The New Jersey Soldier

MARK E. LENDER

New Jersey Historical Commission
This series of publications is dedicated to the memory of Alfred E. Driscoll, governor of New Jersey from 1947 to 1954, in grateful tribute to his lifelong support of the study and teaching of the history of New Jersey and the United States. He was a member of the New Jersey Historical Commission from 1970 until his death on March 9, 1975.
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SUMMARY: With emphasis on New Jersey, examines the often overlooked story of the enlisted men in the Revolution—how they were recruited, their attitudes, problems, and rewards.


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Foreword

New Jersey's Revolutionary Experience is a Bicentennial pamphlet series published by the New Jersey Historical Commission with a grant from the New Jersey Bicentennial Commission. The twenty-six numbers and two teachers' guides are intended to acquaint secondary school students and the general public with the state's history during the era of the American Revolution. Some titles treat aspects of the Revolution in New Jersey, while others show how important themes of the colonial period developed during the revolutionary years; some bring together the results of existing scholarship, while others present the findings of original research; some are written by professional historians, and others by laymen whose investigations of Jersey history exceed avocation. Because the series is directed to a general audience, the pamphlets have no footnotes but contain bibliographical essays which offer suggestions for further reading.

New Jersey's Revolutionary Experience is the product of a cooperative venture by numerous individuals and agencies. On my behalf and that of the pamphlets' readers, I accord recognition and appreciation to the individual authors for their contributions to New Jersey history, to the New Jersey American Revolution Bicentennial Celebration Commission and the New Jersey Historical Commission for their support of the project, to Hank Simon, president, Trentypo, Inc., for his invaluable suggestions and cooperation in producing the series, and to the staff of the Historical Commission: Richard Waldron, Public Programs Coordinator, who as project director supervised the series from commencement to completion; Peggy Lewis, Chief of Publications and Information, and Lee R. Parks, Assistant Editor, who edited and designed each number; and William C. Wright, Associate Director, who contributed valuable suggestions at every stage of production.

Larry R. Gerlach
University of Utah
The continental soldier in prescribed uniform. Congress seldom had the money or supplies to keep the army so handsomely uniformed, and homespun hunting garb was more typical. Courtesy Rutgers University Library.
By the rude bridge that arched the flood,
Their flag to April's breeze unfurled,
Here once the embattled farmers stood
And fired the shot heard round the world.

“A Concord Hymn,”
Ralph Waldo Emerson

With these sentimental lines, Emerson not only celebrated the bravery of the minutemen of 1775, but captured the popular view of all the revolutionary soldiers. Generations of Americans have glorified the patriot army in terms similar to Emerson’s and built a patriotic stereotype of its soldiery. Without too much exaggeration, assumptions about the men can be reduced to this: the revolutionary soldiers were democratic “yeomen” farmers or “honest” mechanics. They left their plows or shops voluntarily, shouldered their muskets, and followed Washington in the defense of liberty. Afterwards, tyranny humbled, they returned to their farms or crafts with the thanks of a grateful nation. No matter who they were as individuals, the troops became idealized collectively as the semi-mythic “embattled farmers,” and the “ragged Continentals.” In fact, the troops of no other American war have enjoyed a greater association with the ideals of freedom in the public mind. These views, however, are more the products of countless Fourth of July speeches than of historical research.

Actually, historians have only begun to look closely at the enlisted men. Previously, the popular patriotic image of the men had been so satisfying to most Americans that it attracted only a few
careful studies. Moreover, the lives of the troops lacked the dramatic appeal of the statesmen and military leaders of the period. Compared to the Washingtons and Jeffereons of the war, investigation of these “common men” went largely neglected. It was a neglect noticeable even during the fighting itself, for the men occasionally complained that the nation had overlooked their contributions. Such was the case when Private Joseph Plumb Martin related the story of his Connecticut regiment’s defense of Fort Mercer on the Delaware in 1777. In a vicious action, Martin and his comrades hampered enemy use of the river and mauled attacking forces. He was convinced that they had fought one of the best battles of the war, but the fact that “there was no Washington ... or Wayne there” prevented proper recognition of their heroism. “Had there been,” he said, “the affair would have been extolled to the skies....” The little known men of the Revolution, he lamented, “generally get little notice taken of them, do what they will. Great men get great praise; little men nothing.”

Our purpose here, then, is to fill some of the gaps in the overlooked story of the enlisted men. The focus of course will be on the fighting men of New Jersey — but their story should tell us a lot about the rank and file in general. How, for example, did they become involved in their war, and what did they think of it? And how, finally, did the soldiers of the actual war compare to the men of the “Concord Hymn”?

Since April 1775, following Lexington and Concord, the British army lay besieged in Boston. Around it were some fifteen thousand New England militia, too weak to take the city, but too strong for the king’s troops to drive off. In June a rush of events not only broke this deadlock, but also dramatically changed the scope of the war. That month the Continental Congress adopted the patriot forces, called for rifle regiments (or “battalions,” the terms were interchangeable) from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to support them, and asked all colonies to put their militia on a war footing. It then appointed George Washington commander in chief and announced formal congressional control of the army on July 4, 1775.

The pace of the war quickened. In August, Fort Ticonderoga fell to the Americans, and a two-pronged invasion of Canada under Richard Montgomery and Benedict Arnold began. In front of
Boston, Washington tightened the ring around the British still more and, in March 1776, finally forced them to evacuate the town. Thus, a year before independence, the colonies had transformed an assortment of militia units into a Continental army and sent it on the offensive against the king.

The rebellious colonies now faced a major war. They knew that continued military operations required a vastly expanded army, and in October 1775 Congress moved to create a regular Continental force for the coming campaigns. It asked New Jersey to raise two of the new regiments, each with some 728 men of all ranks. The state Provincial Congress quickly approved the request and began the warlong effort to send part of its citizenry to the patriot regular army.

A tide of sympathy for the colonial cause aided this first recruiting effort and made it a remarkable success. New Jersey agreed to the Continental recruiting terms — the men were to enlist for a year, bring their own weapons, and receive a clothing issue and $5 a month. The officers took personal charge of recruiting their commands, and some of them reported filling companies (about eighty men) in a matter of weeks. There were some supply problems, but they did not greatly affect recruiting. One group of officers complained that a lack of uniforms made the Jerseymen look like “a motly Crew! ... A Regiment of Rags....” But the first New Continentals were still able to move into positions in the Hudson Highlands and around New York City as early as mid-November; in December they moved into the city itself. The first Jersey Continentals were ready to fight.

