

no later than 10 days thereafter. If the adverse party does not so respond, a summary decision, if appropriate, shall be entered.

(c) Motions for summary decision shall be decided within 45 days from the due date of the last permitted responsive filing. Any motion for summary decision not decided by an agency head which fully disposes of the case shall be treated as an initial decision under N.J.A.C. 1:1-18. Any partial summary decision shall be treated as required by (e) and (f) below.

(d) If, on motion under this section, a decision is not rendered upon all the substantive issues in the contested case and a hearing is necessary, the judge at the time of ruling on the motion, by examining the papers on file in the case as well as the motion papers, and by interrogating counsel, if necessary, shall, if practicable, ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and shall thereupon enter an order specifying those facts and directing such further proceedings in the contested case as are appropriate. At the hearing in the contested case, the facts so specified shall be deemed established.

(e) A partial summary decision order shall by its terms not be effective until a final agency decision has been rendered on the issue, either upon interlocutory review pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.10 or at the end of the contested case, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.6. However, at the discretion of the judge, for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary litigation or expense by the parties, the order may be submitted to the agency head for immediate review as an initial decision, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.3(c)12. If the agency head concludes that immediate review of the order will not avoid unnecessary litigation or expense, the agency head may return the matter to the judge and indicate that the order will be reviewed at the end of the contested case. Within 10 days after a partial summary decision order is filed with the agency head, the Clerk shall certify a copy of pertinent portions of the record to the agency head.

(f) Review by the agency head of any partial summary decision shall not cause delay in scheduling hearing dates or result in a postponement of any scheduled hearing dates unless the judge assigned to the case orders that a postponement is necessary because of special requirements, possible prejudice, unproductive effort or other good cause.

Amended by R.1990 d.368, effective August, 6, 1990.
See: 22 N.J.R. 3(a), 22 N.J.R. 2262(a).

In (e): added text to provide for an agency head to remand partial summary decisions to judge when deemed appropriate that decision will be reviewed at the end of contested case.

Amended by R.2008 d.151, effective June 16, 2008.

See: 40 N.J.R. 915(a), 40 N.J.R. 3617(a).

Rewrote (a); in (b), added the fourth and fifth sentences; and in (c), substituted "due date of the last permitted responsive filing" for "date of submission".

Case Notes

Commissioner of Education was not required to conduct evidentiary hearing before removing local school board and ordering creation of state-operated school district, where there were no disputed issues of fact

material to proposed administrative action. *Contini v. Board of Educ. of Newark*, 286 N.J.Super. 106, 668 A.2d 434 (A.D.1995).

Limitations period for challenge to denial of tenure did not begin to run when president of college advised employee by letter that he agreed employee should have tenure. *Dugan v. Stockton State College*, 245 N.J.Super. 567, 586 A.2d 322 (A.D.1991).

Evidential hearing in contested case is not needed if there are no disputed issues of fact. *Frank v. Ivy Club*, 120 N.J. 73, 576 A.2d 241 (1990), certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 799, 498 U.S. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 860.

Fact-finding conference conducted by state Division on Civil Rights could serve as basis for resolution of claim that eating clubs practiced gender discrimination. *Frank v. Ivy Club*, 120 N.J. 73, 576 A.2d 241 (1990), certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 799, 498 U.S. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 860.

Validity of partial summary decision rule upheld; reversed summary decisions in sex discrimination case re: men's eating clubs on jurisdiction and liability, final hearing necessary to resolve disputed fact (cited former N.J.A.C. 1:1-13.1—13.4). *Frank v. Ivy Club*, 228 N.J.Super. 40, 548 A.2d 1142 (App.Div.1988).

Administrative official could not resolve disputed facts without trial-type hearing. *Frank v. Ivy Club*, 228 N.J.Super. 40, 548 A.2d 1142 (A.D.1988), certification granted 117 N.J. 627, 569 A.2d 1330, reversed 120 N.J. 73, 576 A.2d 241, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 799, 498 U.S. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 860.

Plenary hearing is necessary for consideration of petition for issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity in this case to consider mitigating circumstances and permit fuller development of all relevant factors. *Matter of Robros Recycling Corp.*, 226 N.J.Super. 343, 544 A.2d 411 (App.Div.1988), certification denied 113 N.J. 638, 552 A.2d 164 (1988).

