175), and the Township of Maplewood (23,977). Some people in each of these municipalities would insist they are suburbanites, while others would call themselves urbanites. It is true that these places are suburbs of the City of Newark and of New York City. But they are urban in the sense that they are thickly settled parts of the great urban complex known as the New York Metropolitan Area.

A few contrasts will further illustrate the confusion in terminology which leads inevitably to confusion in thought. Are the 37,685 residents of the 69.5 square-mile City of Vineland in Cumberland County more or less

urban than the 78,846 residents of the 23.2 square-mile Township of Woodbridge in Middlesex County? Are the 42,085 inhabitants of the 5.9 square-mile Township of Teaneck in Bergen County more or less rural than the 271 citizens of the 8.92 square-mile Corbin City in Atlantic County? Are the inhabitants of the Borough of Princeton more or less urban than those of the surrounding Township of Princeton?

Despite the common tendency of people in the “suburbs” to deny that they belong to the city, the census definitions of “urban places,” “urbanized areas,” and “metropolitan areas” clearly include suburban places. Part of the difficulty lies in the uncertain meaning of the word “suburban.” To the Romans a suburb was a dependent part of the *urbs*, or city, sometimes a center for the low life or dubious activities found in parts of cities. Gradually a suburb has come to mean a settled area lying immediately outside a central city or town. We usually think of suburbs as primarily residential, tree-shaded, and less densely populated than the older city. Yet New Jersey has suburbs that match or exceed the industrial development of the central city, and are no more rural than Newark’s Broad Street.

Often, being suburban rather than urban is basically a state of mind. For many, the suburban life implies preferred social status. Taxes are often lower, at least to begin with; hence the emigrant can enjoy many benefits of the near-by city without paying for them or taking responsibility for solving the city’s special problems. The modern suburbanite reverses the yearning of the ancient Roman for *rus in urbe*, for bringing the delights of the country into the city, and seeks rather to take the city with him out into the country. Modern communication, transportation, and sanitation seem to make this possible for a while, but New Jersey is demonstrating that the price of this effort is steeper than it looks and that suburbia tends to destroy itself as the urban conquers the rustic. The most dedicated suburbanites find they must

keep pushing farther out to frontiers not yet ravished by the bulldozer.

Forty years ago a New Jersey writer, H. P. Douglass, said in *The Suburban Trend* that the suburbs were in essence "parts of the evolving cities." He continued:

The suburb is a footnote to urban civilization affecting the near-by countryside. . . . It is a part of urban civilization. Even though it is a town in form, the brand of the city is stamped upon it. It straddles the arbitrary line which statistics draw between the urban and rural spheres; but in reality it is the push of the city outward. It makes physical compromises with country ways but few compromises of spirit. It is the city trying to escape the consequences of being a city while still remaining a city. It is urban society trying to eat its cake and keep it, too.

The "suburban trend" can be compared, in some respects, to the march of the old frontier. The American frontier was assuredly a state of mind in those who occupied it. It was also a transitional society which, as it moved onward, destroyed itself by leaving behind an extension of the more mature community—of which the frontier was the outer edge or thrust. Of course the frontier left its own traces in persistent habits of thought and behavior. So does suburbia. In some areas the suburban way of life may prove to be more durable than that of the frontier, but in others it is just as transitory.

Whether the suburban trend is viewed as a state of mind, a social movement, a stage in urban development, or a way of life, it has nowhere had greater impact on a whole state than in New Jersey. It is only superficially paradoxical to say that if New Jersey is the most urban state, it could also be called the most suburban. Indeed, it has always been a suburban state—suburban to New York and to Philadelphia. Virtually everyone in New Jersey lives, and knows that he lives, within the economic and cultural orbits of the two great metropolises.

New Jersey's dependence upon its great urban neigh-

bors has manifested itself in many ways throughout history. Whether one looks at the influx of peoples and the pattern of settlements, the sources and control of finance, the centers from which culture is drawn, the channels of news and information, the flow of travel and traffic, the markets for labor and things—the inescapable fact is that from colonial days to the present, New Jersey's development has been largely an extension of developments reaching out from New York and Philadelphia.

This fact has been commented upon for more than two hundred years, and some of the comments have not been relished by the loyal inhabitants. Benjamin Franklin is supposed to have likened New Jersey to a keg tapped at both ends. Others have called it “the corridor state,” “the doormat state,” “the bedroom state,” “the state with two faces.” Edmund Wilson wrote a bitter essay on the subject entitled, “The Slave of Two Cities.” Even the official nickname, “The Garden State,” appropriately suggests suburban plots rather than large-scale agriculture.

This book will deal with the development and prospects of this unique urban-suburban society between the Hudson and Delaware rivers. The focus is on the “City of New Jersey” rather than on the cities of New Jersey. The concern is with the suburban trend and with the suburban nature of the relationships between New Jersey and New York and Philadelphia rather than with the scores of individual suburbs that dot the landscape.

The most obvious, the most continuous, and the most pervasive fact in determining the special character of New Jersey is its geographical location and accessibility. The effects of geography will appear as the background threads in the expanding tapestry of New Jersey's urban history. These threads will, however, assume new colors and new directions as they interweave with the threads of economic and technological changes to create new patterns of production and distribution, modes of travel and communication, forms of political and corporate organization, types of settlements, styles of living and playing,

and ways of thinking. A constant concern will be to observe how these threads have tied New Jersey to the cities across the rivers and how this has injected a persistently suburban and dependent character into the State's urban development.

Against this background, decisions which have shaped public and private policies that have affected urban change and urban affairs will be considered. Special attention will be given to the policies which have produced the distinctive system of local government by 21 counties, 567 fiercely independent municipalities, and about as many independent school districts. In like manner, the State's policies on corporate enterprise, taxation, and conservation of natural and human resources will be considered for their bearing on the present and future of urban-suburban New Jersey. The ultimate question will remain: "The Slave of Two Cities" or "The City of New Jersey"? Which is emerging?

## II

### THE BEGINNINGS

---

**B**Y THE MODEST STANDARDS of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, New Jersey had a number of bustling towns and a few small cities. These places were proud of their urban nature and conscious of urban problems and benefits not altogether unlike those of modern cities.

At least six New Jersey cities were regarded by the time of the Revolution as more than simple villages. By 1760 New Brunswick, Perth Amboy, and Trenton all had at least one hundred houses, and Elizabeth had two to three hundred. Burlington, capital of West Jersey, had one hundred houses when the Revolution began, and Perth Amboy had grown to two hundred houses, Trenton to 185, and Newark to 141. If we include the smaller villages and trading centers, such as Bergen, Hackensack, Morristown, Shrewsbury, Cape May, Salem, Gloucester, Bordentown, Princeton, and Middletown, portents of urban development can be discerned in the early history of New Jersey.

The pioneer cities were consciously or rationally planned as to location and function and to some extent as to layout. Their ultimate fate was often determined by circumstances beyond human control, such as the exhaustion of ore veins or changes in technology, the growth of out-of-state cities or the loss of markets. But the first plans were conceived with conscious effort and high hopes.



The founders of these cities organized street systems, usually for easy access to markets or wharves, carefully selected sites for public buildings and churches, and provided for open spaces. In some ways they were more consciously organized than later cities. The Proprietors or local governing bodies sought to determine the nature of the population by such devices as proprietary subsidies to Scottish tradesmen at Perth Amboy and attempts to create a Puritan homogeneity at Newark.

The Colony's rich agricultural lands soon produced a surplus for marketing. This led to a division of labor for processing and shipping and to the clustering of population at trade and transportation centers.

The colonial cities were generally planned as commercial centers. Newark and Elizabeth may have been envisioned as Christian commonwealths, and Burlington may have been a Quaker haven, but all three sites were selected for the commercial advantages that soon accrued. Other cities and towns were commercial endeavors of either the Proprietors (such as Perth Amboy in East Jersey and Cohansey in West) or private individuals (such as John Fenwick at Salem and Daniel Coxe at Cape May). Streets were laid out, settlers recruited, and charters sought as part of a commercial policy.

In light of the colonial concepts of defense, techniques of trade and shipping, and knowledge of sanitation and agronomy, it is not surprising that most of these cities were similarly located: on high ground alongside navigable rivers, with the business section close to the water. Perth Amboy on the Raritan bluffs and Burlington on the banks of the Delaware are notable examples.

The sectionalism that has always beset New Jersey has its roots in geography and in political and economic developments in the early days of the Colony. The territory granted in 1664 by the Duke of York to Berkeley and Carteret was politically divided in 1676 after Berkeley sold his share to a group of Quakers and the provinces of East and West Jersey were separated by a line running from Little Egg Harbor northwest toward the Delaware

Water Gap. From the point of view of economic geography, this was a natural division. The line runs across what is to this day an area of low population density and roughly marks the division between the part of the State that is oriented toward New York and the part that looks toward centers across the Delaware: Easton and Wilmington, as well as Philadelphia.

The major settlements were naturally located on the Hudson or Delaware rivers or rivers flowing toward them and were developed largely by the different interests represented by the two proprietorships. Thus, the growth of the early cities and towns both reflected and gave added meaning to the enduring reality of two Jerseys.

Even after the amalgamation of the proprietary provinces in the Royal Province of New Jersey in 1702, the land rights remained with the separate Boards of Proprietors of East and West Jersey, fostering social divisions between, as well as within, the two parts of the Colony.

The shifting nature and aims of the proprietary boards as they sought commercial success tended to promote diversity among the citizens. Unlike New England, there was no unifying religious ethic. Unlike the southern colonies where the rewards of planting were great, there was no homogeneous social system. Only the great commercial ports of New York and Philadelphia could match the diversity of New Jersey: a melting pot of differing ethnic, religious, and social groups, each one clinging to its language and customs well into the nineteenth century.

By comparison with East Jersey, West Jersey appeared homogeneous, with its large estates and Quaker domination. Diversity and rebellion marked East Jersey from the start.

The earliest settlers in East Jersey were Dutch from New Amsterdam who farmed in the area of Bergen (now Jersey City). Indian raids and the advent of the British drove them back to Manhattan in the mid-seventeenth century, but for many years they kept coming back and spread up the Hackensack and Passaic rivers as well as

into the Raritan Valley. They were one-sixth of the New Jersey population at the time of the Revolution. Whole villages in East Jersey spoke Dutch and followed Dutch patterns of family, mercantile, agrarian, and religious life.

The first truly permanent settlers in East Jersey were New England Puritans, mainly from the New Haven colony. They founded four towns—Newark, Elizabeth, Piscataway, and Woodbridge—on the old New England model. All save Newark had obtained grants from Governor Richard Nicolls of New York, who was unaware of the proprietary rights of Carteret and Berkeley.

Other New Englanders also obtained grants from Nicolls for settlement in the Monmouth Grant. They established the towns of Middletown and Shrewsbury, which grew rapidly with the arrival of Baptists and Quakers from Newport, Rhode Island and from Gravesend, Long Island.

Upon the death of Sir George Carteret his proprietary was sold in 1682 to a board of twelve Quakers (including William Penn), who in turn split the shares with twelve Scottish lairds, most of whom were also Quakers. The East Jersey Company soon came to be dominated by Scots.

To organize settlements, the Scottish proprietors combed their country for servants and prisoners (mostly religious) to send to the New World. In 1683 Perth Amboy was founded through their efforts. It became the chief port of the colony as well as the seat of government.

By the middle of the eighteenth century other ethnic groups had begun to reach New Jersey. Germans moved into the mining areas of Hunterdon and Morris counties. Scotch-Irish settled in the mountainous frontier areas of northwestern Jersey, and Negro slaves were imported into all sections, but primarily into the Dutch areas of Bergen and Somerset counties and around the mines of William Morris at Shrewsbury.

To these basic ethnic and religious divisions were added those of the "Great Awakening" of 1740 to 1744

which split the Presbyterian and Congregationalist churches into "Old" and "New" lights and caused severe strains in the Dutch Church as well. Another source of friction was the split between the proprietary and anti-proprietary parties over the questions of land title and quitrents which resulted from the Nicolls grants and proprietary neglect.

Economic, social, religious, ethnic, and political division and diversity were epitomized in colonial New Jersey and in many of its cities and towns. By the time of the Revolution less than one-half the population was English, one-sixth was Dutch, one-sixth Scottish, one-tenth German, and the rest were Swedes, Finns, French, or Irish. There were some ten thousand Negroes, four-fifths of whom were slaves.

Lying between New England and the southern colonies, New Jersey took on the attributes of both. In West Jersey, where land holdings were large and settlements scattered, the logical base for local government was the county. In East Jersey the Proprietors favored a similar form, but this ran counter to the New England tradition of township government that many of the settlers had brought with them. Conflicts over land titles and local government bedeviled the Colony for years, engendering antagonism toward central authority and fostering a strong sense of localism which has persisted to this day.

Actually the localities were given considerable power to control mercantile and public life. Towns were responsible for testing weights and measures, controlling standards and certain types of manufactures, and for exercising some control over public improvements.

Until the nineteenth century, commerce moved chiefly on rivers and protected coastal waters. New Jersey was fortunate in having navigable rivers on two sides and many within. Two of the river ports, Perth Amboy and Burlington, had high hopes for future greatness, but they were pushed into the background by New York and Philadelphia. The Jersey ports generally subsisted on

short-haul river trade and became intermediate produce centers for the markets of the two great cities.

Travel and trade connections between New York and Philadelphia became supremely important as these commercial centers grew. Since New Jersey offered the shortest route, and the only land route, for this traffic, the State's ultimate role as the corridor state was actually established in colonial times. And since the Raritan River was navigable to New Brunswick, and the Delaware from Trenton south, the overland distance across a relatively smooth plain was less than 30 miles—an important consideration in the pre-railroad years.

New Jersey was also the inevitable route to the West for New Yorkers, New Englanders, and overseas travelers who came to the port of New York. Most western traffic was funneled through Philadelphia until the Erie Canal was opened in 1825, but even afterward the overland route was preferred by those seeking the shortest journey.

The road skirting the northern edge of the plain brought business to New Brunswick, Kingston, Princeton, and Trenton. Other routes furthered the development of such towns as South Amboy and Bordentown, which were connected in 1740, and Lambertville, Bound Brook, Plainfield, and Springfield, which were linked by a highway from the Delaware River to Elizabeth. By 1766 a road through the meadows connected Paulus Hook (later lower Jersey City) with Newark. The stage lines of the Trenton–New Brunswick run then extended their service through Elizabeth and Newark to Paulus Hook and thence by ferry to New York.

This pre-Revolutionary pattern foreshadowed some of the basic elements of the modern highway and transportation network which has given New Jersey, among its many other nicknames, the name of the “Transportation State.”

A tour of the principal cities and towns of New Jersey just before the Revolution would have taken several weeks of rugged travel, with nights spent in some of the

four hundred or more taverns which marked places of existing or future development. A quick tour of some of the main stops, outlined by Leonard Lundin's *Cockpit of the Revolution*, shows the contrast between late colonial and contemporary cities and towns.

The ferry from Manhattan docked at Paulus Hook, which had a horse track, a tavern, and a "rather poor" hotel. The population included river roustabouts, gamblers, loose women, and others ready to serve ferry and stage passengers. Paulus Hook was a shipping center for the Dutch farmers who supplied garden produce to New York. Overlooking Paulus Hook was the village of Bergen Point (Bergen Hill, now a part of Jersey City), a settlement of about five hundred Dutchmen. Northward, around Castle Hill in Hoboc, or Hoboken, were the large summer homes of wealthy New Yorkers. Here the William Bayards and the Arent Schuylers lived on plantations tended by fifty or more slaves, one containing two deer parks. Up the Hackensack River lay the pleasant Dutch village of Hackensack in the center of a rich farming area that produced wheat for Newark and New York.

Across the meadows was Newark, a substantial town of 141 houses extending for two-and-a-half miles along Broad Street. The town had an academy, a stone Gothic Presbyterian Church, warehouses, and a few small tanneries. Up the Passaic River from Newark was Aquackanonk Landing (Passaic), which had been founded in 1692 but was just beginning to grow in importance. It was the point for transshipment from the iron mines in the interior. Beyond, at the Great Falls of the Passaic where Paterson now stands, there was only a small village.

Elizabethtown and Perth Amboy were the centers of East Jersey culture and society. Elizabethtown, with some three hundred houses, was the largest city of the colony. It was a chief stopping place of several stage routes and had a "plentitude of taverns and agreeable inns." Here lived the first families of the colony and later leaders of the State: the Daytons, the Ogdens, the Boudinots, and the Jouets.

Perth Amboy enjoyed the dignity of a colonial capital. The town was handsomely laid out on a rectangular plan centering on a brick market place. Up the Raritan from Perth Amboy was New Brunswick, which had begun with a ferry chartered in 1698. Because of the grain raised in the hinterland, mills had sprung up in the area and made New Brunswick an important flour mart. In 1766 the town had become the seat of Queen's College. At the halfway point on the stage route between New Brunswick and Trenton was the pleasant stopping place of Princeton, with about sixty houses along Nassau Street. The College of New Jersey had made the town a cultural center.

The only other East Jersey towns of significance were Morristown and Shrewsbury, both based largely on the wealth produced by the mining industry. Lewis Morris had opened iron mines near Shrewsbury in the early eighteenth century. They were worked by about seventy-five slaves.

Trenton, the terminus of the stage run from New Brunswick, had grown out of the first settlements at the falls of the Delaware in 1680. Because of its strategic location on the main trade route of the colony and its proximity to rich farmlands, Trenton had become a substantial town of 185 houses by the time of the Revolution. There were already two iron furnaces and a slitting mill, which turned out the finished sheet metal product.

Large estates dotted the hills north of Trenton and extended south along the Delaware. The pattern of landholding and settlement was much like the plantation system of Maryland and Virginia.

Burlington, the colonial capital of West Jersey, contained only one hundred houses. It was important chiefly for its political position and for the political and religious controversies that embroiled the town. Gloucester, though still a very small village in 1776, was the early center of two important manufactures of South Jersey: glass and bog iron. Salem, another small settlement, had

one or two sea-going vessels trading mostly with Philadelphia.

The future city of Camden was only a hamlet at Cooper's Ferry, which had been established in 1679. The ferry marked the spot where Philadelphia would eventually overflow into New Jersey.

