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# DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY

## REPORT

On The

# SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY MASS TRANSPORTATION SURVEY

July 18, 1956

**FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY**

ADMINISTRATION BUILDING  
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN BRIDGE PLAZA

CAMDEN, N. J.

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**REPORT  
OF THE  
DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY**

**TO THE GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATURES OF THE  
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA AND THE  
STATE OF NEW JERSEY**

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**R E P O R T**  
**OF THE**  
**DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY**  
**OF PENNSYLVANIA AND NEW JERSEY**

TO THE HONORABLE: THE GOVERNORS AND THE LEGISLATURES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA AND THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

The Delaware River Port Authority was created as a public corporate instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey, with the approval of the Congress of the United States, to effectuate certain defined public purposes, among them being:

Article I, subdivision (j)

“The establishment, maintenance, rehabilitation, construction and operation of a rapid transit system for the transportation of passengers, express, mail and baggage between points in New Jersey communities within the Port District and within a thirty-five (35) mile radius of the City of Camden, New Jersey, and points within the City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and intermediate points. Such system may be established by either utilizing existing rapid transit systems, railroad facilities, highways and bridges within the territory involved or by the construction or provision of new facilities where deemed necessary.”

Article XII, fourth paragraph, of the Agreement further provides:

“It shall not be within the power of the Commission (Port Authority) to construct, erect, or otherwise acquire any new facility or project for a purpose described in Article I, subdivision (j)

hereof, unless and until the Commission shall have made to the Legislature and Governor of the State of New Jersey and to the Legislature and Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania a detailed report dealing only with such contemplated facility or project, and the Governor of said State and the Governor of said Commonwealth shall have filed with the Commission their written consents to such construction, erection or acquisition."

On August 18, 1954, the Authority engaged the nationally-known engineering firm of Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Hall and Macdonald to make a comprehensive survey of the possibilities of building a rapid transit system connecting the Southern New Jersey area with central Philadelphia. A detailed report dealing with all phases of the project was presented after seventeen months' study and investigation. Cost to the Authority was \$325,000. After intensive study of the report and with special attention to the all-important question of financing, the Authority directed a series of questions to the engineers designed to clarify certain recommendations and conclusions. Answers to these queries have been received and carefully reviewed.

The engineers propose that high-speed rail transit be provided from a terminal station near City Hall, Philadelphia with a track connection to the Pennsylvania Railroad Suburban Station, through a new subway under Arch Street and a tunnel under the Delaware River to the existing elevated Broadway Station, Camden and, thence, fanning out along existing railroad rights-of-way to terminal stations just beyond Moorestown, Haddonfield and Woodbury. Stations would be built at Fifth and Tenth Streets along the Arch Street Subway in addition

to the terminal in Philadelphia. The trunkline between Philadelphia and Camden would be 2.9 miles long and the spurs from Camden to Moorestown, Haddonfield and Woodbury, 10.6, 8.6 and 9.5 miles respectively. The rapid transit rails would be entirely separate from the railroad tracks. Grade separations would be provided, safety and comfort of passengers emphasized and patrons would enjoy a reduction in travel time estimated at ten million man-hours a year. By diverting passengers from highways to rails, the roads would be cleared to the great benefit of those who, for one reason or another, persisted in driving their own automobiles.

The engineers commented upon the growing vehicular congestion manifest now upon the highways of New Jersey and the streets of downtown Philadelphia. The report states:

"Yet it is essential to realize that, despite the popularity of the private automobile, the Southern New Jersey area and its connection to Philadelphia depend heavily upon regional mass transportation. During the morning and evening rush hours, for instance, almost 50 per cent of all trips between Philadelphia and Southern New Jersey are made by train or bus. If these trips were suddenly transferred to private automobiles, the existing traffic congestion would mount to chaos.

"Of dramatic significance then is the fact that patronage of interurban mass transportation has been at a stagnant level, or actually declining, during recent years, while the Southern New Jersey area has been growing rapidly and its automobile traffic increasing in record proportions. Since the peak year (1948), patronage of the Bridge Line between Camden and Philadelphia has fallen off about 24 per cent despite the Locust

Street extension and the elimination of ferry service. The utilization of the commuting railroads in the Southern New Jersey area has declined 75 per cent and bus patronage is at the 1947 level thus essentially stagnant in relation to population growth trends. It is of equal importance that regional mass transportation interests have experienced operating deficits and thus are compelled to seek redress in the form of increased fares or reduced service, thereby threatening patronage still further.

