

386

A



3 3009 00117 4558

**RAILROADS FIGHT  
NEW JERSEY SHIP CANAL**

---

**ADDRESS AND BRIEFS**

OF

**HON. J. HAMPTON MOORE**

President, Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association


BEFORE

**SPECIAL BOARD OF ARMY  
ENGINEERS**

PROPERTY OF  
RECEIVED

**AUG 3 - 1937**

**NEW JERSEY STATE LIBRARY  
TRENTON**



**CUSTOM HOUSE**

**PHILADELPHIA**

July 14, 1937

J386.4

m822r

c. l.

## ADDRESS

---

Mr. Moore said:

*Gentlemen of the Board:* Your Special Board of Army Engineers appointed by authority of the Secretary of War, is directed, as we understand it, to review House Document No. 93, Seventy-fourth Congress, and prior reports on the "New York Bay-Delaware River Section of the Intra-Coastal Waterway," with a view to determining "the advisability of constructing a waterway of lesser dimensions than those considered in the two previous reports on this section." In short, the project you are to consider is that section of the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway now generally known as "the missing link" extending from Bordentown on the Delaware River across the State of New Jersey to Raritan Bay and approaches to New York, at a depth "less" than 25 feet which heretofore has been regarded as adequate for ships, barges, yachts and other craft desiring to use the inside channel, now otherwise constructed, from Miami to New England.

We are making this specific statement because of some confusion that has arisen in the public mind, particularly in the State of New Jersey, with regard to the route of the proposed canal. The Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association, without prejudice to any activities in the State of New Jersey or elsewhere, is not advocating the restoration of the abandoned and now partially filled-in Delaware and Raritan Canal which rendered excellent service in earlier years, nor is it substituting in this instance the New Jersey coastal waterway behind the beach islands, which is now operating under the direction of the New Jersey State Board of Commerce and Navigation. It is adhering to and insisting upon a Federal waterway across the State of New Jersey to provide "the last and missing link" of the great Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway now legislatively authorized and constructed (except for the New Jersey "missing link") for the safe passage inland

FOR  
BUSINESSMEN  
YACHTSMEN  
LIFESAVERS  
TIMESAVERS

## THE BATTLE

for an

## ATLANTIC INTRA-COASTAL WATERWAY

has been carried to Congress  
for thirty years—

With these results:

- (1) The Cape Cod Canal has been built and enlarged, enabling vessels to proceed to and from Boston inside Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket, avoiding the fogs and storms outside, and reducing the risk and sailing distance.
- (2) Improved waterways inland from Boston to New York, up the Hudson to Albany and Troy and across New York State by way of the New York State Barge Canal to Buffalo, Oswego, the Great Lakes and the Mississippi.
- (3) Improved waterways for deep draft vessels, barges and pleasure craft from New York, Boston and Hudson River points to Raritan Bay, New Jersey.
- \* (4) Surveys and reports on canal across New Jersey, now known as "the Missing Link." This "Missing Link" is now being reviewed by a Special Board of United States Army Engineers. Until it is built all commerce and pleasure craft and vessels of the Army and Navy desiring to use the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway must go out into the open sea and waste at least 200 miles of sailing distance between New York and Philadelphia.
- (5) Delaware River deepened to 25 feet from Trenton, New Jersey, to Philadelphia and 35 feet to the entrance of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal at Reedy Point, Delaware, in anticipation of "the Missing Link."
- (6) Chesapeake and Delaware Canal (formerly a toll canal, now free of tolls) deepened from 9 to 27 feet from the Delaware River at Reedy Point to Chesapeake Bay—awaiting "the Missing Link."
- (7) Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal (now free of tolls hitherto charged) improved from Chesapeake Bay at Hampton Roads and connected up with inland waterways through Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida—a distance of 1,435 miles from Trenton, New Jersey, to Miami, Florida—the union of Northern and Southern waters being effected at Socastee, South Carolina, May, 1936.

For further particulars, read the enclosed brochure entitled "Railroads Fight New Jersey Canal," or communicate with the United States Army Engineers, or the

ATLANTIC DEEPER WATERWAYS ASSOCIATION,  
Widener Building, Philadelphia, Pa.