Summary disposition by administrative law judge is permissible if undisputed facts indicate that particular disposition is required. *Matter of Robros Recycling Corp.*, 226 N.J.Super. 343, 544 A.2d 411 (A.D.1988), certification denied 113 N.J. 638, 552 A.2d 164.

Former N.J.A.C. 1:1-13.1 through 13.4 cited regarding summary decision; rules held valid. In Re: Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 447 A.2d 151 (1982).

Initial Decision (2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 806) adopted, which concluded that a teacher's case was moot, where the teacher alleged that her tenure and seniority rights were violated by the board's notice that her employment would be reduced from full-time to 60% but she had been reinstated with no loss of compensation or benefits and thus suffered no loss of position or damage; the board's motion to dismiss on mootness grounds was controlled by N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5. *Price v. Bd. of Educ. of Washington*, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 6121-07, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 259, Commissioner's Decision (January 23, 2008).

When confronted in a disciplinary action with a motion that seeks summary decision both on the issue of liability for the alleged violations and on the quantum of sanctions to be imposed, an opposing party is required to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material disputed fact and, if the opposing party fails to do so, summary decision may be entered without the need for a further hearing on the issue of penalties. *Goldman v. Nicolo*, OAL Dkt. No. BKI 10722-04, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 943, Final Decision (October 12, 2006).

While N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b) states that a motion for summary decision may be filed "with or without supporting affidavits," licensees had to file an affidavit or certification denying some or all of the facts set forth by the Commissioner in order to create an issue of material fact. *Bakke v. Binn-Graham*, OAL Dkt. No. BKI 483-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 60, Initial Decision (February 17, 2006).

Initial Decision (2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 440) adopted, which concluded that where Racing Commission suspended horse trainer for 30 days as a result of positive drug test of horse (for Ketorolac) and disqualified horse from sharing purse, summary decision in favor of Commission was appropriate where, following a stay of his suspension, horse trainer failed to respond to certifications by the Commission;

summary decision is the administrative counterpart to summary judgment in the judicial arena. *Carter v. N.J. Racing Comm'n*, OAL Dkt. No. RAC 629-05, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1477, Final Decision (November 16, 2005).

Motion for summary decision granted on grounds that doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred re-litigation of issues (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-13.1). *Lukas v. Dep't of Human Services*, 5 N.J.A.R. 81 (1982), appeal decided 103 N.J. 206, 510 A.2d 1123 (1986).

1:1-12.6 Emergency relief

(a) Where authorized by law and where irreparable harm will result without an expedited decision granting or prohibiting some action or relief connected with a contested case, emergency relief pending a final decision on the whole contested case may be ordered upon the application of a party.

(b) Applications for emergency relief shall be made directly to the agency head and may not be made to the Office of Administrative Law.

(c) An agency head receiving an application for emergency relief may either hear the application or forward the matter to the Office of Administrative Law for hearing on the application for emergency relief. When forwarded to the Office of Administrative Law, the application shall proceed in accordance with (i) through (k) below. All applications for emergency relief shall be heard on an expedited basis.

(d) The moving party must serve notice of the request for emergency relief on all parties. Proof of service will be required if the adequacy of notice is challenged. Opposing parties shall be given ample opportunity under the circumstances to respond to an application for emergency relief.

(e) Where circumstances require some immediate action by the agency head to preserve the subject matter of the application pending the expedited hearing, or where a party applies for emergency relief under circumstances which do not permit an opposing party to be fully heard, the agency head may issue an order granting temporary relief. Temporary relief may continue until the agency head issues a decision on the application for emergency relief.

(f) When temporary relief is granted by an agency head under circumstances which do not permit an opposing party to be fully heard, temporary relief shall:

1. Be based upon specific facts shown by affidavit or oral testimony, that the moving party has made an adequate, good faith effort to provide notice to the opposing party, or that notice would defeat the purpose of the application for relief;
2. Include a finding that immediate and irreparable harm will probably result before adequate notice can be given;
3. Be based on the likelihood that the moving party will prevail when the application is fully argued by all parties;

4. Be as limited in scope and temporary as is possible to allow the opposing party to be given notice and to be fully heard on the application; and

5. Contain a provision for serving and notifying all parties and for scheduling a hearing before the agency head or for transmitting the application to Office of Administrative Law.

