STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Department of Law and Public Safety
DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL
25 Commerce Drive Cranford, N.J. 07016

BULLETIN 2116 September 20, 1973

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ITEM

STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Department of Law and Public Safety
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1. APPELLATE DECISIONS - CAUSEWAY INN, INC. v. SOUTH RIVER.

Causeway Inn, Inc., t/a Causeway Inn, Appellant, v. Borough Council of the Borough of South River, Respondent.	)	On Appeal CONCLUSIONS and ORDER

Benjamin Kleinberg, Esq., Attorney for Appellant
Strong, Strong, Gavarny & Longhi, Esqs., by Robert A. Longhi, Esq., Attorneys for Respondent

BY THE DIRECTOR:

The Hearer has filed the following report herein:

Hearer's Report

Respondent Borough Council of the Borough of South River (Council), the local issuing authority, suspended appellant's plenary retail consumption license for one hundred-eighty days, after appellant pleaded non vult to the charges which were made a part of the adoptive resolution, dated March 7, 1973, as follows:

> (1) For permitting or suffering a brawl or act of violence in the licensed premises, in violation of Rule 5 of State Regulation No. 20; and (2) failed to keep on its licensed premises a list of persons currently employed therein, in violation of Rule 16(c) of State Regulation No. 20.

The resolution set no date for the commencement of the suspension and provided that "the said licensee shall have the right to file a petition to the Director of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, within ten (10) days from the receipt of this Resolution and Order for the payment of a fine in lieu of the license suspension pursuant to Chapter 9 of the Laws of 1971.

In its petition of appeal, appellant challenged the suspension as being harsh and excessive; that the Council considered matters that were irrelevant in fixing the suspension; and that the suspension imposed resulted from bias and prejudice.

The Council, in its answer, contended that its action was reasonable, just and for the protection or the general welfare of the Borough residents, and that, in fixing the penalty it considered not only the nature of the charges levelled against it but also appellant's prior record of suspensions of license and warnings as disclosed in the records of the Division.

The parties agreed to present this appeal upon the submission of several joint exhibits in evidence including the adopted resolution, a letter addressed to the Council by appellant's attorney in mitigation, appellant's prior record and oral argument pursuant to Rules 6 and 8 of State Regulation No. 15.

Among other matters, the resolution provided that the plea of non vult be accepted; that the license be suspended for a period of one hundred-eighty days, and that the licensee shall have leave for a period of ten days to apply to the Director for the payment of a fine in lieu of suspension.

Appellant urged leniency because the brawl did not occur in the presence of the principal corporate officer; it occurred while a bartender was on duty. Furthermore, the length of the suspension would visit a serious financial hardship upon the licensee and would impede a sale or transfer of the license.

Preliminarily, I observe that, in disciplinary proceedings, a licensee is responsible for all acts committed by an employee. The fact that the licensee through its principal officer did not participate in the violation or that its agent, servant or employee acted contrary to instructions given to him by the licensee or that the violation did not occur in the licensee's presence shall constitute no defense to the charges preferred in such disciplinary proceedings. Rule 33 of State Regulation No. 20; Greenbrier v. Hock, 14 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1951); F. & A. Distrib. Co. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 36 N.J. 34 (1961).

The hardship that may be imposed upon a licensee is of no moment in arriving at a determination of his status. It has been consistently held that in a conflict between a licensee's financial concern and the public interest, the latter must prevail. Smith v. Bosco, 66 N.J. Super. 165 (App. Div. 1961).

Unquestionably, the Council, in arriving at its determination, considered the previous case history of the licensee which may be capsulated, as follows:

"(1) Assault by licensee on a patron, penalty 15 days, effective February 17, 1965.

(2) Sale to a minor, penalty 15 days, effective February 17, 1965.

(3) Front, license suspended for balance of term, effective April 26, 1965, with leave to file petition to lift after May 21, 1965; suspension terminated May 21, 1965.

(4) Permitting minors on premises unaccompanied by parents and sale to a minor, penalty 30 days, effective April 9, 1966.

(5) Refill, penalty 25 days, effective June 12, 1967.

(6) Sales during prohibited hours (Violation) - warning letter sent May 8, 1967.