\* Arrayed against the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway thus far constructed, and opposing its completion by the erection of "the Missing Link" across New Jersey, are ten railroads connected with the Associated Railways of the United States, who oppose free canals and waterway competition.

of vessels desiring this national service, from the tip of Florida through all the seaboard States, to Boston and New England and, by way of the Hudson River and the New York State Barge Canal, to the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River. The project we advocate and which must be incorporated into the comprehensive national plan of protected waterways, if they are to be made effectively serviceable to the American people, is well known to the Army Engineers, and has been the subject of numerous reports by boards of inquiry authorized by the Congress of the United States. In every report thus far submitted by the War Department on the project of the so-called "missing link," its tremendous advantages, not only to the State of New Jersey, but to the whole Nation, have been enlarged upon, the element of cost only standing in the way generally of a favorable report. The State of New Jersey by legislative action, early supported by Governor Woodrow Wilson, has time and again indicated its willingness to co-operate with the Federal Government, going so far as to guarantee the cost of the right of way across the State when Congress, acting upon a favorable report of the War Department, shall have given the word to go ahead.

*Not Local But National.*

As recently as April, 1936, after the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway, now thwarted only by the absence of "the missing link," had been negotiated along the entire coast from Cape Cod to Miami, and the last link in the southern chain for a distance of 1,435 miles from Miami, Florida, to Trenton, New Jersey, had been welded together in liquid bond at Socastee, South Carolina, Major General E. M. Markham, Chief of Engineers, with pardonable pride in the constructive work that had been accomplished on this great American waterway, summed up with a tribute to those volunteers of the Association who had been standing by the project for thirty years, and added: "While our recent report to Congress on the proposed Ship Canal across the State of New Jersey found that the cost of the improvement was considerably in excess of the anticipated benefits, it is still possible to visualize in the not too distant future, the provision of a com-

pletely protected route extending from New York City to Miami, and connecting with the Gulf route to Corpus Christi."

Like all his predecessors from the time of General MacKenzie, during whose administration the legislation for the Intra-Coastal Waterway from Boston to Beaufort, N. C., on to Key West, Florida, and thence across Florida and along the Gulf to Corpus Christi, Texas, was approved by Congress, General Markham, constructor of great national works such as dams and flood control and leader in the work of providing adequate rivers and harbors for the United States, visualized what we are pleading for today—the *completion* of a comprehensive inland waterway plan moving in all directions, North, South and West, toward the thirty-mile stretch inland across the State of New Jersey, which, while it remains the obstructive menace it now is, drives all vessels, large and small, into the open sea at great risk of life and property.

#### *Other Canals Built and Connected.*

Whereas, since the completion of the Cape Cod Canal, the new Chesapeake and Delaware Canal and the southern canals leading from Norfolk to Miami—all a part of the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway—there has been a considerable lessening of losses of life and property along the coast, the ocean continues to take its toll where safe inside passageways have not been provided. A Coast Guard Service report, presented to the Trenton Convention of the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association last year, disclosed that from Sandy Hook to Cape May during the preceding year, "assistance was rendered in cases involving 2,359 lives and the property involved was valued at \$3,351,310." Returns for the current fiscal year are not all in, but Rear Admiral Waesche advises us that up to July, they are as follows: "Instances of major assistance, 1,013; instances of miscellaneous assistance, 492; persons on board vessels assisted, 3,480; persons saved and rescued from peril, 992; value of vessels assisted (including cargoes), \$3,932,985."

We do not have statistics of the lives actually lost, but there were many.

Where the Federal Government erects canals or inland waterways which safeguard life and property, and attempts to make them continuous as in the case of the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway, it is difficult to understand why, all else along the coast being provided for, life and property should be risked unduly only along the New Jersey coast between the great cities of New York and Philadelphia where population is densest and the needs of transportation greatest. It is even more difficult to comprehend, when expensive dams and public works are being constructed in other parts of the country, and Congress is being asked to make vast expenditures for the St. Lawrence Waterway in Canada.