With the new year, the Jersey regulars assumed an active military role. They saw their first major action in January 1776, when several companies joined a detachment of the Jersey militia under Colonel Nathaniel Heard in disarming Loyalists in Queen’s County, New York. They met no resistance, and the success of the Jerseymen pleased the Continental command. They had completed a task that the indecisive New York Provincial Congress had been unable to do itself. Both battalions then moved out of New York to positions at Elizabethtown (modern Elizabeth) and Perth Amboy. They remained there until the spring when a third Jersey battalion, recruited after a congressional request of February 1776, joined them. Together they moved north as part of an
effort to retrieve the failing American situation in Canada. By mid-May the Jerseymen were taking posts in the Mohawk Valley and around Quebec. Morale was excellent. At this point the troops were genuinely enthusiastic and more than willing to fight. The formal announcement of the Declaration of Independence brought a thunderous cheer from the rank and file, and Colonel Elias Dayton of the Third New Jersey noted the sincerity of their commitment to the cause. One captain noted the high spirits of the Jerseymen and prayed “God grant that they may acquit themselves like soldiers ... & return Crowned with Fresh Laurels....”

But there were no laurels. In fighting around Quebec, the first battles proved sobering experiences. The Jerseymen sustained losses — one fortunately false rumor told of their losing three hundred prisoners in one action — and suffered the ravages of a smallpox epidemic that swept the American lines. By July 1776, a general patriot retreat took the Jerseymen to Fort Ticonderoga where they learned that to the south their Jersey homes faced enemy invasion. This distressing news created almost unbearable anxieties over the fates of families and friends, and the concerned men wanted to leave for home as soon as possible. Though stationed around Ticonderoga, wrote one officer, “you must certainly suppose our hearts are in New Jersey....”

Many Jerseymen consequently refused to remain with the army a minute after their enlistments expired. To the disgust of General John Sullivan, commander of the northern army, Colonel William Winds of the First Battalion ignored an appeal from the army and led a large group of Jersey soldiers home in the first days of November. Sullivan congratulated the men who stayed on at Ticonderoga, but realizing that they were unlikely to remain much longer either, he soon after sent the rest of the First and Second Battalions home. By March 1777 the last of the Jersey Continentals, those in the Third Battalion, had also come home.

While the Continentals were fighting their first disappointing campaign, New Jersey’s militiamen were also getting a taste of war. The militiamen were the citizen-soldiers of the state, roughly similar to today’s National Guardsmen. They served short, rotating tours of duty, usually no more than a month at a time, under state authority. A colonial militia before the Revolution had been used to defend
the province against Indian attack and to protect the settlers during wars against the French and Indians. Although New Jersey, and thus its militia, never saw combat in these campaigns, many militiamen enlisted in volunteer regiments (technically, these were regular outfits) known as the “Jersey Blues.” The “Blues” were excellent troops, and they saw some tough combat against the French and the Indians. The militia itself, however, saw little active duty, and the royal government neglected its strength and training in the years before independence. Jersey patriots, though, quickly saw it as a valuable tool in the struggle with the crown, and in the spring of 1775 moved to reorganize and control it.

In fact, the militia played an important part in early revolutionary activities. Buoyed by the patriotic fervor after Lexington and Concord, local Jerseymen began to raise militia units on private, county, and even township authority. Some of these early outfits were quite extensive. In May 1775, for example, Morris County raised five companies with a pay scale, county-wide command and supply structure, and weekly training schedule. Neighboring counties even tried to coordinate their militia preparations in joint defense planning. All this activity was not enough to ensure military readiness in the state, as some areas were better prepared than others. But it was an impressive effort, particularly since it came under local authority, without benefit of a state militia law, and even before the Continental Congress called for militia preparedness in June 1775.

New Jersey's first revolutionary militia law, largely a formal recognition of the units already raised locally, came in June 1775. It directed townships that had not formed companies to do so and provided statewide regulations for electing officers, enrolling men, and training. The law’s provisions were very general: all males between sixteen and fifty years old were to form companies of about eighty men and elect their company officers (that is, captains and below) who, in turn, would elect regimental officers (major through colonel). Regiments were to be organized on county lines, but they were only loosely defined as “such a number of companies” as local officers deemed proper. Units raised before this legislation, however, had already reached at least this level of organization, and the new statute left them as they were, provided they followed the
training and administrative provisions of the ordinance. Central control of this first revolutionary militia structure was thus minimal. County regiments were ill-defined, there was no higher command strata (brigade) to direct operations involving more than one regiment, and there were no penalties for Jerseymen who refused to participate. For service under the new law was only “recommended” and “advised,” not required.

This initial militia legislation was frequently amended. By October 1775 the state had reorganized many units in an effort to improve Jersey defenses, ended the “recommendation” of the June law and made militia participation mandatory (under the penalty of a fine), and fixed the number of battalions for all counties. Philemon Dickinson and future governor William Livingston received commissions as brigadier generals, allowing them to direct statewide operations. Other revisions in militia legislation followed over the course of the war. To create a battleworthy militia, the state continued to reorganize units when necessary — the county battalions, for example, were grouped into regional brigades in 1778 and reorganized again in 1783 — make command changes, and increase the fines on delinquent militiamen. But despite these subsequent changes, the legal efforts of 1775 had provided a basic structure for the militia which remained generally recognizable throughout the War for Independence.

And so organized, New Jersey sent her militiamen to war. In the summer and fall of 1776, hundreds of them joined Washington in high spirits in and around New York City while others took up positions in their own state. With the rest of the patriot army, however, the militiamen were beaten and driven out of New York in August, and they retreated into their own state over the following weeks. There, discouraged by the defeats, they offered the royal forces little opposition, often melting away in front of an enemy advance. Washington called the Jersey militia’s conduct a disgrace and retreated across the Delaware in early December. For the Jerseymen, this was the lowest point of the war. Although the citizen-soldier would rally again after the American successes at Trenton and Princeton, he had lost the early enthusiasm for the war. Instead of a patriotic triumph, then, as militiamen of 1776 had hoped, their baptism by fire had been a disaster.

