

STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Department of Law and Public Safety
DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL
NEWARK INTERNATIONAL PLAZA
U.S. Routes 1-9 (Southbound) Newark, N. J. 07114

BULLETIN 2355

June 4, 1980

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1. APPELLATE DECISIONS - T.S.J.S. OF GARFIELD, INC. v. GARFIELD.

#4327

T.S.J.S. OF GARFIELD, INC.,)
t/a RAM'S HORN,)

Appellant,)

v.)

MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE CITY)
OF GARFIELD,)

Respondent.)

CONCLUSIONS
AND ORDER

Antranig Aslanian, Jr., Esq., Attorney for Appellant.
Anthony J. Sciuto, Esq., Attorney for Respondent.

Initial Decision Below

Hon. Jack Berman, Administrative Law Judge

Dated: September 17, 1979

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Received: September 18, 1979

BY THE DIRECTOR:

No written Exceptions to the Initial Decision were filed by the parties, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:2-17.14.

Inasmuch as the within involves a recommendation to reverse a license revocation, several comments are required.

Initially, I completely reject as without basis in law the proposition that a license cannot be subject to revocation for violations predicated upon general nuisance allegations occurring outside the licensed premises. See Nordco, Inc. v. State, 43 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 1957); Tyrone's Haven, Inc. v. South River, Bulletin 2214, Item 1.

Review of the file does not indicate what specific charges were preferred by the local issuing authority against the licensee. However, it appears that the licensee was aware of a hearing, and was given the opportunity to present its defenses below. Even if the charges had been general allegations of nuisance situations, absence of specificity would not be a fatal defect, and clearly cured by the de novo hearing on appeal. Parillo's, Inc. v. Belleville, Bulletin 2328, Item 1.

In examination of the Initial Decision, I cannot ascertain whether the Administrative Law Judge rejected completely the testimony submitted on behalf of the respondent or rendered his decision based upon a misapplication of law as to the responsibilities of a licensee.

However, I shall not reject the Initial Decision and/or remand the matter for further hearing predicated upon my conclusions after review of the record as a whole. Three residents of the City of Garfield testified on behalf of the respondent. The testimony was unspecific and vague as to time; dealt with a parking problem not inherently attributable to the appellant, and somewhat mitigated by a patron parking lot built by appellant; included unsupported allegations of diminished real estate values; and involved extremely generalized testimony concerning debris, litter and noise attendant with patron egress and ingress.

Such testimony was of marginal evidential value. It is not supported by any testimony of specific incidents requiring police action, nor is there competent proofs that the disruptive occurrences affected anyone other than the three witnesses.

Clearly, there was an inadequate base to support a finding of guilt to nuisance charges on the evidence presented.

Having carefully considered the entire record herein, including the transcript of the testimony, the exhibits, the legal memorandum of appellant, and the Initial Decision, I concur in the findings and recommendations of the Administrative Law Judge and adopt same as my determination herein.

Accordingly, it is, on this 1st day of November, 1979,

ORDERED that the action of the Mayor and Council of the City of Garfield be and the same is hereby reversed.

Joseph H. Lerner
Director

Appendix - Initial Decision Below

T.S.J.S. OF GARFIELD, INC.)
T/A RAM'S HORN

INITIAL DECISION

v.)

O.A.L. DKT. # A.B.C. 1562-79

MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE CITY)
OF GARFIELD, NEW JERSEY

APPEARANCES:

Antranig Aslanian, Jr., Esq., Fort Lee, N. J.
for T.S.J.S. of Garfield Inc., t/a Ram's Horn,
Appellant

Anthony J. Scuito, Esq., Hackensack, N. J.
for City of Garfield, Respondent

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JACK BERMAN, A.L.J.:

On April 16, 1979, effective 12:00 noon the Plenary Retail Consumption License No. 0221-33-035-003 (formerly License No.C-36) for the year 1978-79 of T.S.J.S. of Garfield, Inc., t/a Ram's Horn (Appellant) issued by the Mayor and Council of the City of Garfield, County of Bergen, State of New Jersey (Respondent) was revoked by Resolution of the Council of the City of Garfield. Notice and petition of appeal from Respondent's order of revocation was filed by Appellant pursuant to R.S. 33:1-31. It was ordered by the Honorable Joseph H. Lerner, Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control of the Department of Law and Public Safety of the State of New Jersey on April 11, 1979 that Respondent's order be stayed pending the determination of the appeal. The Resolution of the Council of the City of Garfield listed as its specific findings of fact the reasons for the revocation the following:

- "1. Litter, including wine, whiskey and beer bottles, is strewn about the licensed premises, as well as about the adjoining streets, sidewalks and properties in and about the area of the Ram's Horn.
- 2. Loud and obscene language can be heard, usually between the hours of 10:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M., at least three nights a week, usually Wednesday, Friday and Saturday.

3. Noise emanates from the area, including racing of car engines, slamming of car doors, hollering, laughing, radios playing loudly, which noises emanate from the parking lot of the licensed premises as well as in the surrounding streets.
4. There is a taking of parking spaces in and about the area of the Ram's Horn, including the parking of patrons' cars in the driveways of the residents in the neighborhood.
5. Persons have been seen urinating in the streets and on the sidewalks in and about the licensed premises.
6. Damage has been done to motor vehicles, as well as to real and personal property, in the vicinity of the Ram's Horn.
7. Neighbors have been verbally abused and physically threatened.
8. Trespassing by patrons has taken place through the yards of the residents of the area.
9. The need for police protection has been increased in the area, which placed a burden on the municipal police department."

The issues to be resolved at the hearing is whether the Appellant violated statutes and/or regulations pertaining to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Laws of the State of New Jersey justifying the revocation of its Plenary Retail Consumption License by the Mayor and Council of the City of Garfield and was the Respondent's action of revocation of Appellant's license arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

The matter was brought to hearing on August 15, 1979.

The Respondent's first witness, Thomas R. Petrie, Sr., a neighbor who resides within 300 feet of the licensed premises, testified of the parking problems caused him by patrons of the Appellant in that they would park their cars in front of driveways and hydrants, making it difficult for him to find a parking space for his car should he come home later than 10:00-10:30 P.M. He also stated that persons have urinated on his fence, and that people in parked cars blow their horns and race their engines when starting their cars, thereby disturbing his sleep. This would occur at 2:30-3:00 A.M. Beer cans and bottles would be strewn around the neighborhood. Mr. Petrie also testified that, "Well, as far as my complaints as to the club itself and the operation of the club, I have no complaints as far as the club is concerned."

In one incident he saw a couple fornicating in a car, but was unable to say that the couple came from the Appellant's

premises. He further stated that the Appellant had hired two (2) policeman from the City of Garfield Police Department to patrol the general area of the neighborhood near Appellant's premises.

The Respondent's second witness was John Herkaler who testified that his residence is located next door to the licensed premises. He stated that (1) patrons parked in front of his driveway (2) patrons threw bottles all over the place, some of it landing on his property including broken glass (3) noise would wake him up around 2:00-2:30 A.M. coming from radios of cars and the sound of car horns (4) dancing would occur in the street around 3 A.M. although no music was played and (5) he saw persons urinating along his fence and on his grass.

The Respondent's last witness was Dick Steffens, who resides one block south of the licensed premises. He stated that patrons of the Appellant's would park improperly, talk loud at night, dance in the streets, urinate in the street, (which he saw on 3 or 4 occasions) damage his fence and most of all prevent him from sleeping at night.

The Appellant's first witness was Anthony G. Sirabella, a stockholder of Appellant and the owner of the Appellant's premises. Mr. Sirabella traced the history of the premises since December 1970 that "a club operated the premises providing live entertainment known as the 'Jolly Smuggler'." The present nature of the operation of the Appellant's club is a discoteque. This change occurred in June 1978. The hours are from 9 P.M. to 3 A.M., seven nights a week. He then related the strict policy of the Appellant regarding age and dress code that is required of its patrons. Patrons are required to wear modern jeans, no sneakers, no T-shirts and gentlemen must have a collared shirt and patrons are to show identification. He stated that Appellant does not sell liquor, beer or wine for off premises consumption. Patrons cannot leave the premises with any alcoholic beverages. This is checked by Appellant's employees stationed at the door when patrons leave. The Appellant's policy, he stated, was to eject those patrons not conducting themselves in a proper manner. When he was informed that neighbors had registered complaints to the Mayor and City Council and was later informed by the Mayor and City Council that the City could not afford to station policemen outside Appellant's premises during Appellant's busy nights (Wed., Fri., and Sat.), he then retained at his own expense, two (2) city policemen to patrol the neighborhood of the licensed premises in an effort to cure the various allegations that had been made to the Mayor and Council by the neighbors.

