NEW YORK METROPOLITAN RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

and

NEW JERSEY METROPOLITAN RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

To the Honorable the Governors
and the Legislatures of
the States of New York and New Jersey

JOINT REPORT
on
The Problem of Providing
Improved Mass Transportation
between
The City of New York
and
New Jersey — Westchester — Long Island

Also the Report's Exhibits 1 to 17 and
Appendices A, B and C

March 3, 1954



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NEW YORK METROPOLITAN RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

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March 3, 1954

To: His Excellency, Governor THOMAS E. DEWEY, and
the Members of the New York Legislature

and

His Excellency, Governor ROBERT B. MEYNER, and
the Members of the New Jersey Legislature

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

Under Chapter 453, Laws of 1952, as amended by Chapter 211, Laws of 1953, of the State of New York, the New York Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission was created; and under Chapter 194, Laws of 1952 of the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission was similarly created. Copies of these Acts of the two States are appended as Exhibits 1 and 2. The New York Commission received an appropriation of $10,000; the New Jersey Commission $20,000.

The two Commissions have actively collaborated and have endeavored to coordinate their activities.

The New York Commission held all-day public hearings on November 12 and 13, 1953, with the New Jersey Commission in active participation. The two Commissions subsequently opened a common office at 15 Broad Street, New York City 5, and held a number of joint conferences. All expenses were shared equally, except the compensation of the respective consultants.

Exhibits 1-17 outline considerable statistical data and technical information which have been developed over the years or submitted by responsible organizations at the public hearings and which have been studied by the Commissions and discussed in some detail in the following Report.

Appendix A gives an outline of efforts previously made to solve the Regional Railroad and Rapid Transit Problem of the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area.

Appendix B sets forth the economic consequences to New Jersey railroads due to the development of motor traffic.

Appendix C presents a list of the organizations and individuals participating at the hearings on November 12 and 13, 1953, and a summary of their respective expressions of opinions and recommendations.

The Port of New York Authority, the Regional Plan Association, the Citizens' Traffic Safety Board and other organizations have rendered material service; and the railroads, when requested, have submitted much data.

The cooperation of all of these groups is hereby gratefully acknowledged. This Report endeavors to indicate the source of the information and the tabulated figures.

1. THE PROBLEM

I

The Commissions believe that the critical importance and urgency of the problem of transit and traffic in the Metropolitan Area, including Long Island, Staten Island, Westchester and New Jersey, are obvious and self-demonstrating.

Transit and traffic in the Metropolitan Area have now exceeded the point of full saturation. Self-strangulation is becoming increasingly acute. The needs of this vast region, constituting in essence one great metropolitan community, as they will exist in 1960 and 1970, and as they presently concern its economy, its civil defense and the convenience of its people, are of urgent pressing importance.

No single formula can solve the complex problem of transit in the New York Metropolitan Area, but any solution must take imagination and courage, and must recognize certain basic fundamentals. These include (among others) the nature and extent of population growth in the area, the tremendously rapid growth of highway transportation, the diversion of traffic resulting in the stagnation and decline of rail transit, the relatively large amount of space required for personalized automobile transportation as compared with rail transit, and the present limitations in mass transportation.

In short, the problem of mass transportation of people and merchandise is inevitably intermingled with that of automobile and truck transportation, and any overall approach must seriously consider the interrelationships between the two. This approach entails the assembling of a vast mass of data on vehicular and passenger traffic, parking, commuting and non-commuting travel, the direction, methods and hours of travel and other pertinent information regarding travel habits, convenience and costs in the Metropolitan Area.

Only on the basis of these facts can an intelligent appraisal be made of the many possible solutions that have been suggested, including such measures as a new direct rail connection between New Jersey and both down-town and mid-town Manhattan, and the establishment of numerous parking lots in the vicinities of rail or bus line connections.

The problem is a tremendous one and no small plans will work. The first essential, therefore, is an adequate comprehensive study based on all available facts, which will result in an overall coordinated plan for transportation in the Metropolitan Area. This study will have to consider all suggested solutions on their merits and weigh them on the basis of a full factual investigation. In addition to traffic considerations, a full scale economic investigation is in order, since one of the most serious aspects of the whole picture is the continuing state of financial crisis which constantly faces most of mass transit facilities.

The urgency and the complexity of the over-all situation and problem demand and should receive the cooperative and constructive consideration of all agencies concerned therein.

It is obvious that adequate studies cannot be made on the basis of the wholly inadequate appropriations thus far made for the separate Commissions of the two States; and that, since the New York Commission is required to make a report to the New York Legislature by February 25th, the two Commissions can presently do no more than to join in a joint report to the Governors and Legislatures of the two States which will (a) state pertinent statistical and technical data and the major factors integrated in the overall subject; (b) collate and summarize the studies, views and recommendations of the distinguished bodies represented by spokesmen at the public hearings; (c) set forth such perceptions as the Commissions may deduce concerning ways and means for constructive progress; and (d) point

out that since the problem is bi-State, constructive action can only result from the unified work and recommendations of a bi-State Commission.

It will then remain for the Legislatures of the two States to determine whether or not they will, as a first step, create a joint Commission with authority to further explore what is today a most complex and critical problem; to make such further investigations as are necessary to define the detailed studies that must be made to arrive at sound measures of progress toward an ultimate solution of the problem; to employ competent technical assistance to this end; and to recommend action in a pressing subject matter of the most vital and daily concern to the 14,000,000 residents of the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area.

In consequence, these Commissions cannot and do not undertake in this Report to propose or endorse any specific plan. One only has to look at the conflicting, and to a degree contradictory, proposals, appraisements, and analyses made by the distinguished advocates speaking at the public hearings to realize how impractical and imprudent it would be for these Commissions, within the limits of their present resources, to undertake now to assert the availability and economic and governmental feasibility of any plan contemplating a major contribution to the solution or even to the amelioration of this great Problem.

The Commissions believe that this report is useful and constructive as a first step; and that the gathering together of the views, studies, and recommendations of the many distinguished and responsible organizations and citizens who spoke at the public hearings was itself a new approach and a unique contribution to a better understanding and appraisement of the Problem itself and to that cooperative and constructive consideration of it which is essential to adequate and effective results.

II

As further emphasis as to the nature, complexity and urgency of "The Problem", the Commissions quote as follows from the Report of the New York Chamber of Commerce, December, 1951:

"To an extent unmatched in any other region of the Nation, the New York Metropolitan Area requires large-scale, mass passenger transportation.

"This densely inhabited area, comprising twenty-two counties in three states, contains nearly fourteen million people. In the past thirty years its population has increased by more than four million. By 1970, as estimated by the Regional Plan Association, the New York Metropolitan Area will have in excess of 15,500,000 people.

"The Metropolitan Area is expanding. In 1925, the built-up area of the region, containing five or more houses per city block, covered 420 square miles. In 1970, according to estimates, this will grow to 1200 square miles—nearly double the present extent.

"The 'hub' of the Area is New York City—and more specifically Manhattan, an island, to which more than 350,000 workers commute daily. This represents an increase in commuters of 20 per cent in the past twenty years.

"Transportation and the New York Metropolitan Area

"Transportation, and particularly rapid transit, occupies a position of unique importance in the New York Metropolitan Area. Virtually all those who work in the Area require transportation from their homes to their places of employment.

"This has led to the development within the City of New York, of an extensive network of mass transportation facilities—subways, elevated railways and buses—that carry some 9,000,000 persons daily.

"It has required the establishment of widespread commuter transportation facilities to serve workers who reside in the outlying suburban communities of the Metropolitan Area.

"It has resulted in a huge investment in new and additional highway facilities, including tunnels and bridges, to accommodate the tremendously heavier highway load brought on by the increase in the number of vehicles, autos, buses and trucks, that are in use in the Metropolitan Area.

"The Changing Patterns of Commuter Transportation

"Over the past twenty years, a most significant shift has occurred in the use of commuting facilities in the New York Metropolitan Area." * * *

"There has been a sharp increase in the use of automobiles and buses for commuting, and a decline in the use of railroads.

"The decline in railroad commuting, and the shift to highway transportation, is most pronounced in the New Jersey sector of the Metropolitan Area. There, railroad commuting has declined 30 percent since 1930, while auto and bus use has increased fourfold.