After this, Jerseymen saw that the militia was simply not
“A Return of the Officers & Men In the Reg'dment of Artificers . . .” listing a group of Essex County men serving in the Continental army. Such lists were used in preparing to pay troops. The term “artificers” reveals that these men served in an artillery unit. NJDOD Manuscripts, No. 3733.Courtesy New Jersey State Library, Archives and History Bureau.
prepared to carry the heaviest burdens of combat alone. And even had militia fortunes been good in 1776, there were other impediments to a battleworthy militia. The state had serious administrative and financial problems which made calling out the militia difficult. Since the finances of revolutionary New Jersey were unhealthy, the militia were frequently angered and demoralized by late or missing pay. Some units in the field were actually disbanded for want of funds to support them. Administratively, the short militia enlistments (seldom more than a month) made long-range planning hard, and communications between state and local commanders were so poor that orders to turn out sometimes never arrived or were too late to do any good. Frequently the local companies had to act independently and tell higher authorities later. Consequently, the state never established a firm central control of its militia forces.

Moreover, New Jersey's human resources were too limited to fight a major war solely with militia. During the war about 135,140,000 people lived in the state, and of these, roughly twenty-five thousand to twenty-seven thousand were men of military age. But serious obstacles prevented their full use. The Quakers, for example, made up about 20 percent of the total population, and about the same proportion of those otherwise eligible for military duty—around five thousand men. As pacifists, very few fought for either side and thus were lost to the war effort. Another estimated thirty-two hundred were lost to the Tories. These Jerseymen were either in Loyalist or British regiments, "refugee" groups which raided their state from bases near New York, local irregulars, British sympathizers, or "neutrals" who stayed aloof from both sides. Moreover, the state granted many official exemptions from duty. Members of state and local government had such releases; and at various times the state also exempted students, teachers, postal workers, special express riders, workmen for the New-Jersey Gazette, and men for New Jersey's various iron works. One furnace manager reported that local farmers were so anxious to avoid militia duty that he never lacked employees. Many other potential militiamen manned an active privateering fleet that raided the English from the Jersey coasts. The profits of the privateer were such that volunteering for sea duty made Continental recruiting difficult (it even lured New Jersey veterans out of ranks), and by
1781 the number of Americans who were privateering was greater than the number of Americans serving with Washington. In all, then, at least some 11,200 men—over 40 percent of the males of military age—were unavailable for militia duty.

The remaining manpower had to be shared with the overwhelmingly agricultural state economy. Had the Jersey militia turned out in the numbers needed to face the British in a full campaign (much less for the war), farm production would have suffered seriously. In fact, the legislature protested to Congress repeatedly that had it supplied all the militia reinforcements the army wanted, Jersey farms would have lain idle and economic calamity would have threatened.

Nor would all those still eligible for service actually turn out. The militia laws simply did not compel men to fight. Instead, they could pay fines or hire substitutes to serve for them, and muster rolls show that many militiamen did just that. Officers complained regularly that because of the fine and substitute laws they could never depend on their men's answering a call to arms, and Washington was particularly angry. He told Governor Livingston that the demands of war required the militiamen actually to serve instead of paying small fines. "We want Men," he said, "and not Money." Yet the legislature refused to force men into service. The powerful bloc of Quaker legislators and their political allies from West Jersey opposed compulsory duty, as did many other Jersey citizens who did not want to risk their citizen-soldiers on campaigns away from home. And so, afraid, as Livingston said, "of disobeying their constituents," the state legislature never made personal militia service mandatory. The result was that a minority of willing patriots fought in the militia.

Moreover, even when men agreed to serve, the populace did not want to send its sons and husbands to battle far from home. Very often as few as ten families constituted over half of a militia company. It was conceivable, then, that many of the men of a single locality could be lost in one campaign. Nor did towns and counties want to be left unprotected if their militia went off to another region. More than one county asked to have its militia posted only within its borders fearing that, as a petition from the Monmouth County militia put it, "their Wives & children [would] ... fall... Prey to the Enemy" if they were called elsewhere. Even Washington
sympathized at times with concerns like this. He occasionally let militiamen go home if they felt their families were in danger. He had to — experience proved that most would have gone home anyway.

Fortunately, the importance of the militia lay close to home, where the part-time soldiers performed a host of important local duties. They provided valuable intelligence on Loyalists and enemy troops, built fortifications, stood garrison duty to release regulars for field activity, and even opened snowbound roads. As there were no state police, the militia had a constabulary function. It transported prisoners, chased and subdued outlaws, and guarded tax collectors from robbery. It also operated effectively in harassing British patrols and foraging parties. No small enemy unit was safe in the countryside, and the militiamen’s ability to strike quickly and then flee was a constant source of irritation to the royal soldiers, some of whom conceded a grudging respect to their local opponents. Despite their shortcomings in extended campaigning, the militiamen served their cause well in these local tasks.

This local activity also served a crucial political function. The harassing of the Tories — watching them, keeping them from the polls in order to assure patriot election victories, preventing their free communication with each other (and occasionally beating or killing them) — clearly impeded the chances for counterrevolution. Tories, therefore, might be active politically or militarily, but only at the eventual risk of becoming patriot targets. The militia, no matter how ineffective in set piece battle, provided the muscle state government needed to win the political war against the king.

Finally, under the right conditions, the militia could fight stand-up actions. The “right conditions” were the presence of Continental troops. The regulars provided a usually dependable core around which the Jersey militia stood firmly at the battles of Monmouth (1778), Springfield (1780), and other engagements. Both leaders and populace agreed strongly on a policy of protecting themselves whenever possible with a shield of Continentals. Private citizens felt that using American regulars would keep the militia out of the heaviest combat. The Continentals were necessary, argued a “Lady in New Jersey,” “if we wish that there may not be occasion to call forth our husbands, our children, and our dearest friends, to risk their lives again in our defense.” In other words, the Continentals had to be kept in the field, or the militia would have to fight.
Indeed, New Jersey’s concern over the lack of protection from the regulars was so great that the state occasionally raised its own version of a standing army. When Continentals were unavailable to protect a key area and the state felt that the rotating tours of militiamen could not offer sufficient defense, the legislature enlisted a separate force of “State Troops.” They were first raised in 1776, and different units were organized as needed during the war; each county had a garrison of at least a company of these troops by the end of the conflict. Jerseymen saw the State Troops as a cut above the militia; the relative stability of their long-term enlistments offered an alternative to the rotations of the citizen-soldiers. But at any given time there were no more than a few hundred such troops on duty, hardly enough to stop a serious British attack. In the eyes of patriot Jerseymen, the State Troops, then, no matter what their advantages over the militia, could not permanently substitute for the Continentals.