(7) Unqualified stockholder (Violation) - warning letter sent May 8, 1968.

(8) Sale to a minor, license suspended for 30 days, effective March 18, 1970.

(9) Sale to a minor, license suspended for 45 days, effective May 24, 1971.

(10) License application incomplete - Violation - warning letter sent August 15, 1972."

Apparently, the Council was faced with the resolution of two questions: (a) was appellant worthy to continue this operation in a reputable manner; and (b) under the circumstances, what would be a proper penalty consonant with the best interest of the public.

A liquor license is a mere privilege. No person is entitled as a matter of law to a liquor license. Paul v. Gloucester County, 50 N.J.L. 585 (E. & A. 1888); Bumball v. Burnett, 115 N.J.L. 254 (Sup. Ct. 1935). Just as in the consideration of applications for the grant or renewal of licenses, so the continuance of such licenses must be vested in persons who are worthy of that privilege. The liquor business is one that must be carefully supervised and should be conducted by reputable people in a reputable manner. The common interest of the general public should be the guide post in the issuance or operation of such licenses. Zicherman v. Driscoll, 133 N.J.L. 586 (Sup. Ct. 1946). As the court said in In re 17 Club, Inc., 26 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div. 1953):

> "The governmental power extensively to supervise the conduct of the liquor business and to confine the conduct of that business to reputable licensees who will manage it in a reputable manner

has uniformly been accorded broad and liberal judicial support."

In the exercise of that power, the Legislature invested the issuing authority (the Council) with the power to suspend or revoke licenses, after hearing, for certain enumerated violations including violations of the law or of State or local regulations. R.S. 33:1-31.

Upon the plea of non vult, the Council had the mandate to determine whether appellant's license should be suspended or revoked. It is clear that it took into consideration the appellant's prior record which was its duty and obligation under its statutory mandate.

The penalty to be imposed in disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Council rests within its sound discretion in the first instance; and the power of the Director to reduce or modify it on appeal should be exercised sparingly and only where such penalty is manifestly unreasonable and clearly excessive. Harrison Wine and Liquor Company, Inc., v. Harrison, Bulletin 1296, Item 2; Rajah Liquors v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 33 N.J. Super. 598 (App. Div. 1955); Gach v. Irvington, Bulletin 2058, Item 1, and cases cited therein.

Under the facts and circumstances herein, I find that the Council acted soundly in its assessment of the penalty. Such action was eminently dictated as the proper penalty, and there is no basis for reversal or even modification on this appeal.

Appellant has failed to sustain the burden of establishing that the Council's action was erroneous and should be reversed as required by Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15. I recommend, therefore, that an order be entered affirming the Council's action and reimposing the aforesaid suspension of license for one hundred-eighty days. Considering appellant's previous record of suspensions, I further recommend that appellant's application for the imposition of a fine in lieu of suspension, if made, be denied.

Conclusions and Order

No exceptions to the Hearer's report were filed pursuant to Rule 14 of State Regulation No. 15.

I have carefully considered the entire record herein, including the transcript of the testimony, the exhibits, the argument of counsel and the findings in the Hearer's report, including the Hearer's recommendation that, in light of the nature of the charges herein and appellant's prior record, the

imposition of a fine in lieu of suspension of license would be inappropriate . I concur in the findings and conclusions of the Hearer and adopt them as my conclusions herein.

Accordingly, it is, on this 16th day of July 1973,

ORDERED that the action of respondent be and the same is hereby affirmed, and that the appeal herein be and the same is hereby dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that Plenary Retail Consumption License C-34 (for the 1973-74 licensing period), issued by the Borough Council of the Borough of South River to Causeway Inn, Inc., t/a Causeway Inn, for premises 15 Jackson Street, South River, be and the same is hereby suspended for one hundred-eighty (180) days, commencing 2:00 a.m. Thursday, July 26, 1973, and terminating 2:00 a.m. Tuesday, January 22, 1974.