"Although commuting from the Westchester-Fairfield and Long Island sectors does not reflect an actual decrease in the use of rail transportation, the proportionate increase in the use of highway transportation far outranks the rate of growth of rail usage.

"Some Results of the Changing Transportation Pattern

"This shift from the rails to the highways for commutation has had far-reaching effects.

"It has aggravated the already difficult financial plights of the commuter railroads which have been faced with steadily rising costs, not fully compensated for by rate increases. In the case of many roads, an actual decline in passengers, has led to steady elimination by the carriers of a growing number of unprofitable lines and runs, and to recurring requests for increased fares. As a result, ever more passengers have been forced to depend on highway facilities, which, in turn, further decreases rail patronage with resultant increased commuter railroad operational losses.

"Insofar as highway facilities are concerned, this shift from rails has contributed greatly to highway congestion, making necessary the construction of additional high-cost road, bridge and tunnel facilities which, in turn, are soon overtaxed and require the planning of still more expensive facilities.

"For New York City, the center of the Area, the tremendous increase in the use of autos and buses has created an almost insoluble traffic and parking problem that is exerting a most damaging effect on the life of the City. * * *

"Clearly, the present trend cannot be allowed to continue. The growing imbalance in commuting passenger transportation, if not corrected, can only lead to ever greater difficulties, which will result in growing social and economic losses for the entire Metropolitan Area.

"The time has come to deal comprehensively with the problem, and to develop a broad-gauged program for the coordination of transportation in the New York Metropolitan Area which will embrace all types of transportation, and which will lead to a better balance in the use of rail, bus and auto transportation."

2. THE PUBLIC HEARINGS

At the public hearings held by the Commissions on November 12 and 13, 1953, in the auditorium of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 132 persons, not connected with the Commissions, registered as attending.

Of this total, 45 organizations were represented and 31 speakers were heard. These are listed under Appendix C.

A great variety of opinions, appraisements and proposals, often conflicting, were presented at these hearings. They ranged from statements to the effect that adequate new facilities were now in progress to a suggestion that all transportation facilities, present and future, in the New York Metropolitan Area be consolidated under one fully empowered Authority.

The data submitted indicates the magnitude of the studies required for a complete review of present and future planning, as well as the complicated engineering studies involved, to coordinate the present facilities and construct new means of transportation so as to reduce the congestion. It was also shown that this much overdue development was essential to the City of New York and the whole Metropolitan Region, and should be undertaken promptly, and that the survey should be adequately financed.

The rapid growth in population and manufacturing in the outlying areas of the Region will continue, mainly due to the central area congestion. There is also a growing consciousness of personal safety through greater means of mass transportation in the event of a war.

This report attempts, as briefly as possible, to give an outline of the results obtained in some of the investigations made and suggestions offered for solving the problem, and to the tremendous amount of work involved in continuing to completion a comprehensive regional plan for the relief of the entire area. It also sets forth the imperative need for cooperative and constructive consideration of the problem and its major factor by all agencies concerned therein.

3. STREET CONGESTION IN MID-MANHATTAN CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES

Street Congestion

In November 1945, a report was submitted to the Port of New York Authority covering a survey of traffic conditions in the areas of known congestion in the Boroughs of Manhattan and Brooklyn.

The study covered the Borough of Manhattan, south of 59th Street, and downtown Brooklyn.

The congested areas are chiefly characterized by extreme concentration of vehicles and slow and difficult maneuvering of vehicles, particularly in peak hours.

The congested areas were designated as such areas where the count showed a traffic density of 400 cars or more per hour. The report shows, however, that at a large number of points within this area, the density was very much greater than the 400 car base, and, at one point, was over 1,000 cars per hour. Such densities very greatly impede all other traffic in adjacent streets with the result that all movements are at a very low speed.

On the above basis, the areas having exceptionally congested vehicular traffic were designated as:

In midtown-Manhattan—the area within Eighth Avenue, Lexington Avenue, 30th Street and 59th Street.

In downtown-Manhattan—the area bounded by Greenwich St., Water Street, and the Bowery, State Street, and Houston Street.

In downtown-Brooklyn—the area within the line enclosing Court and Fulton Streets on the west, Carlton Avenue and Adelphi Street on the east, Bergen Street on the south and Myrtle Avenue on the north.

The volume counts established the peak traffic hour as from 5 P. M. to 6 P. M. Attention was then concentrated on the results in this peak h ur. The above congestion study dealt only with motor vehicles.

Attention is also called to the fact that 1945, when this survey was made, was one of the war years during which gasoline was rationed and automobile registration had decreased from 32,035,424 in 1940 to 30,638,429 in 1945.

The growth in use of automobiles, buses, and trucks in the United States, from 1945 to 1952, amounted to 71%, as is shown on the attached Exhibit 3. The conclusion is that the vehicle congestion in these Manhattan and Brooklyn areas has increased in a reasonable proportion in relation to the increase in registrations.

The congestion caused by persons, principally on the city's transit facilities, affects about the same area in Manhattan as is shown for surface traffic.

Pedestrians on the streets materially impede motor traffic, particularly at important intersections where autos must cross the stream of pedestrian traffic.

The consequences of the congestion are also indicated by the growth of manufacturing and other businesses in the outer areas of the Metropolitan Region, and the estimated losses to New York as a result of this outward movement.

Losses as a Result of the Present Street Congestion in New York, as Estimated by the Citizens Traffic Safety Board

In a survey of the cost of traffic congestion and traffic accidents in the City of New York, the Citizens Traffic Safety Board found the economic drain from our traffic to be in excess of One Billion Dollars per year. From the results of this study, it is estimated that the waste from traffic inefficiency in the Metropolitan Region would easily pass the Two Billion Dollar mark annually.

The report is based on the best information available from a representative cross-section of the business life of the City and in cooperation with business and industry executives and firms, city officials, and organizations.

The most obvious effect of congestion in New York is the loss of time, waste of fuel and wear and tear on automobiles and trucks and lowered operating efficiency. A mileage study showed fuel consumption per vehicle 30% higher due to the congestion and that autos and trucks wear out faster. Traffic motion studies show that, for the average trip in New York City, the wasted standing time is equal to the moving time. Insurance rates have gone up steadily. Insurance company executives figure that if the traffic flow in New York were "normal", the accident rate would drop 25%. These accidents result in wage losses, medical expenses and repairs to property. A reduction in congestion and the accompanying drop in

accident rate would reduce insurance premiums by about $30,000,000 annually on private automobiles.

Studies by various concerns with heavy delivery operations in New York indicate that the per mile operating cost of trucks is over four times greater than the country-wide average.

The condition further results in the movement of people to suburban areas, a decline in the rate of new plant construction, removal of businesses to suburban sites, loss in taxes, time and effort wasted by City Departments, etc.

A breakdown of the One Billion Dollar loss, as estimated by the Citizens Traffic Safety Board, will be found on Exhibit 16.

The estimated regional loss of Two Billion Dollars, due to traffic congestion alone, represents 5% on Forty Billion Dollars. This would seem to justify the expenditure of considerable sums to cut down this traffic inefficiency.

4. GROWTH OF MOTOR TRAFFIC AND FACILITIES BUILT TO CARE FOR IT

Growth of Motor Traffic

Exhibit 3 gives motor vehicle registrations from 1920 to 1952 for the United States, the States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut and the 5 Boroughs of the City of New York.

The growth of automobile registration from 1930 to 1952 has been as follows:

United States	98%
New York	71%
New Jersey	104%
Connecticut	138%
Pennsylvania	85%
City of New York (1933-1952)	75%

This growth of automobile registration which is nationwide has necessitated a vast national program of highway improvements and allied construction. In the New York Metropolitan Region, and areas adjacent thereto, billions of dollars have been spent by Federal, State, and Municipal governments and by special authorities in the construction of highways, super-highways, expressways, parkways, bridges and tunnels to care for a vast increase in vehicular traffic. During this same period no public funds have been spent in improving the railroad traffic flow between Manhattan and New Jersey.

Port of New York Authority Facilities

While the Port Authority has created various facilities, such as inland freight terminals and airport developments, the facilities built to cross navigable arteries, and facilities dependent thereon, have had a marked effect upon the mass transportation in existence prior to the creation of these facilities.