Although none of these New Jersey towns had attained a population of fifteen hundred by 1776, the inhabitants took pride in being city dwellers. They dealt with certain urban problems, such as road, harbor, and bridge developments; policing; and regulation of trades. Here lived a growing society of relatively rich farmers, merchants, lawyers, landholders, and a few incipient industrialists who would rise to the top as commerce and industry began to replace agriculture as the State's economic base.

The New Jersey that entered the Revolution was, politically and economically, one of the weakest of the colonies. One handicap was the historic political and economic division between East and West Jersey. Another was the fact that until 1738 the Colony had shared its governor with New York, which contributed to continuing political primacy of New York interests. Finally there was the perennial controversy over land tenures. The result was a weak provincial government and an almost bumptious independence on the part of the towns.

Geography put the Colony in the middle of the Revolution, and fate decreed a fairly close division between the Whigs and Tories. The war brought more physical destruction and social disorganization to New Jersey than to any other colony save, perhaps, South Carolina.

The winning of independence clarified some matters but left great problems. Quitrents and the colonial land-title controversies were substantially disposed of. Since the leaders of the proprietary interests tended to be Tories, their political and economic influence was sharply reduced. The leadership of the new state would be drawn increasingly from the more urban occupations of commerce and law, rather than the landholding class.



The first state constitution of 1776 provided for a relatively weak state government which preserved the division between East and West Jersey by an equal division in the upper house of the legislature. The governor was to be elected not by the citizens but by the two houses of the legislature—and for a single year's term.

The new state government and the divided economic interests were unable to cope with the discriminatory commercial and currency regulations of New York and Pennsylvania. A mercantile convention held in New Brunswick in August, 1784, under the leadership of a former Loyalist, James Parker, urged the establishment of two free ports and partial amnesty for Loyalists to promote economic regeneration and counteract the repressive tariff policies of the neighboring states. The legislature did establish free ports at Perth Amboy and Burlington, but they did little good. A stronger national union with the power to curb interstate economic warfare was so obviously needed that New Jersey's ratifying convention approved the national Constitution of 1787 without a dissenting vote.

The mercantile interests centered in the cities sought to strengthen their position against the suspicious rural elements by seeking new charters for their cities. New Brunswick, the first to obtain a new charter (1784), won the right to elect its own officials and substantially to control its internal affairs, including the right to raise taxes, regulate the market, and appoint subordinate officers. Perth Amboy and Burlington received charters in 1785 confirming their privileges as free ports but also providing for the appointment of their principal officers by the legislature. The question of state versus local selection of city officials remained an issue for nearly a hundred years.

After the adoption of the Constitution of 1787 the state economy, like the national economy, began to expand. The iron industry, hard hit during the war, resumed operations. Portents of the coming industrial growth were glassworks, about a dozen breweries, several hun-

dred sawmills and grist mills, fulling mills, tanning and leather shops, a tobacco factory, and a boat yard. But manufacturing was generally home-centered until after the War of 1812.


Indicative of the spirit of the age but ahead of its time was the Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures (S.U.M.), organized by Alexander Hamilton and established in 1791 by the first industrial corporation charter issued by the New Jersey Legislature. The Society chose the Great Falls of the Passaic for its manufacturing operations. Despite liberal privileges, including tax exemption and jurisdiction over six square miles (named Paterson, in honor of Governor William Paterson who signed the charter), the manufacturing operations failed and were discontinued in 1797.

The last years of the eighteenth and the first years of the nineteenth centuries saw major improvements in travel and transportation, especially through new toll roads and toll bridges. Bridges were built across the Hackensack, Passaic, Raritan, Delaware, and other rivers by commissioners acting under State authority. The needed money was raised through stock issues or lotteries. The Passaic and Hackensack bridges, eliminating ferries on the road from Newark to Paulus Hook, were completed in 1795. Three stages a day carried commuters from Newark to New York. By 1810 Newark had 8008 people, almost twice as many as the next largest municipality, Woodbridge Township, which reported 4247 inhabitants. Paulus Hook achieved some importance under the aegis of the Associates of the New Jersey Company, a group of New York and New Jersey capitalists whose counsel was Alexander Hamilton. New Brunswick flourished again as the leading grain market of New Jersey. Increasing traffic along the Delaware brought new prosperity to Trenton and Cooper's Ferry.

The growing strength of local economies in New Jersey did not mean that New York and Philadelphia had become less important to the life of the State. On the contrary, improvements in transportation tended to tie New

Jersey cities more closely to their big neighbors and to emphasize the growing importance of the connecting strip across the center of the State. By 1791, even before the building of the bridges, the *American Gazetteer* reported that within this strip “were located the principal towns, the main passable roads, the only stage lines, most of the academies, the more attractive church buildings, all the post-offices, newspaper establishments, and colleges.”

The main line of New Jersey urbanization had already been established long before the Industrial Revolution crossed the Atlantic.



Broad and Market Streets, Newark, c. 1810  
*Collection of The Newark Museum*

### III

## THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

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URBAN LIFE IN NEW JERSEY changed radically between 1800 and 1840. Industrial development marked the beginning of the transition from the mercantile to the industrial city. The advent of canals and railroads had a revolutionary impact. Old cities expanded rapidly and new ones were founded as a network of rails began to cross the State. By 1840 Newark had 17,290 inhabitants, Paterson was a thriving thread and locomotive center, and Trenton had become known for its ironworks.

If any one event was crucial to this evolution, it was the War of 1812. The embargo, the blockade, and war needs promoted home industry and overland travel routes, opening their potential to investors who were now forced to seek local channels for their capital. Although the immediate effects of the war were dislocation and economic distress, the long-term benefits of investment in manufacturing and transportation were tremendous.

Three innovations in transportation, the steamboat, the canal, and the railroad, provided the principal technological basis for the industrial and urban boom in the early nineteenth century. Although John Fitch had first developed the steamboat, Robert Fulton's *Clermont* opened the era of steam transportation in 1807. Eventually every important town from Hoboken to Sandy Hook had direct service to New York.

The canals were late in coming for both financial and

political reasons. New Jersey was reluctant to finance construction herself yet hesitated to turn the business over to private enterprise. The Morris Canal was finally authorized not only as a canal company, but as a private banking company as well. By 1831 the canal was open from Newark to Easton, and anthracite shipments began. In 1837 the canal reached Jersey City. The Delaware and Raritan Canal, chartered in 1830, was opened in 1834, linking New Brunswick and Trenton, with a branch to Bordentown. The waterway was legally joined with the Camden and Amboy Railroad in 1831 into the Joint Companies, which agreed to grant the State 2000 shares of stock and pay transit duties on passengers and freight. The Joint Companies also finally obtained a monopoly over railroad transport and travel between New York and Philadelphia.

The Camden and Amboy was something less than a model railroad. Fares were high, maintenance was low, service was bad, and accidents were frequent. But it was profitable to the State, as were the other carriers. From 1834 to 1850 railroad taxes, dividends, and transit duties provided 69 per cent of the ordinary state expenditures. No general taxes were levied by the State from 1849 until the Civil War.

Other railroads were built only after the Camden and Amboy assured itself that its monopoly was not threatened. In 1832 the New Jersey Railroad Company was chartered to connect Jersey City, Newark, Elizabeth, and New Brunswick; four years later the line reached the Raritan River. Connections with the Camden and Amboy were made at New Brunswick. Through traffic to Philadelphia became a reality when the Camden and Amboy had gained practical control of the Philadelphia and Trenton line in 1836.

In the north, the Paterson and Hudson Railroad began running between Jersey City and Paterson in 1834. The Morris and Essex reached Morristown through Orange in 1838. In the south, only the Camden and Woodbury Railroad was organized before 1840, and it failed. In

general, only the railroads which could draw upon New York and Philadelphia business were successful before 1840. Later, and especially after the Civil War, as the population grew and as New York and Philadelphia expanded their influence throughout the State, more local lines developed. But local transport in New Jersey has traditionally been secondary to through traffic in the attention given to its needs.

By 1840 all save one of what would be New Jersey's major cities of the twentieth century were linked by rail, canal, steamboat, or turnpike to New York or Philadelphia. Atlantic City, which did not exist at the time, fell into the same pattern later.

The new railroads and canals had important influences on urban life in New Jersey. They stimulated manufactures by making it easier and cheaper to transport raw materials and finished products. Their profits supplied capital for other business ventures. By opening new areas to settlement, they encouraged immigration and created a demand for cheap labor. The railroads themselves afforded employment to thousands of Irish and German laborers. Finally, the monopoly grants, relieving the railroads of local taxes, shifted the burden of social costs to the other property holders in each city. To insure perpetuation of their privileges, the railroads became active in state and local politics. Indeed, they soon dominated the economic and political lives of many cities.

Jersey City rapidly developed into a railroad and industrial center. Glass, carpet, and tobacco companies had been started by 1834, as well as foundries. The future of Camden as a shipbuilding center was assured by 1840. As the terminus of the Camden and Amboy, the town and its waterfront were bustling. Paterson was a thriving industrial town in 1840, with numerous cotton, silk, and woolen mills, a locomotive industry, machine shops, foundries, and other shops. This city was twenty years ahead of other New Jersey cities in shifting manufactures from the home to the factory.

Newark, firmly established as largest city in the State,



had a wide variety of industries including tanning, leather working, jewelry manufacture, carriage- and harness-making, and transport.

Trenton's iron, steel, and pottery works were founded soon after the canal and railroad came to the city. The canals also put foundries into business in northern New Jersey and along the Delaware. Boonton, Hanover, Morristown, Pompton, Rockaway, Port Murray, and Port Colden became small centers of iron production.

Some cities were aided by the steamboat. Hoboken became a shipping center, and Red Bank and Cape May developed as fashionable resorts through boat lines from New York and Philadelphia. By 1839 New Yorkers were coming to Long Branch.

The revival of the bog iron and glass industries brought new life to such southern New Jersey towns as Salem and Bridgeton, with steamboat access to Philadelphia. Most of these places retained their eighteenth-century character as small mercantile centers for the rural population until railroad expansion after the Civil War brought them under the dominance of Philadelphia.

Commuters as well as industry followed the railroads. Newark, Elizabeth, and Long Branch residents traveled to New York, while Orange and farther stations on the Morris and Essex supplied workers to Newark. The daily trek between Camden and Philadelphia was started early. Once begun, commuting became increasingly popular. In 1840 the New Jersey Railroad carried 215,699 passengers between Newark and Jersey City; by 1860 the total was 1,306,226 per year.

Thus the transportation revolution and the new industrial order had begun to produce a social and economic system based upon urban needs and values. The city was becoming the center of opportunity for its own inhabitants and for the rural people and the immigrants who were flocking to it. Here they found increasing concentration and specialization of economic activities.

More and more urbanized areas won political independence. Movements for incorporation quite frequently



pleased everybody. The outlying districts were happy to avoid paying taxes to the new urban center, and the city people rejoiced over liberation from rural control. Municipal government meant better planning and faster decisions, both essential if the city was to garner its share of industries and ratable property. The legislature encouraged incorporations. The balkanization of local government had the political merit of increasing the number of offices and jobs. New counties were created, too—no less than eight between 1824 and 1857. Five were formed around industrial cities that had grown within their boundaries. Under the then-existing circumstances, governmental specialization through a larger number of local units was a natural response to economic specialization and development. Counties experiencing industrial, commercial, or real estate booms became checker boards of small, self-governing communities. The great periods of municipal incorporation were the early 1840's, from 1896 to 1912, and from 1920 to 1929. Significantly, these periods were periods of upswing in the business cycle. Local governments have multiplied when times were good.

The process of municipal fragmentation was the easy way under a constitutional and political system which offered no serious obstacles—or ready alternatives—to the creation of new municipalities. Had the New Jersey Legislature been based upon town rather than county units, the proliferation of local governments might not have occurred. Townships might have remained as stable as counties did after Union County was established in 1857. Connecticut, whose legislative representation is based on towns, offers an instructive contrast. Only seven towns have been formed in that state in a hundred years, whereas New Jersey has allowed over two hundred incorporations in the same period. If each incorporation had affected legislative representation, it seems likely that many efforts to create new units would have died a-borning, and ways been found to induce the old townships to provide new and enlarged services. Adoption by

New Jersey of the southern system of county government might, for a different reason, have discouraged the extreme fractionalization of local governments. In Maryland, for example, the readiness of counties to assume municipal functions has often made it unnecessary and unprofitable to create a new municipality to provide service for an urbanized area. Thus the peculiar New Jersey method of a "mixed" township and county system of local government with counties that are weak governmentally but strong politically seems to have been particularly conducive to the balkanization of local government, which is an important aspect of the State's urban scene.

The charters of the new cities created before the Civil War bear testimony to the very practical reasons for their establishment. They dealt with roads, water, sewers, police and fire protection, port and rail facilities, building codes, and other similar matters. About half of each charter was devoted to the organization and operation of the government.

The municipal fathers of the period counted upon economic growth to resolve all problems, and they believed strongly in low budgets and low taxes. Thus Mayor Dudley Gregory of Jersey City listed as one of his city's natural advantages, in 1840, the "small amount of taxes levied to support state, county, and city government compared to New York and Brooklyn." A year later, Mayor Gregory admonished the Common Council on another subject dear to many of New Jersey's urban leaders:

As conservators of the peace, it is your duty to prevent the desecration of the Sabbath by boys and others who frequently cross over from New York for the purpose. Many of our own inhabitants are not guiltless of this crying evil. Boys are not infrequently seen playing ball, pitching cents, and shooting marbles on this day.

It was commonly accepted that a frugal government, free public education, sobriety, and Sabbath observance

would lead inevitably to a healthy and prosperous society.

Not that economic and social distinctions were to be obliterated. On the contrary, self-conscious classes of mechanics, professional men, businessmen, and capitalists were evolving from a more egalitarian rural society. The general climate, however, was one of infinite optimism about the future for everybody, whatever his station, and the city was the embodiment of this optimism.

Both the booster and the reformer saw the city as the area of opportunity. The booster, focusing on expansion and wealth, proclaimed his city's virtues. The reformer called for an end of monopolies so all men could share the opportunities for enterprise. Although the booster generally spoke for the business community and real estate speculators while the reformers represented laborers and mechanics, they often spoke with one voice. The *Trenton State Gazette* combined the rhetoric of both camps in urging that schools be established for the city's betterment:

#### OUR CITY

. . . Our situation will be full of danger if we possess wealth and power, but lack virtue to teach us how to use them. We must have among us the means of spreading light and knowledge to all classes, or that state of temporal prosperity, which we hope is coming, will bring us no good. . . .

We must have in Trenton, the means of spreading knowledge among the people or we cannot be a prosperous community.

Every one who is interested in our prosperity, should give this his warm and earnest support by every means he can employ.\*

Economic expansion during the period from 1830 to 1860 gave city people more freedom than they had ever known before—or have enjoyed since. There was freedom to make money, freedom from family restraints (especially for the immigrants and migrants), the freedom

\* *State Gazette* (Trenton), August 17, 1838.

of anonymity, and the freedom of economic action. And, since class lines were by no means frozen, there was freedom to improve one's status.

Not all men saw this freedom as more than simple license for the irresponsible. William Allen, Burlington delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1844, argued against equal legislative representation on the ground that manufacturing districts had a different population from agricultural areas. He said, "The one was floating, having no permanent interest in the prosperity of the state and its institutions—the other closely wedded to them. . . ."

Mr. Allen's view of "manufacturing districts" notwithstanding, the city offered the best opportunity for self-improvement. One of the city's most valuable institutions not commonly found in rural areas at that time was the public school. The State's first comprehensive school law, passed in 1829 and amended in 1838, provided one dollar of state aid for each two dollars supplied by the towns. By 1850 there were 1702 schools with 2076 teachers for 88,244 pupils. Because there was more tax money in the cities and because the mechanics and artisans kept up a constant agitation for schools, the public schools were generally established in the cities while many rural areas had to make do with poorly attended church or charity schools.

By 1840, New Jersey cities were well on their way to becoming industrial centers. But they were just on the threshold of the population explosion, or rather incursion, which continued unabated in the major cities for almost one hundred years. The rate of growth was not drastically cut back until foreign immigration was reduced to a trickle by World War I and the restrictive immigration laws that followed it. It was finally stopped or reversed for the older cities by the depression of the 1930's. The growth figures for a few cities between 1840 and 1860 indicate how one of the most significant population movements in history started New Jersey on the fast road to its present urban condition:

	<i>1840</i>	<i>1860</i>
Newark	17,290	71,941
Jersey City	3,072	29,226
Paterson	7,596	19,588
Camden	3,371	14,358
Trenton	4,035	17,228
Elizabeth	4,181	11,567
New Brunswick	5,866	11,256

While annexations helped swell the gains for some, especially Jersey City, Camden, and Trenton, these figures indicate a distinct change in the rate of city development from that in the early decades of the century. Clearly, what would have looked to modern eyes to be relatively small towns in 1840 were beginning to look like real cities by the beginning of the Civil War.

It is difficult to compare the degrees of urbanization of the State between 1860 and 1960. In the earlier year, New Jersey was still predominantly rural, but by a rapidly narrowing margin. Approximately 29 per cent of the State's 672,000 people lived in nine cities of over eight thousand people, that is, in the cities in the preceding table plus Orange and Hoboken. If people living in a dozen or more smaller but long established cities or towns are included, the urban percentage rises to 37 or 38.

The waves of immigrants and the economic expansion of the late 1840's and the 1850's brought changes not only in scale but also in the nature of New Jersey cities and their problems. Although political action and rhetoric shifted increasingly to the problem of slavery in the South, the emerging problems of New Jersey, which would have to be dealt with later in the century, were those of a maturing urban industrial social order.

Before the War, New Jersey cities took on the basic social aspects which would define them until the twentieth century. Their people were younger than the average for the rest of the State. Most of the rural and European migrants were between the ages of fourteen and forty. The cities to which they flocked reflected this, and

the median age in urban New Jersey remained two to seven years younger than in rural areas until the end of the century. By 1860, New Jersey had a population of 672,000 which included 122,790 immigrants, mainly from Germany (33,772), Ireland (62,006), and England (15,852). Over 70 per cent of the foreign-born lived in its six most populous counties. Because most of them emigrated before they married, the cities also became the home of many single women and men, especially where the Irish predominated, as in Jersey City.

The city drew these people because it contained the economic opportunity rural areas lacked. Over half of the State's industrial plants were located in her five largest cities, and by 1860 more than two-thirds of the laborers of New Jersey were concentrated in Hudson, Passaic, Essex, Mercer, Camden, and Union counties.