Continual postponement of the national project in New Jersey because of probable cost, only aggravates this situation. There is evidence in the reports subject to review by your Board, of the interest of the Navy in inland waterways connecting large cities like Boston and New York, New York and Philadelphia, Philadelphia and Baltimore, Baltimore and Norfolk, and so on down the line. In another brief I shall submit quotations from Secretaries of the Navy, from Admiral Sperry, who took the fleet around the world, from Admiral W. S. Benson, who was Chief of Naval Operations during the World War, and many others, who confirmed the strategic as well as essential value of inland approaches to the various Navy Yards of the coast.

#### *Army and Navy Involved.*

The absence of ship contact between two great Navy Yards like those at Brooklyn and Philadelphia constitutes a menace which, affecting all other Atlantic Navy Yard approaches, should be removed. There is record of a War Department report from the office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, February, 1915, when the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal was under consideration, which may here be quoted. The Board reporting to Mr. Secretary Garrison consisted of Brigadier General Macomb, Chief of War College Division, and Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss, Acting Chief of Staff. They were strong for an enlarged Chesapeake and Delaware Canal to accommodate submarines or other naval

craft which could be used "for preventing the landing of troops from hostile transports," and for other defensive purposes. They held that such a canal was essential for the defense of Wilmington and Philadelphia, and they wrote into their report that "a canal along this line and one from Delaware Bay to New York Harbor would make a landing of hostile troops almost impossible between Narragansett Bay and Chesapeake Bay." They regarded the construction of the enlarged Chesapeake and Delaware Canal as part only of the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway which, carried across the State of New Jersey, would be of equal or greater value. It is noteworthy that since that report was made, the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal has been deepened from 10 to 12 feet, and is now being enlarged to a 27-foot depth for the accommodation not only of war vessels, but for sea-going craft that are to trade with the world. But no step toward the actual construction of the New Jersey ship canal has been taken, and, to make matters worse, the antiquated Delaware and Raritan Canal has been completely closed. Surely, it was not the purpose of Congress, nor of the Federal Government, when building the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal to 27 feet or the Cape Cod Canal to 32 feet, to completely bottle up the inland waterway approaches from Southern cities to New York and from Northern and Western cities to Philadelphia. A careful review of all Engineers' reports since General Bixby, the Chief of Engineers in 1912, recommended a 12-foot canal across the State of New Jersey, does not justify any such conclusion or intent, but ever and always the question of cost has been injected, which estimated cost in spite of tremendous expenditures for less important projects in other parts of the country, has been steadily mounting from year to year. These variations, attributed largely to increased costs of material and labor, have applied to both sea level and lock canal projects, but the progressive increases in estimates, have been startling. Cost of construction in 1912-13 (see both Bixby and Black reports) ranged from \$20,000,000 for a lock canal 12 feet deep, to \$45,000,000 for a sea level canal 25 feet deep.

When the World War ended and transportation interests began to oppose the canal, the estimated cost for a 25-foot canal rose to

\$200,000,000 plus. Congress is, therefore, justified in ordering this review to ascertain whether adequate lesser depth or depths can be obtained at lesser costs. It is a matter of record that at one time the whole Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway could have been built according to current estimates, for the cost of a single battleship. The "missing link" might be constructed at no greater cost even at today's high prices.

#### *Railroads Muddle the Estimates.*

At the present time we feel that the cost of excavation as estimated in previous reports is excessive; that the number of bridges estimated as needful, is too many; that lock canal construction is unnecessary except for one emergency lock at Bordentown. We feel that slope protection cost has been exaggerated; likewise, the engineering cost. We regard the over-worked salinity question is not justified by the facts, and would feel sorry for any Board of Engineers that would hold itself incapable of controlling such a situation. The salinity question has been injected, not by those interested in the construction of the canal, but by those who would obstruct it. It is more or less a bugaboo. We believe a sea level canal adequate in depth and bottom width could be erected at present-day costs, even if W. P. A. were not employed, at from \$65,000,000 to \$85,000,000. We believe the estimate of cost for right of way, which is about the only cost of importance charged to the State of New Jersey, is too high. The railroads have not apologized for injecting disturbing figures into their calculations of costs which at first were accepted as authentic.