The three bridges built between Staten Island and New Jersey, that is the Bayonne Bridge, the Goethals Bridge and the Outerbridge Crossing, have had little or no effect upon the movement of passengers into or out of Manhattan.

The Holland Tunnel, opened to traffic on November 13, 1927, was the first of the trans-Hudson vehicular arteries built by a predecessor commission of the Port Authority. This artery, by bringing buses, trucks and private cars into Manhattan, did not at first offer much competition to the railroads, with the possible exception of the Hudson & Manhattan.

The opening of the George Washington Bridge on October 25, 1931, disclosed the first serious competition with the railroads serving Bergen and Passaic Counties in New Jersey, and Rockland, and Orange Counties in New York. Buses in increasing number brought passengers from that region into upper Manhattan where they transferred to the City subways. Later on, with the opening of the West Side Highway, many private car owners drove to their destination in New York over these facilities.

The south tube of the Lincoln Tunnel was opened to traffic on December 22, 1937, and as this came into mid-Manhattan, where an increasing number of New Jersey travelers had destination, its effect upon the railroad passenger service was severe.

The Bus Terminal at 8th Avenue and 40th Street in Manhattan, opened to traffic on December 15, 1950, took many buses off the streets of mid-Manhattan, and it no doubt encouraged bus passengers to use it, and this may have caused more people to use the buses into mid-Manhattan than before.

These developments and the increased use of buses, trucks and private cars for movements into and out of New York have seriously affected railroad travel, particularly to and from New Jersey.

5. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES TO SUBURBAN RAILROADS DUE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOTOR TRAFFIC

New Jersey Railroad Traffic

The losses sustained by the New Jersey railroads in their passenger traffic since 1930 have been serious, particularly in the commuter traffic.

New Jersey Railroad Traffic

(in thousands)

(Source: Port of New York Authority Data)

	Commuters	Others	Total
1930	109,874	60,787	170,661
1940	66,140	48,785	114,925
1952	45,601	38,909	84,510
Loss in 1952			
Compared with 1930	59%	36%	51%
" " 1940	31%	20%	27%

In view of the fact that the Pennsylvania Railroad is included in the above figures, and this railroad has had important increases in both commuter and other-than-commuter traffic into the Pennsylvania Station, it must be apparent that the losses sustained by some of the other railroads were correspondingly higher. Commuter losses sustained by the Erie and West Shore Railroads were:

(Source: New Jersey Railroads)

	Loss 1930 to 1950 Commuters	Loss 1940 to 1950 Commuters
Erie	19⅓ million—68%	2½ million—21%
West Shore	5¾ " —68%	1⅓ " —33%

The result has been felt most keenly on two Erie branches, the Northern Railroad of New Jersey, where 1 of the 2 tracks was taken up and the train service reduced from about 30 to 3 trains per day, and on the New Jersey-New York Railroad, where 1 track was also removed, and the line was abandoned in Rockland County from Nanuet to New City, and the number of trains reduced from over 30 to 5 one way and 6 the other way, per day. In addition, six trans-Hudson ferries have been discontinued.

For further details on New Jersey railroad data see Appendix B.

Westchester Railroad Traffic

Westchester railroads have not suffered as much as have the New Jersey railroads, although there have been created many excellent highway facilities leading directly into Manhattan which can be used at a lesser cost than is the case from New Jersey.

While these carriers lost considerable traffic during the "thirties", much of this traffic, both in commuter and other-than-commuter business, has been regained since. The following Table shows the relative position:

Westchester Railroad Traffic

(in thousands)

	Commuters	Others	Total
1930	39,890	23,720	63,610
1940	22,636	17,450	40,086
1952	29,975	21,151	51,126
Loss 1952 compared with			
1930	25%	11%	20%
Gain 1940 to 1952	32%	21%	28%

This relatively good showing is no doubt due to the fact that the people from this region enjoy excellent service and they are brought directly into mid-Manhattan on rails.

Long Island Railroad Traffic

The Long Island sector, on the other hand, has had greater losses than Westchester, even though these passengers are also carried into mid-Manhattan on rails. The relative position here was as follows:

Long Island Railroad Traffic

(in thousands)

	Commuters	Others	Total
1930	83,348	34,842	118,190
1940	47,661	29,887	77,548
1952	48,597	27,795	76,392
Loss 1952 compared with 1930	42%	20%	35%
Gain 1940 to 1952	2%	–7%	–1%

The reason why this carrier lost more than Westchester and did not recoup as much since 1940 is no doubt due to the fact that the New York City subways have been extended to the western boundaries of Nassau County and that the people in Queens who used the railroad previously are now using the subways, and people from beyond the City limits are coming to the subway stations in cars or buses. No details are available on this.

6. RAILROAD AND VEHICULAR TRAFFIC INTO MANHATTAN

From: New Jersey
Westchester
Long Island

The Port of New York Authority has prepared 5 graphs for this Commission showing:

EXHIBIT 4—Commuter and other railroad passengers from New Jersey

EXHIBIT 5—Commuter and other railroad passengers from Westchester

EXHIBIT 6—Commuter and other railroad passengers from Long Island

EXHIBIT 7—Composite chart showing railroad passengers from all three sectors

EXHIBIT 8—All trans-Hudson traffic, railroad commuters and others.

These Exhibits are attached hereto, with explanations.

7. POPULATION TRENDS

(For details see Exhibit 9.)

While the gain in population in the metropolitan region had been moderate from 1930 to 1940, the gain from 1940 to 1950 has been phenomenal for certain sections or counties within this metropolitan region.

The heaviest gains, percentage-wise, were registered for Nassau and Suffolk Counties, with a total of nearly 60% for the combined area between 1940 and 1950.

During this same period, the percentage gain recorded for some of the New Jersey counties, while not as high as for Nassau and Suffolk Counties, was still high, and showed increases of from 30% to 40%.

The Westchester sector had the lowest percentage of increase, with Westchester gaining only 9% from 1940 to 1950 and Fairfield County in Connecticut gaining 20%.

The 5 Boroughs of the City of New York had registered only minor gains, with the exception of Queens. While the gain for Queens, between 1940 and 1950 was 20%, the Bronx showed only a 4% increase, Manhattan 4%, Kings 1% and Richmond 10%, with a total gain for the City as a whole of only 6%.

Although many of the counties in this region have had only minor gains in population, the total gain for the area was 12% from 1940 to 1950, with a gain for the City of New York of only 1/2 of this percentage, in spite of the gain of 20% recorded for Queens.

The lack of gain for the Bronx, Manhattan, and Kings is no doubt due to the general tendency of people to move to the outer regions of the metropolitan area, that is primarily to Long Island, and New Jersey points.

If we omit the passenger traffic statistics for the years 1930 to 1940, which were seriously affected by the depression, and take the more recent and normalized trend between 1940 and 1950, and compare this with the growth of population during this period, we obtain the following:

Growth in Percentages

("Com." means commuters.)

	New Jersey			Westchester			Nassau and Suffolk		
	Com.	Others	Total	Com.	Others	Total	Com.	Others	Total
Railroad	−17%	−11%	−15%	32%	17%	25%	9%	6%	8%
Auto & Bus Passengers from N. J.			+57%			*			*
Combined Total			+19%						
Growth in Population			15%			14%			57%

* Due to the fact that the figures for Westchester and Long Island are not as readily available as they are for the New Jersey auto and ferry traffic, and due to the fact that the New York subways extend up to the borders of Westchester and Nassau Counties, which have been used by many former Long Island Rail Road passengers, it is difficult, in the short time available, to make a comparison similar to that for New Jersey.

While the growth in population in the commuter region of New Jersey has been 15% during the last 10 years shown, the railroad traffic has decreased 15%. Even if all traffic between New Jersey and the City of New York is considered, it is apparent that much of the growth in population found work in New Jersey.

Westchester shows a population gain of 14%, but a railroad passenger gain of 25% from 1940 to 1950. If the bus and auto passengers could be added to this, it would indicate that an even larger percentage continued to travel to the City of New York regularly. This is no doubt due to the excellent railroad facilities available there.

As for Long Island, 49% of the growth in population did not come into New York by railroad. This, however, is only a partial picture as no doubt many of these people transferred somewhere, either from the railroad or automobiles or buses, to the City subways, or came into Manhattan in private automobiles or buses.

