STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Department of Law and Public Safety
DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL
25 Commerce Drive Cranford, N.J. 07016

BULLETIN 2238 October 20, 1976

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ITEM

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October 20, 1976

1. APPELLATE DECISIONS - BLUE PIANO, INC. v. JERSEY CITY ET AL.

Blue Piano, Inc. t/a Blue Piano, Appellant, v. Municipal Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control of the City of Jersey City and Frank Briamonte, Respondents.	On Appeal CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

William J. Caputo, Esq., Attorney for Appellant
Dennis L. McGill, Esq., by Bernard Abrams, Esq., Attorneys for Respondent, Board
Peter E. Reilly, Esq., Attorney for Respondent, Briamonte
Davis, Roth and Beck, Esqs., by Nathan Beck, Esq., Attorneys for Objectors

BY THE DIRECTOR:

The Hearer has filed the following report herein:

Hearer's Report

This is an appeal from the action of the Municipal Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control of the City of Jersey City (hereinafter Board) which, on March 24, 1976 granted the application of respondent Frank Briamonte for a place-to-place transfer of his Plenary Retail Consumption License C-104 from 23 DuPont Street, to 880 Bergen Avenue, Jersey City.

Appellant contends that the action of the Board was erroneous in that the transfer was to a place either within the prohibited distance to a public school, or in such close proximity thereto as to be highly objectionable.

The Board submitted a copy of the resolution adopted by it in which the proximity of the proposed location to the nearby school was referred to, and found to be not adverse to the interests of the public.

Additionally, appellant maintains that the action of the Board was violative of the applicable Ordinance, Section 4:4 (a), which prohibits transfers within 750 feet of existing licensed premises. The Board referred to Sec. 4-4(b)

which contains an exception to that general rule in situations where a licensed premises is required to move because of governmental operation. In such cases, it may move to any site within 4,000 feet of its existing premises. The Board held that the latter situation is applicable to the subject case.

The local Ordinance referred to permits transfers to places of closer proximity when the transfer is the result of hardship; and such transfers have been affirmed on appeal to this Division. Cf. Yurchak et al v. Jersey City, Bulletin 1974, Item 1. That portion of the Ordinance was included for the express purpose of permitting otherwise impermissible transfers, when the requirement of transfer was not the result of the licensees doing. Tube Bar, Inc. v. Commuters Bar, Inc. 18 N.J. Super 351 (App. Div. 1952).

The building in which respondent Briamonte intends to house his license is a nine-story office building which contains, among others, a "business school" in which some teenagers and young adults are enrolled. Appellant's objection to the subject transfer on the basis of the existence of this school became moot, in view of the fact that a letter from the school admitted into evidence indicates that the school officials have no objection to the subject transfer. Whether such "school" was intended to be embraced by the protectory garment of the statute, N.J.S.A. 33:1-76, need not be determined here, as the letter from the school may constitute an implied waiver of the statutory provision. N.J.S.A. 33:1-76 states:

> "...The protection of this section may be waived at the issuance of the license and at each renewal thereafter, by the duly authorized governing body on authority of such church or school...."

However, there exists nearby a local public school, the Martin Luther King elementary school, which appellant concedes, is slightly over 200 feet from the subject premises. It is about 220 feet from a point on the sidewalk in front of the main entrance of the school to a similar point in front of the proposed licensed premises. This was established at the hearing in this Division by the testimony of Detective Cecil West of the Jersey City Police Department, who made measurements at the request of the Board.

Appellant is a competitor of Briamonte; its premises are diagonally across the street. Its manager, Joseph Gorzelnik, testified that there are five licensed premises within the immediate area which has resulted in a saturation of licensed premises. He expressed serious doubts that a new establishment or his own could survive economically if the potential area business were further diluted.

The appellant was joined in its objection by the Parents' Council, Chapter 11, of the Martin Luther King Elementary School. Two of their officers as well as the president of their Council for the entire City, testified that another tavern in the immediate proximity of the school would have a negative effect on the children. They described the high incidence of intoxicated persons in the area; the foul language; urinations; and generally disorderly conduct which has been called to police attention on several occasions. They presented petitions signed by objectors to the transfer, and called attention to a letter to the Board submitted by the counsel of the Board of Education indicating a strong objection by that Board.