New Jersey was making solid progress in industrialization before the Civil War and would have continued if that war had never been fought. The loss of southern markets was a blow to the shoe manufacturers of Newark, but government contracts for army supplies caused a boom in the cotton, silk, and apparel industries. New industries were established and many old ones expanded; similarly, new cities were founded and old ones expanded. Industrial concentration overflowed from Jersey City into Bayonne and Hoboken. Newark spread into the Hackensack meadows, and industry came to the Oranges. The industrial complex at Paterson moved down the Passaic River while that of Newark moved up, the two meeting at Passaic City. Camden, Trenton, and Jersey City began to annex their smaller neighbors.

Rapid population growth continued, especially in the industrial cities and in some suburban areas. Immigration was a major factor in this growth. By 1870, New Jersey had a population of 907,149, of which 188,943 were foreign-born and 350,316 had one or more foreign-born parent. Hence, more than half of New Jersey's population consisted of "first or second generation Americans," a state of affairs that continued until almost 1940. The

foreign-born continued to gravitate to the cities. The eleven largest cities of the State, containing a little over a third of the population, held over 60 per cent of the foreign-born, who still were mainly of German, Irish, or English origin. During the succeeding decades, the State's old cities continued to lead in population growth. The following population figures for the six largest cities for 1880 and 1890 illustrate this:

	1880	1890	<i>Per Cent of increase 1880-1890</i>
Newark	136,508	181,830	33.2
Jersey City	120,722	163,003	35.0
Paterson	51,031	78,347	53.5
Camden	41,659	58,313	40.0
Trenton	29,910	57,458	92.1
Elizabeth	28,229	37,764	33.8

Increased wealth and ease of travel brought into being two peculiarly consumer-oriented types of cities: the commuting suburb and the resort city. Both generally lacked industry but were dependent upon industrial and commercial surpluses for their existence. In the north, the suburbs spread from Hudson County into Essex, Union, Bergen, and Morris counties. By 1890 Belleville, Bloomfield, the Oranges, North Bergen, Montclair, and Morristown were dwelling places for the newly industrial rich. In the Philadelphia sphere, commuters settled in Camden and Burlington counties.

The Jersey shore was famous before 1890. Atlantic City and Long Branch had become the nation's greatest resorts, attracting presidents and tycoons, bishops and racing touts, steel makers and strumpets. Geography, transportation, and the new corporate order had combined to produce the most specialized form of urban life yet conceived.

In 1870 New Jersey ranked fourth in the nation for population density; by 1890 the State moved to third



Newark from the Meadows, c. 1879  
*From a painting by Mary Nimmo Moran in the  
Collection of The Newark Museum*



place. More than 50 per cent of the State's 1,445,000 population lived in places then officially classified as urban areas—i.e., places of more than eight thousand inhabitants. This left out many places that under the present census limit of 2500 would be classified as urban. Among the places of less than eight thousand persons that were substantial communities, many of them with significant industrial development, were Belleville, North Bergen, Bloomfield, Burlington, Dover, Englewood, Gloucester, Hackensack, Kearny, Long Branch, Morristown, South Orange, West Orange, Rahway, Summit, and Vineland. Perhaps more significant is the fact that the three largest cities: Newark, Jersey City, and Paterson, contained 30 per cent of the State's population. At no time before or since has so large a proportion of the people been concentrated in only three cities. While the urban districts were becoming more urban, the rural counties of Hunterdon, Sussex, and Warren showed population declines, especially after the closing of the iron mines. New Jersey's industrial position is indicated by the fact that while it was eighteenth in population among the states it ranked fifth in manufactures.

Concentration of industrial control and management was a prime objective of the new corporate leaders. Smaller firms became parts of larger ones through failure, lease, or sale. The easy incorporation laws of New Jersey allowed interlocking directorates, stock-watering, and trust-building. What the big corporations wanted was large-scale production, so that the resulting economies would yield higher profits. The deep depression of the 1870's, the fluctuations of the 1880's, and the crash of the early 1890's took a heavy toll among the smaller corporations; it was easy for the survivors to enlarge their domains.

Railroad consolidations were among the first and most dramatic. The Pennsylvania Railroad took over the Camden and Amboy and the New Jersey Railroad in 1871 and later acquired the Camden and Atlantic. The northern lines were swallowed by the Delaware, Lackawanna &

Western and the Erie. The Reading Company acquired control of the New Jersey Central and the New York & Long Branch. These four trunk lines thus held most of the trackage, plus immense amounts of land. Wielding enormous power, they became the greatest political and economic force in the State.

The happy days of economic freedom were now only a memory. As the nineteenth century grew older, the economic structure became more and more closed to the people in the lower ranks. Opportunity for economic advancement no longer seemed within reach of any ambitious and industrious person. Gone, too, was the pleasant and hospitable face of the city. The post-Civil War city in the United States was generally ill-built and ugly. New Jersey was no exception. Jersey City and Bayonne copied New York tenements; Camden duplicated the monotonous row houses of Philadelphia; Newark followed Boston in building three- and four-story wooden structures that sometimes incinerated their occupants. The houses of the rich were often cluttered with tasteless ornamentation.

Sanitation was primitive or non-existent. Paterson and Newark dumped sewage into the Passaic River, the source of drinking water for most cities in Essex and Hudson counties. High tide on the Hudson filled tenement cellars in Jersey with the filth of the river. The very air was foul. Deaths from asthma, diarrhea, and tuberculosis soared. The estimated death rate of the United States in 1890 was 18 per thousand; the rate for Jersey City was 27.48 and for Newark 28.64 (highest in the nation, after New York City, for cities of one hundred thousand or more in population).

Accident rates were shocking. Between three hundred and five hundred persons were killed each year at unguarded railroad crossings or open switches; thousands were maimed or injured. Liability for accidents was placed by the courts upon the injured.

The one escape in the urban landscape for some was the saloon. Here at least a man could find light, space,

privacy of a sort, and friendship. By 1888 Jersey City had close to twelve hundred saloons, Newark more than one thousand, and Hoboken three hundred.

Rapid industrialization was producing tensions which threatened to tear the social fabric of the city apart. Drunkenness and disorderly conduct were encountered everywhere. Crime rates were soaring. Violence was becoming the order of the day.

Organization of the political and social world was manifestly essential, and the State's leaders during the second half of the nineteenth century showed increasing awareness of what had to be done. The first attempts were weak and largely ineffective. But the turn of the century was to bring a wholesale assault upon the ills of the political and social order.

Perhaps the most striking response to the new industrial scheme was the emergence of the political boss. In every city thousands of uninformed voters could be guided through the electoral process. Some payment for this service was needed, and the corporate leaders, dependent upon privileges a "boss" could provide, were a logical source of largesse.

From 1870 to 1892 the spoilsmen flourished in New Jersey. Cities suffered from partisan politics, graft, and corporate domination. In 1871 a Republican legislature reorganized the Democratic government in Jersey City. Vesting all powers in a board of legislatively-appointed commissioners, they stripped the elected mayor and aldermen of all function and handed the city over to placemen. Money was squandered, taxes were jacked to the highest level in city history, and the municipal debt was increased by one million dollars.

This gang ruled the city until 1887, two years after the State Constitution was amended to forbid special legislation for individual cities. But the amendment did not halt partisan shenanigans. In 1892 a Democratic legislature tried to purge the leading cities of Republicans. Since the legislature could at this time reorganize cities only by class, the Democrats adopted a strong-mayor law

covering Jersey City and Newark, which eliminated the Republican council in Newark. To control second-class cities, the legislature placed the governments of Camden, Trenton, and Paterson in the hands of police boards chosen by the governor.

More far-reaching than these partisan endeavors was the legislature's generosity to corporations. Jersey City and Camden lost their river fronts because the State sold its rights to its waterfronts on both rivers too cheaply. While city debt was rising because of increased expenditures for improvements, the largest property holders paid little or nothing in taxes. By 1881 one-third of Jersey City was owned by railroads. The aggregate property exempt from taxes was valued at \$19,394,000. Newark's city debt was eight million dollars, but the city could not tax railroad property.

These problems were ignored or their solutions delayed by New Jersey's county-based legislature. The men from the agricultural areas were little concerned with the great population upheavals in the urban counties from 1840 to 1880. The Senate naturally opposed every effort to call a constitutional convention which might conceivably have jeopardized the one-county, one-senator principle written into the Constitution of 1776 and retained in the Constitution of 1844. As early as 1873, Governor Joel Parker found that changes that had occurred since 1844 called for a revision of the Constitution. There was much agitation during the 1880's for constitutional revision, and four bills to call for a convention were passed in the Assembly only to be stopped in the Senate. The *Newark Daily Advertiser* forecast the defeat of the bill in 1881 in the following words: "The bill cannot pass the Senate unless some extraordinary means were taken to assure South Jersey's support for the simple reason that no southern man is willing to surrender the present senatorial representation system." In 1913, Woodrow Wilson, with a Democratic majority in both houses elected on a platform calling for a constitutional convention, was defeated in his effort to secure a convention by the de-

terminated opposition of both Democratic and Republican senators from the small counties. The legislature resisted any suggestion for a constitutional convention for fear the sacred formula of one-county, one-senator might be abandoned. Only strong executive leadership could speak for the urban masses, but before Governor Leon Abbett this leadership did not appear.

New Jersey faced a real crisis in the 1880's. Her cities were being pillaged. Corporate irresponsibility was breeding chaos. Labor violence was spreading as workingmen fought blindly against the corporate order which was reducing their pay. Ethnic and religious conflicts were engendering bitterness.

If the State seemed feeble, local governments appeared to be totally impotent in dealing with their problems. The historic response of balkanization and local decisions in the context of low-tax psychology and corporate domination was plainly not producing either good order or general well-being in the highly complex urban society that the State had become.

## IV

### RATIONALIZATION AND REFORM

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**B**ETWEEN 1870 AND WORLD WAR I New Jersey wrestled increasingly with problems of its urban industrial growth. The movement for rationalization and reform included attempts to control and organize corporate enterprise, to improve the lot of workers, to strengthen public education, to eliminate election frauds, to improve state and local government, and to raise the standards of state institutions for prisoners and patients.

Constitutional curbs on the legislature's haphazard ways of proliferating private corporations and municipal governments and offices were adopted in 1875. Since the adoption of the 1844 Constitution the growth of population, municipalities, and business firms had been such that unrestricted, individualized treatment of corporations and municipalities was becoming too chaotic and capricious to be tolerated. The new constitutional prohibition of special charters for corporations was not anti-corporation in purpose or effect. The general laws under which corporations were formed for many years thereafter were designed to make New Jersey's legal climate more hospitable than that of more squeamish states. This legislation won for the State such appellations as "the mother of cormorants," "the home of trusts," and Lincoln Steffens' famous reproach, "the traitor state."

The railroads, however, did not enjoy the affection lavished upon the new commercial and industrial corporations. In 1884, during Governor Leon Abbett's first

term, a tax on railroad franchises was levied, municipalities were permitted to tax railroad property other than the main stem, the state tax on the main stem was raised, and a State Board of Assessors was established. Although the railroads found ways to avoid local taxes and to influence the State Board of Assessors, this legislation was the beginning of a long effort toward some form of equal taxation.

The free public school system was made state-wide with modest state aid in 1871. As a sequel to the great railroad strike of 1877, voluntary arbitration was encouraged by laws passed in 1880 and 1892. The Australian ballot was adopted in 1890, a precursor to the comprehensive election reform under Woodrow Wilson. Other progressive acts provided Saturday half-holidays, scholarships to the state agricultural college, free public libraries, and state and county support for road improvements.

In 1896 John W. Griggs became the first Republican governor in thirty years. Until Wilson's inauguration in 1911 the Republicans were to control both the governorship and the legislature. The change in party also signaled a change in the nature of the leadership of both parties. The older political professionals were being supplanted by corporation leaders. For some time to come, the Republican Party was to be run by men like Franklin Murphy, paint manufacturer; Garrett Augustus Hobart, corporate organizer; John W. Griggs, a director of many corporations; John F. Dryden, president of Prudential Insurance Company; and Thomas N. McCarter of the Public Service Corporation. They safeguarded the new corporate order of northern New Jersey by reviving the old alliance of agrarian West Jersey and the upper classes of East Jersey.

Similarly, the Democratic Party in 1896 was controlled largely by a few men based mainly in Essex and Hudson counties. Former Senator James Smith, Jr., owner of manufacturing, banking, newspaper, and utility interests, ran Essex County with the able assistance of James

Nugent, while Robert Davis ran Hudson with the essential backing of E. F. C. Young, financier and corporate organizer.

The problems of the new industrial and urban world were to be solved by men who had created and were in tune with that world. Their solution was industrial and governmental organization and efficiency. These brilliant new organizers differed on specific policies and in the scope of their imaginations, but they spoke for the urban-based forces in American life. Theirs was the first really purposeful response to urban life in New Jersey, demanding planning, organization, and governmental responsibility.

Three great population shifts, all interrelated, changed the character of urban New Jersey between 1890 and 1910. First was the emergence of an expanding middle class of technicians, managers, and other white collar workers; second was the rise of the commuter and the spread of the suburb along previously established rail lines; and third was the ethnic shift as the older immigrants from northern Europe were outnumbered by the Italians, Poles, Slovaks, and Negroes.

In 1870 manual and factory workers heavily outnumbered all others. Close to 75 per cent of the work force in New Jersey cities was engaged in factory work, manual labor, or domestic service. By 1910 the picture was quite different. Although large-scale industrial development had created thousands upon thousands of additional factory jobs, there were higher percentage increases among typists, teachers, clerks, and persons in retail trade. In industrial operations, increasingly the demand was for skilled mechanics. The New Jersey labor force was becoming more and more middle-class salaried personnel or skilled laborers.

The shift in occupations contributed to the spatial shift or outward movement of the population. A significant part of the new middle class turned to New York and Philadelphia for employment. Commuting was not a new thing, of course; as far back as 1870 the ferry



between Jersey City and New York carried three thousand passengers a day, and in 1871 the Pennsylvania Railroad had introduced a commuter ticket to Philadelphia. But the thin stream of commuters gradually swelled into a surging torrent as rail transportation was extended and modernized and more people could afford the cost. By the turn of the century New Jersey's 2257 miles of track were, in proportion to the State's area, greater than those of any other state. Next came a system of trolley lines that linked the main cities and also ran to the ferries across the Hudson and Delaware. One of the most dramatic changes came in 1910 when the Hudson Tubes and Pennsylvania Station in New York were opened, providing electric transport from Newark, Jersey City, and Hoboken to Manhattan. Newark and New York were closer together in travel time than many parts of New York City.

The cities and counties in the New York region continued to boom. Newark's 1900 population of 246,000 jumped 41 per cent to 347,000 in 1910. Bergen County's population rose from 78,000 to 138,000, a 77 per cent spurt. Northern New Jersey became fully committed to urban development from Paterson to Elizabeth and from the Hudson to the Orange Mountains. The 1910 Census, using 2500 population as the lower limit for urban places, showed that the State's urban population was 1,907,210 and its rural population, 629,957. The vast majority of the urban people lived within the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan regions.

The commuters had swarmed into New Jersey by the thousands after 1900, seeking realization of the American dream: a home in the country. The first wave took apartments in Jersey City, Newark, and other near-by places. The succeeding waves pushed into more remote areas, following the rail lines and the real estate speculators. Wherever they went they produced upheaval: old-timers would call it chaos, the newcomers called it progress. They demanded organization where informal social ties had been enough to decide civic problems. They fought

for rapid transit and other improvements. More often than not, the old inhabitants were defeated.

Writing in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1913, Randolph Bourne of Bloomfield etched this portrait of the New Jersey commuter:

. . . In some ways the commuter is the most assimilable of all Americans. He is indeed far more fortunate than he deserves to be, for it is he who destroys the personality of a town. Passing lightly from suburb to suburb, sinking no roots, and moving his household gods without a trace of compunction and regret, this aimless drifter is the deadliest foe to the cultivation of that ripening love of surroundings that gives quality to a place, and quality, too, to an individual life. This element of the population depersonalizes American life by not giving it a chance to take root and grow. When it becomes strong enough it begins to play havoc with the politics of a town. For the commuters have permeated all the classes, and when they begin to take an interest in the local issues, party and class lines are slashed into pieces. It is the perennially dramatic contest between the old and the new, and it makes an issue that is really momentous for the future of the town. For the shifting of power means the decay of a tradition, and however self-centered and destitute of real public spirit may have been the rule of the aristocracy, no lover of his town wishes to see things turned over to a loose herd of temporary residents.

Where they faced no institutional power structures or where agrarian interests ruled, as in Bergen County, the commuters formed their own cities or "boroughs," as many of the new municipal corporations were called. The historic process of balkanization continued. Noting the tax boosts in the new towns, the old rural townspeople wished the commuters luck with autonomy.

In the older cities the commuters formed an alliance with the non-commuting middle classes to demand services and reform. From 1894 to 1904 the expenditures of the State's 26 largest cities increased 75.4 per cent from \$12,717,000 to \$22,314,000 as schools, hospitals, parks, and

roads were built. This campaign of the middle class was the genesis of the "New Idea" or progressive movement in New Jersey. The movement began in the cities and achieved its greatest support in urban areas and the new suburbs.

The third great change in the population between 1890 and 1910 was the ethnic shift. The second and third generation Irish and Germans were moving up the social scale. Although Jersey City had its first Irish mayor in 1869, a man remembered for his business acumen and honesty, it was not until 1901, when Mark Fagan took office, that it had its second. By the 1890's other cities were electing their first Irish Catholic or German mayors.

What disturbed the old Protestant stock more was the new immigrant wave from southern and eastern Europe. By 1910 the Italians were outnumbered only by the Germans, and five years later they were the largest ethnic group in the State, followed by the Russians and various Slavic groups. The change was rapid. In Jersey City, for example, the Italian population jumped from 3800 in 1900 to 12,000 in 1910. Passaic became a Slovakian city, and Hungarians flocked to Perth Amboy and New Brunswick.