8. GROWTH IN POPULATION IN OUTLYING REGIONS AND DISPERSION OF INDUSTRY AND BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS TO THE SUBURBS

The Regional Plan Association has furnished this Commission copies of the graphs which it introduced and explained at the hearing. These graphs are attached hereto as Exhibits 10-15 inclusive. They give data on:

Exhibit 10 Trends in Population

Exhibit 11 Fastest Growing Areas

Exhibit 12 Number of Homes in the Region

Exhibit 13 Suburban Branch Stores

Exhibit 14 Key Manufacturing Counties

Exhibit 15 Growth in Employment

In general, these graphs show the principal growth in population has been in the counties which had the greatest industrial growth and that, as the number of persons per household decreased, the need for new dwelling places increased.

The movement of industrial and business establishments into the suburbs has been very considerable. This movement has built up a reverse commuting motion as indicated by comparing the earlier outbound use of the tunnels, bridges, and parkways with the present outbound use.

Based on reasonably reliable data, the Port of New York Authority estimates that on a typical business day in 1952 this reverse travel motion amounted to about 25% of the trans-Hudson passenger movement. (See Exhibit 17 for details.)

The growth in suburban branch stores was also very considerable, with only a few in existence in 1935, and over 100 now. With the establishment of these stores in the suburbs, this has had a depressing effect upon smaller stores, restaurants, theaters, etc., who can not establish such branches and who, in the past, received much patronage from suburban residents who came into the City to shop, dine, and be amused, and who now remain in the suburbs.

In reference to Exhibit 12— In 1900, the 1,168,000 families used 140 square miles in the whole region. In 1940, 3½ million families used 640 square miles. In 1970, it is estimated that the projected 5 million families will use about 1,200 square miles.

What kind of transportation is best suited to serve these people living and working in the region? Should the next trans-Hudson crossing be rail or vehicular?

There are four kinds of movements to be considered:

1. Within the City by subways and buses.

2. Commuting from the outside into the center.

3. Commuting between suburbs now largely taken care of by autos and buses, but on inadequate cross-county highways.

4. Local commuting movements within the suburbs.

9. ORGANIZATION, INVESTMENTS, INCOME AND EXPENSE STATEMENTS OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY and THE TRI-BORO BRIDGE & TUNNEL AUTHORITY

The Port of New York Authority

The Port of New York Authority is an organization of the States of New York and New Jersey established by a Port Treaty authorized in 1921 by the Legislatures of the two States and approved by the Congress and the President of the United States.

The Port Authority is directed to develop and operate transportation and terminal facilities within the Port District, an area of about 25 miles radius from the Statue of Liberty. Second, it is directed to promote and increase the commerce of the New York-New Jersey port.

The Port Authority program, taken as a whole, is carried out on a self-supporting basis. It cannot pledge the credit of either State, nor does it have the power of taxation or assessment. It relies entirely on its revenues and reserves to provide the credit basis necessary to its financial program.

As of October 31, 1953, the Port Authority investment in 17 public transportation and terminal facilities amounted to about $475,000,000. Anticipated additional expenditures in the next 10 years or so amount to more than $500,000,000.

The Port Authority investment in the 17 public facilities, as of October 31, 1953, was as follows:

Holland Tunnel	$ 54,327,575
Lincoln Tunnel	128,770,800
George Washington Bridge	75,114,243
Bayonne Bridge	13,102,269
Goethals Bridge	7,371,665
Outerbridge Crossing	9,910,079
Port Authority Building	18,118,289
Port Authority Bus Terminal	23,540,243
Grain Terminal, Columbia Street Pier	3,262,648
New York Truck Terminal	9,964,759
Newark Truck Terminal	8,152,682
La Guardia Airport	6,944,828
Newark Airport	27,117,565
New York International Airport	56,854,271
Teterboro Airport	6,995,702
Port Newark	20,055,873
Hoboken-Port Authority Piers	5,886,737
TOTAL	$475,490,228

The result of the operations of the Port Authority facilities for 1945, 1950 and 1952 was as follows:

Net Revenues	**1945**	**1950**	**1952**
Gross Operating Revenues	$19,344,475	$42,198,237	$53,823,158
Operating Expenses	6,038,265	16,390,639	24,430,000
Net Operating Revenues	$13,306,210	$25,807,597	$29,393,158
Other Income	167,626	360,565	352,000
Net Revenues	$13,473,836	$26,168,162	$29,745,158
Debt Service	7,100,746	11,243,082	10,520,681
Available for Reserves	$ 6,373,090	$14,925,080	$19,224,477
General Reserve Debt Svc.	911,211	9,090,000	9,155,649
Available for Reserves	$ 5,461,879	$ 5,835,080	$10,068,828

The Port Authority operated eight facilities in 1945, sixteen in 1950, and seventeen in 1952.

Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority

A public benefit corporation existing under the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority Act of the Public Authorities Law of the State of New York.

In addition to the operations listed below, the Authority is empowered to construct and operate or lease the Coliseum project at Columbus Circle, in Manhattan, to construct and operate a vehicular tunnel or bridge connecting Brooklyn and Staten Island, to construct and operate an arterial highway or vehicular tunnel across midtown-Manhattan which would connect with the Queens Midtown tunnel, and to construct and improve certain parkways and highways, such parkways and highways to be maintained by New York City.

Facilities Operated as of December 31, 1950

Triborough Bridge, opened July 11, 1936
Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, opened April 29, 1939
Henry Hudson Bridge, opened December 14, 1936
Marine Parkway Bridge, opened July 3, 1937
Cross Bay Bridge, opened June 3, 1939
Jacob Riis Parking Field, opened May 29, 1936
Queens Midtown Tunnel, opened November 15, 1940
Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel, opened May 25, 1950
Battery Parking Garage, opened July 1, 1950

Result of Operations—1952

Gross Operating Revenues	$28,643,327
Operating Expenses	4,614,833
Net Income from Operations	$24,028,494
Other Income	635,368
Net Income before Interest	$24,663,862
Interest on Funded Debt	4,172,978
Net Income	$20,490,884

A $90,000,000 construction program was anticipated and made a part of the refinancing of February 1952. Some of this work has been completed, part is under construction, and the remainder is in various stages of planning.

10. CIVIL DEFENSE

In view of the recent change in the federal policy of civilian defense, we deem it most important to refer to this phase of our problem.

Under the former policy, primary reliance, in the event of enemy attack, was placed on shelter areas in the large cities. Under the "new concept of civilian defense" referred to in President Eisenhower's budget message of January 21, 1954, plans are now underway for "dispersal" of population in populous centers and for hastily transporting peak numbers of passengers to safe places as soon as any danger may seem imminent. (See N. Y. Times Jan. 22 and Jan. 26, 1954.)

This current development gives peculiar significance to the following statement submitted on behalf of the Avenue of the Americas Association, and quoted from the report of the New Jersey Regional Planning Commission, dated January 14, 1952:

> "Few people have taken the trouble to review New York's transportation problem in case it should ever become necessary to evacuate a large portion of its population in a hurry, or should there arise a vast exodus of its population to safer areas, or should our harbor facilities be blocked, which would be quite possible, and it becomes necessary to feed New York in some other manner than by harbor craft, upon which it depends. The place which most of the people would choose to go to would be directly across the Hudson River to New Jersey, the portal to the vast hinterland where refuge could be had.
>
> "If a city like Chicago, St. Louis, or Kansas City, with their twenty or more railroad lines radiating in all directions, would have to be evacuated, that would be a relatively simple matter. But, when one realizes that New York, the largest city in the world, has only one railroad linking it directly with New Jersey and this hinterland, it becomes apparent that the project in question becomes an absolute necessity from a civil defense angle. Since eight different railroads would be served by such a facility, radiating in all directions from this region, the widest possible distribution could be had with the least confusion."

11. CONCLUSIONS

1. The street traffic congestion in the City of New York, particularly in mid-Manhattan, and in certain sections of the Metropolitan Region, is critical and the consequent financial and time losses are very serious. The over-all "Problem" is believed to be that stated at the outset of this Report.

Since the conditions are critical and the needs of the Region as it will exist in 1960 and 1970 must now be envisaged, comprehensive plans for relief of traffic congestion and for promotion of travel convenience and the requirements of civil defense must be developed. Such plans should give consideration to an improvement of the existing daily transportation service, and at cost as low as sound economics permit.