(g) Upon determining any application for emergency relief, the agency head shall forthwith issue and immediately serve upon the parties a written order on the application. If the application is related to a contested case that has been transmitted to Office of Administrative Law, the agency head shall also serve the Clerk of Office of Administrative Law with a copy of the order.

(h) Applications to an agency head for emergent relief in matters previously transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law shall not delay the scheduling or conduct of hearings, unless the presiding judge determines that a postponement is necessary due to special requirements of the case, because of probable prejudice or for other good cause.

(i) Upon determining an application for emergency relief, the judge forthwith shall issue to the parties, the agency head and the Clerk a written order on the application. The Clerk shall file with the agency head any papers in support of or opposition to the application which were not previously filed with the agency and a sound recording of the oral argument on the application, if any oral argument has occurred.

(j) The agency head's review of the judge's order shall be completed without undue delay but no later than 45 days from entry of the judge's order, except when, for good cause shown and upon notice to the parties, the time period is extended by the joint action of the Director of the Office of Administrative Law and the agency head. Where the agency head does not act on review of the judge's order within 45 days, the judge's order shall be deemed adopted.

(k) Review by an agency head of a judge's order for emergency relief shall not delay the scheduling or conduct of hearings in the Office of Administrative Law, unless the presiding judge determines that a postponement is necessary due to special requirements of the case, because of probable prejudice or for other good cause.

Case Notes

Adult classified special education student with disciplinary problems was precluded from attending Senior Prom. *P.P. v. Westwood Board*, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (EDS) 165.

1:1-12.7 Disposition of motions

Disposition of motions which completely conclude a case shall be by initial decision. Disposition of all other motions shall be by order.

SUBCHAPTER 13. PREHEARING CONFERENCES AND PROCEDURES

1:1-13.1 Prehearing conferences

(a) A prehearing conference shall be scheduled in accordance with the criteria established in N.J.A.C. 1:1-9.1(d).

(b) The prehearing notice shall advise the parties, their attorneys or other representatives that a prehearing conference will cover those matters listed in N.J.A.C. 1:1-13.2 and that discovery should have already been commenced. At the time of the prehearing conference, the participants shall be prepared to discuss one or more alternate dates when the parties and witnesses will be available for the evidentiary

hearing. The judge may advise the parties that other special matters will be discussed at the prehearing conference.

(c) In exceptional circumstances, the judge may, upon no less than 10 days' notice, require the parties to file with the judge and serve upon all other parties no later than three days before the scheduled prehearing conference, prehearing memoranda stating their respective positions on any or all of the matters specified in N.J.A.C. 1:1-13.2 set forth in the same sequence and with corresponding numbers or on other special matters specifically designated.

(d) A prehearing conference shall be held by telephone conference call unless the judge otherwise directs.

Administrative law judge was not required to recuse himself. *Ridings v. Maxim Sewerage Corp.*, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (OAL) 10.

Decision in criminal case involving substantive aspects of judicial disqualification provided no basis for collateral attack on issue of recusal of administrative law judge. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-27. In the Matter of the Tenure Hearing of John Fargo, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 172.

1:1-14.13 Proceedings in the event of death, disability, departure from State employment, disqualification or other incapacity of judge

(a) If, by reason of death, disability, departure from State employment, disqualification or other incapacity, a judge is unable to continue presiding over a pending hearing or issue an initial decision after the conclusion of the hearing, a conference will be scheduled to determine if the parties can settle the matter or, if not, can reach agreement upon as many matters as possible.

(b) In the event settlement is not reached, another judge shall be assigned to complete the hearing or issue the initial decision as if he or she had presided over the hearing from its commencement, provided:

1. The judge is able to familiarize himself or herself with the proceedings and all testimony taken by reviewing the transcript, exhibits marked in evidence and any other materials which are contained in the record; and

2. The judge determines that the hearing can be completed with or without recalling witnesses without prejudice to the parties.

(c) In the event the hearing cannot be continued for any of the reasons enumerated in (b) above, a new hearing shall be ordered by the judge.

(d) An order or ruling issued pursuant to (b) and (c) above may only be appealed interlocutorily; a party may not seek review of such orders or rulings after the judge renders the initial decision in the contested case.