In addition to the foreigners, thousands of Negroes moved up from the South. The first significant migration of Negroes to New Jersey came in the last decade of the nineteenth century. In 1880 there were 38,853 Negroes in New Jersey. The number rose by less than 9000 to 47,638 in 1890, but increased by 21,000 between 1890 and 1900 to 68,844. In the decade of the nineties, for the first time, the Negro population increased at a faster rate than the white—46.6 per cent as against 22.6 per cent. A report issued by the New Jersey Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1909 pointed out that "the abnormal increase in the Negro population has been in the counties having the largest towns," while the gains, if any, in agricultural counties were below those of the whites. The report further observed that the Negroes' preference for the cities was natural because of such advantages as better

schools, more attractive church and social connections, and "the alluring prospect of being able to obtain . . . easier and more remunerative" employment than they had been accustomed to. The report then points with shame and alarm at the substandard conditions under which most of these Negroes were forced to live and the fact that, whether due to prejudice or other causes, few Negroes found their way into anything but the most unskilled employments. Thus, one of the most vexing urban problems of the 1960's had become manifest by the turn of the century.

These population changes upset the old sense of order in New Jersey urban life. The new middle-class managers demanded organization. The commuters and the spreading metropolis had swamped the capacities of the old, simple political and commercial structures. New levels of service were essential. The new immigrants needed education and interim charity, and the older immigrants demanded the reins of leadership. The old community could not survive.

In the face of this social upheaval some form of organization was obviously necessary. From John W. Griggs in 1896 to Woodrow Wilson in 1911, every governor addressed himself to this problem. Griggs and the other great corporate leaders urged the policies of rationalization, efficiency, and organization which had served well in the corporate world. Wilson agreed, but he added a philosophy of countervailing interests harmonized through the State, the corporation being only one of these interests.

The corporate leaders were not blind to the problems of New Jersey. They were limited in their vision perhaps and had a natural bias for the employing class rather than the employees, but they did make honest attempts to correct the worst abuses. Thus Griggs called for an end to special legislation, especially for the creation of new boroughs. He began to develop state commissions for more efficient administration and argued for fewer and better laws.

Franklin Murphy (1902-1905) worked for more reforms. He curbed child labor in factories, tried to clean up the Passaic River, pushed through a limited primary election bill, and introduced voting machines (albeit temporarily). But Griggs and Murphy were unwilling to go further in demanding social responsibility from the railroads and the corporations. Their reluctance can be understood in part from the fact that railroad taxes and corporate fees had greatly increased the State's revenues following the upturn in the economy after 1896.

No such reluctance was felt in the cities. There were widespread demands for an end to the special tax privileges of railroads in particular and corporations in general. Mayor Mark Fagan of Jersey City in a letter to Murphy in 1904 threw down the challenge by arguing that the legislature was controlled by railroad, trolley, and water corporations, and "the interests of the people are being betrayed." The demands that the corporations pay their share of taxes and that the State act in the public interest were keystones of the progressive movement.

It was logical that New Jersey progressivism began in Jersey City, for here the evils of the new order were compounded, and here the full force of all three of the great population shifts described earlier was first felt. Jersey City was smarting under favoritism to the railroads, since the carriers owned more than one-fourth of the city's ratables. Boss rule had become so flagrant in 1892 that repeaters cast the graveyard vote in alphabetical order (and 48 ward heelers went to jail). No schools had been built since the 1870's; there were no parks other than a few small squares donated before the Civil War.

Fagan, an Irish Catholic undertaker's assistant with a deep concern for the poor, had been elected Republican mayor in 1900 and had appointed a brilliant corporation lawyer, George L. Record, as corporation counsel. The two men embarked upon ambitious plans for new schools, public baths, a free dispensary, and summer concerts. Corporation assessments were increased, and the legis-

lature was asked to permit equal taxation of the railroads and of public utility franchises. The legislature did no such thing—hence Fagan's angry letter to Murphy.

In Essex County the revolt against political bosses and public utilities led to the formation of political action groups. A Citizens Union was organized in East Orange in 1902 to fight a perpetual franchise for the Consolidated Traction Company. By 1903 there were good-government organizations in Nutley, West Orange, South Orange, Irvington, Belleville, and the Roseville section of Newark. The first annual convention of the State Civic Federation of New Jersey was held at Newark the same year. The delegates endorsed equal taxation of railroad property and the limitation of public utility franchises.

By 1905 the legislature had to make some concessions to the Essex and Hudson County reformers. A modified equal tax bill, which did not provide true equal taxation but did provide some relief, was passed. State tax collections for local purposes rose from \$605,000 in 1905 to \$1,120,000 in 1906. Continuing agitation by the progressives resulted in the Perkins Act of 1906, which squeezed some three million dollars from the railroads—but this was by no means equal taxation, because assessors kept rail valuations low.

From the railroads Record and Fagan and their Essex County allies turned to the public utilities. They took on the new giant, the Public Service Corporation organized by Thomas N. McCarter. Behind Public Service were the Prudential Insurance Company, the Fidelity Union Trust Company, and political bosses of both the Republican and Democratic parties. McCarter's brother Robert was the attorney general of New Jersey. Thus Public Service represented most completely the political and economic organization of the corporate order.

The issue was joined on the question of limited franchises. The company wanted perpetual rights; the reformers insisted on limited franchises taxed at full value. The battle split the Republicans in Hudson and Essex. Fagan and Record denounced Colonel Samuel D. Dickin-

son, the Republican boss of Jersey City, and broke openly with the machine. Although they did not depose him, they won the support of most Republican assemblymen.

The Essex County rebellion was led by Assemblyman Everett Colby, who in 1905 introduced a resolution denouncing perpetual franchises lacking safeguards. The resolution passed, despite opposition from the bosses. Colby next offered a bill prohibiting perpetual franchises; it was sent to an investigating commission for burial, and the party leaders began to make similar plans for Colby. Not ready for interment, the assemblyman decided to make a primary contest for the State Senate. Fagan and Record came to Essex County to help him. Colby won easily, carrying half of the Newark wards and almost all of the suburbs.

The 1906 legislature had a strong bloc of New Idea men from Hudson, Essex, and Passaic. A bill limiting municipal franchises to twenty-five years was passed, and the machine grudgingly allowed a 3 per cent rise in the tax on trolley gross receipts. These successes spurred the insurgents in other counties. By the end of 1906 there were New Idea organizations in Union, Bergen, Morris, Camden, Monmouth, Burlington, and Middlesex. New reforms were agitated, such as the direct election of senators, an anti-monopoly act, municipal operation of utilities, registration of lobbyists, a comprehensive civil service law, and the initiative and referendum. Insurgency had brought the progressive movement to its peak, and both parties were soliciting its support.

With the election of Franklin Fort to the governorship in 1907 the progressives began a concentrated attack upon the railroads and public utilities. They established a public utility commission and repealed the maximum tax rates on railroad property. By 1910 the stage was set for sweeping reform. Only the generative influence of a mobilizing personality was needed, and in 1911 Woodrow Wilson filled that need. Wilson said in his Inaugural Address:

Corporations are . . . merely organizations of a perfectly intelligible sort which the law has licensed for the convenience of extensive business; organizations which have proved very useful but which have for the time being slipped out of the control of the very law that gave them leave to be and that can make or unmake them at pleasure. We have now to set ourselves to control them, soberly but effectively, and to bring them thoroughly within the regulation of the law.

There is a great opportunity here; for wise regulation, wise adjustment, will mean the removal of half the difficulties that now beset us in our search for justice and equality and fair chances of fortune for the individuals who make up our modern society.

What Wilson wanted was a more rational and humane order for urban New Jersey. Through his drive, ability, and eloquence he was able in a brief period to carry out many of the reforms that progressives had been urging for years.

He first moved against the bosses—to their utter astonishment. He refused to allow the Senate nomination of Jim Smith, Democratic boss of Newark, on the ground that the unofficial primary had designated James E. Martine, an old-time Bryanite. Next, the Geran Act of 1911 provided a complete direct primary system, including election of party committees at the primary. It was supplemented by a Corrupt Practices Act which required candidates to report all expenses, limited campaign expenditures, forbade corporate contributions, and barred fraudulent voting.

The Walsh Act of 1911 was intended to give cities adopting its provisions for the commission form of government more control over their own affairs and a more responsible and efficient government than the typical old-style system with a weak mayor and a ward-elected board of aldermen.

The Employer Liability Law of 1911 provided compensation for job injuries and placed responsibility firmly upon the employer by abolishing the old common law doctrine of employee negligence.

Wilson's final move was on the corporations. The



“Seven Sisters Acts” of 1913 seriously curtailed the privileges of corporations. Holding companies were forbidden, interlocking directorates were curtailed, and charters were made liable to revocation for violations. Other laws tightened the regulations for factory inspection, child labor, women’s labor, and working hours.

Many of these laws never worked. The “Seven Sisters Acts” were amended soon after Wilson left for Washington and were repealed in 1920 when the State began to lose industry to Delaware and other “liberal” states. The political bosses proved themselves immune to laws intended to exterminate them. Their control of certain county machines enabled them to dominate state politics by rolling up tremendous primary majorities in their centers of power. The progressive labor legislation did not create a countervailing power to the corporations. The balkanization of local government was not reversed—indeed, it continued and accelerated during the 1920’s. And the commission form of government, which was adopted under the Walsh Act by most of the larger cities and many smaller municipalities, turned out to be a major obstacle to municipal progress until the Optional Charter Law of 1950 made better charters available.

But New Jersey was a better place to live in after the progressive revolt. The school system was becoming one of the best in the East. The Employer Liability Act was a milestone. The State’s charitable, correctional, and penal institutions were well on the way to modernization. The tax basis of most cities was secured until the Great Depression. It was the twilight before the eclipse of the cities and the triumph of the suburbs.

New Jersey progressivism did not die when Wilson left the State. It continued as an organized response to urban life, but the nature of that life was soon revolutionized by a new toy—the automobile. The automobile and the highway began to disperse both industry and population in new suburban patterns and began to permit the integration of specialized factories and communities into larger systems of corporate management and metropolitan regions.

## V

### THE SPREADING CITY


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**J**UST AS THE RAILROAD steam engine became the symbol of the nineteenth-century industrial system and the creator of early twentieth-century urban patterns, so the passenger automobile and the motor truck have increasingly dominated the period since World War I.

Even people who have lived through this period as adults find it hard to realize how drastically the course and nature of urban development have been changed by changing modes of transportation. Perhaps one reason for this is that the full impact of the automobile has become apparent only since the Second World War. In the period immediately following World War I the automobile was largely a feeder rather than a competitor of rails, which for more than fifty years had determined the course of suburban development in nodes along lines radiating out from the older cities. Automobiles made it easier for people to get to the railroad station or trolley line and thus contributed to the expansion of older suburbs. It was not until after World War II that commuters began in large numbers to use the automobile to escape altogether from their bondage to rails and to fill in areas between and beyond the commuter rail lines with new developments that depended almost entirely upon personally-owned vehicles to get workers to their jobs, children to their schools, housewives to markets, and everyone to places of recreation.

Recognition of the fundamental changes that have been in process during this period is also somewhat

obscured by the spectacular events that have preoccupied people during different segments of it: the boom of the twenties, the depression of the thirties, the World War of the early forties. At the same time, New Jersey's public response to changing needs and problems has tended to play down, if not actually to ignore, their seriousness. Efforts at rationalization and reform have continued, although generally at a lower key than during the days of



Surburban Development, 1938

*From a painting by Charles L. Goeller in the  
Collection of The Newark Museum*

the New Idea movement and Woodrow Wilson. The attempt to organize and conduct the affairs of the State along more efficient and sensible lines without departing from the long-term policies of low state taxation, relatively relaxed state government, and heavy reliance on local and private initiative and action has gone on through wars, depression, and a veritable technological revolution.

New Jersey had 17,619 automobiles registered in 1907. By 1918 the figure was 163,519, and by 1929 more than 800,000 cars were registered. The 1962 total was 2,574,909—an average of more than one-and-one-third automobiles per household.

Not only are there more cars on the road every year, but those that are on the road are used more intensively. The State Highway Department estimates that the average mileage per car in 1930 was 8990. By 1950 the estimated mileage had gone up to 10,180, and by 1963 to 11,600. If it were not for the increase in the number of families with two or more cars the mileage per car would undoubtedly have gone up much more spectacularly. As for the use of New Jersey roads and highways, the department estimates that car-miles traveled increased from a mere 6,554,000,000 in 1930 to 27,710,000,000 car-miles in 1963.

For a time the cities continued to gain population despite the growth of the suburbs. The six largest cities reached new peaks in 1930, but with the exception of Paterson all have declined since then, as shown by the table:

POPULATION CHANGES IN CITIES OVER 100,000					
	1920	1930	1950	1960	<i>Percentage of change 1930-1960</i>
Newark	414,524	442,337	438,776	405,220	— 8.4
Jersey City	298,103	316,715	299,017	276,101	—12.8
Paterson	135,875	138,513	139,336	143,663	+ 3.7
Camden	116,309	118,700	124,555	117,159	— 1.3
Trenton	119,289	123,356	128,009	114,167	— 7.4
Elizabeth	95,783	114,589	112,817	107,698	— 6.0

The 1920's might be called the golden twilight of the cities. There was a healthy boom in construction, manufacturing, and trade. Whole areas of Newark were developed or rebuilt. Journal Square Plaza and Hudson Boulevard were built in Jersey City. Apartment houses and single dwellings went up in the Oranges, Trenton, Camden, and elsewhere. By 1930 more than 66,000 workers were employed in Newark's 1700 factories, while 25,000 worked in 617 factories in Jersey City and more than 32,000 worked in 915 factories in Paterson. From every standpoint, the economic strength of the city during the 1920's seemed undeniable.

Politically, the cities continued to provide leadership after World War I. Mayor Thomas L. Raymond of Newark was a farsighted civic planner and builder, while Arthur T. Vanderbilt as leader of the clean government organization in the Republican Party carried on the reform tradition in Essex, one of the two most urban counties. The progressive tradition of Frank Katzenbach of Trenton and Mark Fagan of Jersey City did not perish, although Mayor Frank Hague's dedication to the public welfare was sometimes questioned by stern observers of Hudson County politics.

Legitimate theaters operated in most cities, and vaudeville and burlesque provided entertainment for millions. The Hudson Theater was the butt of many jokes, but it stood for autonomous popular culture. New York City intellectuals used to seek cultural diversion in Hoboken, and there were some first-class restaurants and speakeasies in Newark, Trenton, Camden, and Jersey City.

Although immigration was drastically reduced, the more recent arrivals from southern and eastern Europe more than maintained themselves. The Poles and Italians formed the two largest ethnic groups in the State by 1930, and a decade later their descendants outnumbered Americans of Irish and German parentage.

With the cutback in immigration, the cities' roles as staging centers and educational institutions for new Americans began to decline. At the same time, however, New Jersey cities began to have an increasing respon-

sibility for the urbanization, education, and employment of migrants from rural America. The majority of these migrants were and continue to be Negroes, and although New Jersey had its Ku Klux Klan, the Negroes, who flocked to New Jersey in increasing numbers in the twenties, were freer than they had been as tenant farmers in the South. As in the 1890's these descendants of early Americans came mainly to the cities. The table on pages 58 and 59 summarizes the story.

There is every indication that this mass movement is continuing at a rapid rate. The Newark City Planning Commission estimates that the Negro population of Newark increased to 42 per cent by 1964.

The demands of urban growth and the afterglow of the progressive movement brought significant governmental improvement and social reform to the State between Governor Wilson's departure for Washington and the Depression. Under Governor James Fielder the jury system was reformed, inheritance taxes were levied, and the railroad maximum tax law was at last repealed. Municipalities won substantial home rule powers through the General Municipalities Act under Governor Walter Edge. The Ellis Earle and Dwight Morrow commissions carried on inquiries, which led to reorganization of penal and welfare institutions and their consolidation in the Department of Institutions and Agencies. Cities benefited from several accomplishments of the George Silzer and A. Harry Moore administrations, including a zoning amendment to the State Constitution, building codes, and authorization for cities to join in construction of sewerage systems.

At the suggestion of Governor Wilson, an Economy and Efficiency Commission was established of which Walter Edge, who later became governor, was chairman. A limited amount of reorganization and consolidation resulted from the recommendations of this Commission. Administrative reorganization continued to be a subject of repeated studies and recommendations until the sprawling state administration was pulled together into

14 departments in accordance with requirements of the new State Constitution adopted in 1947.

The Port of New York Authority was created in 1921, and it soon began building highway links between New Jersey and New York: the Outerbridge Crossing (1927), the Goethals Bridge (1928), and the George Washington Bridge (1931). The Holland Tunnel, opened in 1927, was later turned over to the Port Authority. The Benjamin Franklin Bridge across the Delaware between Camden and Philadelphia opened in 1926. A modern highway department was established, and a state highway system was planned and pushed forward. Towns were empowered to acquire land for airports.

By 1928 a number of regional commissions had been established to deal with water supply, sewer, and port problems, and a North Jersey Transit Commission had been established to study the increasingly complicated problem of rapid transit. One of the pioneer county park commissions in the nation had been inaugurated in Essex County in 1895. By 1927 commissions had been established also in Camden, Hudson, Union, and Passaic counties. The park commission movement has continued to the present with the establishment of commissions or committees in eight other counties.

Not that every problem was solved. There was no serious attempt to bring the tax base into line with the State's twentieth-century responsibilities. Too many workers were ill paid, and their strikes for better terms were not sympathetically handled by the police of Paterson, Passaic, and Bayonne, whose first concern was corporate rights. The state of civil liberties in Hudson County and elsewhere was not precisely idyllic.

Despite these flaws, the 1920's should be remembered for attempts to solve the problems posed by New Jersey's peculiar urban pattern. Many of the attempts came to naught because the stock market was rising and soon everybody would be well off. Why not go to Atlantic City for a good time? No less than ten million people did, each year.