"The dominant problem for the Southern New Jersey area is whether to accept the stagnation and decline of regional mass transportation and the intensification of traffic congestion and frustration of regional development that will result, or whether to reinvigorate regional mass transportation.

"We, on our part, look forward to the continued importance and vitality of the center city cores of Philadelphia and Camden; a continuation—even acceleration—of the dispersion of homes to the residential suburbs, and out of the prosperity of the center city cores and their commuters, the generation of substantial new commercial activity in Southern New Jersey. But this can only come about through the reinvigoration of mass transportation in a form to penetrate the downtown urban cores, link the centers of employment and commerce and collect from automobiles, before they accumulate in zones of potential congestion, the workers and shoppers upon whom the vitality of the whole region will depend.

"The success of regional mass transportation will in turn depend upon its development of an attractive competitive posture in relation to the private automobile. To achieve this, interurban mass transit must provide comfortable seats for all passengers, must operate at high speed and must provide service at short intervals. Our own

proposals, for instance, contemplate average speeds approximating 45 miles per hour, including time for station stops and frequency of service as short as 3 minutes and not exceeding 9 minutes during rush hours. During the day, between rush hours, service should be provided at intervals not to exceed 15 minutes.

"Perhaps most important of all, stations must be located at points that can be conveniently reached by the travelers being served. At centers of employment and commerce, stations must be within convenient walking distance of the major business centers and shopper destinations. In suburban residential areas, stations must be tied to the travelers' homes by good local streets and highway networks. Ample parking areas must be provided together with convenient facilities for transfer from local buses.

"To meet the standards necessary to divert automobile travelers from the urban centers and their approaches, and to serve the high volume of transit travel that such standards will induce during rush hours (over 15,000 during the peak hour, for instance, in Philadelphia) a regional system of interurban rapid transit is required. We are confident that such a system, integrated with highway networks, competitive with the private automobile, designed to serve commuters and shoppers and directed toward relieving congestion in the urban centers and on the highway approaches to them is not only the best, but the least cost solution to the region's total land development and transportation problem."

The Delaware River Port Authority endorses the conclusions of the engineers that the projected line should be constructed and put into operation as quickly as possible. There is no doubt as to its desirability. The question is—how can this system be financed? The engineers estimate that the cost of

construction, rights-of-way and equipment, exclusive of financing charges and interest during construction, will be \$242,000,000. Inclusion of the items omitted would necessitate a bond issue of from \$282,000,000 to \$300,000,000. The lesser amount would represent the saving that could be effected if the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey "or responsible sub-divisions thereof" would guarantee the bonds.

The Authority now is expressly debarred from pledging the credit of either State. Its sole resources are the tolls collected for passage of vehicles over the Benjamin Franklin Bridge, to be augmented next year from Walt Whitman Bridge tolls and from those received on any other bridge it may be authorized to build. This includes the high-level bridge to replace the present Tacony-Palmyra structure for which legislative authorization has been given by Pennsylvania but, to date, not by New Jersey.

The engineers and their financial advisers, Smith, Barney and Company, made a most searching inquiry into the resources of the Authority. Net annual income from the new rail project during the first 14 years of operation was estimated at \$5,745,000. They reported that the total net earnings of the Benjamin Franklin, Walt Whitman and new Tacony-Palmyra Bridges plus revenues of the projected transit line would support an Authority bond issue from which \$113,600,000 could be allocated as a partial payment toward the \$242,000,000 project cost. To make up the difference would call for contribution by Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or their sub-divisions, of \$128,400,000. This would be a subsidy

given in recognition of the benefits to be derived by the citizens of both states through inauguration of a vastly improved method of transporting people than the area now enjoys.

This Authority has no means of knowing whether this course would be approved by the Legislatures and Governors nor is it in a position to suggest how the expenditure should be divided. In a desire to get some light on this subject, the following query was put to our engineers:

“Upon what formula could the state or local subsidy—i. e., tax burden—be allocated? Population? Ratio of cross-river movements? Can you supply us with any information as to what formulae exist in other areas?

“ANSWER: We are glad to supply the following information as to what formulae exist in other areas. You are, of course, familiar in this regard with the New York City transit operations. Here debt service for the capital cost of the subway system is borne in its entirety by the city itself from general city funds.