We quote from the Engineers' report (Document No. 93, page 29), Chief of Engineers' letter to Chairman Mansfield, Committee on Rivers and Harbors, March 28, 1936: "At a hearing held April 16, 1935, by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, a brief was submitted by the Reading Co. and the Pennsylvania Railroad Co., in which it was alleged that the cost of right of way for the proposed canal would be materially in excess of that estimated by the special board. An independent check of the figures submitted by the railroad interests fails to show a justification for their contention, although the Board's present estimate runs

about \$1,000,000 over the figures of a few years ago. In order to make the figures comparable, the check has been confined to the limits of the railroad's study, so does not include the cost of spoilage-disposal areas.

"The special board's estimate of cost of right-of-way, referred to by the railroad interests, was based on figures prepared some 2 years ago, and came to an aggregate of \$1,040,000. An investigation just completed for the special board by Capt. H. M. Underwood, of the Second New York District, places the probable cost at \$2,051,700. Compared to this sum, the railroads' estimate is \$8,787,850. A tabulation prepared by Captain Underwood is included as part of his report, which is hereto appended as enclosure I. (Not printed.) This tabulation shows in parallel columns the railroad estimates and those of the special board, broken down as to counties, townships and boroughs.

"It is to be noted especially that the railroads show \$1,100,000 as the assessed valuation of land in the city of New Brunswick that would allegedly be damaged by the canal; while, in their summary, the purchase price of that land, plus damages, is shown at \$5,000,000. The only apparent explanation of this wide spread between assessed valuation and purchase price is in their statement that their estimates are 'based on experience in appraising and acquiring like properties.'"

#### *Other Railroad Misinformation.*

There is not time now to discuss the brief filed with the Special Board of Engineers of the War Department, October 8, 1934, by counsel for railroads serving ports at New York and Philadelphia, which weighed in one of the "adverse reports," but it might be perused by your Board as a reminder of other misinformation which railroad agents have imposed upon the Engineers. Nor were the activities of these same agents successful in holding up other links of the Intra-Coastal Waterway as in the case of their opposition to the 12-foot channel project, a link of the Intra-Coastal Waterway extending from Charleston to Savannah. They were just as sure that all other links of the 1,435-mile completed waterway from Trenton to Miami were "the dreams of certain

enthusiasts," as they are that "the project originated politically in Philadelphia, and that it has grown to gargantuan proportions," threatening the existence of the railroads of the country. Statements such as these may well be attributed to such influences as chloroformed the Delaware and Raritan Canal across the State of New Jersey and then unloaded it on that State, depriving it of any inland water contact whatever between New York and Philadelphia.

I also call to the attention of the Board the naive but now historic letter of General Atterbury, President of the Pennsylvania Railroad, February 11, 1930, in which, responding to the suggestion that railroads were opposed to the canal across New Jersey, he declared emphatically for "a deep water canal \* \* \* not less than 25 feet, and preferably 35 feet, from some point on Raritan Bay across the State of New Jersey to some point at or near Bordentown; and that the Delaware and Chesapeake Canal should be deepened with the connecting channels, so as to give 35 feet of water from New York Harbor inland through to Norfolk." General Atterbury recognized the gradual opening up of the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway, and he wanted 35 feet through from New York across New Jersey on down to Norfolk. Why? Were the railroads sincerely for the Intra-Coastal Waterway then, or were they demanding a 35-foot channel to block the enterprise because of prohibitive costs? They know the Cape Cod Canal (which did not exist thirty years ago) has been deepened and redeepened until it has attained a 32-foot depth. They know that the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal leading Baltimore out to the sea, has been deepened and redeepened and will soon be opened at a 27-foot depth. Why should they now oppose the canal across New Jersey? Or why should the Federal Government now fall back upon its own comprehensive plan by blocking the Intra-Coastal Waterway across the State of New Jersey, telling those who reach the Delaware River from the South and those who reach New York from the North and the West: "This far you shall go and no farther. Here is where you abandon your safe inland course, turn back or go out to sea whether equipped for it or not."