2. It is obvious that comprehensive consideration must be given to the problem of bringing people in and out of Manhattan by mass transportation.

3. It is altogether possible that the solution of the problem between Manhattan and New Jersey, Manhattan and Westchester, and Manhattan and Long Island may be developed independently as to physical considerations. It is important, however, to consider simultaneously the transportation needs of the whole Region.

4. It will be necessary to make thorough investigation of origin and destination of passengers, in order properly to prepare plans, estimates of construction, operation, and financing. No conclusions can be definitely developed and proposed until the facts are all carefully developed and studied.

5. The two Commissions are in full agreement that such consideration is needed and that the cost is fully warranted, and that the purpose can best be furthered by a merger of activities and the creation of a single bi-State Commission.

12. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended:

1. A single bi-State agency should be established forthwith to make thorough and comprehensive study and report on ways and means for relieving, presently and in the long-range future, the traffic congestion, frequently approaching self-strangulation, in the Metropolitan Area, particularly in mid-Manhattan; for providing further means and improvement for mass transportation of people and merchandise to, through and from the critical centers of population and business; for considering the transportation needs and civil defense of the whole region; and for promoting the convenience of those who travel and economies in cost and time. Such a study and report, other than as here presented, have not been possible on the limited funds presently available to these Commissions.

2. Legislation be enacted consolidating the New York and the New Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commissions into one temporary bi-State Commission and that this Joint Commission be known as the "Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission".

3. The Joint Commission shall be authorized to establish an office in the City of New York and to engage a staff of engineers and other assistants.

4. The Joint Commission shall render a report to the respective Governors and Legislatures of the States of New York and New Jersey as soon as possible, presenting that which has been accomplished and submitting recommendations.

5. In accordance with and in continuance of previous legislation, the various state, municipal and other public and quasi-public organizations, which are referred to in such legislation or which have expressed interest, including particularly railroads, other transportation companies and utilities, should be requested and authorized to cooperate with the Joint Commission and to give active assistance to it. It shall be the purpose of the Joint Commission to seek such assistance and cooperation.

6. For the purpose of undertaking the foregoing responsibilities, the Joint Commission should be supplied with a minimum provision of at least $100,000. Although such sum would, if standing alone, be grossly inadequate for the purposes above stated, nevertheless if it is supplemented by the active assistance and cooperation of the other organizations mentioned, useful accomplishments may reasonably be expected.

13. DRAFT OF PROPOSED ACT

STATE OF .....

An Act to consolidate the New York Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and the New Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission into one temporary bi-State Commission, to be known as the "Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission", to study the prospective rapid transit needs of the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area, to develop and recommend measures for meeting such needs; and to make an appropriation therefor.

The People of the State of ....., represented in the Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

WHEREAS the New York Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission was created by Chapter 453 of the laws of 1952, as amended by Chapter 211 of the laws of 1953, of the State of New York, and the New Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission was created by Chapter 194 of the laws of 1952 of the State of New Jersey; and

WHEREAS these two Commissions have submitted a joint report to the Governors and the Legislatures of the States of New York and New Jersey, together with conclusions and recommendations;

Section 1. The New York Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission as now constituted and the New Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission as now constituted are hereby consolidated into one temporary bi-State Commission of the States of New York and New Jersey respectively, to be known as the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission.

Section 2. The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission shall select its own Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and such other officers as may be required. The members thereof shall receive no compensation for their services, but shall be reimbursed for their expenses actually and necessarily incurred in the performance of their duties thereunder. Vacancies shall be filled by appointment by the governor of the state wherein such vacancy arises.

Section 3. Within the limit of the appropriation therefor, the Commission is authorized to establish offices at a location convenient to the members from both States, and to employ such administrative, technical, and clerical assistance as may be required, and to fix their compensation.

Section 4. The Commission shall study present and prospective rapid transit needs of the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area and develop, recommend and report as soon as possible measures for meeting such needs. The Commission may enter upon public or private property of either State in order to carry out its functions.

Section 5. All agencies of either State, having information, records or data helpful to the Commission, are hereby authorized and directed to render such assistance to the Commission as it may request, within the limits of available staffs and facilities.

Section 6. All railroads and other transportation services operating within either State are requested and authorized to provide the Commission with such technical and operating information and data as the Commission may request, within the limits of staffs and facilities.

Section 7. To cover the expenses of the Commission there is hereby appropriated and made available to the Commission the sum of $50,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, out of any moneys in the state treasury in the general fund to the credit of the state purposes fund not otherwise appropriated. Such moneys shall be payable out of the state treasury on the order and warrant of the comptroller on vouchers certified or approved by the chairman of the Commission or by an officer or employee designated by him.

Section 8. This act shall take effect immediately upon the enactment into law by the State of of legislation of like substance and effect; but if the State of shall have already enacted such legislation, this act shall take effect immediately.

Respectfully submitted,

NEW YORK METROPOLITAN RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

CHARLES H. TUTTLE
Chairman

MICHAEL A. MADIGAN
Vice-Chairman

ALLEN S. HUBBARD

WILLIAM ZECKENDORF

CARL WHITMORE

NEW JERSEY METROPOLITAN RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

DAVID VAN ALSTYNE, JR.
Chairman

CHARLES F. KRAUSE, JR.
Vice-Chairman

JOHN F. KRAUS
Secretary

ALEXANDER H. ELDER

FRANK SCOTT, JR.

March 3, 1954

EXHIBITS

1 to 17

EXHIBIT 1

NEW YORK METROPOLITAN RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

Chapter 453 of the Laws of 1952: State of New York

AN ACT to create a temporary state commission to study rapid transportation facilities of the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area, and making an appropriation therefor

Became a law April 3, 1952, with the approval of the Governor. Passed, by a majority vote, three-fifths being present

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

Section 1. A temporary state commission is hereby created to be known as the metropolitan rapid transit commission. The commission shall consist of five members to be appointed by the governor. The governor shall select a chairman and vice-chairman from the members of the commission. The members of the commission shall receive no compensation for their services, but shall be reimbursed for their expenses actually and necessarily incurred in the performance of their duties hereunder.

2. It shall be the duty of the commission to study the present and prospective rapid transportation needs of the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area and proposals for the improvement and coordination of such facilities, and the costs thereof.

3. The commission may employ such personnel as may be necessary and may fix their compensation within the amount made available by appropriation therefor.

4. The public service commission, board of transportation of the city of New York, and such other state and municipal agencies, departments and officers as may have technical and economic data required by the commission are authorized to render such assistance as may be appropriate to enable the commission to carry out its duties hereunder.

5. The port of New York authority is authorized to make available to the commission any studies or pertinent data in the possession of the authority relating to its studies hereunder.

6. The commission shall make a report to the governor and to the legislature on or before January fifteenth, nineteen hundred fifty-three, together with its recommendations.

7. The sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated out of any moneys in the state treasury in the general fund to the credit of the state purposes fund not otherwise appropriated, and made available for the use of the temporary state commission hereby created in carrying out the provisions of this act. Such moneys shall be payable out of the state treasury on the order and warrant of the comptroller on vouchers certified or approved by the chairman of the commission, or by an officer or employee designated by him.

8. This act shall take effect immediately.

Chapter 211 of the Laws of 1953: State of New York

AN ACT to amend chapter four hundred fifty-three of the laws of nineteen hundred fifty-two, entitled "An act to create a temporary state commission to study rapid transportation facilities of the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area, and making an appropriation therefor," in relation to extending the time for the commission to make its report until February twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred fifty-four

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

Section 1. Section six of chapter four hundred fifty-three of the laws of nineteen hundred fifty-two, entitled "An act to create a temporary state commission to study rapid transportation facilities of the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area, and making an appropriation therefor," as last amended by chapter five of the laws of nineteen hundred fifty-three, is hereby amended to read as follows:

The commission shall make a report to the governor and to the legislature on or before February twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred (fifty-three) fifty-four, together with its recommendations.

This act shall take effect immediately and the amendment made by this act shall be deemed to have been in full force and effect from and after February twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred fifty-three.