Amended by R.2008 d.151, effective June 16, 2008.
See: 40 N.J.R. 915(a), 40 N.J.R. 3617(a).

Added (d).

1:1-14.14 Sanctions; failure to comply with orders or requirements of this chapter

(a) For unreasonable failure to comply with any order of a judge or with any requirements of this chapter, the judge may:

1. Dismiss or grant the motion or application;
2. Suppress a defense or claim;
3. Exclude evidence;
4. Order costs or reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, to be paid to the State of New Jersey or an aggrieved representative or party; or
5. Take other appropriate case-related action.

New Rule, R.1991 d.279, effective June 3, 1991 (operative July 1, 1991).

See: 23 N.J.R. 639(a), 23 N.J.R. 1786(a).

Amended by R.1996 d.133, effective March 18, 1996.

See: 27 N.J.R. 609(a), 28 N.J.R. 1503(a).

Added (b) through (d).

Recodified in part to N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.15 by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.

See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

Recodified (b) through (d) as N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.15.

Case Notes

Administrative law judge has power to impose reasonable monetary sanctions on attorneys. In re Timofai Sanitation Co., Inc., Discovery Dispute, 252 N.J.Super. 495, 600 A.2d 158 (A.D.1991).

Before administrative law judge (ALJ) could impose sanctions on attorneys, court was required to conduct evidentiary hearing. In re Timofai Sanitation Co., Inc., Discovery Dispute, 252 N.J.Super. 495, 600 A.2d 158 (A.D.1991).

Initial Decision (2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 414) adopted, finding that when discovery requests encompassed all aspects of the petition, the proper remedy under N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14 for failure to provide discovery was suppression of the petitioner's claim. L.A. and C.A. ex rel. P.M.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Port Republic, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 12031-06, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 521, Commissioner's Decision (July 18, 2007).

Parent's duplicative discovery requests did not warrant sanctions (adopting 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 263 as supplemented) (decided under former N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14(a) and (b), now N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14 and 1:1-14.15). R.O. ex rel. R.O. v. Bd. of Educ. of W. Windsor-Plainsboro School Dist., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 8827-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 575, Commissioner's Decision (June 28, 2006).

Initial Decision (2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 397) adopted, which ordered insurance producer's defenses stricken where, for almost seven months, the producer failed to respond to requests for discovery, failed to comply with the ALJ's order to comply with the discovery requests, and demonstrated a flagrant disregard for the rules and the OAL's orders. Bryan v. Bellissima, OAL Dkt. No. BKI 10040-2004S, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1154, Final Decision (August 30, 2005).

1:1-14.15 Conduct obstructing or tending to obstruct the conduct of a contested case

(a) If any party, attorney, or other representative of a party, engages in any misconduct which, in the opinion of the judge, obstructs or tends to obstruct the conduct of a contested case, the party, attorney, or other representative may be fined in an amount which shall not exceed \$1,000 for each instance.

(b) Where the conduct deemed to obstruct or tending to obstruct the conduct of a contested case occurs under circumstances which the judge personally observes and which he or she determines unmistakably demonstrates willfulness and requires immediate adjudication to permit the proceedings to continue in an orderly and proper manner:

1. The judge shall inform the party, attorney or other representative of the nature of the actions deemed obstructive and shall afford the party, attorney or other representative an immediate opportunity to explain the conduct; and

2. Where the judge determines, after providing the party, attorney or other representative, an opportunity to explain, that the conduct does constitute misconduct and that the conduct unmistakably demonstrates willfulness, the judge shall issue an order imposing sanctions.

i. The order imposing sanctions shall recite the facts and contain a certification by the judge that he or she personally observed the conduct in question and explain the conclusion that the party, attorney or other representative engaged in misconduct.

(c) Where the conduct deemed to obstruct or tending to obstruct a contested case did not occur in the presence of the judge or where the conduct does not require immediate adjudication to permit the proceedings to continue in an orderly and proper manner, the matter shall proceed by order to show cause specifying the acts or omissions alleged to be misconduct. The proceedings shall be captioned "In the Matter of _____, Charged with Misconduct."