“The operation of the Metropolitan Transit Authority of the Boston Metropolitan District is also a case in point. The present Boston Metropolitan Transit Authority is owned and operated by the Metropolitan Transit Authority (known as M. T. A.). The Authority was set up under Chapter 544 of the Laws of 1947 and took over in 1949 the original system belonging to the Boston Elevated Railway Company. This company owned all the surface lines, rolling stock and portions of the underground subways. The remaining portion of the underground and several structures were built by the cities of Cambridge and Boston and the State, and were rented to the Boston Elevated Railway Company on an annual rental

basis. The system serves 14 cities and towns with a total population of 1,530,000 (1950). The present system consists of 25 miles of rapid transit and 208 miles of trolley and bus lines.

"The legislation provides that, in the case of any deficit in funds required for operation or debt service, the Board of Trustees of the Metropolitan Transit Authority will notify the Boston Metropolitan District (a separate financing agency for transit) at the end of each calendar year, and will be reimbursed in the exact amount by the State Treasurer. The State, in turn, then proportions this deficit among the 14 cities and towns serviced by the M. T. A. on a ratio of the number of passengers using the M. T. A. facilities for the previous year. The distribution up until 1955 was based on the results of a survey taken in 1940. For the present year, however, a new distribution is now being worked out.

"In the event of any extensions of the M. T. A. into those cities and towns not presently in the transit district, the voters in each municipality must vote on their inclusion in the system through a referendum. Following this, special legislation must be passed authorizing the extension.

"For the fiscal year 1955, total State assessments on the cities and towns were \$7,516,000.

"These precedents may be of interest in the development of tax policy to support rapid transit in the Southern New Jersey-Philadelphia area. While it is beyond the scope of our assignment, or position, to formulate such policy, we are glad to point out the following matters which bear on the problem:

1. Twenty per cent of anticipated rapid transit trips will originate and terminate in New Jersey.
2. Eighty per cent of anticipated rapid transit trips will involve crossings of the Delaware River.

3. The benefit to Philadelphia would largely accrue to downtown business and shopping, and thus downtown business properties convenient to rapid transit stations would be very greatly benefited. But, in addition, since downtown business provides jobs and supports tax ratables that are vital to the whole Philadelphia economic structure, the whole of Philadelphia will benefit to a significant extent.
4. Municipalities in New Jersey which would be served by a rapid transit station would receive a very substantial benefit. In addition, the six counties, all or part of which are in the tributary area in New Jersey, will be benefited by the general stimulus to the area of convenient transportation to Camden and center city Philadelphia.
5. Rapid transit during work days will very significantly relieve the demand in New Jersey on highways leading to Camden and Philadelphia.

"The problem for the tax experts would be to allocate the burden for the support of rapid transit to these areas of benefit. The report contains comprehensive station-to-station transit movements and population statistics for their use."

The Authority realizes that the concept of two States undertaking the major responsibility for a mass-transit project in this area is novel and may not meet with universal approval. It knows also that this Authority was created as a self-supporting agency of the States to carry forward projects on its own resources. However, this particular improvement is incapable of realization unless we are given substantial financial assistance. If it were not sincerely convinced of the essential need for rapid transit in this region, the Authority would not even

suggest this idea of State aid. To dispel the illusion that the Authority has funds and credit to enable it to proceed on its own resources, the engineers were asked these questions:

"Can the Delaware River Port Authority, by dedicating all unencumbered revenues of the Benjamin Franklin Bridge, Walt Whitman Bridge and new Northeast Philadelphia-New Jersey Bridge, if built, and by covenanting that it will build no new facilities and limit its expenditures for port promotion and development to \$250,000 annually, finance the rail transit line projected in your report?

"ANSWER: No.

"Can the Authority, by thus pledging the total resources under its direction and control, finance any transit system that would materially improve present transportation between South Jersey and Philadelphia?

"ANSWER: If, as we postulated for the conduct of our work, the measure of material improvement of transit will be its ability to attract to its service substantially more travelers than now patronize existing mass transportation facilities—then our answer is no. \* \* \*

"The question has been raised as to whether or not adequate results could be achieved by developing segregated lanes or grade-separated rights-of-way and terminals for buses. The essential point in this connection is that, to be successful, such a system must give convenient distribution in downtown Philadelphia and, if successful, terminal facilities would have to be provided to handle at least 15,000 passengers per hour. These could not be provided underground nor elevated at such convenient points as designated for the rapid transit stations, but would have to be constructed of the size and in the character, for instance, of the bus terminal of The Port of New York Au-

thority, outside of the central business section. But such a terminal, or terminals, would impose on the traveler destined to the central business section of Philadelphia the necessity of transferring for the last lap of his journey to local transit. But this is a transfer not required now for present bus service to and from New Jersey. Thus, though such bus stations would serve to take New Jersey buses off the city streets of Philadelphia, we see little outlook for such a system as a whole generating significantly more patronage than does the present bus service.