EXHIBIT 2

NEW JERSEY METROPOLITAN RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

Chapter 194 of the Laws of 1952: State of New Jersey

AN ACT to establish a Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission to act either independently or jointly with a similar commission of the State of New York to develop plans and specifications for improvement and co-ordination of rapid transportation facilities of the New Jersey-New York metropolitan area, and to recommend all appropriate measures therefor, and making an appropriation.

Whereas, The New Jersey Regional Planning Commission has recommended that a comprehensive study be made to determine the most effective action toward improving rapid transportation for the metropolitan region of New York and New Jersey (Report No. 1, Trenton, 1952); and

Whereas, Improved rapid transit facilities in this region would be of immeasurable convenience to the residents of both States, would help to relieve traffic congestion on the city streets in the metropolitan area, and would contribute to the growth of economic values throughout the district of the Port of New York; and

Whereas, It is plainly apparent from some seventeen known efforts of public and private bodies that any realistic approach to metropolitan rapid transit will require the fullest possible interstate co-operation to produce a regional solution for a regional problem; therefore,

Be it enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

1. There is hereby created a Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission to act either independently or jointly with a similar commission of the State of New York to develop plans and specifications for improvement and co-ordination of the rapid transportation facilities of the New Jersey-New York metropolitan area and to recommend appropriate measures therefor.

2. The commission shall consist of five members to be appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. All members of the commission shall serve without compensation but they shall be entitled to be reimbursed for their necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties.

3. The commission shall be charged with the duty of:

(a) Inquiring into the present and prospective transportation needs of the New Jersey-New York metropolitan area and determining the most effective method by which these needs may be met;

(b) Submitting specific recommendations for the financing, acquisition, construction and operation of facilities necessary to meet these needs in the most economical and effective manner.

4. The commission is directed to have printed a report or reports containing its recommendations and the reasons therefor and to draft or to have drafted bills for introduction in the Legislature to carry out its recommendations. It shall report its findings and recommendations to the Legislature and to the Governor on or before January fifteenth, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-three.

5. The commission is directed to include in its report:

(a) A survey of traffic conditions based upon a passenger census of both railroad and bus passengers travelling between New Jersey and New York with information as to destination and routes followed in reaching such destinations and an estimate of the possible number of passengers that may be expected to use the proposed facilities;

(b) Specific recommendations as to what facilities should be provided to serve commuters and related passenger and freight

traffic between northeast New Jersey and New York City, giving special attention to the recommendations of the New Jersey Regional Planning Commission for the creation of a Union Terminal;

(c) A reliable estimate of the cost of creating and maintaining these facilities including an economic study to determine the annual cost of operation; possible rental income from railroads and fares from passengers using the facilities; other revenue to be maintained from concessions, leases or other various sources; and savings that may be made by the railroads by virtue of the creation of these facilities.

6. The commission is authorized to establish offices at a convenient location either within or without the State and to engage such competent and expert advisors, investigators, engineers, technical and clerical assistants as it may deem necessary to the accomplishment of the purpose of this act. Its agents, officers and employees may enter upon private and public property to make field surveys, measurements and tests.

7. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey Turnpike Authority and such other State and municipal agencies, departments and officers as may have technical and economic data required by the commission are authorized and directed to render such assistance, within the limits of available facilities, as the commission may request from time to time.

8. All railroads and railroad companies authorized to operate within this State shall provide the commission with such technical and operating data as the commission may require, within the limits of facilities available therefor.

9. The Port of New York Authority is requested and authorized to make arrangements for and pay the cost of technical, consulting and other assistance to the commission and to make available to the commission any studies or pertinent data in the possession of the Authority relating to the purposes of this act.

10. There is hereby appropriated to the commission, for the purposes of this act, the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-three.

11. This act shall take effect immediately.

Approved and effective May 16, 1952.

EXHIBIT 3

MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATIONS

(Source: Automobile Manufacturers Association)

United States
Privately Owned Vehicles

Year	Passenger Cars	Buses	Trucks	Total	Increase Since 1930
1920	8,131,522	—	1,107,639	9,239,161	
1930	22,972,745	40,507	3,518,747	26,531,999	
1940	27,372,397	72,641	4,590,386	32,035,424	
1945*	25,691,434	112,253	4,834,742	30,638,429	
1950	40,185,146	143,206	8,272,153	48,600,505	
1952	43,646,343	144,439	8,853,535	52,644,317	98%

* Registration decreased during the years 1942-1946.

Privately and Publicly Owned Vehicles

1945	25,793,493	162,125	5,079,802	31,035,420
1950	40,333,591	223,652	8,637,969	49,195,212
1952	43,810,531	240,142	9,243,820	53,294,493

By States (New York City Region)
New York State

1920		Buses		676,205	
1930	1,966,981	Included	340,749	2,307,730	
1940	2,407,253	with	335,761	2,743,014	
1945	2,016,831	Trucks	304,063	2,320,894	
1950	3,240,425	11,161	454,740	3,706,326	
1952	3,481,285	11,443	457,143	3,949,871	71%

New Jersey

Year	Passenger Cars	Buses	Trucks	Total	Increase Since 1930
1920		Buses		227,737	
1930	719,696	Included	133,154	852,850	
1940	949,840	with	137,126	1,086,966	
1945	865,558	Trucks	148,184	1,013,742	
1950	1,347,275	7,134	217,990	1,572,399	
1952	1,508,767	7,106	224,380	1,740,253	104%

Connecticut

1920		Buses		119,134	
1930	279,830	Included	51,196	331,026	
1940	417,828	with	75,839	493,667	
1945	433,784	Trucks	69,400	503,184	
1950	620,582	2,991	91,336	714,909	
1952	687,496	3,026	96,694	787,216	138%

Pennsylvania

1920		Buses		570,164	
1930	1,534,830	Included	218,687	1,753,517	
1940	1,883,094	with	262,755	2,145,849	
1945	1,674,395	Trucks	278,718	1,953,116	
1950	2,528,682	9,892	439,654	2,978,228	
1952	2,753,058	10,560	469,440	3,233,058	85%

Five New York Boroughs

				Persons Per Passenger Vehicle
1933	643,534	Buses	135,892**	10.8
1940	798,345	Included	121,249	9.3
1946*	634,802	with	123,775	12.0
1950	1,046,890	Trucks	129,482	7.6
1952	1,128,750	(75% Increase)	124,142	7.1

New York had 11,796 taxicabs in 1952.

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* Not Published for year 1945
** Includes Taxis

EXHIBIT 4

This Exhibit shows the annual railroad passengers between New Jersey and the City of New York from 1925 to 1952, inclusive, for commuters and other-than-commuter passengers.

While there was a decided drop in the early "thirties", this was not entirely due to the vehicular competition, but due largely to the depression.

1943 was a war-time year with motor vehicle traffic held down by gasolene rationing and a consequent high level of railroad traffic. There has since been a general decline in all railroad traffic. This decline, however, has been more than offset by a growth in vehicular traffic, both in bus and automobile passengers.

The data includes traffic on the Pennsylvania Railroad, which has had a very large growth in both commuter and other passengers. If the traffic on this road were excluded, as is shown in Appendix B for the other eight railroads therein mentioned, it will be found that these other carriers have suffered much more seriously from the vehicular competition than this graph would indicate.

EXHIBIT 4


ANNUAL RAILROAD PASSENGERS
IN AND OUT OF NEW YORK CITY
NEW JERSEY SECTOR
1925 - 1952
MILLIONS OF PASSENGERS
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
TOTAL PASSENGERS
OTHERS
COMMUTERS
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
YEARS
THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY

EXHIBIT 5

This Exhibit shows the annual railroad passengers between Westchester and the City of New York from 1925 to 1952, inclusive, for commuter and other-than-commuter passengers.

This graph also shows that there has been a serious decline in all railroad passengers in the early "thirties", or the early depression years.

From 1940 on, there has been a general increase with a peak in 1945, a low year in 1950, and a slight rise again since 1950.

Generally speaking, the railroad traffic from Westchester has remained higher, relatively, than from the other two sectors. This has been due, no doubt, to the fact that excellent railroad service has been maintained and that the people are brought into a section of the mid-Manhattan region where many have destinations, or from which point eastside and westside subway distribution is available.