He stated that disco music cannot be heard outside the Appellant's premises. He also offered the Mayor and Council his cooperation in any way and at anytime to help cure the various complaints of the neighbors. He has at times observed bottles outside his premises but stated they are not bottles that his establishment sells. Nonetheless, he has relegated to an employee

the job of picking up bottles and cans around the area of the licensed premises.

On Wednesday, Friday and Saturday, the club's busiest nights, approximately 400 people enter and leave in the course of an evening. In an average week the total number of people going into Appellant's premises is approximately 2,000 to 2,500 people. After 2 A.M., Appellant's policy is not to permit more people to enter.

Shortly after the Appellant's premises opened as a disco in August 1978, Appellant leveled a building it owned (former body and repair shop) and constructed a parking lot for Appellant's patrons.

A nightclub has been at the premises for thirty years. When the club was operated as the Jolly Smuggler (for seven (7) years) the number of people going into it per week (during the club's busiest years) was about the same as the present operation (approximately 80,000 people per annum).

The Appellant's final witness was John Muhaw the Appellant's manager who enforces the conduct and dress code of the club. Every night he surveys the outside of Appellant's premises to ascertain the conduct of Appellant's patrons after they leave. He has been doing this since September or October of 1978. From then until the present he has never observed any patrons leaving Appellant's premises with liquor, glasses, bottles or cans in their hands. He stated that patrons are not permitted to leave with any alcoholic beverage in their hands. He stated that patrons are screened by Appellant's employees when they arrive and when they leave. He stated he has never heard loud or obscene language used outside of the premises nor seen anyone urinating on the street or noticed any persons fornicating in cars or patrons doing any physical damage in the area.

He spends approximately 15-20 hours a day in and around the Appellant's premises. He has also patrolled the streets looking for litter. He has found bottles off the premises, but not bottles that the Appellant sells. He stated that two (2) police officers are employed by the Appellant approximately three (3) nights a week from 10 P.M. to 3 A.M. Their function is to patrol the streets around the Appellant's premises, and to disperse patrons, thereby preventing them from congregating outside the area of Appellant's premises.

Therefore, from a review of the record the COURT FINDS that:

1. Appellant is the holder of Plenary Retail Consumption License No. 0221-33-135-003 for premises located at 480 Boulevard, Garfield, N.J.;
2. After hearing held by Respondent, the Respondent ordered Appellant's license revoked effective April 16, 1979 at 12:00 noon.

3. On April 11, 1979, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control stayed Respondent's order of suspension pending the determination of the appeal;
4. Appellant has not violated nor been charged by Respondent with violating any statutes, rules or regulations pertaining to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Laws of the State of New Jersey;
5. Appellants have built a parking lot for its patrons, thereby reducing off-street parking;
6. Appellants have hired two (2) police officers of the City of Garfield to patrol the streets around the Appellant's premises;
7. Appellants have taken reasonable steps within its control to cure the various complaints of its neighbors.

It should be remembered that the sale of liquor has never been a business or right in this state Grant Lunch Corp., v. Driscoll, 129 N.J.L. 554 (E & A 1943), Cert. denied 320 U.S. 801 (1944). There is no common, inherent, natural or constitutional right to a liquor license as it is but a privilege Eskridge v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 30 N.J. Super 472 (App. Div. 1954). The liquor industry has been described as a business which may be restricted by such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super 564 (App. Div. 1952). The right to prescribe conditions under which intoxicants may be sold is practically limitless with the power to do so vested in the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control or other issuing authority pursuant to N.J.S.A. 33:1-31. As stated by the court in In re 17 Club, Inc., 26 N.J. Super 43, 52 (App. Div. 1953):

"The governmental power extensively to supervise the conduct of the liquor business and to confine the conduct of that business to reputable licensees who will manage it in a reputable manner has uniformly been accorded broad and liberal judicial support."