"Thus, for a successful mass transportation system, from the point of view of diverting to its service a substantial percentage of those who have automobiles at their command, there is in our view no alternative to rapid transit for delivery and distribution in center city of Philadelphia.

"The question of least cost, however, becomes intimately involved in considering how far out from Camden and Philadelphia, and over how many routes, rapid transit lines should extend. It would be nice if they were projected within walking distance of the majority of tributary homes but, in this era of dispersed single-family residences, such a concept would impose fabulous capital costs and operating expenses. In our view, such a vast extension of rapid transit lines is unnecessary and irrational.

"We have concluded that it will be necessary to extend rapid transit lines only far enough out, and only over such routes as are necessary to provide stations which may be reached from all parts of the area by private car or bus without traversing seriously congested highways.

"In seeking to forestall automobile trips that are now congesting the urban centers and their arterial highway approaches, we are dealing largely with home-to-work commuters and shoppers who now drive all the way into the urban

centers to park. We do not fear their willingness to use their cars, but we must provide adequate parking lots and convenient transfer facilities generally along their line of travel, and with assurance that they can reach them without serious traffic congestion.

"Thus, we are confident that a rapid transit system, integrated with the regional highways, is the least cost solution to the overall problem.

"The system we have recommended provides for new underground stations in Philadelphia, a trans-river tunnel, and three grade-separated branches in New Jersey. In arriving at this recommendation, we did not overlook such other possibilities as re-equipping the Bridge Line with modern cars, and/or purchasing and renting to the railroads, at rates attractive to them, modern diesel-powered cars, and/or consummating with the railroads agreements to provide more frequent service with part of the cost to be borne by the Authority, and/or providing additional escalators for convenient transfer from the railroad stations in Camden to the Bridge Line, and even electrifying non-grade-separated railroads and providing a physical connection in Camden between them and the Bridge Line for through service to Philadelphia.

"All of these possibilities were earnestly considered by us, and none selected for detailed engineering cost estimates, because, none would offer sufficient improvements in speed, comfort and convenience to induce or sustain significantly more patrons for mass transportation than are now attracted to existing mass transportation facilities, particularly the buses operating over the common highways. We would therefore emphatically recommend against them.

"You may now wish our comment as to what the alternative may be if the solution is sought without the development of a modern rapid transit

system that can effectively compete with the automobile for commuters and shoppers destined to the center cities. This alternative should entail a full recognition of the problems of growth and congestion, together with the belief that their solution lies in a greatly expanded program of highway, parking and bus terminal facilities. The mass transportation component of this regional system would be provided by the bus which would draw patronage largely from those who do not have automobiles at their command or do not wish to use them. The stagnation of interurban mass transportation would continue, in contrast to the rapidly increasing total demand for transportation, leaving the great mass movements of commuters to be accommodated in ever-greater proportions by the private automobiles. (In the past five years, for instance, the number of bus trips over the Benjamin Franklin Bridge has been relatively constant, while automobile trips have increased 29%). If mounting congestion and the growing transportation barrier between New Jersey and Philadelphia be relieved, drastic reconstruction would be required in the major commercial centers for urban arterial highways, off-street bus terminals and parking garages, and for a complex re-patterning of city streets to give access to these facilities."

The engineers advise emphatically against any attempt to reduce cost of the project by using the present rail transit line on the Benjamin Franklin Bridge by saying:

"As a result of extensive studies recorded in our full report, we have concluded that any development of rapid transit which contemplates the long-range utilization of the Bridge Line, would fail in the following respects to meet the standards for a modern rapid transit system which we deem essential:

1. Low passenger utilization of the Locust Street Subway—currently under 2,500 daily—has demonstrated its ineffectiveness as a distributing line in Philadelphia for travelers to and from Southern New Jersey. The 8th and Market Street Station, together with its distributing lines, would fail to provide the convenience in passenger distribution so essential to the realization of a rapid transit patronage potential of over 15,000 passengers during the peak hour in Philadelphia. And even at a patronage level less than this, the 8th and Market Street Station could not handle the load that would be tributary to it. We are therefore convinced that new distribution facilities, as provided at three stations under Arch Street in our recommended plan, are essential for successful rapid transit.
2. Utilization of the Bridge Line itself with connections, however, to a new subway under Arch Street, would add five minutes to each trans-river trip. As a measure of the significance of this differential the average speed of a transit trip between Haddonfield and the 10th Street Station in Philadelphia would be reduced from the 40 miles per hour, to be achieved by the recommended plan, to 29 miles per hour if the Bridge Line is utilized. From another point of view, this would mean an increase in regional travel time in excess of 7,000 man-hours each workday or over 2,000,000 man-hours a year. Increased operating and maintenance costs would exceed \$200,000 a year.
3. Such a connection as noted above between the Bridge Line and a new Arch Street subway would inevitably mean the elimination of the Independence Mall Station as provided in the recommended plan. This would result in a significant loss in potential patronage because

of inconvenience to an estimated 38,000 daily passengers who would otherwise use the Independence Mall Station.

4. It should be noted here also that permanent use of the Bridge Line would eliminate an important potentiality of the recommended plan which can be realized by the conversion of the space now occupied by the Bridge Line tracks to four highway traffic lanes. This could be accomplished by extending and strengthening the brackets now supporting the tracks to a width suitable for the creation of a two-lane roadway on each side of the bridge. When proper highway approaches become available this could bring substantial relief to week-end traffic to and from the Jersey shore.

"All of the considerations briefly outlined above have led to the conclusion that the penalties which would result from the utilization of the Bridge Line as a permanent element of the transit system definitely outweighs the savings in capital cost (\$26,000,000) as compared to the recommended plan.

"However, in view of the prospective savings in initial cost as noted above, it has been essential to consider the desirability of using all or parts of the present Bridge Line on a temporary basis, with subsequent conversion to a more effective routing employing a tunnel crossing of the Delaware River. Here we must re-emphasize our recommendation that no rapid transit project, looking forward to reversing the decline of interurban mass transportation patronage, should be undertaken without substantial improvement in passenger distribution in Philadelphia. Thus, a plan providing for temporary use of the Bridge Line must include the construction of the proposed Arch Street subway to a point east of the 10th Street Station, with a connection to the bridge tracks

in the vicinity of 7th and 8th Streets. Such a plan would contemplate using, temporarily, the route over the bridge and the underground route and stations in Camden, with a connection from the underground station at Broadway to the Trunk Line leading to the three branches.

"As we have previously noted, utilization of the Bridge Line facilities to the extent discussed above would reduce by \$26 million the capital cost of construction compared to the recommended plan. This difference takes into account \$5.8 million required to connect the Bridge Line to the Arch Street subway and necessary alterations and modifications to the Bridge Line between this connection and the Broadway Station in Camden.

"This investment would be lost at the time the Bridge Line is abandoned, and \$40.3 million would be required in new capital funds for the river tunnel crossing and its connections—including the Independence Mall Station in Philadelphia. Thus, the total project construction cost would be increased by \$14.3 million above the cost of the recommended plan. We consider this too high a penalty in ultimate capital construction cost to pay for the opportunity of merely deferring for a few years the cost of a tunnel crossing of the Delaware River. This is particularly true in light of all the operational penalties during the period of utilization of the bridge.

"One variant from the recommended plan should be noted here, which would make possible the location of a second station in Camden, adjacent to the waterfront. This is not possible with the recommended plan because of the grades from the elevated station in Camden to the river tunnel portal. Consideration was therefore given to routing the Trunk Line underground through the existing Broadway under-

ground station and continuing it underground along the railroad embankment to a station adjacent to the waterfront, and thence to the under-water tunnel. This plan, however, would cost \$8.5 million more than the recommended plan. Since essentially all of the work destinations which would be tributary to the additional station are within one-half mile of the Broadway Station, we do not consider the additional expenditure justified from the point of view of transportation."

The engineers and their financial advisers explored the possibility of increasing tolls on all Authority bridges to reduce the amount of outside aid required for financing. A 30-cent toll on passenger automobiles, they reported, would cause a traffic reduction of 5 per cent but, over a 40-year period, would enhance revenues by an average of \$3,000,000 annually. Nevertheless, the additional aid required would be \$95,000,000 for capital cost financing. A 35-cent toll would result in a 10 per cent traffic decrease, augmented receipts annually averaging \$6,500,000 and diminish the outside aid required to \$58,000,000.