Robert E. Bower
Director

2. APPELLATE DECISIONS - SCOTT'S TAP ROOM, INC. v. SOUTH RIVER.

Scott's Tap Room, Inc., t/a Scott's Tap Room, Appellant, v. Borough Council of the Borough of South River, Respondent.	)	On Appeal CONCLUSIONS and ORDER

Kolodziej and Cohan, Esqs., by Frederick A. Simon, Esq., Attorneys for Appellant
Strong, Strong, Gavarny & Longhi, Esqs., by Stephen VR. Strong, Esq., Attorneys for Respondent

BY THE DIRECTOR:

The Hearer has filed the following report herein:

Hearer's Report

This is an appeal from the denial by respondent Mayor and Council of the Borough of South River (Council) of appellant's application for a place-to-place transfer of its plenary retail consumption license so as to include the addition of a room approximately seventeen feet wide by thirty-three feet long, adjoining the right rear side of appellant's present licensed premises at 65 Ferry Street, South River.

Appellant alleges in its petition of appeal, that the action of the respondent was erroneous in that, in its action taken on April 18, 1973 denying the application, no reason was stated therefor.

Apparently, the Council, in order to counter the allegation contained in the petition of appeal, thereafter met and approved the resolution denying appellant's application on May 21, 1973, for the reasons set forth therein. The resolution attached to respondent's answer and which was relied upon by it as reasons for its action in denying appellant's application, reads as follows:

> "WHEREAS, Scott's Tap Room, Inc. has heretofore applied to the Mayor and Council for permission to enlarge an existing facility with a Broad C. license; and

WHEREAS, it appears that the applicant enlarged the existing facility without first having secured council approval and

WHEREAS, it appears that the applicant's place of business is situated on Main Street at the corner of Ferry Street, an area which is one of the most heavily traveled sections of the community and one of the most congested; and

WHEREAS, the area presently has a limitation on parking facilities which will become more severe when the new bridge between South River and Sayreville is completed; and

WHEREAS, it is deemed that to enlarge the proposed establishment will add to the congestion and traffic problems; and

WHEREAS, the applicant is unable to provide any off-street parking to accommodate the anticipated increase in parking.

NOT THEREFORE BE IT and it is hereby Resolved that the application of Scott's Tap Room, Inc. to enlarge the existing premises is denied for the aforesaid reasons."

Additionally, respondent alleged that it acted lawfully and in the best interests of the Borough and of its citizens.

The appeal was heard de novo pursuant to Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15, with full opportunity for counsel to present testimony under oath and cross-examine witnesses.

Albert M. Parneg, the principal stockholder of the corporate licensee which operates a barroom at the corner of Ferry Street and Main Street, testified that on March 8, 1973 he filed an application with the local issuing authority for premises-enlargement and an application with the building department for a permit to perform the work. Shortly thereafter, the building department issued a building permit.

Parneg testified that it was his intention to provide additional space allowing him to install eight tables for the comfort of his patrons. The present premises are approximately eighteen feet wide by eighty feet long and contain a bar with twenty-eight or thirty bar stools. Due to the narrowness of the present premises a concentration of patrons gives the barroom an appearance of being crowded. His intent is to make the

establishment more attractive and comfortable for the patronage and not specifically to serve more patrons than he does presently. The plans received in evidence reveal that the appellant intended to make an opening into the right rear wall of the premises in order to use an adjoining room of the dimensions hereinabove noted. This room would be used for tables.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that when the application for the premises-enlargement came on for hearing before the Council on April 4th, the minutes of the meeting, which were received in evidence at this de novo hearing, disclosed that the Borough Clerk announced that the procedural requirements were complied with; that no one commented on or objected to the application; and that it was moved that the hearing be closed and the Council consider the application. A resolution to approve the place-to-place transfer was tabled for consideration at a continued meeting to be held on April 18, 1973. Among other matters, it was noted in that resolution that no protests were filed opposing the application.

Parneg testified that he had assumed that the resolution granting the transfer was adopted, and he, therefore, commenced and completed most of the work on the premises-enlargement. Two days thereafter two police officers came into the licensed premises and informed him that the resolution was not adopted and that he could not use the rear room. He later ascertained that the adopted resolution called for the tabling of the resolution granting the transfer instead of the granting of the transfer.