(d) In any proceeding held pursuant to (c) above, the matter may be presented by a staff attorney of the Office of Administrative Law, or by the Attorney General. The designation shall be made by the Director of the Office of Administrative Law. The matter shall not be heard by the judge who instituted the proceeding if the appearance of objectivity requires a hearing by another judge.

Recodified in part from N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14 and amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.

See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

Recodified former introductory paragraph of (b) as (a); in (a), substituted a period for "provided:."; recodified former (b)1 as introductory paragraph of (b); in introductory paragraph of (b), substituted a colon for ", the"; inserted designation (b)1; in (b)1, inserted "The" at the beginning and "and" at the end; in (b)2, inserted "and that the conduct unmistakably demonstrates willfulness" and substituted a period for "which" at the end; inserted designation (b)2i; and rewrote (b)2i and (c).

Case Notes

Administrative law judge has power to impose reasonable monetary sanctions on attorneys. In re Timofai Sanitation Co., Inc., Discovery Dispute, 252 N.J.Super. 495, 600 A.2d 158 (A.D.1991).

Before administrative law judge (ALJ) could impose sanctions on attorneys, court was required to conduct evidentiary hearing. In re Timofai Sanitation Co., Inc., Discovery Dispute, 252 N.J.Super. 495, 600 A.2d 158 (A.D.1991).

SUBCHAPTER 15. EVIDENCE RULES

1:1-15.1 General rules

(a) Only evidence which is admitted by the judge and included in the record shall be considered.

(b) Evidence rulings shall be made to promote fundamental principles of fairness and justice and to aid in the ascertainment of truth.

(c) Parties in contested cases shall not be bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence or any formally adopted in the New Jersey Rules of Evidence except as specifically provided in these rules. All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided herein. A judge may, in his or her discretion, exclude any evidence if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will either:

1. Necessitate undue consumption of time; or
2. Create substantial danger of undue prejudice or confusion.

(d) If the judge finds at the hearing that there is no bona fide dispute between the parties as to any unstipulated material fact, such fact may be proved by any relevant evidence, and exclusionary rules shall not apply, except for (c) above or a valid claim of privilege.

(e) When the rules in this subchapter state that the qualification of a person to be a witness, or the admissibility of evidence, or the existence of a privilege is subject to a condition, and the fulfillment of the condition is in issue, the judge shall hold a preliminary inquiry to determine the issue. The judge shall indicate which party has the burden of producing evidence and the burden of proof on such issue as implied by the rule under which the question arises. No evidence may be excluded in determining such issue except pursuant to the judge's discretion under (c) above or a valid claim of privilege. This provision shall not be construed to restrict or limit the right of a party to introduce evidence subsequently which is relevant to weight or credibility.

Case Notes

Rules of Evidence application in arbitration proceedings. Fox v. Morris County Policemen's Ass'n, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 630 A.2d 318 (A.D.1993), certification denied 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140.

M.D. license revocation's request that all 70 patients present be permitted to testify held unreasonable (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.2(a)). In the Matter of Cole, 194 N.J.Super 237, 476 A.2d 836 (App.Div.1986).

In an administrative hearing, all relevant evidence is admissible (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.2(a)). Delguidice v. New Jersey Racing Commission, 100 N.J. 79, 494 A.2d 1007 (1985).

Evidence at public hearings under former rulemaking regulations. In re: Matter of Public Hearings, 142 N.J.Super. 136, 361 A.2d 30 (App.Div.1976), certification denied 72 N.J. 457, 371 A.2d 62 (1976).

Exclusion of chiropractor's testimony in a Lemon Law proceeding was within the realm of the ALJ's discretion, where the chiropractor, who had not examined the claimants, was prepared to testify as to whether the driver's seat of their vehicle provided sufficient support; the ALJ had observed that the chiropractor would be testifying without reference to any particular standards. Krinick v. Ford Motor Co., OAL Dkt. No. CMA 7868-05, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1068, Final Decision (September 9, 2005).

Appeal from license suspension for refusal to submit to breath test (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4). Administrative law judge is able to consider unpublished appellate opinion. No provision in the Administrative Procedure Rules of Practice prohibits this. Absent a ruling requiring otherwise, an agency is not free to ignore relevant unpublished appellate opinion of which it is aware unless the respondent can show surprise. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Festa, 6 N.J.A.R. 173 (1982).