POPULATION BY COLOR

	1920
State of New Jersey	
Total population	3,156,000
White	3,037,000
Non-white	117,000
% Non-white	3.7
<i>Urban</i>	
Total population	2,475,000
White	2,381,000
Non-white	92,000
% Non-white	3.7
<i>Rural</i>	
Total population	681,000
White	656,000
Non-white	25,000
% Non-white	3.6
City of Newark	
Total population	414,000
White	397,000
Non-white	17,000
% Non-white	4.1
City of Camden	
Total population	116,000
White	108,000
Non-white	8,000
% Non-white	7.3
City of Trenton	
Total population	119,000
White	115,000
Non-white	4,000
% Non-white	3.6



1920-1960

<i>1930</i>	<i>1950</i>	<i>1960</i>
4,041,000	4,835,000	6,067,000
3,829,000	4,512,000	5,539,000
209,000	319,000	515,000
5.2	6.6	8.5
3,339,000	4,186,000	5,374,000
3,161,000	3,984,000	4,891,000
175,000	279,000	472,000
5.2	6.7	8.8
702,000	649,000	690,000
668,000	609,000	649,000
24,000	40,000	41,000
4.8	6.2	5.9
442,000	439,000	405,000
403,000	363,000	266,000
39,000	75,000	138,000
8.8	20.7	34.1
119,000	125,000	117,000
108,000	107,000	89,000
11,000	17,000	28,000
9.6	13.6	24.0
123,000	128,000	114,000
115,000	114,000	88,000
8,000	14,000	26,000
6.5	10.9	22.8

New industries made new towns and old cities expand. The motion picture industry in Fort Lee, General Motors in Linden, Edison Electric in West Orange, and pharmaceuticals in New Brunswick were twentieth-century endeavors. Camden benefited from the presence of Radio Corporation of America and Campbell's Soup, and from the wartime shipping boom. The chemical industry, destined to become the State's largest enterprise, grew up along the Delaware, the Raritan, and the rivers of Newark Bay.

Public Service, the Prudential Life Insurance Company, Bamberger's and other department stores, insurance companies, and banks made Newark a nexus of agents, clerks, and managers. The city was also a transportation hub where railroads and highways converged. The city became known for an excellent public school system and an outstanding public library. It had its own College of Engineering, and in the late twenties private efforts were beginning to lay the foundations of a university. For a brief time Newark came close to being in truth the metropolis of New Jersey.

In Jersey City, the power of Frank Hague actually rested upon the reforms of the Progressives. The increased municipal services had required more officials. This had increased patronage, and the newly instituted commission government formed the legal and political base of Hague's power. The Mayor was willing to expand social services, and although his huge medical center was a rich source of patronage, it was also a very useful civic institution.

While factory workers in the expanding cities sweated under the speed-up in no-union or company-union plants, a few miles away their managerial cousins, the product of the same speed-up, sweated over their lawns and problems of status. The same transport, industrial, and governmental innovations which furthered the urban expansion of the 1920's were promoting even more rapid expansion of the suburbs.

The automobile was only one of several factors that spurred the suburban boom of the twenties. Middle-class incomes had gone high enough to make country home ownership feasible, especially with easy mortgage payments. New materials and new methods enabled developers to keep prices down. Many of the developments offered such conveniences of city life as electricity, piped water, and sewage systems—plus trees and enough space for six tomato plants. These improvements appealed to men (and women) who had never drawn water from a well or limed an outhouse. There were, on the other hand, speculative developments with inadequate sanitary and other facilities which shortchanged the buyers and left problems for local governments from which some communities are still suffering.

New suburbs, some with as many as 15,000 inhabitants, were incorporated. Older suburbs became more like cities; population increases of 150 per cent to 230 per cent were not uncommon. Suburban Bergen County increased its population by 154,000 between 1920 and 1930. Essex grew by 181,000, only 28,000 of this in Newark. Urban Hudson County and rural Cumberland grew by almost identical percentages (15) while Union and Passaic grew by 22 and 48 per cent respectively, the greater part of this growth occurring outside of the old urban centers of both counties.

The social shock of this growth was often cataclysmic. Villages suddenly found themselves with urban problems of zoning, sewers, schools, traffic, street-paving, water, fire, and police protection. An immediate reaction was the standard New Jersey practice of carving up old townships into two or more smaller municipalities as both newcomers and old settlers tried to escape social responsibility and higher taxes. Sixty-four new municipalities were incorporated between 1920 and 1930; almost as many were defeated in referendums. By 1929 the State had 543 municipalities and about the same number of school districts, plus numerous special districts to provide

water, sewage disposal, and other services. By 1937 there were 565 municipalities, 551 school districts, and 225 special districts.

Tax avoidance was a main reason for setting up new municipalities. In an extreme case, the five enterprising residents of the Borough of North Cape May got themselves incorporated in 1928 and exempted from \$139,000 of assessable property from the school tax. Two golf courses in Camden became the Boroughs of Pine Valley and Tavistock.

While older townships lost much of their taxable property, the new boroughs strained to finance the schools, roads, and water systems formerly provided by the older community. Road mileage was often too small for effective administration, fiscal capacity too limited for a full-time engineering staff, and the land area too small for planned improvement programs. High schools built to serve one municipality led to unnecessary duplication and lack of service elsewhere. Unplanned municipal capital investment compounded the problems.

The State attorney general did try to move against this proliferation of postage-stamp boroughs, but the State's highest court ruled that although the legislation allowing it was unwise, it was constitutional. How unwise was neatly illustrated in a 1937 report of the Princeton Local Government Survey: "Drive from the New Jersey end of the George Washington Bridge along Route 6 (Fort Lee to Paterson) for some twenty miles. You will pass through: 3 counties, 16 municipalities, 15 school districts, 2 sewerage districts, and 2 water supply districts."

This multiplication of governmental units limited the citizens' ability to solve problems and thereby undercut the very autonomy that defenders of small units claimed they were preserving. It often meant costly postponement of action on an emerging problem and ultimate action by establishing a new agency overlapping local boundaries. Thus, the Princeton Local Government Survey in 1937 pointed out that one who crossed the Delaware

River to Camden found himself "in *six* major service jurisdictions, namely: a county, a city, a school district, a port district, a rapid transit district, and a joint bridge commission."

Another consequence of the proliferation of municipalities was the diversity among the suburbs in New Jersey. Some of them had grown as natural extensions of the Newark, Paterson, Trenton, and Jersey City manufacturing areas. Others grew up around new industries or courted them for their usefulness in improving tax revenue. Still others remained almost exclusively residential, while some were flourishing shopping centers. Many residential suburbs exhibited a high degree of internal uniformity; other suburbs were much more heterogeneous in composition. The diverse new industries of the 1920's, such as chemicals, automobiles, aeronautics, and research facilities; the new offices needed to administer these giants; and the continuing growth of the technical, managerial, and bureaucratic hierarchies provided the economic and social base for this suburban development.

By 1929 the urban pattern of New Jersey seemed firm. The older cities, with their neighboring industrial suburbs, it appeared, would continue to grow, although more slowly than in the past, and provide employment, diversion, and culture. The commuting suburbs would give a coming generation a chance to frolic on the grass and recapture the values of rural America while enjoying the benefits of the city. This vision ended abruptly in 1929. The Depression hit New Jersey hard. By 1937 over seventy thousand New Jersey workers were employed by the Works Progress Administration; unemployment during the worst part of the Depression went to two hundred and fifty thousand.

The larger cities began to lose population as jobless men went back to the farm or hit the road. Suburban growth was smothered by a wave of mortgage foreclosures.

The industrial slump was appalling. For example, the

value of the manufactured products of Newark fell from \$502 million in 1929 to \$328 million in 1935, and in Jersey City the decline was from \$312 million to \$206 million.

The plight of the new suburbs was acute. Leadership was inexperienced, expenses were normally high, and tax arrears mounted. Almost all of the commissaries and food depots established by the State were placed in these municipalities because they were less able than the older cities and suburbs to provide relief out of their own resources.

Resort areas were almost deserted by paying customers. But many owners of summer cottages left their city homes and took up permanent residence—sometimes on relief—by the seaside or a lake.

New Jersey, like most states, had no program or policy to cope with the industrial decline and no state agency or funds for relief. Not until 1931 was an Emergency Relief Administration formed to reimburse counties and municipalities for relief works and payments. By June, 1934, the State had petitions for aid from 128 municipalities that could not raise money for relief; by the end of that year 400 of the State's 564 municipalities were turning their relief appropriations over to the State in return for full state direction of the program.

The first federal aid to New Jersey was two million dollars from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1933. Then came WPA and other relief programs. But assistance always fell short of the need. In 1936 unemployed workers marched on Trenton to demand broadening of the State program. They occupied the State House for nine days, but the legislature adjourned without acting.

The State was able to finance its relief program without resort to a broadly-based state tax only because of the fortuitous death of Dr. John Dorrance of the Campbell Soup Company in 1930. Seven years later the State collected fifteen million dollars in inheritance taxes. The balkanization of local government handicapped

local action to meet depression problems. Some of the municipalities set up to escape taxes had separated those most able to pay from those most in need. The social irresponsibility of indiscriminate municipal incorporation came into full view as New Jersey struggled through the Depression. As the author of the authoritative study of "Seven Years of Employment Relief in New Jersey" put it, all services "were affected by the chaotic structure of local government," and the municipal boundary was "a barrier to the efficient government of the community."

The role of the federal government became increasingly significant. Aside from WPA and other work relief programs, it provided funds for schools, hospitals, highways, water systems, harbor development, and airport improvement. Several of the pioneer housing projects of the Public Works Administration were built in New Jersey, and when the Housing Act of 1937 was passed the leading cities quickly organized local housing authorities and began building low-rent housing with federal aid. These programs put people back to work, stimulated the economy, and left many permanent improvements. Some of them also had the long-range effect of contributing to suburban sprawl. Federal funds improved roads but not rail facilities. Thus, when people could again afford automobiles, it was possible to move further out to live in houses made easy to buy on the installment plan by the FHA mortgage system.

In these programs—especially housing—a new relationship developed between the city and the federal government. Symbolized in Mayor Hague's close relations with Franklin D. Roosevelt and the national Democratic Party, the new relationship by-passed the State. Thus local housing authorities planned projects with the advice of federal officials, arranged financing with the aid of a federal guarantee, and were directly supervised by federal officials in construction, management, and fiscal activities. Even though the principal welfare programs were to be administered through state and county agencies, the basic policies and financing came from Washington. Conse-

quently, they tended to increase the interdependence of the city and the federal government.

A related development was that the cities became overwhelmingly Democratic, if they were not already so. Immigrant groups, and Negroes especially, turned to the New Deal as the hope of freedom and opportunity. Since the legislature remained Republican and was weighted heavily in favor of the more rural counties in the Senate, the political gap between the older cities and the State widened.

The social welfare programs of the New Deal became permanent functions vital to the cities, for it was in the most urban areas that the needy were found in largest numbers long after the Depression.

World War II strengthened the bond between Washington and the cities by reviving many of the cities' ailing industries through direct action in the form of wartime contracts, harbor development, and subsidized construction. Although construction of public facilities virtually ceased, increased federal spending and war work brought thousands into the cities. Only Trenton and Paterson, among the major cities, reached new population highs, but every city was stimulated economically by wartime industrial revival.

In spite of the primacy of the national government in the wars against depression and foreign enemies and the effects of this on urban development and politics in New Jersey, the State made impressive governmental progress during this period. Its response to the increased pressures on its system of government was consistent with—indeed, essentially a continuation of—the earlier attempts at rationalization and reform. The effort was to improve the machinery of government, make it more efficient, orderly, and businesslike, and thus enable it to meet the needs of its citizens better.

The movement for reorganization of state administration which had begun with the Economy and Efficiency Commission suggested by Woodrow Wilson appeared to be stalled by the end of the twenties after comprehensive



reports for two successive legislative committees were shelved. Governor A. Harry Moore revived the issue and secured some progress in the early thirties by persuading Dr. Harold Dodds to lead a Princeton University team in suggesting limited reorganization and a tightening of state fiscal administration in the interest of "constructive economy" designed to get the most useful work from scarce tax dollars.

An association of civic organizations led by the State Chamber of Commerce and the League of Women Voters responded to the depression-revealed chaos in public finance with a series of proposals for tightening up local borrowing, budgeting, and accounting procedures, for closer state supervision of local fiscal operations, and for a strong state department of finance. Some of the objectives of this group were achieved through legislation developed after extensive studies by the Princeton Local Government Survey headed by Dr. John Sly. The State's somewhat archaic child welfare laws were revised with the help of a group of people representing various welfare interests following a 1932 report by a state Pension Survey Commission.

A direct assault was made, even on the old taboo against a broad-based state tax, and almost succeeded. A state Commission on County and Municipal Taxation and Expenditures established in 1929 issued a series of reports between 1930 and 1932 which among other things suggested that the State should rely less heavily on the local property tax and raise money by moderate business and personal income taxes and possibly a sales tax. Some years later, Governor Harold Hoffman took up the cause and won enactment of a sales tax from the 1937 Legislature. A sharp attack on the law led by the Retail Merchants Association drove the legislature to repeal the act the same year and stifled serious discussion of the basic tax problem for years to come.

The 1929 Commission, popularly known as the Tax Survey Commission, and later the Princeton Surveys documented the effects of the multiplication of local units

on local services and costs, but the system of small local governments jealously guarding their right to rule their limited domains was too well entrenched to invite anything but a verbal attack.

Many other problems were reviewed by state commissions or civic groups: juvenile delinquency, public health administration, school aid, the perennial railroad tax issue, outdoor recreational needs, labor relations, the growing congestion in the courts, to name but a few problems of obvious importance in an urban society. Action followed some of these reports, but the inflexibility of the tax structure and the rigidities in the local government system set limits to effective reform in various areas.

Two basic matters of governmental organization continued to be agitated by interested persons and groups. These were the decentralized system of state administration by scores of departments and agencies only loosely related to the governor as chief executive, and the ancient New Jersey court system, justly described as the most "antiquated and intricate" in the English-speaking world. The reform of these and other constitutionally based barriers to governmental efficiency and economy, finally became practical politics with the election of Governor Charles Edison in 1940. The advocacy of constitutional revision by both Edison and Robert Hendrickson, his Republican opponent in the campaign of 1940, sparked a combination of civic and political leadership, including the leadership of three successive governors, Edison, Edge, and Driscoll, which seven years later won the new constitution prepared by the Convention of 1947. Most of the groundwork for this spectacular victory for governmental reform was laid during the war.

Among the changes that made the new constitution more appropriate to the urban age were those to streamline the state court system; to strengthen the office of governor by extending his tenure, by expanding his veto and certain other powers, and by reorganizing state administration; to increase the scope of municipal powers,

including powers in the area of urban renewal; and to forbid segregation in the militia or the public schools.

The revision of the constitution was obtained at a price. In order to persuade the legislature to permit the question of calling a convention to be voted on by the people, the leaders agreed to include in the act submitted to referendum a prohibition against any change in representation in the legislature. Thus the new constitution perpetuated the system of equal representation of the counties in the Senate, originally adopted in haste by the Provincial Congress in 1776, partly because it happened to give equal weight to East and West Jersey, which at the time were nearly equal in population. The result is that, statistically, a resident of the State's smallest county (Cape May) now has almost 19 times the voting power in the Senate of a citizen in Essex County. To look at it another way, 18 per cent of the people of the State residing in the eleven smallest and least densely settled counties, which include the ten most rural counties, elect a majority of the Senate; while the five largest, which include the four most urban counties, all of them in the northeast, and 54 per cent of the people of the State, elect only five, or less than one-quarter of the senators. Of the eleven smallest counties, Somerset is the only one that is not on the western edge or in the southern half of the State. The result is that the historic composition of the Senate, designed to reflect sectional differences, now also reflects differences in degrees of urbanization and gives the less urban areas a representative advantage neither intended nor anticipated by the founders.

The adoption of the new constitution was followed by the creation of a Commission on Municipal Government which prepared the Optional Charter Law of 1950, commonly called the Faulkner Act after the chairman of the Commission. This act, for the first time, gave all municipalities an opportunity to adopt modern charters providing for a strong mayor or an appointed manager. Between 1952, when Vineland became the first city to operate under one of the new optional charters, and 1964,

36 municipalities had taken advantage of the act. These included all of the cities over 100,000 population except Paterson and embraced approximately 30 per cent of the population of the State.

This widespread revision of municipal charters might be described as the second municipal revolution of the century. The first, in the years immediately following the adoption of the Walsh Act in 1911, brought most of the large cities and many smaller municipalities under the commission form of government. The second was in fact a counterrevolution against commission government, which, according to the Faulkner Commission, had been responsible for many deficiencies in municipal operations.

Since World War II, as is shown by the table on page 54, every city over 100,000 except Paterson has declined. The decline has been more serious than the loss of population. A composite portrait of New Jersey's chief cities would show that per capita income has increased only half as much as for the State as a whole; employment has fallen; retail sales have dropped; the tax base has diminished; construction has not matched the pace of the golden twenties. The cities look old and tired. Their architecture, except in renewal areas, reflects the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.

The great expansion in New Jersey since World War II has been in the so-called suburbs, outside the old core cities and the long-established industrial areas adjacent to them. Although the farm population has declined and the industrial cities have lost population, the State as a whole gained 25.5 per cent in population from 1950 to 1960. This growth was concentrated mainly on the fringes of the expanding New York and Philadelphia metropolitan areas. Thus the older suburban counties of Bergen, Camden, and Union increased by 45 per cent, 30 per cent, and 26 per cent respectively, while counties farther out increased more rapidly: Burlington by 65 per cent, Middlesex by 64 per cent, Morris by 59 per cent, and Ocean by 91 per cent. These figures reveal the march of urban-suburban development across the State.

The growth of a few of the new suburbs, those that are peculiarly the product of the post-World War II period, when the automobile began in earnest to take the commuter business away from the railroads instead of feeding it to them, indicates the radical change that has occurred in the pattern of urban development:

POPULATION GROWTH IN SELECTED MUNICIPALITIES

	1940	1950	1960
Bridgewater *	4,934	8,234	15,789
Cedar Grove	5,208	8,022	14,603
East Brunswick	3,706	5,699	19,965
Ewing Township	10,146	16,840	26,628
Hamilton Township	30,219	41,156	65,035
Livingston	5,972	9,932	23,124
Madison Township	3,803	7,366	22,772
Middletown	11,018	16,203	39,675
Parsippany-Troy Hills	10,976	15,290	25,557
Wayne Township	6,869	11,822	29,353
Willingboro *	642	852	11,861

\* Boundary changes occurred between 1950 and 1960.

An important factor in the growth of many of the fringe suburbs has been the dispersal of large-scale industries. Ford in Mahwah and Edison, U.S. Rubber and American Cyanamid in Wayne, Squibb in North Brunswick, Colgate in Piscataway, CIBA in Summit, and U.S. Steel in Pennsauken represent the steady trend of industry to the suburbs. Out in the open spaces the industrial giants find land at moderate cost, low taxes, easy access to markets, cheap water, and other inducements. Easy credit and new roads, both produced with federal help, make it easy for their employees to move with them.