The Board Secretary, Joseph J. Faccone, Sr., testified that all of the communications he received registering objection to the transfer were presented to the Board. He expressed belief that the Board approved the transfer because of the restaurant-type establishment that Briamonte planned to create in the new location.

The respondent, Frank Briamonte testified that he has been in the alcoholic beverage business as a licensee or in some connection therewith for more than twenty-five years. He operated his establishment, recently acquired by Urban Renewal Agency, for sixteen years without any violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Law. He explained that, upon the loss of his license situs, the Board admonished him that he must obtain an approved location shortly or his license would not be renewed and, after some searching, he came upon the subject premises.

That location has been a branch Post Office for a number of years and has been recently moved; hence the location was available. He presented a copy of the architect-rendering reflecting the proposed interior of that location. He described the planned establishment as a restaurant containing tables for seventy persons; the cocktail lounge would accomodate twenty-four persons; and the bar an additional twenty-five. He estimates the cost to be about one hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

His attention was called to the complaints of the members of the Parents Council. His reply centered about the proposed restaurant clientele whom he expected would not be made up of the type of derelicts that have brought the area to grief.

The burden of establishing that the action of the Board in granting the transfer was erroneous and should be reversed rests with appellants. Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15. The decision as to whether or not a license will be transferred to a particular locality rests in the first instance within the sound discretion of the local issuing authority. Hudson-Bergen County Retail Liquor Stores Association v.

North Bergen, Bulletin 997, Item 2. Where there is an honest difference of opinion in the exercise of discretion for or against the transfer of a liquor license, the action of the issuing authority in approving the transfer should not be disturbed. Paul v. Brass Rail Liquors, 31 N.J. Super. 211 (App. Div. 1954).

> In such appeals: "the Director conducts a de novo hearing...and makes the necessary factual and legal determination on the record before him... under his settled practice, the Director abides by the municipality's grant or denial of the application so long as its exercise of judgment and discretion was reasonable....". Fanwood v. Rocco, 33 N.J. 404, 414 (1960).

> Further, "once the municipal Board has decided to grant or withhold approval of a premises-enlargement application...its exercise of discretion ought to be accepted on review in the absence of a clear abuse or unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of its discretion....". Lyons Farms Tavern v. Newark, 55 N.J. 292, 303 (1970).

The objections by the representatives of the Parents Council were directed to sociological problems foistered upon the area by the abundance of bars near to the school. There was no criticism whatever raised against respondent, Briamonte. His exemplary record as a licensee is uncontroverted. The apprehensions that additional consumption of alcoholic beverages in the area would result in an increase of the drunkenness problem is not unique. In a parallel matter involving this community, the Director noted:

> "Jersey City is the second-largest municipality in our State; it enjoys a well-organized and directed Police Department of which the residents are justly proud. The loitering, crime, addiction to drugs and concomitant evils are police problems and should be vigorously attacked by that department. Certainly local ordinances exist which would permit the sweeping of sidewalks of loiterers and the reduction of resident's fears." 482 Jackson Avenue Corp. v. Jersey City, Bulletin 2106, Item 3.

A review of the sketch of the proposed restaurant planned by respondent Briamonte indicates an intention to create a substantial establishment. The Board obviously determined that such a facility would not contribute to the offensive conduct described as occurring in the area. The apprehensions of the parents and members of the Board of Education were primarily directed against the incursion into the area of a typical

neighborhood bar, of which there are already too many. They failed to distinguish between the proposed operation and that of such bars; the former is rarely a contributor to the social problems so graphically described by the parents.

I find from the totality of the evidence presented that the transfer was not contrary to the public interest; and that the Board's deliberations and ultimate decision was neither improperly motivated nor an unreasonable arbitrary action. Thus, I find that appellant has failed to sustain its burden of establishing that the action of the Board was erroneous and should be reversed, as required by Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15.

Accordingly, it is recommended that the action of the Board be affirmed, and the appeal herein be dismissed.

Conclusions and Order

Written Exceptions to the Hearer's report were filed pursuant to Rule 14 of State Regulation No. 15.