1:1-15.2 Official notice

(a) Official notice may be taken of judicially noticeable facts as explained in N.J.R.E. 201 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.

(b) Official notice may be taken of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the specialized knowledge of the agency or the judge.

(c) Parties must be notified of any material of which the judge intends to take official notice, including preliminary reports, staff memoranda or other noticeable data. The judge shall disclose the basis for taking official notice and give the parties a reasonable opportunity to contest the material so noticed.

Amended by R.1996 d.343, effective August 5, 1996.
See: 28 N.J.R. 2433(a), 28 N.J.R. 3779(a).

In (a) updated Rules of Evidence citation.

Case Notes

Official notice may be taken of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the specialized knowledge of the agency or the judge. If the agency bases no belief on some unexpressed agency expertise, it should have noted the same for the record (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.3(b)). *A.C. Powell Health Care Center v. Dep't of Environmental Protection*, 1 N.J.A.R. 454 (1980).

Official notice may be taken of judicially noticeable facts as explained in Rule 9 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.3). *Div. of Motor Vehicles v. Exum*, 5 N.J.A.R. 298 (1983).

Parties must be notified before or during the hearing of the material noticed and the parties will be afforded an opportunity to contest that material of which the judge is asked to take official notice (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.3). *In Re: Perno Bus Co.*, 1 N.J.A.R. 402 (1980).

1:1-15.3 Presumptions

No evidence offered to rebut a presumption may be excluded except pursuant to the judge's discretion under N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.1(c) or a valid claim of privilege.

1:1-15.4 Privileges

The rules of privilege recognized by law or contained in the following New Jersey Rules of Evidence shall apply in contested cases to the extent permitted by the context and similarity of circumstances: N.J.R.E. 502 (Definition of Incrimination); N.J.R.E. 503 (Self-incrimination); N.J.R.E. 504 (Lawyer-Client Privilege); N.J.S.A. 45:14B-28 (Psychologist's Privilege); N.J.S.A. 2A:84-22.1 et seq. (Patient and Physician Privilege); N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.9 (Information and Data of Utilization Review Committees of Hospitals and Extended Care Facilities); N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.13 et seq. (Victim Counselor Privilege); N.J.R.E. 508 (Newsperson's Privilege); N.J.R.E. 509 (Marital Privilege-Confidential Communications); N.J.S.A. 45:8B-29 (Marriage Counselor Privilege); N.J.R.E. 511 (Cleric-Penitent Privilege); N.J.R.E. 512 and 610 (Religious Belief); N.J.R.E. 513 (Political Vote); N.J.R.E. 514 (Trade Secret); N.J.R.E. 515 (Official Information); N.J.R.E. 516 (Identity of Informer); N.J.R.E. 530 (Waiver of Privilege by Contract or Previous Disclosure; Limitations); N.J.R.E. 531 (Admissibility of Disclosure Wrongfully Compelled); N.J.R.E. 532 (Reference to Exercise of Privileges); and N.J.R.E. 533 (Effect of Error in Overruling Claim of Privilege).

Administrative Correction.

See: 23 N.J.R. 847(a).

Amended by R.1996 d.343, effective August 5, 1996.

See: 28 N.J.R. 2433(a), 28 N.J.R. 3779(a).

Updated Rules of Evidence citations.

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.

See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

Substituted "Cleric-Penitent Privilege" for "Priest Penitent Privilege".

Amended by R.2009 d.112, effective April 6, 2009.

See: 41 N.J.R. 5(a), 41 N.J.R. 1391(a).

Deleted "N.J.R.E 501 (Privilege of Accused)" following "similarity of circumstances:".

Case Notes

Deliberative process privilege did not apply to Department of Insurance documents. *New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Company v. Department of Insurance*, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (INS) 27.

1:1-15.5 Hearsay evidence; residuum rule

(a) Subject to the judge's discretion to exclude evidence under N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.1(c) or a valid claim of privilege, hearsay evidence shall be admissible in the trial of contested cases. Hearsay evidence which is admitted shall be accorded whatever weight the judge deems appropriate taking into account the nature, character and scope of the evidence, the circumstances of its creation and production, and, generally, its reliability.

(b) Notwithstanding the admissibility of hearsay evidence, some legally competent evidence must exist to support each ultimate finding of fact to an extent sufficient to provide assurances of reliability and to avoid the fact or appearance of arbitrariness.