Additionally, Parneg testified that his business hours are from 7:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m. except Sunday, when the hours are from 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. He estimated that the premises were open for business approximately one hundred-twenty hours weekly and that "...90 or 95 per cent of our business was done within 20 hours (of the work week hours) which was night-time hours of nine to two." He has found parking to be no problem because most of his business is transacted at night when the other businesses are closed. On-street parking is available on both sides of Ferry and Main Streets. A large municipal parking lot is located one-half block distant on Ferry and Main Streets. The proposed "expansion of Main Street" will not "touch" the parking lot.

The witness then testified as follows:

"Q Do you know what percentage of your customers drive to your place of business and what percentage walk?
A Well, I wouldn't be able to say, but most of them are local. Most of them--a lot of them do walk, and whatever parking is

> available, everybody just knows where to park."

On April 18th, Parneg was briefly called into the caucus meeting held by the Council and responded affirmatively upon being questioned concerning whether a permit was issued to him.

At a meeting of the Borough Council held on May 29, 1973 wherein the Borough Council advertised that parking fines would be discussed, and which was attended by many of the businessmen, one of the Councilmen who voted against the transfer urged the businessmen to "...get their businesses going, fix them up, draw some out-of-towners in to keep the Town lively." Parneg responded that he had attempted to better his place of business and was denied that opportunity.

On both cross examination and on redirect, Parneg testified that at night-time, in addition to the municipal parking lot, there are ample on-street parking facilities to accommodate his patrons. The causeway under construction is located a block distant from his place of business. He anticipates that traffic on Main Street will be increased as a result thereof; however, the anticipated increase in traffic will occur in the daytime, and not at night.

Respondent offered no testimony in rebuttal. It offered in evidence the resolution dated May 21st, which was admitted over the appellant's objection, asserting that it was adopted as an afterthought to the resolution originally adopted by the Council, on April 18th (which contained no reasons for its adoption), and that it was adopted because of the appeal filed herein.

The transfer of a liquor license is not an inherent or automatic right. If denied on reasonable grounds, such action will be affirmed. Richmon, Inc. v. Trenton, Bulletin 1560, Item 4. On the other hand, where it appears that the denial was arbitrary and unreasonable, the action will be reversed. Tompkins v. Seaside Heights, Bulletin 1398, Item 1; Bomwell v. Newark, Bulletin 1639, Item 1. The instant case is comparable to and governed by the case of Bivona v. Hock et al. 5 N.J. Super. 118 (App. Div. 1949). As the court pointed out in that case:

> "...the issue is, not whether a discretionary power has been improperly exercised, but rather whether in the exercise of the power respecting transfers, R.S. 33:1-26, authority existed in the local body to refuse a transfer of a license for the reason upon which the refusal was based." Cf. South Jersey Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Burnett, 125 N.J.L. 105 (Sup. Ct. 1940).

As was stated hereinabove, no witnesses were produced at this hearing in behalf of the Council. It is also apparent that no one appeared before the Council to object to the grant of the transfer. On the other hand, the uncontradicted evidence presented at this hearing by the appellant leads to the conclusion that the fears expressed in the resolution adopted by the Council subsequent to the filing of the appeal herein by a vote of three in favor and two opposed, were unfounded on the record.

This case is unlike Lyons Farms Tavern, Inc. v. Newark, 55 N.J. 292 (1970) wherein numerous individual objectors, petitions, clergymen and organizations including a hospital which contained a school of nursing appeared to voice their strenuous objections to a place-to-place transfer occasioned by a premises-enlargement. In Lyons Farms Tavern, supra, much of the locality was devoted to residences. Area residents and hospital employees (male and female) had been molested. In that case the Supreme Court affirmed the local Board's denial of the place-to-place transfer and held that the Board's finding that the paramount equities favored the objectors was reasonably grounded. None of these factors or the other factors considered by the court in Lyons Farms Tavern are present in the within case.

In reviewing the record herein, including the exhibits and the testimony presented, I find no factual or legal foundation to support the Council's action and find that the action of the Council was unreasonable and arbitrary.

For the reasons stated, I conclude that the appellant has sustained the burden imposed upon it under Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15. It is, therefore, recommended that the Council's action be reversed, and that the application for transfer be granted, in accordance with the application filed therefor.

Conclusions and Order

No exceptions to the Hearer's report were filed pursuant to Rule 14 of State Regulation No. 15.