EXHIBIT 5


ANNUAL RAILROAD PASSENGERS
IN AND OUT OF NEW YORK CITY
WESTCHESTER SECTOR
1925-1953
MILLIONS OF PASSENGERS
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
TOTAL PASSENGERS
OTHERS
COMMUTERS
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
YEARS
THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY

EXHIBIT 6

This Exhibit shows the annual railroad passengers between Long Island and the City of New York from 1925 to 1952, inclusive, for commuter and other-than-commuter passengers.

This sector also lost many passengers during the early depression years, but, like the railroads from the other two sectors, more or less held its own from 1933 to 1942. It likewise showed a peak for the war and early post-war period, but the decline here since the war peak has been greater than for Westchester and is more nearly comparable with the losses sustained in New Jersey.

The losses sustained by this carrier are probably largely due to the New York City subway competition, since these subway lines have been extended to points near the borders of Nassau County.

If it were not for this fact, and, naturally also bus and auto competition, this road would no doubt have maintained a higher passenger volume since it, too, is bringing its passengers into a modern railroad terminal in mid-Manhattan.

EXHIBIT 6


ANNUAL RAILROAD PASSENGERS
IN AND OUT OF NEW YORK CITY
LONG ISLAND SECTOR
1925-1952
MILLIONS OF PASSENGERS
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
TOTAL PASSENGERS
OTHERS
COMMUTERS
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
YEARS
THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY

EXHIBIT 7

This Exhibit shows the total railroad traffic, from all three sectors, one superimposed upon the other so as to obtain a total for all railroad passengers entering New York City.

While New Jersey still is the largest sector insofar as railroad passengers are concerned, it has been losing much of its former volume, while Long Island and Westchester have gained, or at least maintained the traffic volume which they had in the early "forties".

EXHIBIT 7


ANNUAL RAILROAD PASSENGERS
IN AND OUT OF NEW YORK CITY
ALL SECTORS
1925-1952
MILLIONS OF PASSENGERS
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
TOTAL PASSENGERS
WESTCHESTER SECTOR
LONG ISLAND SECTOR
NEW JERSEY SECTOR
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
YEARS
THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY

EXHIBIT 8

This Exhibit shows that between 1930 and 1933, the first depression years, the overall traffic between New Jersey and New York had decreased from about 262 million per annum to 214 million. The greatest loss was sustained by the railroads, in both commuter and other-than-commuter traffic. The total railroad traffic had come down from 171 million to 122 million, a loss of about 49 million.

From 1933 to 1952 there has been a general gain in the overall trans-Hudson traffic. These gains were made primarily in bus passengers and private car passengers. The losses in the commuter traffic on the railroads had been continuous as well as the losses in pedestrian traffic on the railroad ferries.

In 1943, the total trans-Hudson traffic was again about equal to the former peak year of 1929. In other words, after the traffic started to rise again after 1933, it took 10 years to recoup the losses of the early depression years. Or, expressed differently, the depression had caused a setback of 13 years in the normal growth of traffic between New Jersey and New York.

The 1952 total trans-Hudson traffic was 281 million, as compared with the former all time peak of 267 million in 1929.

If compared with 1930, the railroad passengers in 1952 were only ½ of the 1930 total, whereas the bus and private car passengers were nearly 4 times larger in 1952 than they were in 1930. The greatest gain has been in bus passengers, where in 1952 there were nearly 8 times as many passengers as in 1930.

EXHIBIT 8


ANNUAL TRANS-HUDSON PASSENGERS
IN AND OUT OF NEW YORK CITY
MILLIONS OF PASSENGERS
1925-1952
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
TOTAL PASSENGERS
BUS PASSENGERS
FERRY PASS.
AUTO PASSENGERS
TOTAL RAILROAD PASSENGERS
OTHERS
COMMUTERS
HOLLAND TUNNEL 11-13-27
GEO. WASHINGTON BRIDGE 10-25-31
LINCOLN TUNNEL 1ST TUBE 12-22-37
LINCOLN TUNNEL 2ND TUBE 2-1-45
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
YEARS
THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY

EXHIBIT 9

POPULATION BY COUNTIES

(Source: World Almanac)

	1930	1940	% Incr. over 1930	1950	% Incr. over 1940	% Incr. over 1930
New Jersey						
Bergen	364,977	409,646	12	539,139	32	48
Passaic	302,129	309,353	2	337,093	9	12
Hudson	690,730	652,040	–6	647,437	–1	–6
Essex	833,513	837,340	1	905,949	8	9
Morris	110,445	125,732	14	164,371	31	49
Union	305,209	328,344	7	398,138	21	31
Somerset	65,132	74,390	14	99,052	33	52
Middlesex	212,208	217,077	2	264,872	22	25
Monmouth	147,209	161,238	9	225,327	40	53
TOTAL	3,031,552	3,115,160	3	3,581,378	15	18
Rockland	59,599	74,261	24	89,276	20	50
TOTAL	3,091,151	3,189,421	3	3,670,654	15	19
Westchester						
Westchester	520,947	573,558	10	625,816	9	20
Fairfield	386,702	418,384	8	504,342	20	30
TOTAL	907,649	991,942	9	1,130,158	14	24
New York City						
Bronx	1,265,258	1,394,711	10	1,451,277	4	15
Manhattan	1,867,312	1,889,924	1	1,960,101	4	5
Queens	1,079,129	1,297,634	20	1,550,849	20	44
Kings	2,560,401	2,698,285	5	2,738,175	1	7
Richmond	158,346	174,441	10	191,555	10	20
TOTAL	6,930,446	7,454,995	8	7,891,957	6	14
Nassau and Suffolk						
Nassau	303,053	406,748	34	672,765	65	122
Suffolk	161,055	197,355	22	276,129	40	70
TOTAL	464,108	604,103	30	948,894	57	105

EXHIBIT 10


TRENDS IN POPULATION INCREASE
FOR KEY* GROUPS OF COUNTIES IN REGION
POPULATION GROWTH 1930-1940
POPULATION GROWTH 1940-1950
PER CENT INCREASE
30
20
10
0
ABSOLUTE INCREASE
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
PRINCIPAL MANUFACTURING COUNTIES
Manhattan
1,960,101 in 1950
Fairfield
Queens
Brooklyn
Hudson
Essex
Passaic
6,683,845 in 1950
COUNTIES GROWING IN MANUFACTURING IMPORTANCE
Nassau
Middlesex
Union
Bergen
1,874,914 in 1950
THE ELEVEN REMAINING COUNTIES
3,432,146 in 1950
*See Chart in R.P.A. Bulletin 80, New Industrial Location, for key to county grouping
Regional Plan Association, Inc., 205 E. 42nd Street, New York 17, N.Y.

EXHIBIT 11


ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH
OVER 10%
5 TO 10%
2 TO 5%
UNDER 2%
NO DATA AVAILABLE
THE FASTEST GROWING AREAS
1949 - 1950
ANNUAL INCREASE OVER 1940 DWELLING SUPPLY
CALCULATED FROM PERMITS ISSUED FOR NEW DWELLING UNITS
AVERAGED OVER TWO YEAR PERIOD, 1949 THROUGH 1950
Sources: Municipalities, Counties and Bureau of Labor Statistics
REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, Inc.
205 East 42nd Street, New York 17, N.Y.

EXHIBIT 12

A LARGER NO. OF SMALLER HOMES

AS THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD DECLINES, MORE DWELLING UNITS ARE NEEDED TO HOUSE THE SAME NUMBER OF PEOPLE



REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, INC.
NEW YORK CITY, APRIL 1949.