Case Notes

While the writings of an administrative analyst with the New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits were hearsay, as they appeared highly reliable, they were admissible in an administrative hearing under the residuum rule, N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(b), to corroborate a retiree's un rebutted testimony about the advice the retiree received from the Division; therefore, an administrative law judge erred in concluding that there was no corroboration for the retiree's testimony. *Hemsey v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System*, 393 N.J. Super. 524, 925 A.2d 1, 2007 N.J. Super. LEXIS 176 (App.Div. 2007).

"Residuum rule" requires that findings be supported by residuum of competent evidence. *Matter of Tenure Hearing of Cowan*, 224 N.J. Super. 737, 541 A.2d 298 (A.D.1988).

Facts did not need to be proved by residuum of competent evidence, so long as combined probative force of relevant hearsay and relevant competent evidence sustained ultimate finding. *Matter of Tenure Hearing of Cowan*, 224 N.J. Super. 737, 541 A.2d 298 (A.D.1988).

Written, sworn statements of evidence to support charges against tenured, public high school teacher could be hearsay. *Matter of Tenure Hearing of Cowan*, 224 N.J. Super. 737, 541 A.2d 298 (A.D.1988).

Notwithstanding the admissibility of hearsay evidence, some legally competent evidence must exist to support each finding of fact (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.8(b)). In the *Matter of Tanelli*, 194 N.J. Super. 492, 477 A.2d 394 (App.Div.1984), certification denied 99 N.J. 181, 491 A.2d 686 (1984).

Audiotaped statement of non-testifying female dancer admitted at hearing, but would not be used to impute actual knowledge of prostitution to ABC licensee's management because the licensee did not have

the opportunity to cross-examine her. N.J. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. S.B. Lazarus, Inc., OAL Dkt. No. ABC 2309-07, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 342, Initial Decision (June 2, 2008).

In an automobile insurance cancellation case, the insurer's contention that water incursion could not cause a digital odometer rollback, presented only by hearsay evidence, could not be found as fact without legally competent evidence to support it, and the insurer's subsequent submission of affidavits attesting to the same bare conclusion did not cure the residuum rule deficiency. *Nguyen v. NJ Re-Insurance Co.*, OAL Dkt. No. BKI 2981-06, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 309, Initial Decision (April 23, 2008).

Initial Decision (2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 202) adopted, which considered the out-of-court statements of a cognitively impaired victim as to the source of the injury to his jaw, though there was a question as to whether the victim understood truth from a lie; testimony of witnesses and exhibits corroborated the hearsay statements. *In re Murphy*, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 12287-07, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 604, Final Decision (April 23, 2008).

ALJ dismissed one charge of abuse against a certified nurse aide because it was based entirely on hearsay. *N.J. Dep't of Health & Senior Services v. O.B.*, OAL Dkt. No. HLT 2051-07, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 263, Initial Decision (May 15, 2007).

Initial Decision (2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 725) adopted, which concluded that it could not be found that a certified nurse aide threw a wet pad at a resident of a long-term care facility where there was no competent legal evidence to corroborate the resident's hearsay statement that the act had occurred. *N.J. Dep't of Health & Senior Services v. Turner*, OAL Dkt. No. HLT 2091-06, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 872, Final Decision (September 20, 2006).

Administrative cases are unique in that N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(b), entitled the "residuum rule," allows hearsay to be admitted, but it also requires the ultimate findings be supported by residuum of competent evidence; the residuum rule is consistent with the principle that, like judicial proceedings, administrative adjudication must include procedural safeguards, including notice and an opportunity to be heard and opportunity for cross-examination, defense, and rebuttal — essential for reliable fact finding. *2 Lars, LLC v. City of Vineland*, OAL DKT. NO. ABC 8875-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 730, Initial Decision (September 12, 2006).

Competent evidence refers to evidence that would ordinarily be admissible in a court under the rules of evidence; while hearsay is admissible in an administrative proceeding, the ultimate finding must be based upon competent evidence and may not be based solely upon hearsay. *2 Lars, LLC v. City of Vineland*, OAL DKT. NO. ABC 8875-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 730, Initial Decision (September 12, 2006).