Unquestionably, the primary responsibility to enforce the law pertaining to retail licenses rests with the municipality N.J.S.A. 33:1-24 which has the power to conduct disciplinary proceedings to suspend or revoke retail licenses N.J.S.A. 33:1-31. This power, however, should not be abused The Boss Co., Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Atlantic City, 40 N.J. 379, 384 (1963) or be used in the abstract N.J.S.A. 33:1-31. It must relate to specific violations of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Laws and be within the power of the licensee to control

N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.6. The licensee should be placed on notice as to allege violations of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Laws so that he may properly defend against such allegations N.J.S.A. 33:1-31. Notwithstanding, the privilege nature of the license the licensee is entitled to normal due process of law Drozdowski v. Sayreville, 133 N.J.L. 536,538. A municipality's action in revoking a license without confronting the licensee with statutory or regulatory violations of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Laws is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable N.J.S.A. 33:1-31.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

In view of the foregoing, the record in this matter reflects that the determination of respondent was arbitrary and did represent an abuse of its discretion. The Appellant has sustained the burden of proof imposed on it by N.J.A.C. 13:2-17.6. Therefore, the revocation imposed by the Respondent is hereby REVERSED and the Appellant's license is hereby restored with all those rights and privileges afforded it by law.

This action cannot be effected prior to the effective date of this order which is forty-five (45) days from the date of agency receipt of this order, unless the agency head acts to affirm, modify or reverse during the forty-five (45) day period N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

The COURT HEREBY FILES with the Director of Alcoholic Beverage Control its Initial Decision in this matter and record in these proceedings.

DATE

JACK BERMAN, A.L.J.

Receipt acknowledged:

DATE

AGENCY HEAD

Mailed to Parties:

DATE

FOR OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

2. SPECIAL RULING PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 33:1-12.39 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF MAY ROGERS.

In the Matter of:)
Petition of May Rogers) CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

Lomell, Muccifori, Adler, Ravaschiere & Amabile, Esqs., by Herman A. Adler, Esq.,
Attorney for Petitioner
Mart Vaarsi, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, representing the Division.

Initial Decision Below

Hon. Jack Berman, Administrative Law Judge

Dated: September 20, 1979

Received: September 20, 1979

BY THE DIRECTOR:

No Exceptions were filed to the Initial Decision Below in connection with the application submitted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 33:1-12.39.

Having carefully considered the entire record herein, including the transcript of the testimony, the exhibits and the Initial Decision, I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Administrative Law Judge, except as noted below, and adopt them as my conclusions herein.

The subject license is a plenary retail consumption license without the broad package privilege. The proposed purchaser of this license indicates that she intends to sell package goods in connection with a supermarket operation. The terms of such license only permit package sales from the public barroom and preclude its location on premises where a grocery store operation is conducted. N.J.S.A. 33:1-12 and N.J.A.C. 13:2-35.1 et seq.

However, there could be user of this license in compliance with the above cited statute and regulations by the proposed purchaser, provided an appropriate floor plan and location of the licensed premises is established, as well as the inclusion of a public barroom which has sufficient room area. Thus, I shall consider this proposed effort to activate the license a bona fide effort and approve the Petition.

Accordingly, it is, on this 5th day of November, 1979,

ORDERED that the Petition of May Rogers, submitted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 33:1-39 be and the same is hereby approved; and it is further

ORDERED that the Borough Council of the Borough of Lakehurst be and the same is hereby authorized to consider the application of May Rogers, owner of Plenary Retail Consumption License No. 1513-33-005-001 for renewal of said license for the 1979-80 license term, and to grant or deny same in the reasonable exercise of its discretion; upon the special condition that if granted, the license must become operational during the 1979-80 license term; no further extensions will be authorized.