Exceptions were filed by appellant and the objectors. The Exceptions primarily take issue with the interpretation of the evidence presented by respondent Briamonte which was accepted by both the Board and the Hearing Officer. Additionally, appellant contends that sections (a) and (b) of the subject ordinance preclude a joinder of their effect. The attorney for the objectors, however, admits that "there is obviously no valid argument against the right of the ... Board of the City ... having discretion to permit a place-to-place transfer within 500 feet of an existing licensed premises when hardship is shown." The Hearer found that the facts and law supported the action of the Board.

I have analyzed and assayed the Exceptions herein, and find that they are lacking in merit.

Having carefully considered the entire record herein, including the transcript of the testimony, the exhibits, the Hearer's report, the Exceptions filed with respect thereto, and the Answer to the said Exceptions, I concur in the findings and recommendations of the Hearer and adopt them as my conclusions herein.

Accordingly, it is, on this 3rd day of August 1976,

ORDERED that the action of the respondent Municipal Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control of the City of Jersey City be and the same is hereby affirmed, and the appeal filed herein be and the same is hereby dismissed.

Joseph H. Lerner
Director

2. APPELLATE DECISIONS - MIRAPH ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PATERSON.

Miraph Enterprises, Inc. t/a The Cabaret, Appellant, v. Municipal Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control for the City of Paterson, Respondent.	On Appeal CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

Philip Tanis, Esq., by Michael A. Sternick, Esq., Attorneys for Appellant
Joseph A. La Cava, Esq., by Ralph A. De Luccia, Jr., Esq., Attorneys for Respondent

BY THE DIRECTOR:

The Hearer has filed the following report herein:

Hearer's Report

This is an appeal from the action of the Municipal Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control for the City of Paterson (hereinafter Board) which, on May 3, 1976 suspended appellant's Plenary Retail Consumption License C-248, for premises 11 Hamilton Street, Paterson, for a period of one-hundred twenty days, on four charges, and on May 14, 1976 for thirty additional days of a fifth charge. The charges of which appellant was found guilty resulted in a total suspension of one-hundred fifty days.

The charges alleged that on February 25, 27 and 28, 1976, appellant conducted its premises as a nuisance in that it permitted the congregation of known prostitutes therein; in violation of Rule 4 of State Regulation No. 20; two further charges alleged that on February 27 and 28, 1976 it permitted prostitutes to solicit patrons; in violation of Rule 5 of State Regulation No. 20.

The appellant contended, in its petition of appeal, that the Board had based its determination on improper evidence. The Board denied this contention, averring that the conclusions reached were based upon the preponderance of the credible evidence. The appellant further contended that the Board arrived at its conclusion by the admitted route of making a determination based on appellant's prior record instead of referring to appellant's prior record for admeasurement of penalty only.

This de novo appeal was heard in this Division, with full opportunity afforded the parties to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses, pursuant to Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15. Additionally, the Board introduced and relied upon the transcript of the proceedings before it, in accordance with Rule 8 of State Regulation No. 15.

However, the Board did produce an additional witness whom it was unable to produce at the hearing before it, viz., Rodger D. Thunell, a patron of appellant's premises on the evening of February 28, 1976. He testified that he visited a series of taverns on that evening, finally entering appellant's premises. After ten or so minutes, standing near the bar, he was approached by a female who indicated certain sexual pleasures might await if he departed with her. Doing so, they proceeded to his automobile at which point the woman negotiated a price for sexual favors. He asserted that no negotiations occurred within appellant's premises.

I.

In reference to those charges against appellant which allege that it permitted solicitation for prostitution within its premises, a review of the transcript of the proceedings before the Board as well as the testimony of Thunell, fails to reveal any such action by anyone being called to the attention of any agent or employee of appellant or being done in such manner that appellant's employees should have known of its occurrance.

Despite the vigorous argument of Board's counsel, the alleged permitting of solicitation for prostitution by the employees of appellant was, at best, by inference only. A Police Lieutenant was solicitated by a prostitute using sotto voce out of earshot of any employee in the premises. The patron, Thunell, by his own admission, was not in negotiations by the prostitute within the appellant's premises; such negotiations did not commence until he was well away from the tavern.

While there is not set formula for determining the quantum of evidence required, each case being governed by its own circumstances, the verdict must be supported by substantial evidence. Hornauer v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 40 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 1956).