*Justified by National Conditions.*

You, gentlemen, of the Board have something else besides the interests of railroads or other special interests, to consider in this matter of "the missing link." The industrial, commercial and employment advantages of "the missing link" must engage your attention. After a careful survey from Buffalo to Savannah, our Association reported a probable tonnage of more than 10,000,000, which the Ward report—Document No. 219—increased to 12,500,000, justifying the cost of construction. You must deal with the matter of life-saving, and above all with preparedness which vouchsafes the national defense. These matters are of greater import than the interests of the railroads. Moreover, the Nation cannot withdraw from its own great work now so nearly completed; if it does, great waste will ensue and a great waterway chain will stand useless—its supporting link broken.

The pros and the cons with respect to this national problem are many. Favoring the project are national progress and incidental growth of wealth, industrial and commercial activity, and the employment of labor. A completed waterway chain such as "the missing link" will provide, presages improvements all along the line from New England to Florida and from the Great Lakes to the Gulf. It means a wider interchange of natural resources as well as of manufactured products. It means tremendous re-employment for men hitherto out of work. It means (whether they know it or not) greater business for the railroads, the truckers and all other common carriers. They must share the business which this canal will create. The project is a lifesaving one. It will be a haven for vessels which should not be in the open sea and whose business, commercial or recreational, should be facilitated in safe water routes. It will supply, in the Army and Navy sense, the link that is missing in our scheme of national defense along the Atlantic seaboard.

We are asking that the review by your Board take these and other pertinent matters under consideration. We believe there have been errors in estimates in some of the preceding reports. We dare not say they have slipped in for the purpose of postponing the great work. We have faith in the Engineers, and

believe them capable of building this canal at costs far less than those which have compelled the proponents of the project to persist in their efforts before Congress.

---

**WOODROW WILSON AND OTHER NEW JERSEY  
GOVERNORS FAVOR THE CANAL**

**ATLANTIC DEEPER WATERWAYS ASSOCIATION**

*Philadelphia, July 20, 1937.*

COLONEL JOHN C. H. LEE,  
Chairman, Special Board of Army Engineers,  
900 Custom House, Philadelphia, Pa.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:—At the recent New Jersey ship canal hearing before your Special Board there appeared in opposition, in addition to the railroads who denied "the economic necessity" of the canal, several New Jersey groups, including the New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce and certain spokesmen for the City of Newark. There was no opportunity under the rules to rebut the statements of these New Jersey objectors, but it seems important that you be not misled, so I advise that the Board of Trade of Newark was amongst the original proponents of the cross-State canal, and that they had representation upon the New Jersey State Board appointed by the Governor to proceed under appropriation made by the Legislature to monument a route across the State, which was subsequently put under the general direction of the present New Jersey State Board of Commerce and Navigation. A convention of the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association was held in Newark in the year 1924 when very positive affirmative resolutions endorsed by leading men of New Jersey, were passed.

It may be well also to recall that the New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce, anticipating another pro-canal convention at Atlantic

City, October, 1920, announced from its headquarters in Newark, that:

"The New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce is definitely committed in favor of the proposed sea level canal and urges all the citizens of the State \* \* \* to work for early Congressional action toward the completion of the canal."

You should also be informed that every New Jersey Governor since E. C. Stokes, who helped to organize the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association in Philadelphia in 1907, has looked upon the project as of great advantage to the Nation and to the State. Some of the deliverances of these Governors, not the least of whom was Woodrow Wilson, afterwards President of the United States, will now bear repeating. After a special session of the New Jersey Legislature which he attended April, 1911, Governor Wilson said:

"I am not going to indict the persons who have hitherto controlled the processes of transportation in New Jersey \* \* \* but I do want to point out to you that the railways of New Jersey have so monopolized the traffic of New Jersey that many of her best energies have been cabined and confined until she has had an artificial growth in some parts, and that growth in very few parts."

Referring to the advocates of the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway who had appeared before the State Legislature in his presence, the Governor added:

"These men gathered together to show her how she had but to open her arteries and let the blood flow, how she had to make a little link here and a little link there and nature's great fluid highways would carry her boats and her cargoes—link her processes of trade with every part of the country, north and south, keep her away from the winds and dangers of the outer coast and see her factories grow thick along the lines of the great highway where no man could establish a monopoly and where the people would have their rule and their opportunity. \* \* \* These are the things that are gathering the forces in the capitol of Trenton."