Joseph H. Lerner
Director

In the Matter of:)
) INITIAL DECISION
 May Rogers,)
 Petitioner) O.A.L. DKT. # A.B.C. 2277-79

APPEARANCES:

Herman A. Adler, Esq., attorney for Petitioner,
 May Rogers

Mart Vaarsi, Esq., Deputy Attorney General for
 Respondent, Division of Alcoholic Beverage
 Control

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JACK BERMAN, A.L.J.:

This is a proceeding to determine whether good cause has been established by the Petitioner who seeks to file a further application for renewal of its Plenary Retail Consumption License No. 1513-33-001 issued by the Borough of Lakehurst for the 1979-80 license term, pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 33:12.39.

A hearing de novo to determine this limited issue was held on September 11, 1979 pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 et seq.

The Petitioner, May Rogers, testified that in July, 1940 she purchased with her own funds liquor license #C-1 issued by the Borough of Lakehurst, Ocean County, New Jersey. This license she stated, was used by herself and her late husband, Ralph Rogers, in the operation of a tavern business known as Rogers Bar which was located at 22 Union Avenue, Lakehurst, N. J. Her late husband died on November 26, 1946. During the time her late husband and she operated the business there were no violations of any of the alcoholic beverage laws or regulations by them. After her husband died, she continued the operation of the tavern business with the help of a bartender. During the time that she operated the tavern business after the death of her husband, there were no violations of any of the alcoholic beverage laws or regulations. For a period of time after her husband's death the license was issued in the name of "Mae Rogers, Executrix of the Estate of Ralph Rogers." This continued until May 4, 1950 when the license was re-issued in her name.

After the death of her husband, she actively operated the tavern until 1974, when certain factors caused her to discontinue operation of the business. Those factors were:

- (a) She was at that time sixty-seven (67) years old and was not physically strong enough to perform all the work necessary to operate the tavern;
- (b) There was a substantial cutback in the personnel stationed at Lakehurst Naval Air Station and that materially reduced the amount of available business;
- (c) A VFW facility with a club liquor license had opened right next door to her tavern and was able to sell beverages to members of the organization for substantially lower prices than she could and this further reduced her business;
- (c) She did not have the capital to make major improvements to her business premises to compete with other local taverns.

She testified that commencing in March, 1977 she had the misfortune of having been involved in two (2) legal proceedings instituted by her daughter for the purpose of having her interest in said liquor license forfeited to her daughter. These proceedings were:

- (a) Ellen Matluk v. Mae Rogers, Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division before Judge Wiley in Ocean County, Docket No. C-2368-76, wherein her daughter sought to have the Court rule that she had only a life interest in the license, which could be forfeited to her daughter by reason of her not operating the license. The Court ruled in Petitioner's favor, but she was unable to attempt to deal with or sell said license until May 24, 1979 because there was a Receiver appointed for the license;
- (b) In the Matter of Mae Rogers, An Alleged Incompetent Person, Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Judge Huber, Ocean County, Docket No. P-312-78, wherein her daughter sought to have her declared incompetent and have herself appointed as Petitioner's guardian so that she could thereby gain control over the liquor license. The Court ordered on May 24, 1979, Petitioner testified, the complaint be dismissed, and dissolved the restraints against Petitioner dealing with the liquor license. The appointed Receiver was discharged.

Petitioner testified that her license was renewed for the license year 1978-79 term by the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control who ruled that good cause had been established to warrant a further application for renewal of her liquor license.

She further testified that subsequent to the discharge of the Receiver, she made timely application and paid the appropriate fees for renewal of her license for the license year 1979-80. At the meeting of the Lakehurst Borough Council held on June 28, 1979, that governing body formally renewed her license for the year 1978-1979, but declined to renew it for the current license year because of the provisions of N.J.S.A. 33:1-12.39.

She stated that if her license is renewed for the current license year, she would not be able to personally operate it because of her age and lack of working capital, but she does intend to cause the license to become activated by selling it to a buyer who is amply capitalized and legally qualified to own a liquor license. She stated that the proceeds of the sale of her liquor license would serve as a basis for her support for the remaining years of her life.