In fact, patriot leaders saw the Continental regulars as the best security for New Jersey. They based this view on a frank admission that the experience and training of the Continentals made them better troops than the militia or State Troops, and that the British were less likely to move against the state if it was under their protection. The Continentals were also more efficient than the rotating militia tours and better for the economy because they left the farmer-soldiers free for agriculture. Accordingly, state officials actively sought the protection of the Continental army and complained heatedly whenever the regulars left the state. When Washington wintered at Valley Forge in 1777-1778, Jerseymen feared an enemy invasion without Continentals on Jersey soil; they were concerned too when areas close to the British New York garrison, such as Perth Amboy and Elizabethtown, lacked a shield of regulars. Even Governor Livingston preferred a bodyguard composed of Continentals rather than his state’s militia. By common consent among Jerseymen, the Continental soldier was to be the keystone of the war effort when it came to sustained campaigning. This was a major decision: it was a realization that the citizen-soldiers of the militia — exemplified by the “embattled farmers” of the “Concord Hymn” — could not secure independence alone. To stop an enemy regular army, patriots would need regulars of their own.

The state recognized the relative strengths of the militia and
regulars only during the fighting of 1776, however, and by the time Jerseymen decided on the need for a permanent army the initial Jersey regiments, as we have seen, were already disbanding. To replace them, the state had to raise a "Second Establishment" in 1777. These new Continentals would be every bit as good as European regulars, or so Washington hoped. To ensure stable levels of manpower, Congress discarded the old one-year enlistments and substituted tours lasting either three years or for the duration of the war. To lure men into the regiments it offered a bounty of $20 and a yearly clothing issue for a three year tour, and it provided an additional 100 acres of land for men serving for the war.

New Jersey contributed four regiments to the new army. They generally served together as the "New Jersey Brigade." Another regiment, one of sixteen raised independently by Congress, was often brigaded with them. This was "Spencer's Regiment," after its colonel, Oliver Spencer, who had raised the unit primarily in New Jersey. Thus its unofficial title became the "Fifth New Jersey." Brigade command went to an experienced soldier, William Maxwell of Sussex County. Maxwell had earned a good record in the French and Indian War, and with William Alexander (Lord Stirling) of Somerset County, received a colonelcy in one of the original Jersey battalions in 1775. When Alexander left to serve as a major general under Washington, Maxwell became the ranking Jerseyman and received a brigadier's star in October 1776. Not a brilliant leader, he was at least steady in combat and a dependable subordinate. He served until 1780 when he resigned pleading ill health. The brigade then fell to Colonel Elias Dayton. Dayton had also fought the French and had led the Third New Jersey. Early in the war he had hoped for a reconciliation with the crown, but after independence he became a loyal and talented officer who had gained Washington's esteem. He commanded as colonel until January 1783, when he was promoted to brigadier.

Under Maxwell the recruiters set to work. Ideally, the new republic wanted them to enlist the freemen of the state, the "yeomen" farmers of Emerson's poem. They were to be the best of American manhood, hardy "tradesmen's sons, and farmers' sons" as John Adams put it. As they searched for volunteers, they tried to be as sociable as possible to local residents, hoping any
good will created would lead to information on possible recruits. The recruiters usually posted a notice of their mission and then had a drummer, and sometimes musicians, "beat up" for recruits—this was standard procedure, and a practice inherited from the British. It was an old routine, but it worked well enough at times in New Jersey.

Jersey patriots hoped that men would respond to these calls as enthusiastically as at the beginning of the war. Enlistments, however, were slow, and by January 1777 it became apparent that New Jersey would not find enough volunteers to fill the new regiments. Patriot morale had suffered considerably in the 1776 campaign, and recruiting consequently lagged. Although victories at Trenton and Princeton brightened American spirits, they could not dispel memories of the bitter cold and the smallpox that hit the patriot forces in Canada, nor the defeats in New York and New Jersey. Most of the veterans of the "First Establishment," who had already seen a year of soldiering, refused to reenlist despite the pleas of the state legislature. Moreover, men with farms and families asked themselves why they should leave home for years as a Continental when they could serve instead on local militia tours. So, while the three Jersey battalions of 1776 had attracted roughly two thousand men, the New Jersey Brigade of 1777 (including Spencer's men) enlisted fewer than fifteen hundred. And as Table 1 (p. 18) shows, the experience of 1777 was only the first stage of a chronic manpower shortage that lasted throughout the war. The well of volunteerism, then, had almost run dry before the war was two years old.

The state made various attempts to remedy this situation, most of which involved looking for men besides the ideal "yeoman" soldier. In April 1777, the state passed a law exempting any two militiamen from militia duty if they hired a man for Continental service and sent him to the army. It also allowed payments to masters who sent their indentured servants into ranks. Indeed, New Jersey even gave up asking for freemen in its appeals for troops. Any "able-bodied and effective volunteers" would do: and this loose regulation, in fact, accounted for most of the volunteers. For the men who answered these calls were a varied lot; well over half of them left no evidence of having lived permanently in any Jersey township. They were an assortment of drifters, foreigners,
a few Indians and runaway servants and slaves, and men who otherwise had few roots in civilian society. They were individuals like John Evans, a black, and one of the 2 percent non-white soldiers in the brigade, who cited Reading Township as his home even though he left no evidence of having lived there; or William Holmes, an Indian who was unrecorded as a resident of Cumberland County where he said he lived; or like drifter Job Polk, who traveled from Bucks County, Pennsylvania, to enlist in Burlington County. Others came from as far away as North Carolina and Virginia. Poor foreigners, from places as diverse as France, Holland, Scotland, Germany, and Canada, also filtered into ranks. Some were enemy deserters.