Having carefully considered the entire record herein, including the transcript of the testimony, the exhibits, the argument of counsel and the Hearer's report, I concur in the findings and conclusions of the Hearer and adopt his recommendations.

Accordingly, it is, on this 16th day of July 1973,

ORDERED that the action of respondent Borough Council of the Borough of South River be and the same is hereby reversed, and respondent is directed to grant the said transfer in accordance with the application filed therefor.

ROBERT E. BOWER
DIRECTOR

3. APPELLATE DECISIONS - BROGEL v. TRENTON.

Ann Brogel, t/a Babbling Brook,

Appellant,

v.

City Council of the City of Trenton,

Respondent.

On Appeal

CONCLUSIONS and ORDER

Gerald Patrick Higham, Esq., Attorney for Appellant
Robert A. Gladstone, Esq., by Raymond B. Demski, Esq., Attorney for Respondent

BY THE DIRECTOR:

The Hearer has filed the following report herein:

Hearer's Report

This is an appeal from the action of the City Council of the City of Trenton (hereinafter Council) which on April 24, 1973, adopted a resolution suspending appellant's plenary retail consumption license for thirty days, in consequence of guilty finding on two charges alleging that appellant had, on December 20, 1970 and March 15, 1971, permitted minors unaccompanied by their parents, to remain on the licensed premises, in violation of Section 4-4, sub-section 4-5.4 of the local ordinance; and, further, that on November 29, 1970, appellant had allowed and permitted a brawl on the licensed premises, in violation of Section 4-8.1k of the said ordinance.

The Council's order of suspension was stayed by order of the Director, dated May 9, 1973, pending the determination of the appeal. R.S. 33:1-31.

The appellant contended that the action of the Council was not based upon supportable facts, hence represented an abuse of discretion. The Council denied this contention.

The appeal was heard de novo pursuant to Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15 with full opportunity afforded the parties to introduce testimony and cross-examine witnesses.

At the outset of the hearing and pursuant to Rule 8 of State Regulation No. 15, the transcripts of prior hearings

were received into evidence over objection by appellant. These transcripts (three) were of testimony taken before the Municipal Court of Trenton in connection with a criminal proceeding against the appellant and others, stemming from the same incidents involved herein. The Council, on the preferment of the charges opened the matter for acceptance of the plea whereupon counsel for appellant proffered the transcripts of the testimony taken before the Municipal Court both in defense and in mitigation of any penalty. The Council relied upon these transcripts to base its finding of guilt.

An analysis of these transcripts as well as testimony taken at the hearing in this Division of a police officer of the City of Trenton revealed the following accounts of the incidents which took place at or near the licensed premises on the dates recited in the charges: On November 29, 1970, a bartender of the establishment (although allegedly not on duty at that date) pursued a minor girl, who had been admitted to the licensed premises, outside thereof, and fired two shots from a revolver, one shot striking her leg. She was, thereafter, presumably hospitalized.

Later on the same evening, two female patrons became engaged in a fight (it was alleged in this connection that one girl had part of her ear severed) and were being removed from the premises upon the arrival of the police. The appellant was, thereupon, forcibly arrested after allegedly throwing a glass at one of the officers. Another officer was struck by flying glass.

The Municipal Court heard the testimony of all of the witnesses involved in the matter and entered a judgment finding the appellant guilty of the charges. It was on the transcripts of the testimony of all of the witnesses in the matter that the Municipal Court made the finding, and, upon the further introduction by the appellant of such transcripts to the Council that the Council, in turn, imposed the subject suspension.

The appellant took no appeal from the determination of the Municipal Court and by proffering the transcripts at the Board advanced them in support of the defense of the appellant. Thereafter, the transcripts were offered at the de novo hearing in this Division. Additionally, as above noted, the Council introduced the testimony of two police officers, Cunningham and Feltes, in further support of the Council's determination.

Police Officer Henry Cunningham of the Trenton Police Department, testified respecting an incident on the licensed premises on November 29, 1970. His testimony was substantially similar to that given by him before the Municipal Court on December 29, 1972.