Although there is ample inference born of suspicion that the employees within appellant's establishment should have known that the parade of prostitutes within the premises were obviously plying their trade there, there is no proof that appellant's agents knew, or should have known, that the illegal practices were being carried out within the premises itself.

Applying a further principle, in order for appellant to prevail in the instant matter, it must appear that the evidence did not preponderate in support of the determination of the Board. Feldman v. Irvington, Bulletin 1969, Item 2.

Accordingly, I find that the evidence presented before the Board supported by additional testimony given at the de novo appeal in this Division, does not preponderate in favor of the Board; to the contrary, it appears that the appellant has sustained its burden of proving that the action of the Board was erroneous insofar as it found appellant guilty on charges 3 and 5 of the subject resolutions. I recommend that appellant be found not guilty as to those specific charges.

II.

The remaining charges as embraced by charges 1, 2 and 4 as contained in the subject resolution, refer to the appellant maintaining a nuisance by permitting the assembly of known prostitutes within its premises on February 27 and 28 of 1976.

The ample proofs before the Board were furnished by the testimony of Paterson Police Detectives Casper Morelli and Dante DeStefano and Police Lieutenant Thomas Mahull. Their combined testimony related the presence of six or more known prostitutes within the premises at their individual visitations. The Board had before it the Police records reflecting complaints against Diane Gray, Amanda Timmons, Carry Webster, Mildred Conde, Shawn Fritts, Gwendolyn Riley, Peggy Dunn, Wilma Moore, who, with the exception of Diane Gray, were found guilty of solicitation for prostitution.

Appellant contended that there was no proof that the principal stockholder of appellant corporation, or any of its employees, were aware of the identity of the known prostitutes. Such contention is spurious. Not only were the appellant's agents and employees warned of the prostitution traffic, but the principal owner of the corporate appellant admitted, in testimony before the Board, that he had presented a list of named prostitutes to his manager. It was further admitted that known prostitutes had solicited cars and men directly outside the subject premises.

It has been consistently held that the licensee and its agents are not only expected to regulate the activity on licensed premises but must use their eyes and ears and must use them effectively to prevent the improper use of the licensed premises. Re Schuler, Bulletin 1787, Item 1; re Ehrlich, Bulletin 1441, Item 5; re DiMattia, Bulletin 1645, Item 1; re Perla's, Inc., Bulletin 1946, Item 3; Bilowith v. Passaic, Bulletin 527, Item 3.

The records of this Division indicate that, less than six months prior to the date of the subject offenses, the appellant pleaded not guilty to a charge, among others, of employing a convicted prostitute. Hence, appellant was aware of the localized activity of prostitution from which it should have guarded itself.

> "Experience has firmly established that taverns where wine, men, women, and song centralize should be conducted with circumspect respectibility. Such is a reasonable and justfiable demand of our social and moral welfare intelligently to be recognized by out licensed tavern proprietors in the maintenance and continuation of their individualized privilege and concession." McFadden's Lounge, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 33 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div. 1654).

It has long been held that solicitation for immoral purposes and the making of arrangements for sexual intercourse cannot and will not be tolerated on licensed premises. The public is entitled to protection from these sordid and dangerous evils. In re 17 Club, Inc., Bulletin 949, Item 2, aff'd. 26 N.J. Super 43 (App. Div. 1963); re Lemongelli, Bulletin 1960, Item 2.

From the testimony of the police officers it is apparent that appellant's premises are, in fact, a congregation point for the area prostitutes. Official notice may be taken of former taverns which were the hub of prostitution activity, and which licenses have been revoked. Apparently, the frequenters of these former places now use appellant's premises as a focal point.

Although this thesis has not been fully substantiated by the proofs, the evidence does establish the substantial number of the prostitutes and their casual activity in these premises. There was uncontroverted proof that solicitation of both the Police Lieutenant and patron Thunnell did take place within the premises; thus it may be concluded that the prostitutes are not using appellant's tavern merely as a rest stop en route to other arenas.

I find that there was substantial evidence to support the Board's findings with respect to charges 1, 2 and 4 and that appellant failed to sustain its burden of establishing that the action of the Board was erroneous. I recommend that the action of the Board on those charges be affirmed.