**TABLE 1**

**NEW JERSEY CONTINENTAL MANPOWER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quota Regiments</th>
<th>Quota Men</th>
<th>Actual Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1777</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,720</td>
<td>1,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,088</td>
<td>1,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1779</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>1,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1780</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>1,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1783</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,522</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Even permanent residents in Jersey towns rarely fit the yeoman image. Only some 20 percent of them were from a New Jersey middle or upper class in terms of their personal or family wealth. The rest came from the poorest two-thirds of society, and about 46 percent of these troops had no property at all. Worse, 57 percent of them were landless, and excluded from the major form of economic security in the state's largely agricultural economy. Even the Continentals who had farms seldom owned more than one hundred acres—not enough for any great prosperity. Most of
the Jersey regulars thus left little behind them when they joined the army.

The social origins of the army did not escape critical contemporary notice. By 1777, New Jersey found that it had to prohibit legally the arrest of its soldiers for debts under fifty dollars because so many of them were so poor that civilian creditors were having them thrown into debtor's prison. The same year, a French officer said openly that the Continental troops "had a bad reputation with the general public...." They were all "vagabonds and paupers," he asserted, and no "enticements or tricks could force solid citizens to enlist [as regulars] inasmuch as they had to serve in the militia anyway." Another Frenchman writing in the New-Jersey Gazette took an equally hard look at the Continentals. He stated that Americans with farms and families were unwilling to "forego the sweets of domestic life for three, four, or seven years service." Nor did he think that there were enough men of the type who filled European ranks—the propertyless and single—to give Washington a large professional force. But he said that those who had enlisted as Continentals were of the same "class of men who compose the common soldiers in Europe"—that is, the poor. There were a few propertied and family men in ranks, he admitted, but noted that they had enlisted in the early days of the war, "when the salvation of America was thought to depend entirely upon ... filling up the Continental regiments."

One tends to trust the judgment of these Frenchmen, particularly in light of our own findings on the Continentals. Coming as they did from the military of the Old World, they knew more than a little about the kind of men who served as regular soldiers. Moreover, they were right about another characteristic of the men: they noted too that many of them were very young. And, in fact, half of the Jersey troops were no more than twenty-two years old, a large number of them in their teens. These youths had been prime recruiting targets, for the army knew that most of them had not yet launched careers or formed strong marital or economic bonds to the civilian world. The youth, said one recruiter, were "very proper for the Service" because "they have little, and some no property...." Thus in terms of age, in
addition to wealth, the Continentals had little to leave behind for the army.

As hard as army life was, then, it could still prove appealing to men with so little stake in civilian society. Certainly the poor found the bounties attractive. Washington, in fact, thought that most recruits had enlisted for them alone. Those who joined out of principle, he said, were “no more than a drop in the Ocean.” General Maxwell reported that many Jerseymen were willing enough to enlist but that they would not actually bear arms until they first received their bounties.

But financial concerns were not the only factors in enlistments. Some soldiers had other, equally compelling reasons to serve. For servants and slaves in the ranks, for example, service sometimes meant eventual freedom. Samuel Sutphin, a slave of Somerset County, may have had just such a hope. He fought valiantly as a militiaman and Continental throughout the war and applied for his freedom afterwards (it was denied). At other times the army provided a way out of broken homes and family disputes. Jerseyman Samuel Reynolds, who displayed no warm desire to serve himself, “volunteered for the express purpose of allowing his father to remain home, he being upwards of 80, and, though not compelled... would go to defend his country.”

Some situations were even more delicate. One M'Donald Campbell was in and out of the militia, the Continentals, and British service (in which he afterwards claimed he was a spy for the Americans). At one point, he recalled, “I had formed an acquaintance with a young woman in Somerset county, of a very creditable family, with whom I had been too intimate. Her father summoned for me to come and see him,” and Campbell ended up married. He fled wedlock for the army again, however, and after the war prospered as an enterprising counterfeiter. Indeed, the “shotgun marriage” brought more than one man to the Continental recruiter. In 1776 an army doctor treated a patient, “formerly an ordained Minister, but by some misfortune respecting him and his maid he was Dismissed from his congregation and now Served as a Sergeant in the Continental army.”

Unfortunately, men enlisted under these circumstances often lacked a commitment to the cause to help them endure the trials of army life. For the eighteenth century was a hard time to be a soldier,
and service in the Continental Line was no exception. Discipline, for instance, was harsh. Offenses like theft, insubordination, or drunkenness could bring a flogging of a hundred lashes or more. Cowardice, desertion, or repeated acts of robbing civilians invited a possible death sentence. And as the war continued, relations with the officers deteriorated. Before the war the officers had generally been propertied and thus had little in common with the soldiers. Indeed, many of them demanded the privileges of the European officer corps. Private Timothy Tuttle, of the Third New Jersey, felt that the men had few commissioned friends. When a popular commander died he remarked sadly, “I can’t think that some of our officers is much sorry, Because . . . it is not the Disposition of our officers to like those who is a soldiers friend what ever the matter is.” Living conditions were sometimes almost intolerable. In the winters, adequate food and shelter were often scarce. Pay was frequently late—and with rampant inflation almost worthless. Disease was a constant threat, and claimed as many men as did battle casualties, or more. Worse, the troops were generally on poor terms with civilians. During supply shortages, soldiers often pillaged what they needed from the populace, creating serious ill will. And soldiers had been unpopular in colonial America, in part because of their low status as civilians, and this critical attitude did not change during the Revolution. While some civilians did their best to help the army, most simply wanted nothing to do with the men. A soldier’s life, then, was clearly not for the faint-hearted.

Perhaps as bad as anything else was the boredom of garrison life. In fact, the tedium of army routine dominated most of the diaries and letters of the troops. The letter of a young New Jersey captain was typical. Leaving for duty in New York in 1780, he expressed the frustrations and drudgery of military life. “I am tired of war and war affairs,” he wrote. He did not relish being cooped up in a garrison with “hoggs, Horses, cows...& squalling children,” and looked forward to his worst assignment. “In truth,” he concluded, “I have a good while felt tired of the situation I am in.”