Immense numbers of clerks, technicians, managers, and administrators are needed to operate the industries. These employees put their stamp on many of the suburbs. Thus the urban picture in New Jersey over the past two decades is one of ailing cities, new expanding suburbs, and older suburbs becoming more like the cities of the



Aerial View of Jersey City  
*Thomas Airviews*

past. Each group faces its own problems. Old centers or foci of business and cultural activity struggle against decline; new ones strive for recognition and support as people cross one another's trails in search of things to buy and places to work or play or renew their minds and spirits.

The new constitution and the Faulkner Act both reflected a growing sense that an urban society needed better structured, more efficient governmental institutions at both the state and local levels. After World War II the State also resumed the attempt to adjust public policies, programs, and facilities to the requirements of the urban age. Advances were made in social, labor, and civil rights legislation. Rutgers became in law and in fact the State University, while the state teachers' colleges became state colleges. All have benefited from substantial building programs, but the demand for admission to college has continued to outpace the development of new facilities and teaching capacity. The State has authorized the establishment of community colleges under county auspices, but the fact that a very substantial part of the cost must be borne by the already-burdened local property taxpayers has had a limiting effect upon the speed and extent of local response.

Greatest progress in absolute terms has been made in highway development, with the opening of the New Jersey Turnpike and the Garden State Parkway, the building of the Walt Whitman Bridge between Camden and Philadelphia, the widening of other crossings on both the Hudson and Delaware rivers, and the expansion of the state highway system. Yet the State, with a highway department long known as a leader and innovator in planning and construction, has continued to fall behind in the race between traffic and construction.

The threat of the virtual extinction of the commuter railroads, with the inevitable intensification of the highway traffic snarl, forced the State to take a new look at its railroad policy. A Rail Transportation Division was set up within the Highway Department in 1959 which began

administering a stop-gap subsidy to the commuter lines in return for guarantees of continued service; but this did not stop the complaints of the railroads that they were being crushed between the pressures of local taxes and more heavily subsidized highway transportation.

The bankrupt Hudson and Manhattan Railroad was finally taken over by the Port of New York Authority to be modernized and operated by a subsidiary with the symbolic initials P.A.T.H. In 1964, construction was commenced on a new rapid transit system between Philadelphia and the Camden area by the bistate Delaware River Port Authority, operator of the Walt Whitman and Benjamin Franklin bridges.

Meanwhile, the Port of New York Authority had acquired and expanded the principal air and seaport facilities in northern New Jersey: Port Newark, Newark Airport, and Teterboro Airport, starting in 1948, and the Hoboken piers in 1952. Still later, it undertook the development of port facilities in the Elizabeth section of Newark Bay.

As these developments indicate, New Jersey had by the early sixties consigned the responsibilities for its principal air and water port developments and for interstate rapid transit facilities to bistate authorities. It was also in partnership with its neighbors in comprehensive regional transportation planning, with major federal financing, in the PennJersey and Tristate Transportation studies. At the same time, the Governor took a step toward integrated transportation planning by setting up a three-man Transportation Committee to begin "to develop over-all transportation policy for the state."

The State has begun to make important though belated progress in the acquisition of open space. The 97,000-acre Wharton Tract in the Pine Barrens was acquired in 1954 primarily to ensure the protection of its extensive underground water. Island Beach State Park, one of the last available strips of untamed and undeveloped ocean beach, was acquired in 1952, and Sandy Hook State Park was leased from the United States Government ten years later. In 1961 a sixty-million-dollar "Green Acres" bond



issue was voted by the people to acquire land for conservation and recreation purposes. The State finally, in 1958, responded to the grave danger of a water shortage which might create industrial paralysis and human suffering by taking steps to develop new sources of water at Round Valley and Spruce Run for northern and central urban New Jersey.

A pioneering venture in inter-governmental cooperation was inaugurated with the establishment of the Delaware River Basin Commission in 1961. This Commission sets a precedent in that it represents the U.S. Government as well as the governments of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New York. It is responsible for planning the development and management of the Delaware Basin's water resources for purposes of flood control, water supply, power, recreation, and conservation.

The State and Regional Planning Division in the Department of Conservation and Economic Development has become recognized as one of the best staffed state agencies of its kind. It has done significant state-wide planning which has resulted in improved interdepartmental coordination and the adoption of the first six-year state capital improvements program. In addition to providing assistance and encouragement to hundreds of municipal and county planning bodies, the Division has conducted important studies in the fields of open space, urban blight, and "The Setting for Regional Planning." It has made a special effort to promote regional planning through intermunicipal cooperation.

Impressive as the variety and nature of these activities have been, they have not kept up with the rate and intensity of urban growth and economic expansion. A major obstacle to prompt action commensurate with growing needs in such areas as education, welfare, transportation, acquisition of open space, and control of air and water pollution has been the scarcity of state tax dollars.

A great deal of time was spent on the tax problem with relatively meager results. A new tax clause in the 1947 Constitution required that real property taxes for local

purposes be assessed according to the same standard of value and at the general local tax rate of the district in which the property is situated. This clause was exacted of the Constitutional Convention of 1947 by Mayor Hague as the price of his support. It was perhaps the last act in the century-long effort of political leaders, especially in Hudson County, to enhance or protect local tax revenues from the railroads. In effect, the clause invalidated a law enacted during Governor Edison's term to limit the tax on second-class railroad property to \$3.00 per \$100 assessed valuation. The clause also eliminated the old requirement that property must be assessed "according to its true value." Sixteen years after the new constitution went into effect this short-tax clause was still at the center of a bundle of inconclusive controversies over the taxation of real and personal property. The controversies might have been less intense and less difficult to resolve were it not for the fact that the State was still relying more heavily on property taxes than any other urban-industrial state. This forced local officials to view with alarm any change that might reduce their revenues from any type of property.

The only two new taxes adopted during the period were a corporation income tax pegged considerably lower than those of neighboring states and an "Emergency Transportation Tax," commonly known as the "commuter income tax." This was to be a graduated tax, ranging from 1 per cent to 10 per cent, on incomes earned by New Jersey commuters in New York and by New York commuters in New Jersey. Since New York promptly amended its own state-wide income tax law to eliminate the deduction allowed to commuters from other states for taxes paid to their state of residence on income earned in New York, New Jersey could collect effectively only from the smaller number of "reverse commuters" from New York, a sum which amounted to \$6,719,124 in 1963. The legal rationale for this novel tax was that it would be spent for transportation purposes because of a critical interstate transportation problem as determined by the State Highway Commissioner. Thus, the old relationship

between transportation and tax problems generated a new but not very profitable fiscal invention.

Governor Richard Hughes tied transportation and taxes together in still another package. The Commission on State Tax Policy in its tenth report in 1963 came to the same conclusion that the Tax Survey Commission had more than thirty years earlier. It suggested a new broad-base tax (a majority of the Commission preferred a sales tax) to curb the mounting burden on the property tax and supply unmet needs in education, welfare, highway construction, and other areas. Governor Hughes agreed on the needs, but proposed to postpone resort to a new tax by borrowing \$750 million against future Turnpike revenues. The proceeds were to be used for capital construction and, in the process, to release for school aid some current revenues that would otherwise be applied to construction. The voters turned down this proposal. By its Tercentenary Year, New Jersey remained the only state except Nebraska without either a general sales tax or a personal income tax or both.

Another obstacle to effective action on many problems continued to be the inadequate size and resources of most of the State's 567 municipalities. New charters adopted after the Faulkner Act improved the capacity of many of them for efficient government, but could not expand their resources or their boundaries. Many people pointed to counties as more logical agencies for the performance of some functions that had outgrown municipal boundaries, but county governments continued to resist modernization of their form and structure, and thus discouraged those who might have pushed for increasing their responsibilities. At the same time, the State, lacking the means to expand such services as mental hygiene, child welfare, and higher education as rapidly as needs increased, attempted to impose heavier financial burdens on the counties for these purposes.

The State by 1964 had clearly recognized the existence of the urban age but had not yet found the will or the means to pay the full price for it.

## VI

### THE MOST URBAN STATE

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**T**HE PRINCIPAL CLUE to the nature of a city or any other community is its people, who they are, what they do, how and where they live. What about the people of New Jersey?

New Jersey is known for a population that keeps expanding. The 1950 population of 4,835,000 grew to 6,067,000 in 1960, a gain of 25.5 per cent—about 50 per cent higher than the national average. In the whole northeastern region only Connecticut, with a 26.3 per cent increase, showed similar growth. Population growth within its narrow limits has made for increasing density. Ranking forty-sixth in area among the States, it has the eighth largest population, with a density twice that of New York and three times that of Pennsylvania.

Since New Jersey has a relatively high mortality rate and the lowest fertility rate in the nation, the abnormal population growth is explained by large-scale in-migration. The movement of people into New Jersey is consistent with the national patterns of migration. As the most highly urbanized state, it has necessarily gained from the rural to urban stream. Moreover, since it is on the eastern seaboard, it gains from the overall movement out of the south and the central core of the country. Even more important, its location between New York and Philadelphia has meant that it receives a substantial part of the increase attributable to the growth of these

urban giants. Even the declines in the central cities themselves contribute to growth in New Jersey since it is to the outer regions, not to the cores of urban complexes, that people are now moving. In short, New Jersey is growing rapidly, largely by becoming a residential zone of the extended cities located across its borders. These include not only New York and Philadelphia but also the Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton complex in the northwest which spills over into Warren County, and the Wilmington, Delaware region which spreads into Salem County.

Newark, Jersey City, Elizabeth, and Paterson have become satellites of New York, just as Camden may be called a satellite of Philadelphia. They have been engulfed or surrounded by the extended New York metropolitan area. These built-up cities generally show the population declines typical of an old central city. Between 1950 and 1960, Newark shrank by 7.6 per cent, Jersey City by 7.7 per cent, Elizabeth by 4.5 per cent, and Camden by 5.9 per cent. Only three cities of more than 50,000 population in 1950 recorded gains in 1960: Clifton, Irvington, and Paterson.

The satellite cities are not a part of the periphery of the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan areas—they have become part of the inner core. Significantly, while all other counties in the State increased by at least 15 per cent in population, Essex County (Newark) gained only 1.9 per cent and Hudson County, closest to the center of New York, lost 5.7 per cent of population. But the typically peripheral counties forged ahead: Bergen, 44.7 per cent; Morris, 59.2 per cent; Middlesex, 63.8 per cent; and Somerset, 45.3 per cent.

The net gain from in-migration in the 1950-1960 decade was slightly more than 500,000. Women outnumbered men by a small margin. About one in-migrant out of every five was non-white. Generally barred from the suburbs and from the better residential areas of the cities, the non-whites gravitated to the slums of the inner core. Simultaneously, there was heavy out-migration of

whites to the peripheral regions, drastically changing the racial composition of the long established cities.

Thus, as New Jersey's population expands, it also keeps moving. Compared with older or more agrarian societies the whole country has always been characterized by a high degree of population mobility. The original colonies were settled by migrants, and the process of filling up the country has involved successive waves of immigration and continuous movement of people across the land. New Jersey, because of its position, has always been more affected than many other regions by the combination of factors making for population mobility and residential instability. From colony days, New Jersey, like New York and Philadelphia, has been a way-station for persons on the move toward the west, while over the years it has increasingly become the temporary or permanent abiding place of people attracted to the New York and Philadelphia regions. The "suburban trend" and the lengthening of commuting lines have led to a great deal of in-state migration, from Hudson to Essex and Bergen counties and thence farther out to Morris and Somerset, to give an example from one section of the State.

The spectacular rates of growth registered by many New Jersey communities at certain periods during the last two hundred years have, of course, been indicative of movement. Thus during the decade of the 1950's whole towns have been largely populated or re-populated by newcomers. In Middlesex County, for example, Madison Township showed a rate of growth of more than 209 per cent, East Brunswick of more than 250 per cent, and a number of others of well over 100 per cent. In 1960, 90,095 residents or 23.7 per cent of the population of Middlesex County aged five years and over, had come from outside the county within the preceding five years. More than 60 per cent of these had come from other parts of New Jersey, the remainder mainly from northern and western states. In addition to the 90,000 people who moved into the county during the five-year period, there

were over 77,000 who moved from one house to another within the county.

For the decade of the fifties 67.3 per cent of the net increase in the population of the county was due to migration. As the third fastest growing county, Middlesex shows higher migration rates than the State as a whole, but those for the State itself were high enough to constitute one of the most significant facts about urban New Jersey. Of the State's 1,232,000 population increase, 48 per cent was attributable to in-migration. As for migration within the State, the figures for changes in residence between 1955 and 1960 among persons five years old and over in 1960 give a striking picture. Of the 5,425,000 persons in this age group, 2,271,502 had moved from one house to another within the five-year period. Of this number, 1,345,892 moved within the same county, and 425,367 more moved within the State but from one county to another. Those who moved into the State from different regions were distributed as follows: from the northeast, 628,609; from the north-central, 47,239; from the south, 100,960; from the west, 23,335.

One aspect of this interchange of people which does not bulk much statistically but has considerable social and civic significance is the movement of white-collar and managerial personnel about the country by large corporations operating at many locations. One result is that many people who would otherwise provide leadership both in government and in voluntary community organizations, especially in suburban areas, do not become involved because they do not expect to remain long or because they fail to gain local acceptance before they have moved on. Many who do become involved leave gaping holes in the civic structure when they are suddenly shifted to another part of the State or of the country.

The pattern of New Jersey's population can be seen by setting up four ecological zones:

1. The urban core consists of municipalities in non-

rural counties with populations of 25,000 or more. A few low density municipalities (e.g., Hamilton Township in Mercer County) are excluded, and some of high density but less than 25,000 are included (e.g., Guttenberg) so that all of Hudson County is in this zone.

2. The urban inner periphery consists of all of Bergen, Essex, Passaic, Union, and Camden counties not included in the urban core.

3. The urban outer periphery consists of all Burlington, Gloucester, Morris, Salem, Somerset, and Warren counties, and those parts of Atlantic, Mercer, and Middlesex counties not included in the urban core.

4. The rural zone consists of Cape May, Cumberland, Hunterdon, Monmouth, Ocean, and Sussex counties.

This pattern is an adaptation of the Census Bureau concept of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas to the unique conditions found in New Jersey. It confirms the conclusion that New Jersey is the most urban state in the nation. Based as it is upon counties and major densely settled municipalities within counties, it clarifies the manner in which people are distributed around the major urban centers and the directions in which they are being redistributed.


In terms of the stage of development, the nature of the economy, and the way of life, the inner and outer peripheries belong with the urban core as parts of urban New Jersey. To be sure there are areas, especially in the outer periphery, that still retain a rural aspect while there are places in the "rural" zone that are quite properly classified as urban by the Census.

The first table gives an elementary description of the population of the four zones. Note that the urban core has 44 per cent of the total population, and the two peripheries account for 44 per cent more, leaving only 12 per cent for the rural zone.

Negroes are concentrated in the urban core and are most scarce in the inner periphery, which generally contains the best housing. The foreign-born are also most numerous in the core, but these people are fairly old and



## The Four Ecological Zones of New Jersey



there is no appreciable immigration today. The Negroes, however, are still coming, and unless their mobility is thwarted by discrimination, they are likely to show increases in all four zones.

THE POPULATION OF THE ECOLOGICAL ZONES \*

	<i>Urban Core</i>	<i>Inner Periphery</i>	<i>Outer Periphery</i>	<i>Rural</i>
Proportion of total population	.44	.21	.23	.12
Sex ratio (Males per females)	.94	.95	1.02	.97
Proportion Negro	.14	.02	.05	.08
Proportion foreign- born	.13	.09	.07	.08

The following table shows some basic family characteristics. The inner periphery is revealed as the stronghold of the family, for it has the smallest proportion of unrelated individuals (persons who live by themselves or in an institution). The urban core has many older persons whose mates have died, and many young in-migrants who have not yet started a family. Fertility, as measured by the ratio of children (0-4 years of age) to all women in the childbearing years, is lowest in the core.

FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS

	<i>Urban Core</i>	<i>Inner Periphery</i>	<i>Outer Periphery</i>	<i>Rural</i>
Proportion unrelated individuals	.08	.04	.07	.07
Persons per household	3.13	3.42	3.46	3.26
Children 0-4 per woman 15-44	.40	.44	.51	.50

\* This table and the subsequent four tables are based on: Bureau of the Census, *United States Census of Population and Housing: 1960, PHC (1)*, Vols. 5, 9, 67, 91, 105, 114, 116, 145, 160, 173, Tables P-1, P-2.

The next table reveals a serious weakness in the urban core: lack of education. Nearly half of the adult population has not gone beyond the eighth grade—if it has gone that far. But only 31 per cent of the inner periphery population is so handicapped, and even the rural zone makes a better showing. In contrast, the urban core is slightly ahead of the other three in the proportion of children in school. If the youngsters stick, the core should eventually overcome its handicap. But the scantily educated adults of today will suffer increasingly as automated industry eliminates unskilled labor.

EDUCATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

	<i>Urban Core</i>	<i>Inner Periph- ery</i>	<i>Outer Periph- ery</i>	<i>Rural</i>
Proportions of persons 25 years or more with 8 years or less of schooling	.44	.31	.36	.38
Proportion of persons aged 5-17 in schools	.89	.88	.87	.87

The table of occupational characteristics provides abundant documentation for the concept of the middle-class white collar worker, commuting from his suburban home to a job in Newark, New York, or Philadelphia, or to a rural factory or laboratory. The inner periphery (which might be called the prestige zone) has the smallest proportion of blue-collar workers (craftsmen, foremen, operatives, and laborers). It has the smallest proportion of working women, the highest percentage of commuters to another county, the lowest proportion of small incomes, and the biggest share of \$10,000-and-up families.

There was a time—generations ago—when the great majority of New Jersey's labor force walked to work. And it was generally a short walk. The contrast today is shown in the following table. In none of the four zones does the proportion working within their own county reach two-thirds of the total. Many of those who hold jobs in the

county of residence may drive 10, 20, or even 30 miles each way.

The rural zone has the highest proportion (17 per cent) of families with incomes of less than \$3000 a year, and the urban core is next highest. The other side of the coin is that these same zones have the smallest shares of \$10,000-and-up families. When a young urban family begins to prosper, it usually heads for the periphery to mingle with its peers.

# OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

	<i>Urban Core</i>	<i>Inner Periph- ery</i>	<i>Outer Periph- ery</i>	<i>Rural</i>
Proportion employed males in blue-collar occupations	.50	.42	.50	.49
Proportion females 14 or older in the labor force	.39	.32	.36	.33
Proportion employed persons working in county of residence	.63	.48	.63	.53
Proportion families with income less than \$3000 per year	.13	.06	.10	.17
Proportion families with income \$10,000 or more per year	.19	.32	.22	.16

The table on housing shows some dramatic differences among the four zones. Houses at moderate rent are twice as scarce in the inner periphery as in the urban core, and less than one-fourth of the dwellings in the two peripheries are rented—as against 56 per cent in the core. The inner periphery is the zone for expensive houses, too, with only 26 per cent valued at less than \$15,000.

Dilapidated dwellings are seldom found in this status zone, and overcrowding is also uncommon.

#### HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

	<i>Urban Core</i>	<i>Inner Periph- ery</i>	<i>Outer Periph- ery</i>	<i>Rural</i>
Proportion rented residences at less than \$80 per month	.66	.33	.50	.54
Proportion owner-occupied residences valued at less than \$15,000	.34	.26	.50	.55
Proportion of all residences which are renter-occupied	.56	.23	.23	.27
Proportion of all occupied housing units which are deteriorating or dilapidated	.15	.06	.12	.12
Proportion of all occupied housing units with more than one person per room	.08	.05	.07	.05

The characteristics of the four zones may be briefly summarized:

The urban core contains the largest portion of the state population; there are more Negroes and foreign-born; a low level of fertility; less education; more blue-collar workers and more working women; fairly low incomes; more rented housing and more sub-standard dwellings.

The urban inner periphery is the most advantageous zone from the standpoint of family ties, education, income, type of work, and housing.

The urban outer periphery has the youngest population, with the highest fertility; the education and income levels are between those of urban and inner periphery; housing is better than urban but not equal to inner periphery.

The rural zone has the lowest incomes, but its housing closely compares with outer periphery; the educational level is intermediate; a decreasing dependence on agriculture is shown by 49 per cent of males in blue-collar jobs, and 33 per cent of females working.

The boundaries of the four zones will shift, with the urban core and peripheral zones broadening out at the expense of the shrinking rural zone. For example, if this study were based on data more recent than 1960, Monmouth County, which is counted by the Regional Plan Association as part of the New York Metropolitan Region, would almost certainly be shifted from rural zone to outer periphery. This would cut the rural zone nearly in half, reducing it to about 7 per cent of the total population of the State. It also seems reasonable to suppose that the urban core will encroach further on the two peripheries as it has in the past.

Any such general analysis as this is open to many specific exceptions and necessarily obscures significant facts. This is particularly true with respect to suburban development. A comparison between matched pairs of "older" and "new" suburbs is revealing. For this purpose an "older" suburb is one whose suburban character was well established by 1940. These suburbs were all built along railroads, and most of their commuters lived fairly close to a railroad station. The new suburbs, in contrast, have been developed largely since the Second World War along highways in the pie-shaped areas between the rail lines. Although two or three of them are on or reasonably close to commuter rail lines, their development as residential areas has clearly been a product of the automobile rather than of the railroad era. Here is a list of seven pairs of suburbs matched for

their similarity in population according to the 1960 Census:

<i>"Older"</i> Suburbs	<i>Population</i>	<i>"New"</i> Suburbs	<i>Population</i>
Montclair	43,129	Edison	44,799
Westfield	31,447	Wayne	29,353
Englewood	26,057	Paramus	23,238
Ridgewood	25,391	Parsippany	25,557
Maplewood	23,977	Livingston	23,124
Red Bank	12,482	Clark	12,195
Chatham	9,517	Oakland	9,446

If these two lists are compared for density, housing stock, and other demographic and social characteristics, some very important differences are uncovered. In general, the "older" suburbs which are more densely populated have, as would be expected, a more aged housing stock, contain a much higher proportion of rental units, show less new building activity but more such activity in multi-family structures. They also have higher average valuations per house, more high-priced and fewer economy homes, and higher tax rates. They have fewer young married couples and children, more people over fifty-five years of age, and a higher percentage of executives and professionals. But at the same time they have three times as many unskilled laborers (the new suburbs have three times as many skilled laborers). They show a wider spread in income, with greater percentages above \$10,000 and under \$5000, and have a great many more non-whites. In most of the new middle-class suburbs Negroes are almost never seen unless they come in as domestic workers or day laborers. Thus, while the newer suburbs generally have less than 1 per cent non-whites, the percentages in the older suburbs reach highs of 24 per cent in Montclair and 27 per cent in Englewood.

Undoubtedly all or most of the "new" suburbs are continuing to grow in population, and therefore in den-

sity, and are changing in other respects that will gradually narrow some of the differences between them and the "older" suburbs. The differences between these suburbs illustrate the considerable instability and lack of homogeneity in the population zones previously described. While the first five of the older suburbs listed are in the urban inner periphery, Chatham is in the outer periphery and Red Bank is in the so-called rural zone. On the other hand, of the "new" suburbs, five are in the inner periphery and only two in the outer periphery.

This is New Jersey, 1964, in terms of its people and the way in which they distribute themselves over its 7836 square miles. With two-thirds the area of the Netherlands, which is the most densely populated independent nation in the world, it has a slightly higher population density. The place was here, without a name, when the first Dutch settlers moved across the Hudson from New Amsterdam more than three hundred years ago. People from many lands have made it the home of a significant and highly concentrated segment of humanity. As New Jersey, it has become, within the Federal Union, essentially a city-state of greater size and complexity than any city-state of the ancient or medieval world. It is, however, a different kind of city-state from any the world has known before. Earlier ones were developed around a dominant urban place, or *polis*, which was the center of culture and political and economic power. New Jersey has no such central place. Rather it links and shares the destinies of two great centers, both of which are outside its borders. This is the source of much that is interesting and much that is vexing about New Jersey.



## VII

### THE CITY OF NEW JERSEY

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THE CITY HAS SPREAD across the plain, up the rivers, over the low-lying hills, down along the sea. Long ago it had put its stamp indelibly on New Jersey, but it continues to move with the inevitability of time.

Three factors have mainly determined this destiny: geography, changing transportation systems, and the economic order as it evolved from commerce based on agriculture and mining through the Industrial Revolution to the present complex of professionally managed industrial and commercial enterprise. These three factors have largely determined the course of urban development and have influenced the policies by which the people of New Jersey have adapted and, to some extent, given impetus or direction to this development.

These forces have also dictated the dominant influence of neighboring New York and Philadelphia, although this influence was intensified in colonial days by the nature of New Jersey government and politics and in more recent time by certain public policies.

The dominance of New York in the north Jersey region was discerned and graphically described by the U. S. Census in 1880 in the following excerpt from a section of *The Social Statistics of Cities* entitled "The Metropolis":

It seems proper, in treating of the vast population occupying the cities of New York, Brooklyn, Jersey City, Newark, and Hoboken, to consider them not only as constituting five dif-

ferent municipalities, but as one great metropolitan community. This population has grown from one nucleus—the little trading-post at the Battery—and its separation into different civil divisions is by physical and political lines, which have had little influence on the character of the people, their industries, or their modes of life. The relation between these cities is in a great degree the same, though more strongly marked by physical divisions, such as the Hudson river and the Hackensack meadows, as that which existed up to 1856 between the city of Philadelphia, then bounded by the two rivers and by Vine street on the north, and by Pine street on the south, and its adjacent districts—West Philadelphia, Spring Garden, Kensington, Germantown, etc.—which had then each its own distinct local government, and all of which are now united in name and in municipal control, as they formerly were in interest and in mutual interdependence. . . . There is no controlling reason why Flushing, New Rochelle, Yonkers, and Paterson might not be included in the same community. Indeed, the villages and towns strung along the railways for 50 miles from New York are very largely made up of persons doing business in the city, or occupied in manufactures which there find their market. Wherever the line may be drawn it must be an arbitrary one, and it has been thought most proper to include only those larger towns which are most intimately allied with New York as their commercial center, and, as it happens, which transport their raw material and their products from and to it largely by wagons.

To adopt the opposite course, considering New York as New York, Brooklyn as Brooklyn, and Newark as Newark, would be misleading to one who might read the report of each particular city by itself. There is no reason to suppose that the western end of Long Island would have become the site of a great city had it depended on its own natural advantages alone; neither that Newark would have become a great manufacturing town had it not been for the distributing facilities of New York.

The Bureau of the Census was convinced that Newark's greatness was derived from its connection with New York and would not have been achieved otherwise. It may be illuminating to speculate on the possible reasons why in fact, whether inevitably or not, urban growth west

of the Hudson has been essentially an extension of New York. This side of the Hudson has certain theoretical advantages, including the excellence of its natural harbors and the fact that it is on the edge of the continental mainland, not an island. Why did not the New Jersey city of Hudson or perhaps of Hudson and Essex become the center of the New York Metropolitan Region? The obvious first reason is that New York, as New Amsterdam, got a head start as the natural enough place for the first settlement.

Once New York and Philadelphia became well established, they had the advantage of being strategically located for trade with the larger hinterlands of the Hudson and Mohawk valleys and the farmlands of Pennsylvania. The New Jersey cities had direct access only to the narrow interland between the two rivers, their access to the broader reaches being largely through New York and Philadelphia. Politics, by separating New Jersey from its larger neighbors and providing it with a relatively weak government, tended to ensure its subordination to the booming interests of New York and Philadelphia. New Jersey, in effect, was first subjected to and ultimately embraced the status of junior partner—if not of poor relation—in enterprises largely directed from outside. Transportation rates and port practices tended to perpetuate this status. The progressive balkanization of local government in New Jersey may be partly effect and partly cause of this situation. While for a time annexations expanded the boundaries of Jersey City and Newark and Trenton, New Jersey never grew a city comparable in power or influence to New York or Philadelphia, even as those cities were before they achieved their present size through massive consolidations.

Whatever the explanation, the fact is that New Jersey does not now have, and never has had, a dominant great city. This has meant that neither at the municipal nor at the state level has New Jersey ever developed the kind of governmental power base that was able to deal on equal terms with the great cities and larger states be-



Aerial View of Newark, Jersey City, and New York  
*Greater Newark Development Council*

tween which it was wedged. To be sure, according to the 1910 and 1920 Census, Newark ranked fourteenth in size among the cities of the country, but by 1930 it had slipped back to its 1900 position as sixteenth. By 1950 it had slipped still farther to twenty-first place, and in 1960 to thirtieth. The most urban state, although small in area, and eighth largest in population, has no single major city within it. Nineteen other states have one or more cities larger than Newark.

Newark, New Jersey's largest city according to the 1960 Census, contained 6.7 per cent of the total population of the State. The only other state among the 13 most urban whose principal city contains a smaller percentage of the state's population is Connecticut, with Hartford at 6.4 per cent. Perhaps even more significant: among the same group of states New Jersey registers the smallest percentage of its total population (11.2 per cent) in its two largest cities, Newark and Jersey City, and again the smallest percentage (17.4 per cent) in the five largest cities. New Jersey then is essentially an urban state without strong central cities of its own, a fact which has tremendous significance for government and especially for the development of public policies to deal with the urban age. The State's relatively small "major" cities are all ringed about by still smaller cities and other incorporated municipalities. This means there are no powerful centers or foci for city leadership on urban problems. Even when the mayors of the State's six cities of 100,000 population or more speak together, they speak for only 19.2 per cent of the population. The problem of getting together and speaking together is complicated by the fact that these six cities are spread among six counties from the northeastern to the southwestern part of the State.

These facts give added point to the proposition that urban New Jersey can better be understood and governed in terms of the concept of the "City of New Jersey" than of the hundreds of so-called cities and other mainly urban places which comprise the total.

The "City of New Jersey" is a new kind of city. It may be closer to the prototype of the city of the future than those which have shaped the common concept of the city: Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh; or Paris, London, or Rome. Urban growth not only in this country but also in other parts of the world is mainly outside these highly visible older cities with their identifiable downtown centers of business and cultural life surrounded by residential zones and their local service areas.

The present lineaments of this New Jersey example of the city of tomorrow have been described in broad outline. Old central cities and market towns have been engulfed by developments in which new residential, industrial, and commercial uses are spreading out over ever-widening areas. New suburbs, creatures of the automobile age, are growing up alongside of and beyond the older railroad suburbs. The location and nature of particular developments are determined not only by transportation but also by the real estate and money markets, and by the diverse zoning and development policies of hundreds of competing municipalities—competing for "clean" industry to pay taxes and against people with modest means and many children. The combined forces of the population explosion and the profit motive of developers do, however, find places for the people with children, so that vast areas are settled as Kendall Parks, Levittowns, and other mass-produced, popular-priced "communities," with their own shopping centers complete with bowling alleys. Along the shore similar developments are offering more and more year-round residents, as well as vacationers and retired couples, homes with carport facing the street and boat dock on the lagoon in back.

The uniformity of appearance and construction in these suburbs is matched to a degree by the uniformity of the population and its occupational and other activities, although similarity in income and the age and number of children are more potent selective factors than

similarity in occupation. Wartime savings and the affluence of the 50's and 60's have brought great numbers of factory operatives and skilled tradesmen, as well as white-collar workers, to these places outside the city. But most of the postwar suburbs are at least as "unbalanced" as the old cities in the sense that they do not contain a representative sample of the kinds of people that make up the State. In contrast, as was pointed out earlier, older suburbs such as Montclair, Englewood, the Oranges, and Plainfield have become more nearly balanced. All social classes and occupational, racial, and ethnic groups are to be found in these places.

The newer one-class suburbs are providing a field day for the social commentators on the supposed personal and family problems of people living in a community that tends to be one class, one age, one race and, during the day, one sex. These suburbs clearly do not provide the environment and the mix of human conditions and local cultural opportunities that some of the multi-class suburbs do, nor do they provide as good laboratories for responding to such social problems as school segregation.

The ultimate in suburban uniformity and isolation may be just around the corner if plans for "leisure villages" are carried out. Such communities would provide homes for people who have retired or who are about to retire, with strict lower limits on the age of the inhabitants. One such proposal would bar any person under fifty-two years of age.

There are undoubted conveniences and short-run economies in the one-class suburb, but their existence and probable extension in New Jersey raises a number of questions for the future. No one really knows what social costs may be paid for the dollars saved. No one can predict the ultimate effect of the residential segregation of large numbers of people by income, occupational, and age groups on the ability of the political system to cope with social and economic problems not visible to the naked eyes of the new suburbanites. These questions are not, of course, unique to New Jersey but they are per-

haps more critical for the future of New Jersey than of any other state.

One further question must be noted: no one knows how durable these one-class suburbs will be. For example, will the first young families grow old along with the community, or will they move on and make room for others like them? There are indications that some places will become more diversified or cosmopolitan, while others, if effective preventive measures are not taken, may gradually turn into suburban slums. Stable uniformity? More urbane variety? Urban decay? These questions confront the new suburbs of today, and no man can be sure of the answer. But the answer or combination of answers holds an essential clue to the future of the "City of New Jersey."

The spotty unordered nature of this postwar urban development has alarmed many people for a variety of reasons, including the way in which it is gobbling up land, the complications it produces in transportation patterns, and the loss of the kind of focal or accent points which heretofore have been provided by distinct urban centers. The Regional Plan Association goes so far as to say: "Recent and projected development follows an entirely new pattern which Regional Plan has called 'Spread City.' It is not a true city because it lacks centers, nor a suburb because it is not a satellite of any city, nor is it truly rural because it is loosely covered with houses and urban facilities."

Whether it is a "true city" or not depends upon definition. It may be, as has already been suggested, that this is the city of the future—a wide-spreading urban area dotted with different kinds of settlements, including a variety of focal points, serving various economic, social, and cultural purposes. The older cities would be among the more important of these focal points but they would have changed to the extent that the old concept of the city would fit them little better than it seems to fit the newer urban development. For it is this combination of urban spread and concentration that makes up the whole



city of today. And in this city, the old relation between the central "city" and neighboring "suburb" is to some extent reversed. The suburb used to be, as Paul Douglass said, "a footnote to urban civilization" which was really concentrated in the city. If there is to be an "urban civilization" in the future, it is clear that a much greater, perhaps the major, part must be found in more dispersed form throughout vast urbanized regions. The "footnotes," for better or worse, are assuming more of the functions of the original text. For example, leadership, political, economic and cultural, was once clearly the function of people based in the central cities. More and more, leadership for an entire urban region, if it is to be found at all, must be found outside those cities.

The concept of the "City of New Jersey" can be fully understood only in light of probable future developments. The population of the State is expected to reach eight million and, according to some predictions, may approach nine million by about 1980. By July 1, 1963, the State Planning Division estimated that the population of the State had already reached nearly six-and-a-half million. New Jersey will undoubtedly continue for some years to receive large numbers of in-migrants although the number is expected to taper off in time. There seems to be little doubt that the northward movement of Negroes will go on and that New Jersey's older cities and perhaps more of the suburbs will have a markedly higher proportion of non-whites. In Newark, at least, Negroes may become the majority group. Regional Plan predicts that for the New York Metropolitan Region as a whole in-migration will drop below out-migration by 1975 but that the children of the region itself will force continued urban expansion. It also points out that by 1975 babies born in the postwar boom will be reaching their thirties, the home-buying age.

Some basic national trends will continue with more or less predictable effects in New Jersey. Both the percentages, and more spectacularly, the absolute numbers of both older and younger citizens will continue to rise.

By about 1980 the number of persons sixty-five years of age or over in New Jersey will probably grow from the 550,000 in 1960 to about 900,000. The number of children in the total population should increase more substantially. There may be as many as 33 per cent under the age of fifteen as against 28.8 per cent in 1960, an increase from 1,750,000 to over 3,000,000. These figures mean there will be more dependents per worker and taxpayer, and these dependents are precisely the members of the population who require the most expensive special services in education, health, recreation, and various kinds of welfare. Automation will certainly create problems for the community in the form of increased leisure time and a labor market less and less hospitable to the unskilled. More leisure will intensify the need for convenient and properly maintained open space, while the pressure of development will tend to compress open space. The decline in demand for unskilled labor will increase the need for technical, professional, and higher education. It will also increase the labor force available for various kinds of service occupations, some relatively unskilled, some skilled to the point of the professional level. Finding ways to develop and support those occupations will tax the ingenuity of society.