Increasing tolls, a most distasteful procedure, would therefore not balance the budget even if the Secretary of the Army, who has jurisdiction over tolls on interstate bridges, were willing to give his consent. Opposition from motorists would be naturally intense, based upon the ground that they were being singled out to bear the burden of the rail transit project. They would undoubtedly assert that the present toll schedule covers operation costs and debt service on the bridges in use or proposed and claim that rail transit patrons should pay their own way.

In their report, the engineers suggested that the fare to Camden from points in New Jersey should be 20 cents with an additional 20 cents between Camden and Philadelphia. They recommended that no commutation rates be established. Undoubtedly, if rail fares were raised appreciably, many potential patrons would continue to drive their automobiles. The greatest obstacle in improving mass-transportation by rail in commuting districts is the characteristic American's love of driving his own car. Recognition of this explains why toll bridges can be easily financed and why the investing public shies away from putting money into rapid transit improvements.

Although the engineers made an exhaustive study of the subject and reported in detail upon estimates of cost and revenues to be anticipated, the Authority is not in a position to guarantee that supplementary contributions from the States can, in fact, be limited to \$128,400,000. The Authority portion of the ultimate cost can not exceed \$113,600,000 because that is the absolute limit to be reached by a pledge of its total resources. One of the items for which no provision has been made in the \$242,000,000 total project cost is the amount the bus companies now using the Benjamin Franklin Bridge would require as compensation for discontinuing service competitive with the rail transit line. The engineers strongly recommend that present short-run service between Philadelphia and New Jersey by way of the Benjamin Franklin Bridge be eliminated. Bus companies advised the engineers that they are not in a position to make any commitments for voluntary discontinuance.

In the compact creating this Authority is a direct prohibition against competition with private enterprise and, of course, the Authority has no police power to bar interstate buses. All these facts point to a solution predicated upon paying the bus companies to abandon service. How much this might amount to is undetermined. Asked to comment upon the possibility that bus companies would elect to continue their present operation, the engineers replied:

“If local bus service across the Benjamin Franklin Bridge is continued, rapid transit revenues may be reduced by up to 25 per cent and net transit revenues available for debt service by up to \$2,500,000. This would increase by that annual amount the burden on sources of revenue other than rapid transit income. We consider this a very high price to pay for the duplication of mass-transportation services across the Benjamin Franklin Bridge to center city Philadelphia.”

No provision is being made at this time for future extensions beyond the first-stage transit system outlined in the report. The engineers report that about 40 miles of new extensions would be required beginning in 1975 and extending for at least fifteen years. They state that such extensions would cost approximately \$120,000,000 based on today's rates. These costs would have to be met by some one other than the Authority because, as above stated, its resources will already have been fully committed. The engineers advise that all Authority earnings should be reserved for liquidation of its own debt including that portion required for the transit system and the accumulation of reserves to support its credit. They

advise against the Authority's entering into any contract which would preclude its financing of necessary future projects.

It should be borne in mind that one of the prime purposes for which the Authority was created was the improvement and development of the Delaware River port. Nine years ago, the Legislatures of both States directed The Delaware River Joint Commission, predecessor of the Authority, to undertake the formulation of a specific action program for promotion of the river from Trenton to the sea. In obedience to this mandate, the Authority set up a Port Development Department with offices for the solicitation of freight in New York, Pittsburgh and Chicago. An extensive advertising campaign to publicize the Port's advantages is being carried on. The Authority is actively engaged in defending the interests of the Port Area in rate cases before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Authority may be called upon in the near future to assume the burden of building modern wharfs to facilitate movement of commerce through the port.

The Authority is the creature of the Legislatures of Pennsylvania and New Jersey and the course of action to be determined in this mass-transportation question obviously lies with the Legislatures and Governors.

Fortunately, New Jersey has appointed a legislative committee comprised of five senators and five assemblymen for the express purpose of studying the Southern New Jersey Mass-Transportation Survey report. The Authority undoubtedly will be

given an opportunity to confer with this committee so that all facets of the situation may be explored. The Authority hopes to review the problem also with an appropriate committee representing the Pennsylvania Legislature as well as with Governors Leader and Meyner.

The engineers' detailed report points to a solution of a most difficult and pressing problem. Action to be taken by the Authority will, of course, be dictated by the Legislatures and Governors.

Respectfully submitted,

DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY

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July 18, 1956

Ans  
62694  
Answer