No witnesses or evidence was offered by appellant who, in her defense, relied solely upon the postulate that the Council had not established that its determination had been properly reached. Full opportunity had been afforded appellant to introduce oral testimony and documentary evidence in accordance with Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15, which places upon appellant the burden of establishing that the action of respondent issuing authority was erroneous and should be reversed. In short, the appellant, having failed to introduce testimony in her behalf upon completion of the Council's presentation, made what was tantamount to a motion to dismiss.

The cases are legion which hold that "...the court on a motion to dismiss, must accept as true all evidence supporting the claim of the party against whom the motion is made, together with all legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom." Honey v. Brown, 22 N.J. 433,438 (1956).

Appellant placed much emphasis upon the contention that, as the factual review indicated that much of the action complained of took place "outside of the licensed premises", such charges could not be then established. It has been held that "The fact that...the violation did not occur in the licensee's premises shall constitute no defense to the charges preferred in such disciplinary proceedings." Howard Tavern, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control,(App. Div. 1961, not officially reported, recorded in Bulletin 1491, Item 1).

The basic principles involved in the matter sub judice is the determination as to whether the Council properly exercised its function herein.

> "The primary responsibility for enforcement of the laws pertaining to retail licensees rests upon the municipality." Benedetti v. Trenton, 35 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 1955); Rajah Liquors v. Div. of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 33 N.J. Super. 598 (App. Div. 1955).

A further contention was advanced by appellant that there was laches in the prosecuting of the matter long after the dates of the incidents charged. If this defense had merit, it should have been properly advanced at the time of the prosecution before the Municipal Court, i.e., December 1972. Thereafter disciplinary proceedings were quickly instituted by the Council, and the appeal heard in this Division without delay.

Furthermore, it has been held that:

> "While the delay is regrettable, there is no merit to the contention of the licensee that the Division was guilty of laches or that the licensee has been unduly prejudiced. In any event, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law does not contain any time limit within which disciplinary proceedings may be brought."

Re Grumka, Bulletin 1958, Item 4; Bernstein v. Paterson, Bulletin 1356, Item 1; Re Kinney Club, Inc., Bulletin 502, Item 7; Re Cruikshank, Bulletin 1962, Item 4; Cf. McCarter, Atty.-Gen. v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 78 N.J. (E. & A.) 346. Cf. Rules 1 and 2 of State Regulation No. 16.

The testimony advanced before the Municipal Court was in a crimonal action against appellant.

> "The quantum of proof in a criminal trial is different from and higher than that in proceedings before an administrative agency. In the former, proof must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; in the latter, it is only necessary to establish the truth of the charges by a preponderance of the believable evidence...."

In re Darcy, 114 N.J. Super. 454, 458 (App. Div. 1971); Benedetti v. Trenton, supra; Kravis v. Hock, 137 N.J.L. 252 (1948). The sum of the testimony advanced in the instant matter clearly preponderates against the appellant and in favor of the Council. Thus, appellant has failed to sustain the burden of establishing that the action of the Council was erroneous and should be reversed, as required by Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15.

It is recommended, therefore, that the action of the Council be affirmed, the appeal be dismissed and the suspension originally imposed by the Council and stayed by the Director pending the determination of this appeal, be reimposed.

Conclusions and Order

No exceptions to the Hearer's report were filed pursuant to Rule 14 of State Regulation No. 15.

Having carefully considered the entire record herein including the transcripts of the testimony, the exhibits and the Hearer's report, I concur in the findings and recommendations of the Hearer and adopt them as my conclusions herein.

Accordingly, it is, on this 25th day of July 1973,

ORDERED that the action of respondent City Council of the City of Trenton be and the same is hereby affirmed, and the same is hereby dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the order dated May 9, 1973 staying respondent's order of suspension pending the determination of this appeal, be and the same is hereby vacated; and it is further

ORDERED that Plenary Retail Consumption License C-33 issued by the City Council of the City of Trenton to Ann Brogel, t/a Babbling Brook for premises 502 Lamberton Street, Trenton, be and the same is hereby suspended for thirty (30) days, commencing 2:00 a.m. on Wednesday, August 8, 1973, and terminating 2:00 a.m. on Friday, September 7, 1973.

/s/ Robert E. Bower
Robert E. Bower
Director