In an age of shorter workweeks and "labor-saving" gadgets, there are still many people who lack help that could make life more pleasant or meaningful: patients and inmates in under-staffed hospitals and welfare and correctional institutions; young people who are at loose ends for lack of meaningful work or of sensibly-directed recreational and learning experiences; mothers with large families, especially those who find it necessary or desirable to work outside the home; householders who are frantically trying to "do-it-themselves" when it could be done much better and more easily by someone who really knows how; members of neighborhood or community organizations who lack the know-how to carry on rewarding programs; adults who are looking for refresher

courses to broaden their cultural or vocational horizons; and many others.

The future of New Jersey will, of course, continue to be related to the future of the larger urban region of which it is a part and of the two great centers in New York and Philadelphia. As the population continues to spread outward around these centers, the bonds between New Jersey and its neighbors will probably be more rather than less important in the future. The nature of the relationships between them, however, could conceivably change as New Jersey becomes more and more the center of gravity of the east coast megalopolis. Depending partly upon public policies—national, regional, and especially state policies—New Jersey could become less the junior partner of New York and Philadelphia and much more the dominant or at least the “mediating” partner, to borrow a word from Woodrow Wilson. New Jersey is strategically located to become a major seat of economic and social power for the nation. The extent to which this happens may depend upon whether or not it can also become a major seat of political power.

If New Jersey is to become such a seat of power, it will have to depart from its traditional practice of relying on a relatively weak state government and legally strong municipalities with limited resources, for dealing with problems related to urban development. This traditional system, with public policies deliberately tailored to exploit the economic advantages of a tributary position between New York and Philadelphia, obviously was compatible with earlier spectacular economic growth. In the early period of industrial development, it also seemed to be compatible with a reasonable level of general welfare. During the last part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth, when the seamy effects of the Industrial Revolution began to show up in unbearable conditions, especially in the older cities, a combination of city-based political leadership and city and suburban-based reform provided sufficient amelioration

to carry the State fairly comfortably up to the Depression. In general, reform in New Jersey has always stressed organization and technique, but it has also been tinged, since the time of Dorothea Dix and even earlier, by charitable reform growing out of the Puritan morality and an increasing sense of *noblesse oblige*. This emphasis on economy, efficiency, rational organization and a moral concern with the problems of the unfortunate were all basically acceptable to the captains of industry and finance who at the turn of the century also served to a greater extent than before or since as captains of politics.

Prophets of a new dispensation are always subject to suspicion but there are many signs that the old prescription of efficiency and reform in an essentially laissez-faire political system with emphasis on localism cannot continue to serve the needs of the State. Farsighted men have seen this for some time. Chester I. Barnard, President of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, said in 1928:

The policy of local independence and isolation, well adapted to conditions of twenty-five or fifty years ago, is already impossible in New Jersey, and this is universally recognized as respects interstate bridges and tunnels, state roads and to some degree as to parks and intra-state transit facilities, and it is, of course, very well recognized as to many phases of public utility operation, but it appears not to be well recognized as to some aspects of public protection, building, zoning and regional planning, port and terminal developments, etc.

Mr. Barnard went on to pay his respects to the out-of-state orientation of commuters and to argue that, ". . . Leadership should also definitely establish in the minds of the citizens of this State the increasing degree to which this community is a statewide community, and the increasing importance of comprehensive and state programs for the support and protection of more local community projects."

It is significant that Mr. Barnard was speaking the

year following the adoption of the zoning amendment to the New Jersey Constitution, specifically asserting the power of the State to delegate zoning powers to municipalities, "other than counties." Recognizing that this amendment would lead to a great expansion of local zoning, he observed that the application of zoning "is strictly local; and this means consideration of community development in only a fragmentary way." He concluded that unless local zoning were set in a context of effective regional planning, it would be as if we were "... trying to be modern and still wear the garments of the gay nineties."

Since that time, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter, the State has made some, but limited, progress toward genuine state-wide urban policies to meet the needs of the "City of New Jersey." A good case could be made for the proposition that it has in rudimentary form at least most of the elements of a comprehensive set of such policies. In the area of physical resources and facilities, there are the Green Acres program, the water resources program, and some of the essential elements of a program to control air and water pollution. There are also the expanding highway system and even the beginnings of a more comprehensive attack on the transportation problem. In the area of human resources and services, there are good public schools in many areas, an expanding system of higher education, a complex of institutional and other welfare services which have for many years included notable pioneering efforts at understanding and meeting human needs, and fairly forward-looking programs in the field of civil and human rights.

In the area of basic governmental institutions and practices, the State has a constitution which provides at least as good a basis as any in the country for responsible and effective government with a minimum of those constitutional limitations that drastically restrict the freedom of innovation and action of most states. It has made it possible for any of its municipalities to adopt a modern form of local government. It has a long-standing attach-

ment to the merit system in public employment and an even longer-standing attachment to frugality in the spending of public monies.

These are all valuable foundations for a structure of public policies and programs for the emerging "City of New Jersey." How firm and livable a structure will be built will depend upon the way in which the State overcomes certain other elements in its tradition. Certainly the "City of New Jersey" cannot be well served and governed, nor can its future development be rationally and effectively guided by any lesser agency than the State itself. Local governments have very important roles to play but they cut up the State into too many pieces to govern the new kind of city that spreads out over the tortured boundaries of counties and cities, boroughs and towns.

Assuming the virtual impossibility, if not the undesirability, of a wholesale reconstruction of local units of government so that they might correspond to some such planning regions as have been outlined by the Division of State and Regional Planning, there are several kinds of action which the State might take to make the present system of state-local government meet future needs. These include a substantial increase in advisory services and technical assistance to local officials, especially in the areas of planning, finance, and intergovernmental co-operation. A State Department of Community Affairs properly staffed and financed, and including well-developed research and information services, could assist the State in harmonizing the policies and programs of its hundreds of local units with a minimum of coercion. It could also assist in improving their competence by helping to develop and encourage stepped-up programs of pre-service, inservice and mid-career education for persons engaged in municipal government. There is a strong probability that federal money will be available for this purpose in the near future but the effectiveness of its expenditure will depend upon how well the State directs

it toward the most urgent educational needs of the public service.

Another step toward a more rational system of local government would be to modernize, or through some kind of optional charter law, permit local action to modernize county governments. County lines, like municipal lines, cut across the "City of New Jersey" without regard to the way it has developed, but the counties, being larger and fewer in number, are better adapted to the needs of some aspects of local government today than most municipalities. New York, California, and a number of other states have greatly strengthened county governments, especially in certain urban and suburban areas, so that they have become acceptable agencies for the performance of an increasing number of municipal-type functions. So far the strongest resistance to such reform of county government in New Jersey has come from county officials themselves. If this resistance continues to be effective, it can be predicted that the end result will be a transfer of more responsibility for local programs to the next highest level, namely, the State itself. There is, theoretically, another, but extremely unlikely, possibility: that existing counties might be abolished and a new set of intermediate local units established with lines drawn in accordance with modern conditions.

Even assuming that the State does everything possible to maximize the usability of existing local units, there are some actions demanded by a great urban society that only the State itself can take. These include provisions for an adequate system of higher education capped by the state university; the provision of institutional and other welfare services that cannot be properly financed or administered on a municipal or even a county basis; the development and execution of transportation, open space, water supply, environmental health, and economic development programs in terms of the growing needs of the State as a whole and its position in megalopolis; and the maintenance of a fiscal system compatible with

the economy of the State and adequate to the support of necessary public programs.

In order to do these things, the State will need to learn to invest a great deal more in staff work, especially in what might be called the research and development base for public policy formation. No large private industry hoping to survive in today's world would think of providing its top policy makers, corresponding to the governor and the legislature, with so little intellectual support for policy development as does the State of New Jersey.

Presumably, the ancient system of representation in the New Jersey Senate will have to be abandoned in the near future in order to meet the standard adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the reapportionment cases. This will put the responsibility for the government of urban New Jersey squarely up to the majority of the urban citizens of the State and, hopefully, might tend to make the State more responsive to urban needs. For example, the development of an adequate water supply for the northern part of the State might not have been postponed so long and so dangerously as it was if the legislature had been more representative of the population. On the other hand, the strongest opposition to a broad-based tax comes from political and other leaders of some of the most highly urbanized counties. Yet it is precisely the lack of such a tax that makes it impossible for the State to provide the assistance required to meet the special educational and welfare needs of old cities like Newark, Elizabeth, Trenton, and New Brunswick that have become havens for the underprivileged and undereducated from other parts of the country.

The fact is that neither a good constitution nor rational administrative organization nor even "fair representation," nor all three together, is a guarantee of good or forward-looking government. All are important ingredients of good government but informed public purpose and leadership are of the essence. This means that the



State needs to place particular emphasis upon the development of education and policy-oriented research at the highest level, if it hopes to play a responsible role in directing its course during the next three hundred years. It is coming more and more to be recognized that education and research are the essential foundations of economic and social development.

Compared with other states, New Jersey lags far behind in the public support of many services, including highways and public welfare. Most significantly, it ranks forty-seventh in per capita expenditures for higher education. This accounts for an increasing tendency on the part of states like Michigan, that spend much more heavily for this purpose, to close the doors to New Jersey students seeking admission to their universities. The strategic location of the State and its private affluence have tended to obscure the long-range risks in neglect of higher education and university research. Yet thirty-six years ago Chester Barnard pointed out that the relatively low support for higher education resulted in increasing dependence of New Jersey students "on institutions in other states which are themselves overcrowded." He asserted, "The supply of New Jersey graduates from New Jersey institutions is becoming less and less adequate to the civil and industrial needs of the state." He pointed out that the increasing use of machinery, the larger scale of business operations, and the growing complexity of community conditions added up to a need for increased emphasis upon higher education.

If time is running out for the State in its race to develop an adequate intellectual and research base for its future, it is running out at least as fast in its race to preserve a fair amount of its remaining open space and the natural beauties for which it was once justly famous. Too many people think of New Jersey in terms of "the smells of the Jersey salt meadows: sulphur, varnish, a whiff of dead apples, smoldering rags and paper ash, moldy bologna drenched in bay rum, ether . . . obsolete crisco and the strangling stench of burned tires," to

quote part of a sentence from John Dos Passos' description of a ride across New Jersey in a recent issue of the *Atlantic Monthly*. A ride among the hills or down along the shore indicates, however, that many more people will have a similar unfavorable image of New Jersey as they travel in more remote and still beautiful parts of the State if stronger measures are not taken to control future commercial, industrial, and even residential development. Such control can come only from the State, for it is only the State that can speak for every citizen's interest in the beauty and livability, as well as in the economic prosperity, of New Jersey.

Another very crucial matter for New Jersey is inter-governmental cooperation. New Jersey has had a long and on-the-whole satisfactory experience in cooperating with its neighbors with respect to such varied functions as transportation, air pollution control, sanitation, water supply, law enforcement, port development and parks. The fact that it shares its northern metropolitan region with New York and Connecticut, and its western metropolitan region with Pennsylvania and Delaware puts it under the necessity to cooperate with these states in metropolitan planning and in the development and maintenance of facilities and services of metropolitan-wide importance. This necessity is underscored by federal requirements that spending for certain federal programs, especially in transportation, shall in the future be based upon metropolitan-wide plans. Yet New Jersey has shown a reluctance to enter into a formal compact with New York and Connecticut for continuing the regional planning for the New York area started by the Tri-State Transportation Committee that was created by agreement of the governors of the three states. The reluctance seems to have been based on something like the fear of being out-manuevered in dealings with outside powers that supported American isolationism until World War II. New Jersey is in about the poorest position of any state to indulge in isolationism although such an attitude is a natural result of the failure to develop a strong

state government with well-defined policies based upon a firm sense of State interest. If New Jersey cannot overcome such timidity, it might be better if Queen Anne had followed the advice given to the Lords of Trade by Edward Randolph in 1701 that “. . . East Jersey ought to be annexed to N.Yorke, and West Jersey to Pensilvania . . . .”

These observations point up the central question about the future of New Jersey. The question, to put it sharply, is “How real is New Jersey?” It was dramatically expressed in the title of a recent article in *Harper's Magazine*: “New Jersey's Search for Identity.” A sense of identity, and of dignity, meaningful to its own people and to the country is a prime need of the State if it is to govern the emergent “City of New Jersey” effectively and responsibly. There can be no doubt about it: the “City” will continue to grow, to spread private homes and places of work, and to meet at least some of the presently unmet needs of people. The federal government moved in during the Depression to meet needs that state and local governments were then utterly unable to cope with. It continues to respond more actively than the State to some of the needs of an increasingly urban society, especially those that tend to be centered in the older cities: urban renewal, public housing, area redevelopment, vocational training for school drop-outs and displaced workers. These and the “War on Poverty” and other expanding national programs such as those in transportation and environmental health are forging closer and closer ties between the old cities, as well as other communities, and the federal government.

These developments constitute both a challenge and an opportunity to the State of New Jersey. They offer the opportunity to use the federal programs to assist the State in taking charge of the “City of New Jersey.” They also point up the danger that the State could, through prolonged inertia and inaction, lose any effective control over its own destiny.

Given the present zoning, the increased population

expected in the New York metropolitan area by 1985, according to the Regional Plan Association, will occupy more than twice the amount of land now developed. For New Jersey, this would result in completely filling in the available land in the northeastern part of the State, and solid development westward to Princeton and southward to Lakewood. No doubt the market will break down large-lot zoning in some municipalities, but without a determined effort to change present land-use policies and to relate transportation and other physical facilities to a single plan of development, the growth of the "City" will vastly increase the clutter and confusion that have more and more characterized the urban landscape since the Second World War.

In its "Goals for the Region" project, the Regional Plan Association has suggested that, if the people of the area wish, they can alter this prospect. It is possible to plan for a more rational distribution of people and land use to bring to the "City of New Jersey" qualities of order and form that are notably absent today. The "City" can be more convenient, more economical, more beautiful and more human if the State and its immediate neighbors are willing to work together to this end. The Netherlands, comparable to New Jersey in size and population, plans and controls future growth out of a conviction of necessity. New Jersey as part of a vast, rich, and continental nation is not under the same compulsion. Nevertheless, it has the opportunity to choose between an almost endless and formless urban sprawl and a future "City of New Jersey" which, as it grows, becomes more serviceable, more beautiful, and more attuned to the spirit of man.

Only the people of New Jersey can determine to what extent they, as citizens of one of the most populous and rich states, will participate in determining the future of their virtually state-wide city. New Jersey has been inventive in the past. It has pioneered in the fields of governmental organization, transportation, science, agriculture, welfare, and private and public education. It has

the resources to pioneer on an even greater scale in the future. It also is in a position to have a disproportionate influence on the rest of urban America. It may yet rise to the challenge uttered fifty-three years ago by Governor Woodrow Wilson. Pointing out that New Jersey had always been "inconvenienced" by New York and Philadelphia, he suggested that "New Jersey occupies a very singular position in the sisterhood of states. . . ." He then went on to accentuate the positive: "New Jersey is what I may call a mediating state. Her life mediates in some degree the life of the surrounding portions of the country." He focused particularly on the problems of New Jersey as he saw them at the very beginning of his term as governor:

. . . all the great urban problems, all the great problems of water supply and of drainage, all the problems which are created by congestion of population lie here right around us, where we are. Jersey has to solve the problem of the home and the problem of the city, and the problem of transportation under conditions which put her character and sagacity to a greater test than the character and sagacity of any other equal population in the country is put. That is what is infinitely interesting about New Jersey. We have got the problems of the country in such a form that they are raised to their highest degree of difficulty and complexity.

Very well—what is the moral? That we in New Jersey have got to show the country how these problems are to be met and settled. . . .

New Jersey is the fighting center of the most important social questions of our time. The whole suburban question, the whole question of such transportation as will serve suburban communities . . . center in New Jersey more than any other single State of the Union.

The City of New Jersey is still the fighting center of the most important social questions of our time.

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The Regional Plan Association has been responsible for the publication of a great deal of material on the New York Metropolitan Area. From 1927 to 1931 it issued *The Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs* in eight volumes and *The Regional Plan* in two volumes. These volumes provide a detailed physical, economic, and governmental profile of the region as it was then. For the purposes of this book, see especially *Survey*, Volume II, *Population, Land Values and Government* (New York, 1929).

Some thirty years later the Association issued the *New York Metropolitan Region Study*, directed by Raymond Vernon, the results of which were embodied in nine volumes published by the Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1959-1961). See especially Edgar M. Hoover and Raymond Vernon, *Anatomy of a Metropolis*; Oscar Handlin, *The Newcomers*; Robert C. Wood, *1400 Governments*; and Vernon, *Metropolis 1985*.

On the basis of the above studies, and further investigations, the Regional Plan Association issued *Spread City: Projections of Development Trends and the Issues They Pose: The Tri-State New York Metropolitan Region, 1960-1985* (New York, 1962). Robert C. Wood, *Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics* (Boston, 1958) is also pertinent. The New Jersey Department of Conservation and Economic Development, Division of State and

Regional Planning, has published two useful volumes: *The Setting for Regional Planning in New Jersey* (Trenton, 1961), and *The Northeastern New Jersey Regional Urban Renewal Survey, a guide to urban renewal* (Trenton, 1963).

Two currently useful publications on New Jersey are the New Jersey Taxpayers' Association, *Financial Statistics of New Jersey Local Government*, September, 1963, and the Commission on State Tax Policy, Tenth Report: *Increased State Aid to Public Schools and Distribution of the Cost of Expanding Public Service* (Trenton, 1963). Finally for current demographic material we have relied almost entirely upon Don Heisel, Assistant Research Specialist of the Urban Studies Center. The profile of the state in four ecological zones in Chapter VI is based upon "New Jersey Demographic Trends" by Don Heisel, in *Urbanization: Some Educational Implications*, 29th Yearbook of the New Jersey Secondary School Teachers Association (Plainfield, 1964).

The comparison of "older" and "new" suburbs is based on material developed by Ernest Erber "Can the Older Suburbs Stay Attractive?" background paper for Regional Plan Association Conference, Fall, 1963, and "Suburbia—A Passing Phenomenon?" an address delivered to College of Business Administration of Fairleigh Dickinson University, March, 1961.

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







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