Under these conditions it is hardly surprising that many men, also “tired” of their situation, did not stay with the army. While officers could resign, the men were committed to stay for the term
of their enlistments. If they wanted to leave they usually had to desert. And desert they did by the hundreds. In 1777 the desertion rate was a staggering 42 percent of the Jersey Line. As discipline improved and as the fainthearted deserted early, the rate fell to 10 percent yearly after 1779. But even this was a serious loss for an army with recruiting problems. A good number of these deserters, particularly in early 1777 when the Jersey Brigade was being organized, were bounty jumpers. They enlisted in one regiment for the bounty money, deserted, and then enlisted somewhere else for another bounty. If a man stayed ahead of any paperwork with his name on it, or if he were not recognized, he could repeat the process as often as he liked or until he was caught. The practice became, as Washington complained, "a kind of business" with the men. A John Welch of the Fourth New Jersey, enlisted and deserted five times. And he was only too typical of others. In August 1778, a firing squad ended the career of a particularly enterprising soldier who had managed to collect seven bounties before he was caught. But relatively few deserters were caught, and just as few ever returned to duty after leaving in spite of legends of the men returning after going home to harvest crops. These losses constituted a permanent and damaging drain on brigade manpower.

The need to replace the losses to desertion and to fill even the basic regimental quotas created seemingly insoluble problems for recruiters. In desperation they began to accept recruits from illegal sources — with the ultimate results of strengthening the numerical domination of the rank and file by the poor, and of increasing the number of soldiers with few attachments to the patriot cause. Enemy deserters and prisoners, for example, though barred from the ranks by Congress and the state, became recruiting targets. There were good reasons not to use them: authorities noted their lack of zeal for the American cause and their alleged willingness to desert. Livingston complained that their use as soldiers prevented their exchange for captured Americans. Yet even Washington allowed a condemned Englishman to enlist as a Continental rather than hang, and many Hessians, to whom Congress directed appeals to desert, were willing enough to fight for the Americans. Throughout the war German prisoners of war and deserters found
employers in New Jersey, and some entered the Jersey Brigade. One Jersey colonel even arranged special protection for a Hessian in his unit, knowing he risked death if recaptured by the British. The use of former enemy personnel, then, despite occasional congressional objections, was a permanent part of the patriot war effort.

The Loyalists became another source of manpower. So serious were troop shortages that even Governor Livingston agreed to risk forcing the domestic enemies of the Revolution into the patriot ranks. Tories arrested for treason frequently received the choice of enlisting in the Continentals or going on trial for their lives. Beginning in 1777, men brought before the Council of Safety for “suspicious Circumstances surrounding their Conduct” often enlisted rather than face further investigation. After that, persons tainted with any sort of Loyalism faced the possibility of a trial. In 1779, for example, a patriot court in Gloucester County tried seventeen men for high treason, sentenced them to the noose, then pardoned all but one. Two of the lucky ones went into exile, six definitely enlisted as a condition of pardon, and the rest probably did the same. Earlier, a 1777 court in Morristown sentenced thirty-five Tories to hang. They were duly brought to the hangman, where two met their Maker, and the others, reprieved “from the gallows if you will enlist in the American army for the remainder of the war,” met Continental recruiters. On another occasion, Morristown tried seventy-five Tory soldiers, hanged their two officers, and sent the rest into the army.

Sometimes a Tory chose prison or death rather than take up arms against his king. One Alexander Worth, a Tory soldier taken at Woodbridge as a spy, had the option of being branded or enlisting. A tough customer, he took the brand—“Death,” he said, “is preferable to fighting against the King”—and was released. A William Newman agreed to enlist at first and then changed his mind. This took courage indeed, as prison was a hard lot: “Sometimes upwards of 50 have been confined ... in one Room not exceeding 18 feet square,” wrote one jailed Tory, “frequently Water was not to be had,” and without the charity of local families, “they must have starved to Death.” Newman himself contracted smallpox—a high cost for loyalty to the king.

The last source of manpower outside the formal recruiting
structure was the criminal court. Although Congress had ruled recruiting from prisons illegal in 1776, New Jersey still saw fit to use some of its felons as soldiers. John Sanders received a sentence of two floggings as a horse thief at Morristown in 1777. After the first, "the said John Sanders had signified his willingness to enlist in the Continental Services," and the courts remitted his second whipping. Governor Livingston pardoned one Benjamin Bartholomew of Gloucester County, sentenced to death as a burglar, if he enlisted. Others enlisted to escape jail terms for lesser crimes and misdemeanors.

We do not, and cannot, know exactly how many felons and Tories entered New Jersey regiments. Too few court records survive, and muster rolls only infrequently mention the background of a particular recruit. But there were doubtless plenty of them — the troops mentioned above alone accounted for over a third of a battalion. We should also note that their use was perhaps not a mistake. Of a group of Tories reprieved at Morristown in 1777, eleven of twenty-one with traceable war records deserted. But four of these returned, and the rest apparently served as good soldiers. One, Barnett Banghart, was even wounded and served until 1783. He then received a veteran's land grant, one of the same grants due troops enlisted under the most patriotic circumstances.

But the use of Tories and enemy personnel were only stopgap measures. They could not supply all the men needed to fill the Jersey regiments, and the army's manpower crisis remained acute. Moreover, after the disappointing results of the 1777 recruiting campaign and the appalling desertion rate, it became clear that a manpower policy tied solely to volunteers would end in failure. Aware of this fact, Washington urged another approach. In 1776 he had tactfully suggested to New Jersey that voluntary enlistments were too few and questioned "whether it may not be prudent, to devise some other way" to get men. The next year he openly called for a draft: "the Government must have recourse to coercive [sic] measures; for if the quotas required of each State cannot be had by voluntary enlistment, in time, and the Powers of Government are not adequate to drafting, there is an end of the Contest, and opposition becomes vain." Only days later, on April 14, 1777, Congress itself suggested the draft if all else failed.
New Jersey, however, waited instead until 1778 for its draft, when a congressional committee, including Nathaniel Scudder of New Jersey, urged a conscription of militiamen for nine months Continental duty. Livingston fully supported the measure; and with their governor of this mind, some Jerseymen took up the pen in support of the draft. Draft the militia, urged an unknown "Adolphus" in the New Jersey Gazette. "It is a maxim in government which I never heard a man of sense deny," he wrote, "that every state hath a right to demand the personal service of its members or an equivalent [sic] whenever the public weal demands it." The legislature at first balked at the proposal, saying the state was too exhausted by the war to raise men by draft, and then by keeping the recruiting law itself in debate from February 20 to April 3. But the final statute doubtless satisfied proponents of the draft. It provided for the division of the militia regiments into groups, or "classes," each class having eighteen men. Upon a full regimental muster, commissioners in charge of classing and drafting were to explain the recruiting laws and bounties, and then allow each class ten days to present a volunteer or substitute to serve nine months in the Jersey Brigade. If, after ten days, a class did not present a recruit, one of the men in the class would be drafted by lot. He then had five days to report for duty, find a substitute, or pay a $300 fine.