Hearsay cannot be "boot strapped" from a municipal hearing into an administrative hearing by shifting the burden of proof to the licensee; if the municipal hearing was built entirely upon hearsay and the hearsay was accepted by the ALJ at an administrative hearing, it would turn it into a rubber stamp and the administrative process would be rendered meaningless. *2 Lars, LLC v. City of Vineland*, OAL DKT. NO. ABC 8875-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 730, Initial Decision (September 12, 2006).

Where the city's case relied solely on hearsay, as the city's witness to a fight in the licensee's establishment was not presented as a witness at the administrative hearings and her admissions or statements made to the officers were thus out-of-court statements offered for the truth, the licensee was not afforded procedural safeguards, including opportunity for cross-examination, defense and rebuttal; the city therefore failed to establish by competent evidence that the licensee violated N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1(a). *2 Lars, LLC v. City of Vineland*, OAL DKT. NO. ABC 8875-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 730, Initial Decision (September 12, 2006).

Student accused of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute failed to present any evidence rebutting the police detective's report that he possessed six bags of marijuana, and the fact that the detective's account of the marijuana found with the student was hearsay did not

automatically render the evidence incompetent under N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(a) and (b). The student himself offered into evidence three exhibits that described circumstances leading to the student's apprehension and possession of marijuana, and while the reports were all hearsay, they nonetheless corroborated each other and were from three separate individuals, one of whom was a witness to the car stop and police activity, and while the witness's statement did not directly refer to the student, it did corroborate facts in police reports. *P.G. ex rel. M.G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Woodcliff Lake*, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 7495-03, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 572, Commissioner's Decision (June 28, 2006).

In a proceeding against respondent for operating a solid waste facility without a permit, respondent's exception to an investigator's hearsay testimony failed, where the investigator had testified that the individual he observed dumping solid waste (who did not testify) said he had permission from respondent to do the dumping. Applying the residuum rule requires identifying the ultimate finding of fact that must be supported by a residuum of competent evidence, and here, the Solid Waste Management Act imposes strict liability. Thus, the ultimate finding of fact that the dumping occurred was well supported by the investigator's sworn testimony of observed actions corroborated by photographs taken by the investigator depicting the individual dumping solid waste into a container on the property occupied by respondent. *N.J. Dep't of Env'tl. Prot. v. Circle Carting, Inc.*, OAL Dkt. No. ESW 05939-03, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 227, Final Decision (February 21, 2006).

Hearsay opinion in police report, when successfully rebutted, was not a sufficient basis to require licensee to undergo driver re-examination. *Division of Motor Vehicles v. Cioffi*, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 57.

Hearsay medical reports not sufficient to show police officer permanently and totally disabled for accidental disability retirement purposes. *Mercier v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System*, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (TYP) 94.

Residuum rule requires that notwithstanding the admissibility of hearsay evidence, some legally competent evidence must exist to support each ultimate finding of fact (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.8). *Div. of Medical Assistance v. Kares*, 8 N.J.A.R. 517 (1983).

Letters from real estate agents held admissible hearsay (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.8(a)). *Country Village v. Pinelands Commission*, 8 N.J.A.R. 205 (1985).

Casino Control Commission determined that the residuum rule did not apply to hearings conducted pursuant to the Casino Control Act. The standard to be applied (N.J.S.A. 5:12-107(a)(6)) permits the Commission to base any factual findings upon relevant evidence including hearsay, regardless of the fact that such evidence may be admissible in a civil action, so long as the evidence is the sort upon which responsible persons are accustomed to rely upon in the conduct of serious affairs (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.8). *Div. of Gaming Enforcement v. Merlino*, 8 N.J.A.R. 126 (1985), affirmed 216 N.J.Super. 579, 524 A.2d 821 (App.Div.1987), affirmed 109 N.J. 134, 535 A.2d 968 (1988).

Hearsay evidence allowed subject residuum rule. *In Re: White Bus Co.*, 6 N.J.A.R. 535 (1983).

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1:1-15.6 Authentication and content of writings

Any writing offered into evidence which has been disclosed to each other party at least 10 days prior to the hearing shall be presumed authentic. At the hearing any party may raise questions of authenticity. Where a genuine question of authenticity is raised the judge may require some authentication of the questioned document. For these purposes the judge may accept a submission of proof, in the form of an