Since the discharge of the Receiver, she has, through her attorney, considered a number of offers to purchase the license and on August 7, 1979 she entered into a contract with John S. Gault and Justine Gault, to purchase her license. The Buyers have a location to which the license can be transferred. The contract is contingent upon a renewal of her license and municipal approval of both a person-to-person and place-to-place transfer. The Buyers, would qualify for both transfers. The proposed business to be conducted by the Buyers and the location to which the license will be transferred will be in accordance with the desires expressed by members of the Lakehurst governing body as stated in informal discussions between her attorney and the council subsequent to the filing of her application for renewal.

Petitioner's witness, John S. Gault, testified that he had entered into an Agreement of Sale with the Petitioner to purchase Petitioner's license. He stated that he and others operated three (3) supermarkets in Ocean County. He stated that if the license is renewed he would assign it to a corporation whose shareholders are the same as the shareholders in the three (3) supermarkets. He has never been convicted of a crime and knows of no reason why he would not be approved as a licensee. The other shareholders to his knowledge have never been convicted of a crime nor did he or they have an interest in any liquor license. He stated that he would transfer the license to 7 Union Avenue in Lakehurst, which is a supermarket but plans to thereafter transfer the license to a supermarket to be built in a shopping center that is to be erected before June 30, 1980. He stated that the license transfer to that location should be approved as he is of the opinion that the Lakehurst Borough Council would like to see a license in the new shopping center. He said he is interested in primarily a package store. The shopping center will be located near senior

citizens' retirement communities. He stated that the other three (3) supermarkets that he is a corporate stockholder of and President of, do not have a liquor license. In the interim until the subject supermarket is completed he would utilize the license at the Union Avenue store and renovate that store to enable it to sell liquor.

The relevant section of the N.J.S.A. 33:1-12.39 states:

"No Class C license, as the same is defined in R.S. 33:1-12, shall be renewed if the same has not been actively used in connection with the operation of a licensed premises within a period of two (2) years prior to the commencement date of the licensed period for which the renewal application is filed unless the director, for good cause and after a hearing, authorizes a further application for renewal." (Emphasis added)

Therefore, based on review of the entire record in this matter, the COURT FINDS:

1. The basis for inactivity and efforts to activate this license include (a) physical and mental illness of prior licensee which resulted in receivership. The receiver subsequently was discharged by the Court on or about May, 1979.
2. Subsequent to the discharge of the Receiver, Petitioner made timely application and paid the appropriate fees for renewal of Petitioner's license for the license year 1979-80.
3. Since the discharge of the Receiver, Petitioner has, through her attorney, considered a number of offers to purchase the license.
4. On August 7, 1979 the Petitioner entered into a Sales Agreement to sell her license to John S. Gault and Justine Gault.
5. The Buyers intend to transfer the license to a corporation that owns three (3) supermarkets in Ocean County, New Jersey.
6. The Corporation intends to build a supermarket located in a Shopping Center near retirement communities and locate its license in said supermarket to sell package liquors.
7. Until the Supermarket is completed the Buyers plan to locate the license in a store on Union Avenue, Lakehurst, New Jersey.

- 8. The licensee (Petitioner) has established good cause in accordance with the statutory requirement.

Therefore, the COURT CONCLUDES: The Borough of Lakehurst be and the same is hereby authorized to consider the application for renewal of the subject license for the 1979-80 license term, and, to thereupon, grant or deny said application in the reasonable exercise of its discretion. The petition is HEREBY GRANTED.

This action cannot be effected prior to the effective date of this order, which is forty-five (45) days from the date of agency receipt of this order, unless the agency head acts to affirm, modify or reverse during the forty-five (45) day period N.J.S.A. 52:14E-10.

The COURT HEREBY FILES with the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control its Initial Decision in this matter and the record in these proceedings.

DATE

JACK BERMAN, A.L.J.

Receipt acknowledged:

DATE

AGENCY HEAD

Mailed to Parties:


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FOR OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

3. STATE LICENSES - NEW APPLICATION FILED.

Daniel F. Vernon, Jr.
RD2 Burrell Road
Tewksbury Township
Lebanon, New Jersey

Application filed May 27, 1980 for
person-to-person and place-to-place
transfer of plenary winery license
3400-21-166-002, from Anthony Terri,
RD 1, Stockton, New Jersey.



Joseph H. Lerner
Director