Drafting days doubtless brought furious negotiating over who among the men would volunteer or how they would procure substitutes. Private Joseph Plumb Martin, who enlisted as a substitute in Connecticut, described a scene probably typical of drafts in all the states. Once a class knew he was available for hire they bought his services immediately: "I forgot the sum.... They were now freed from any further trouble, at least for the present, and I had become the scapegoat for them.... I thought, as I must go, I might as well endeavor to get as much for my skin as I could." In Somerset County one class continually refused to send a man. The company commander drew the lot twelve times, and each time the draftee paid the fine instead of serving. Finally, it settled on one Peter Post, who had once before also paid a fine not to serve. His final selection is suspicious as he was probably in debt to his company commander, giving the captain a lever in such a tight situation. But one way or another, men came forward, and in April
and May of 1778 the militia sent hundreds of draftees and substitutes to the army. Consequently, the state raised more Continentals in 1778 than in any other year except 1776.

Success did not ease legislative distaste for the draft, however, and there was little hurry to continue it in 1779. The state, in fact, considered no recruiting act at all until June, by which time some Jerseymen were gravely concerned. "The Publick is astonished," noted Elisha Boudinot, "that we are so far advanced in the Spring and nothing done in our State towards filling up the Regiments or preparing for the next campaign....This is like men sleeping on the Point of a Precipice." Unfortunately, the legislature left no reason why it refused to conduct another draft, although possible adverse constituent reaction to the first one may have influenced the decision. At any rate, repeated calls by Congress and Washington further failed to produce a New Jersey draft by March 1780. The state also refused a motion to "sentence" delinquent Jersey
militiamen to three months in a Continental regiment. Predictably, troop shortages again became acute.

To alleviate the troop dilemma, the state finally agreed to draft men for six months duty in June 1780. This effort was less successful than that of 1778, apparently because of lackluster measures to enforce its provisions. Essex County, for example, drafted only about half as many men as in 1778. A Tory editor remarked that the new draft merely caused men to flee rather than be drafted or to hire a substitute. Although men trickled in throughout the campaign, by August the law had produced fewer than two hundred recruits. Congress, bewildered, complained to Livingston on the “extraordinary backwardness of some states” in completing their battalions. Could it be, it asked, that “avarice, luxury and dissipation” had seduced “the boasted sons of American freedom” and persuaded them to forsake country and liberty?” Were they ready for the slavery which “their generous nature but a few ... years before would have revolted at the bare idea of?” The very thought, it concluded, was contemplated only with “the extremest pain; nay, horror!” Horror or not, however, this was New Jersey’s last draft, and the state reverted to seeking voluntary enlistments and living with troop shortages.

The problems raised by troop shortages and the humble civilian origins of the soldiery, however, did not obscure the fact that the New Jersey Brigade could fight. The Garden State Continentals gained a reputation for steadiness in combat, which they earned in every one of Washington’s major battles after 1776. In 1777 they fought well at Brandywine and Germantown, and again, in 1778, at Monmouth after the winter at Valley Forge. In 1779 they accompanied General John Sullivan’s expedition against the Iroquois in western New York. Sullivan had specifically requested the Jersey regiments and they served him well. Colonel Spencer’s men helped clear a path for the army as an advance party; another detachment under Colonel Israel Shreve, of the Second New Jersey, guarded the expedition’s base of supplies. General Maxwell, with the main body of Jerseymen, temporarily commanded the entire army when Sullivan fell sick in August 1779. The brigade then returned to Morristown for the winter, and in 1780 fought skillfully beside militia to help turn back the last major enemy incursion into their state at Springfield.
The final year of campaigning was one of paradox: it began in disgrace and ended in glory. Quartered at Pompton in January 1781, some of the Jerseymen followed the Pennsylvania Line into mutiny when they could no longer endure the trials of poor supply, late pay, and the cold of one of the worst winters of the war. But unlike the numerous Pennsylvanians who were strong enough to warrant a negotiated settlement largely on their terms, the mutiny of the Jersey Line was crushed and two ringleaders summarily executed. Yet the mutiny destroyed none of their willingness to fight, and they began to redeem themselves almost immediately. In February, the marquis de Lafayette took 160 Jersey Light Infantry—selected from all of the regiments for their physical fitness and military skill—with him on his expedition to Virginia, where a royal force led by turncoat Benedict Arnold had been raiding since December 1780. Unable to stop Arnold, Lafayette was nonetheless pleased with the conduct of the Jerseymen, who remained near Williamsburg until September 1781. There, the rest of the Jersey Brigade met them on its way south with Washington to trap General Charles Cornwallis at Yorktown. The entire brigade then actively participated in the final siege of the war.

The Jerseymen directly helped to force a conclusion. To weaken the British lines, Washington decided to move against two crucial redoubts guarding the enemy left flank. The Continentals and the French were to attack one position each in simultaneous assaults. The general scheduled the operation for the night of October 15, with the Jersey Light Infantry as the first assault group. It was an important task and placing the Jerseymen in the lead doubtless expressed Washington’s confidence in their ability and loyalty. In a last minute change of plans, however, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton claimed the forward position for himself. It was, he explained, his “tour of duty” that night, and the request was granted. Still, the Jerseymen would not be denied a share of the fight; advancing behind Hamilton’s men, they stormed into the redoubt at the height of the attack. With these posts gone, Cornwallis knew his position was hopeless, and he surrendered on October 19. Thus, when the Jersey Brigade marched north again after the final victory (it camped near New York until it disbanded after the peace of 1783), it had earned a
combat record as fine as any in the Continental army.

In the general patriot rejoicing at the end of the war, few if any Jerseymen noted that their soldiers had changed dramatically between the first shots of 1775 and the demobilization of 1783. For the men of the hard-fighting Jersey Brigade, who had faced the king's men on so many fields and gallantly assaulted the final redoubt at Yorktown, simply bore no resemblance to the "yeomen" who faced the redcoats at Concord Bridge. The early patriots glorified in Emerson's poem had largely left the service over the years as they found the demands of caring for families and farms incompatible with the hardships of long-term soldiering. In New Jersey, as we have seen, they left duty in the Continental Line to the poor, the very young, the propertyless, the draftees and deserters, and to all the others drawn from anywhere men could be found to fill the ranks. Socially, these men did not constitute the ideal patriot army of propertied farmers and tradesmen.