It should be noted that records in this Division indicate prior investigations of appellant's premises on allegations of prostitution activity on three occasions in 1975. Although no evidence of such resulted, appellant's license was suspended for twenty-five days effective October 20, 1975, in consequence of a brawl which occurred within the premises; and, thereafter appellant's license was suspended for fifteen days by the Board and affirmed by the Director to become effective June 15, 1976 upon a finding that it employed an unauthorized person who permitted distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (drugs) on the licensed premises and permitted premises to be operated as a nuisance. Miraph Enterprises, Inc. v. Paterson, Bulletin , Item ; Bulletin , Item .

The above has no direct relevancy to the penalty imposed by the Board or to its findings; however, attention is called to appellant's record as indication of the callousness and disregard of the laws and regulations pertinent to the operation of a licensed premises.

It is recommended that the action of the Board in finding appellant guilty of charges 1, 2 and 4, with the commensurate penalty imposed by the Board on these charges of sixty days be affirmed. It is, further, recommended that its findings of guilt on charges 3 and 5 be reversed, for reasons hereinabove stated.

Conclusions and Order

Written Exceptions to the Hearer's report, with supportive argument, were filed by appellant pursuant to Rule 4 of State Regulation No. 15; and an Answer thereto was filed by respondent, who, additionally, filed Exceptions to part of the recommendations contained in the said report.

The Exceptions filed by appellant are without merit in that the record amply supports the conclusions reached by the Hearer. In its Exceptions, the appellant argues that the manager of the licensed premises and other employees were aware of the specific identity of the prostitutes. However, the record indicates that, despite their proper names being unknown to appellant, their descriptions were available to it from police information at hand, and appellant could have taken appropriate action if it truly desired to exclude them from the premises.

The principal stockholder of the corporate appellant admitted that a known prostitute was in the premises on one occasion, but that his efforts to rid her from the premises were aborted because of his inability to reach a certain police lieutenant. Similar responses throughout his testimony led the Hearer to his finding with respect thereto.

The appellant maintains that, in view of the fact that the convicted prostitute who had been employed in its premises, had been charged with violating a local ordinance, the Hearer should not have referred to her as a convicted prostitute. I find this reasoning to be unsound. The woman was charged with prostitution after being identified as such, and the charge was downgraded, (as frequently is the procedure, in order to expedite the disposition of these matters) so that it came within the Disorderly Persons section of the local ordinance which contains reference to prostitution. The charge specifically refers to the prostitution section of that ordinance. The denial at this time of the reference to the offense referred to, is patently absurd, and is rejected.

Appellant further contends that the Hearer based his findings upon dismissals of charges rather than on convictions. Appellant has misread the report. The references to the prior charges, which were dismissed upon hearing, were merely to indicate that prostitution was rampant in the general area in which the premises are located. Therefore, appellant had the continuing obligation to adequately control the premises, so that it did not permit the conditions which gave rise to these charges.

In reviewing the Hearer's report in its totality, I find the report reflects with reasonable accuracy the sum of the testimony, and any inconsistancies as noted by appellant are of such minor nature that the recommendations of the Hearer are unaffected. I, therefore, find the Exceptions filed on behalf of appellant to be without merit.

Respondent filed Exceptions to the recommendation that the charges (3 and 5) relating to solicitation for prostitution on the licensed premises be dismissed in that appellant "should have known" that the police officer and the patron Thunell were solicited there. Respondent relies on Benedetti v. Trenton, 35 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 1955). Reliance upon Benedetti in this instance is misplaced.

The facts in Benedetti evidenced such proliferation of prostitution activity, accompanied by the frank admission of the licensee that his premises were a focal point of congregation by prostitutes, that it was held that such numbers eroded the licensee's contention that he and his employees were unaware of such solicitation, particularly on the heels of admissions by seven known prostitutes that they had, indeed, solicited within the premises.

The facts here relate to isolated instances and, although there were numbers of prostitutes present, the evidence of solicitation by the prostitutes of Police Officer Mahull and patron Thunell, could not, in and by itself, inculcate the appellant's employees. The hearer correctly noted that the evidence relevant to these charges (3 and 5) was insubstantial, and that the respondent's action with respect thereto should be reversed.