Previously, Governor John Franklin Fort who promoted legislation for the construction of the New Jersey inland waterway from Cape May to Manasquan, addressing a Waterways Convention at Providence in 1910, made this reference to the proposed cross-State canal:

"It crosses our State from the Raritan Bay at Amboy to the Delaware at Bordentown, a distance of thirty-three and a half miles. From the City of New York to Bordentown by water, going around Cape May and up the Delaware, is 297 miles. If the waterway proposed be constructed, from New York to Bordentown, it will be only about 57 miles, a saving of 240 miles of water transportation, and it will cut off, of the distance by water, fully 200 miles between New York and Philadelphia. What this would mean to manufacturing and other industries established in New Jersey, on the waterway and along the coast, is past estimation. Our location makes such a waterway of greater value to us than to almost any other State."

Addressing the Legislature at Trenton, February 19, 1917, Governor Walter E. Edge, afterwards United States Senator and Ambassador to France, said:

"These acts definitely commit New Jersey to the securing of the necessary right of way, providing the Federal Government appropriates sufficient money to dredge the lands and complete the canal. The New Jersey Department of Commerce and Navigation has been earnestly working on this project, \* \* \* Of course, the ultimate benefit to New Jersey if this canal is built must be apparent to every one. It will not only furnish a safe inland passage between the two metropolitan cities of New York and Philadelphia, which of itself is of untold benefit to the Nation, but it will open to manufacturing industries that will locate within our borders, miles of water-bound territory, inviting millions of dollars of capital to the State. It is a project that New Jersey should back with vigor and determination."

Governors Edwards and Silzer also strongly advocated the canal. Governor Edwards continued to do this after he became United States Senator. In January, 1926, Governor George S. Silzer, favoring an appropriation for "the acquisition of land necessary for a trans-State ship canal to be built from the Delaware River to Raritan Bay, and so complete the National Inland Waterway," said:

"I am thoroughly in accord with the project, especially if it can be co-ordinated with a trans-State highway and railroad, and if provision be made for manufacturing sites along the canal."

In an inaugural address January 14, 1929, Governor Morgan F. Larson came out flat-footed for the canal across the State. He said:

"The trans-State ship canal is of National and State importance. It would furnish the last link of the Atlantic Inland Waterways between New England and the South. Its importance to New Jersey cannot be over-estimated. It would make New Jersey the commercial highway of the nation. It would reduce freight rates, stimulate industry and invite the establishment of new enterprises along its route. It would constitute a safer route. It would save in water shipments between New York and Philadelphia 187 miles that are now consumed in traveling around Cape May."

More recently Governor Harold F. Hoffman, both as a member of Congress and as Governor of New Jersey, has supported the waterway project. He personally attended the Waterway Convention, at which favorable resolutions were passed, at Trenton, October, 1936, and presided at one of the convention sessions.

I can cite numerous other New Jersey endorsements of the canal across the State, many of them from farmers and shippers who have been hedged in by railroad freight rates and who desire the additional business and employment which would result from the linking up of the northern and southern waterways across the State of New Jersey. Yacht and motor boat owners, too, are intensely interested in the project.

Very truly yours,

J. HAMPTON MOORE,

*President.*

## GREAT PROJECT STARTED BUT NOT COMPLETED

### ATLANTIC DEEPER WATERWAYS ASSOCIATION

*Philadelphia, July 21, 1937.*

COLONEL JOHN C. H. LEE,

Chairman, Special Board of Army Engineers,  
900 Custom House, Philadelphia, Pa.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:—That you may be further informed as to the attitude of the representatives of several trade bodies who supported the railroad opposition to the New Jersey ship canal project at the hearing July 14th, I wish to advise that most of the organizations for whom they filed objections have hitherto heartily supported the project. I cite The Bourse, whose secretary submitted a protest. The facts are that the founder of The Bourse, George E. Bartol, and the long-time secretary, Emil P. Albrecht who was an expert in port matters, were pioneers in the work of deepening the Delaware River and in promoting the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway, of which it is an important link. The senior Mr. Bartol, who had a wide commercial acquaintance, was one of the founders of the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association. He was urgently in favor of the New Jersey ship canal as a part of the Intra-Coastal Waterway, as a coal and heavy freight carrier and as a rate regulator. At the first convention held in Philadelphia in 1907, where he presided at several of the sessions, Mr. Bartol said:

"This waterway project is not a new thing, of course, but an old thing that has been revamped, and now has behind it what it never had before, the united sentiment of the North, the South and the whole Eastern coast. As I think of this waterway I can close my eyes and picture every river entering into the Atlantic, from Maine to Louisiana, canalized, improved and bringing down to this waterway the products of the interior of those States for transportation between the North and South on a free highway."

Both Mr. Bartol and Mr. Albrecht, founders of the present-day Bourse, attended other conventions to promote the Intra-Coastal Waterway, participating in the preparation of approving resolutions.

As an expression of Philadelphia sentiment I am able to quote another founder of a large Philadelphia institution, Mr. J. M. Pew, of the Sun Oil Company. At the Baltimore Convention of 1908 when ways and means for carrying on the work of the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association were under discussion, Mr. Pew said:

"It seems to me that this Association was not formed for one year, two years or five years. If we are going to really accomplish what we have started out to do, it means that some citizens must look after the matter for some years to come, and there will be many essential and necessary expenses to be provided for during that period. \* \* \* To my mind it is a very important business, and very much will be involved if we follow this up to the finish. My experience is that it is much easier to start things than to follow them out to the finish. It will be a great thing if we can get these canals built, but we can afford to sacrifice a great deal to do it."

Mr. Pew then proceeded, with the consent of the Convention, to raise funds to carry on the voluntary work of the Association in accordance with his views.

The Committee on Resolutions of the Baltimore Convention of 1908, included Senator Anthony Higgins of Delaware, Chairman; Charles Heber Clark of Philadelphia; Congressman John H. Small of North Carolina; W. E. Cotterell of Virginia; Congressman Irving P. Wanger of Pennsylvania; Thomas G. Boggs of Maryland and R. G. Rhett of South Carolina. The resolutions contained these significant paragraphs:

*Resolved*, That the business interests of the seaboard population directly, and of the entire nation indirectly, require the removal, at the earliest possible moment, of the natural obstructions to a free interior deep water route from Massachusetts Bay to Key West along the lines indicated by exist-

ing canals and by surveys made under the auspices of the Government of the United States.

*Resolved*, That in the judgment of the members of this Association, and of several of the foremost railway experts in the country, the construction of this water highway can alone give gravely necessary and permanent relief to the business of transportation already hampered by insufficient facilities and threatened with more serious obstruction in the early future.

*Resolved*, That the evidence is conclusive that an interior deep water channel along the coast will be likely to repay even very large cost within a brief period by reducing the charges for the movement of commodities.

*Resolved*, That the canals should be digged in any case by the Federal Government; first, because the Government alone has authority over navigable waters; second, because all the canals should be free, but chiefly because the enterprise, planned in the interests of peace, will have incalculable value for the whole nation in case of war.

They were approved by the representatives of Atlantic coastal States from Maine to Florida and by commercial and business interests, including from Philadelphia and Pennsylvania delegates from the Philadelphia Bourse, the Trades League, the Board of Trade, the Commercial Exchange, the Paint Manufacturers' Club, the Tug Boat Owners' Association, the Allentown Retail Coal Association; National Board of Trade; Carriage Builders' Association; Corinthian Yacht Club; Grocers' and Importers' Exchange; Maritime Exchange; Lumbermen's Exchange; Hardware Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association; Master Builders' Exchange; Quarrymen's Association; Vessel Owners' and Captains' Association; Foundrymen's Association and the Business Men's and Taxpayers' Association of Frankford. Firms and corporations and leading cities from all the coastal States endorsed the resolutions.