Gone too was the patriotic zeal celebrated in the "Concord Hymn," for the New Jersey Brigade was hardly a "revolutionary," or "people's army," as we think of the terms today. That kind of crusading spirit and ideological awareness was just not present. But this does not mean that the troops had no feelings for their cause. There was at least a recognized identification of themselves as Americans. The men made occasional references to their "American Land" or "American Liberties" as opposed to a crown and Parliament for which they had no use. These were expressions of a developing nationalism. Within this consciousness the "patriot soldier" was one who was simply loyal to his country, and fought for the goal of independence.

It was a quiet nationalism, however, as the troops rarely articulated their feelings in specific terms. When they did, they did so in support of the separation from Britain. They toasted the nation on the Fourth of July (although, like most soldiers, they would probably have raised a glass to almost anything), and sometimes raised a cheer for Congress. One veteran regiment celebrated the anniversary of a unit victory with drinking, cheering, and a Liberty Pole, a symbol of early resistance to England. It should be noted, however, that the toasting and cheering simply may have corresponded to a royal regiment raising a cheer after a victory, as at Lexington, or giving a "huzza" for the king. For the
writings left by the men do not sustain assumptions that they associated their service with any further developed political tenets, concepts of "democracy," or social values. They certainly did not see themselves as torchbearers for a rising lower class.

The depth of this largely silent nationalism can never be precisely known. Certainly there were men with no love for the cause. Some of the foreigners in ranks and those who enlisted merely for bounty considerations merited little trust; and the compelled soldiers of the draft, not to mention the substitutes, could not be counted upon for zeal. And there were large numbers of deserters. But, as we have seen, the troops who took bounties often did so with an understanding of independence. And even the acceptance of a bounty tied the soldier to the republic. Had America lost the war and independence failed, Continental pay and bounty monies would have been worthless. Land bounties, perhaps the most potentially valuable to poor men in a farming society, would have lost all validity. So if the Continental lacked the selfless idealism of the "Concord Hymn," at least his personal interests depended on the success of the cause and bound him to it. It is probably true, then, that most men who remained under Continental arms found independence a goal worth the fight, even if they only expressed their dedication through loyal and faithful service.

Finally, there is reason to believe that America came to accept this inarticulate nationalism as the most she could expect from her troops. When the time came to honor the services of the men who had endured the long years of war, no less than the commander in chief himself defined the patriot soldier in terms of simple, uncomplicated loyalty. In August 1782 Washington created the "Badge of Military Merit" to recognize soldiers of "bravery, fidelity, and good conduct." Three years of such service earned a stripe on the left sleeve, and six years, two stripes. "Unusual gallantry," or "extraordinary fidelity and essential service" won a cloth purple heart. No one who had quit the field or met "an ignominious punishment or degradation," was qualified for an award. These, then, were the attributes of soldierly patriotism, not zealousness nor dedication to any particular political or social ideals. They opened to all, the general said, the "road to glory in a patriot army and a free country...."
For Further Reading

There are unfortunately few published works on the enlisted men of any state. But the titles below should provide a good foundation for the study of the revolutionary army and its troops. The only study dealing specifically with the men is Charles K. Bolton’s *The Private Soldier under Washington* (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1902), which details the lives of the soldiers, their equipment, and the problems of organizing the patriot armies. It contains little on the social origins or motives of the troops, but remains the only published national study of the men. Allen Bowman’s *The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1964; first published in 1943), is narrower in subject than Bolton’s work, but is a good survey of the problems patriot leaders faced in maintaining army morale. A scholarly investigation of the civilian origins of the Maryland Continentals is in “General Smallwood’s Recruits: The Peacetime Career of the Revolutionary War Private,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., vol. 30 (January, 1973), pp. 117-132, by Edward C. Papenfuse and Gregory A. Stiverson. *The Delaware Continentals* (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1941), by Christopher Ward, and *The North Carolina Continentals* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), by Hugh F. Rankin, are lively narratives of the troops of these states. Some of the campaigns of the New Jersey Brigade are related in William S. Stryker’s volumes on *The New Jersey Continental Line In The Virginia Campaign Of 1781* (Trenton, 1882), and *General William Maxwell’s Brigade Of The New Jersey Continental Line In The Expedition Against The Indians in the Year 1779* (Trenton, 1885).

Other, more general works, have useful information on the men. Benjamin Quarles’ *The Negro In The American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., by University of North Carolina Press, 1961), covers the activities of black soldiers. New Jersey’s role in the war, including its role in the military effort, is explained in Leonard Lundin’s *Cockpit Of The Revolution: The War For Independence in New Jersey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940; reprinted by Octagon Books, New York,

Some excellent soldiers' accounts are available. Private Joseph Plumb Martin's memoirs were skillfully edited by George F. Scheer and published as *Private Yankee Doodle* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1962). It is a delightful and revealing view of the war from the rank and file. *Rebels and Redcoats*, Hugh F. Rankin and George F. Scheer, eds. (New York: World Publishing Co., 1957) is a fine collection of participants' accounts. Kenneth Roberts, author of many historical novels, collected the diaries of the men who invaded Canada with Benedict Arnold in 1775. Published as *March To Quebec* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1938), they are, with Roberts's comments, valuable sources on the rank and file. James Thacher's *Military Journal Of The American Revolution ...* (Hartford, Conn., 1862), is also a good army account. Together, the above are some of the liveliest reading on military aspects of the war.
New Jersey's Revolutionary Experience
Larry R. Gerlach, Editor

1. Richard F. Hixson The Press in Revolutionary New Jersey
2. John P. Snyder The Mapping of New Jersey in the American Revolution
4. Peter O. Wacker The Cultural Geography of Eighteenth Century New Jersey

5. Mark E. Lender The New Jersey Soldier
6. John T. Cunningham New Jersey's Five Who Signed
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25. Samuel S. Smith The Battle of Monmouth
26. Linda Grant DePauw Fortunes of War: New Jersey Women and the American Revolution
27. Stanley N. Worton Teachers' Guide: Secondary

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