However, it is apparent that the Hearer did err in the computation of the period of suspension of license. The Board had imposed a suspension of thirty days on each count of the charge. The Hearer recommended affirmance on three of the five charges (charges 1, 2 and 4) with recommendation of reversal on charges 3 and 5. As elementary arithmetic indicates, a suspension of the charges 1, 2 and 4 at thirty days each would result in a total suspension of ninety days, rather than the sixty as indicated by the Hearer.

Having examined the entire record herein, including the transcript of the proceedings before the Board and the transcript of the proceedings held in this Division, the Hearer's report, the Exceptions filed by appellant and the Answers to the said Exceptions, as well as respondent's Exceptions to the said report, I concur in the recommendations of the Hearer and hereinabove modified, and adopt them as my conclusions herein.

Accordingly, it is, on this 9th day of August 1976,

ORDERED that the action of the respondent Board of Alcoholic Beverage for the City of Paterson in finding appellant guilty of charges 1, 2 and 4, be and the same is hereby affirmed; and it is further

ORDERED that the action of respondent in finding appellant guilty on charges 3 and 5 be and the same is hereby reversed; and it is further

ORDERED that my order dated May 5, 1976, staying respondent's order of suspension be and the same is hereby vacated; and it is further

ORDERED that Plenary Retail Consumption License C-248, issued by the Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control for the City of Paterson to Miraph Enterprises, Inc. t/a The Cabaret for premises 11 Hamilton Street, Paterson, be and the same is hereby suspended for ninety (90) days, commencing at 3:00 a.m. on Thursday, August 19, 1976 and terminating at 3:00 a.m. on Wednesday, November 17, 1976.

Joseph H. Lerner
Director

3. DIRECTOR'S ADVISORY OPINION - INQUIRY RELATIVE TO ELIGIBILITY TO ENGAGE IN ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE INDUSTRY FOLLOWING CRIME - ATTEMPTED OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE.

In the Matter of an Application of)
) ADVISORY OPINION
Charles S. Barondess)
Elig. No. 879)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -)

BY THE DIRECTOR:

The applicant seeks an advisory opinion as to whether or not he is eligible to engage in the alcoholic beverage industry by reason of his conviction of a crime. N.J.S.A. 33:1-25.

The applicant was convicted of attempted obstruction of justice on November 26, 1975 in Union County Court. He was sentenced to one to two years in State Prison, suspended, fined in the amount of $1,000.00 and placed on probation for a period of one year.

At the hearing held herein, an opportunity was afforded applicant to present background facts and circumstances surrounding his conviction which the Director may take into consideration. See Div. of A.B.C. v. McNally, 91 N.J. Super 513 (App. Div. 1966), Cert. den. 48 N.J.605 (1966). Applicant testified that he presently holds 100% of stock of three corporations which hold Plenary Retail Consumption licenses in the State of New Jersey; and that he has been engaged in the alcoholic beverage industry for a period of approximately 10 years.

The applicant stated that the facts of the conviction in question related to the renewal of a plenary retail consumption license in the Borough of Roselle Park. Numerous objections were made to the renewal of the license in question. An individual who lived next to the licensed premises approached the applicant and advised the applicant that he and his brother did not object to the renewal of the license, and that they were willing to testify in a favorable manner at the hearing before the Borough Council, if the applicant would compensate them for their lost wages for the day of appearance at the hearing, which amounted to a total of $150.00.

The applicant gave the stated amount of money to the individuals. The prospective witnesses never appeared or testified at the renewal hearing. The license in question was renewed nevertheless.

The applicant forcefully maintains his innocence; that he pleaded guilty to the offense as a result of a plea bargaining agreement upon the advice of his attorney.

Under the facts and circumstances as described above, I find that the applicant's conviction in question does not involve the element of moral turpitude.

Accordingly, the applicant is not disqualified to engage in the alcoholic beverage industry in this State.

Joseph H. Lerner,
Director

Dated: August 18, 1976

4. STATE LICENSES - NEW APPLICATION FILED.

High Grade Beverage
Georges Road off Route 130
South Brunswick Township, New Jersey
Application filed October 15, 1976
for place-to-place transfer of State
Beverage Distributor's License SBD-187
from 422 Jersey Avenue, New Brunswick,
New Jersey.

Joseph H. Lerner
Director