It is true that some of the associations above referred to and many of the leading citizens engaged in laying the foundations

for the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway have passed away, but it is fair in view of the railroad attitude toward this waterway at the present time, that you be informed of the unanimity of sentiment in favor of it at the early conventions of the Association, and, in fact, at all conventions held during the last thirty years. That these founders did not labor in vain, is demonstrated by the completion of 1,435 miles of the Atlantic Intra-Coastal Waterway from Miami to Trenton on the Delaware, by the construction of the Cape Cod and Chesapeake and Delaware Canals, and the improvement of connecting waterways to the Great Lakes and along the Gulf to Texas. It is only across the State of New Jersey that the great work has been held up to the disadvantage of the thousands of commercial and recreational craft which are now compelled to go into the ocean between New York and Philadelphia.

Very truly yours,

J. HAMPTON MOORE,  
*President.*

---

### LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

*Washington, September 30, 1936.*

HONORABLE J. HAMPTON MOORE,  
President, Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association,  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

MY DEAR MR. MOORE:—In my letter to your Association last year it was my pleasure to point out to the members of the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association the progress which had been made in harbor and waterway improvements along the Atlantic Coast with funds of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act. These meritorious public works have been continued and during the past fiscal year funds totaling more than \$24,300,000 have been ex-

ended in the improvement of rivers and harbors on the eastern seaboard. This year has been noteworthy in witnessing the completion of the 1,435-mile inside route of the Intracoastal Waterway from Trenton, New Jersey, to Miami, Florida. Much credit for this accomplishment belongs to your Association and it is to be congratulated therefor. Other waterway projects of permanent value to the Nation sponsored by your Organization have been completed or are progressing in a satisfactory manner.

It is a pleasure for me again to extend my greetings to the members of your Association on the occasion of its twenty-ninth annual convention. Your Organization, since its inception at Trenton in 1907, has been most active in sponsoring waterway improvements along the Atlantic Coast. I may say to you that these improvements are being prosecuted vigorously and that funds for the fiscal year 1937 amounting to \$24,000,000 have been allotted to this purpose. Permit me to congratulate you on the success which has attended your efforts and express my appreciation of your continued interest in natural waterway improvements which serve to increase business and industry, improve employment, and provide lasting benefits to the Nation's welfare.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

---

### THE "RECORD" WAS RIGHT—THEN

(Editorial from the *Philadelphia Record* (now opposing the waterway), October 30, 1911.)

*"Carts, Boats and Rails"*

"In the United States from the outstart of railway development it has been deemed good policy on the part of the railway companies as far as possible to do away with the rivalry of water carrying. To this end vast sums of money have been spent in acquiring control of canals and water lines of coastwise, river and lake transportation, with a view either to compulsory disuse or

to such control of rates and traffic as would destroy effective competition. In this way the canal systems in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio and other States have fallen into destructive control and disuse. In this way coastwise, lake and river carrying has been brought under railway control, to manifest public disadvantage.

"The adoption of such a destructive policy was perhaps natural enough at the beginning, but it was and is a stupendous blunder. Good roads, canals, lake, river and coastwise lines of transport are as a matter of fact the serviceable drudges, feeders and breeders of rail carrying. These instrumentalities build up interior towns and inland ports, which in turn become centers of industrial and commercial activity, creating profitable traffic for the railroads and at the same time affording better and cheaper facilities for heavier and less remunerative traffic. Instead of displacing other forms of land transportation, the railways have trebled the haul over the highways. Similarly they would have trebled the adjunctive business of the canals had railroad managers not been blind to their own prospective advantage.

"The true policy of the railways is a policy of uplift for all other forms of carrying. Interior towns that are near to the coal, iron ore and timber resources of the country should not be deprived of their natural advantage. Inland ports like Philadelphia and Baltimore are natural manufacturing centers. In the process of turning raw material into finished product, and afterward sending the finished wares to the four corners of the earth; interior cities and inland ports furnish an endless round of concentration and distributive work which is the life blood of the carriers.

"It was a mistake to fill up the canals with a view to force traffic to the rails, just as it would be a mistake to abandon roads and cartage. To create a new facility for traffic is to create new traffic. To destroy an existing facility brings no answering advantage."