NEW JERSEY–NEW YORK–CONNECTICUT METROPOLITAN REGION

EXHIBIT 13

SUBURBAN BRANCH STORES



EXHIBIT 14


REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, INC.
205 EAST 42nd STREET, NEW YORK 17, N.Y.
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION
NEW JERSEY
CONNECTICUT
NEW YORK
PRINCIPAL MANUFACTURING COUNTIES
COUNTIES GROWING IN MANUFACTURING IMPORTANCE
THE ELEVEN REMAINING COUNTIES
ULSTER
SULLIVAN
COLUMBIA
DUTCHESS
LITCHFIELD
PENN.
ORANGE
PUTNAM
NEW HAVEN
SUSSEX
WARREN
PASSAIC
ROCKLAND
WESTCHESTER
FAIRFIELD
MORRIS
BERGEN
ESSEX
HUDSON
HUNTERDON
SOMERSET
UNION
NASSAU
SUFFOLK
LONG ISLAND SOUND
MIDDLESEX
MERCER
MONMOUTH
BURLINGTON
OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
KEY GROUPS OF COUNTIES
IN THE
NEW JERSEY-NEW YORK-CONNECTICUT METROPOLITAN REGION

EXHIBIT 15

GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT, 1942-1951
AND THE EFFECT OF MAJOR WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES



* Excludes self-employed persons and jobs in Agriculture, Government, Domestic Service and Nonprofit Organizations

** Ordnance and Transportation Equipment

Source: R.P.A. estimates based on State Labor Department data

EXHIBIT 16

Citizens Traffic Safety Board Estimate of Annual Cost of Congestion in New York City

1.	Increased meter charges and tips for taxicab travel	$ 57,000,000
2.	Extra fuel for autos and trucks	75,000,000
3.	Excessive repairs and maintenance (without accident involvement)	70,000,000
4.	Rapid depreciation of vehicles	175,000,000
5.	Insurance settlements for traffic accidents	18,250,000
6.	Insurance premiums (excess above average of other large cities with better accident records)	30,000,000
7.	General traffic accident losses (wage loss, medical expense and property damage in excess of average of other large cities with better accident records)	26,500,000
8.	Entertainment media	30,000,000
9.	Time losses of top salaried business executives	18,750,000
10.	Wages covering time lost in traffic	350,000,000
11.	Retail sales loss	100,000,000
12.	Unrealized new construction	100,000,000
13.	Loss in retail sales tax, unrealized assessed valuation and other tax revenues from out-migration, suburban expansion and unrealized new population	11,700,000
14.	Efficiency of city services	10,000,000
15.	Miscellaneous losses	10,000,000
		$1,082,200,000

EXHIBIT 17

VOLUME OF PASSENGERS USING TRANS-HUDSON FACILITIES ON A TYPICAL DAY

From New Jersey to New York

and

From New York to New Jersey

The statement of The Port of New York Authority headed "Typical Business Day Trans-Hudson Passenger Traffic into New York City" shows a total of 376,110 such passengers in 1952. This total includes both non-commuters and commuters, and the commuters include not only New Jersey residents who travel daily to Manhattan,

but also residents of Manhattan who travel to New Jersey. The origin and destination of some of these passengers may be beyond New Jersey or Manhattan.

Based in part on sample data which is reasonably reliable, the total passengers have been classified by modes of travel and divided between non-commuters and commuters. The latter have been further classified to show those residing in New Jersey and those residing in New York.

The number of passengers handled and the corresponding percentages are shown in the following table:

Trans-Hudson Passenger Movement By Modes of Travel and By Types of Passengers on a Typical Business Day in 1952

No. of Passengers Handled by	Total	Non-Commuters	COMMUTERS		
			Total	Residents of New Jersey	Residents of New York
Railroads	140,848	53,155	87,693	73,379	14,314
Autos	126,862	88,803	38,059	19,030	19,029
Buses	102,861	41,144	61,717	49,374	12,343
Ferries	5,539	2,216	3,323	2,658	665
TOTAL	376,110	185,318	190,792	144,441	46,351
TOTAL	100%	50%	50%	38%	12%
Approximate Percentages					
Railroads	100%	38%	62%	62%	10%
Autos	100	70	30	15	15
Buses	100	40	60	48	12
Ferries	100	40	60	48	12
Railroads			100%	84%	16%
Autos			100	50	50
Buses			100	80	20
Ferries			100	80	20

APPENDIX A

Outline of Efforts Previously Made To Solve the Regional Railroad and Rapid Transit Problem of the Metropolitan Area

An outline of the more important official and semi-official studies made for solving this problem, meetings and hearings held, and decisions reached as to the type of facility suggested to meet the needs of the Region.

APPENDIX B

Economic Consequences to New Jersey Railroads Due to the Development of Motor Traffic

APPENDIX C

Abstract of Data Introduced and Statements Made at the Public Hearings Held in New York on November 12 and 13, 1953

This Appendix deals principally with "the problem" insofar as it directly concerns the City and State of New York. It summarizes the views expressed by 31 distinguished speakers at the public hearings, many of whom also submitted much valuable data. 45 prominent organizations were represented.

APPENDIX A

OUTLINE OF EFFORTS PREVIOUSLY MADE TO SOLVE THE REGIONAL RAILROAD AND RAPID TRANSIT PROBLEM OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA

During the last 30 years considerable study has been given to the problem of handling the increasing suburban passenger traffic originating outside of New York City and having its destination within the City. The problem is accentuated by the fact that this traffic for the most part must be handled into and out of New York City during the morning and evening rush hour periods of one and a half hours each.

The suburban passengers to a considerable extent use the rapid transit facilities of the City which are themselves overtaxed in handling the urban transportation problem of the City itself. The problem of suburban transit must therefore be studied in conjunction with the City transportation problem and with due consideration to the convenience of those who travel and to service to be rendered by the trunk line carriers.

1. The question of additional facilities for the Westchester commuter travel was the subject of extensive study by the Westchester County Transit Commission appointed by the Board of Supervisors of Westchester County under authority of the New York Legislature, Chapter 591 of the Laws of 1921. The Commission issued a preliminary report in 1923, a second report in 1924, two interim reports in 1924 and 1925 and a final report on March 1, 1926.

2. In 1922, the New Jersey Legislature created the North Jersey Transit Commission for the purpose of solving the New Jersey-New York railroad problem. In 1924, this Commission made an origin-destination traffic survey, which was used extensively by all who were interested in finding a solution. For its interstate solution, that Commission offered a loop plan, starting at North Bergen, entering New York at 57th Street, down through the center of Manhattan to the Battery, then over to the Central Railroad of New Jersey terminal at Jersey City and back to North Bergen. On its plan, it showed its north and south line in Manhattan extended north on Madison Avenue to link up with the New York Central Railroad tracks north of the Harlem River.

3. New York State, recognizing the importance of the suburban transportation problem of the City and its environs, created the New York State Suburban Passenger Transit Commission by Chapter 228 of the Laws of 1925. It was authorized to investigate the conditions affecting and the requirements of suburban and commuter traffic entering the City of New York. It reported to the New York State Legislature on March 15, 1926.

4. In 1927 the Port of New York Authority, at the request of the New Jersey Legislature, organized the "Suburban Transit Engineering Board." On this Board were representatives from the North Jersey Transit Commission; Board of Supervisors, Westchester County; Board of Supervisors, Nassau and Suffolk Counties; Board of Transportation, New York City; the railroads; and the Port of New York Authority. Numerous studies were made and reports developed, but with no final recommendations on account of the business depression and the uncertainties of the future. On that account the Board ceased functioning in 1931.

In its preliminary report of March 31, 1930, this Board stated:

> "The studies of this Board have been toward developing a comprehensive plan to facilitate the easy movement of suburban passengers to and through the centers of the Metropolitan District and not toward the development of transit facilities for intra-community passengers."

This Board accepted the origin-destination traffic survey of the North Jersey Transit Commission and made its own survey to cover Westchester and Long Island.

Speaking of the studies made for solving the New Jersey problem, it stated:

> "These studies, developed at the conferences, were based upon the general principle adopted by the Board that any proposed suburban transit system should provide distribution for suburban passengers on Manhattan separate from and in addition to the City transportation system. No particular plan has been adopted and an adequate solution of the problem of how to handle and what to do with the suburban rider from New Jersey is still being studied."

The solution offered for the Long Island problem was in the form of a loop from Jamaica to mid-Manhattan, down through the

center of Manhattan to the Battery, following approximately the route shown by the North Jersey Transit Commission, then over to Brooklyn and back to Jamaica.

For New Jersey, that plan showed an extension from the Battery to the Central Railroad of New Jersey terminal in Jersey City and, in mid-Manhattan, a line to North Bergen and an extension towards Lyndhurst so as to intercept the railroads in northern New Jersey.

5. In 1933, a private group in New York undertook a very extensive survey with a staff of engineers. This study took over 2 years to complete.

The sponsors of the plan were interested in bringing the New Jersey railroads, except the Pennsylvania Railroad, into a new Union Passenger Terminal in mid-Manhattan. They established relations with all interested railroads and the City of New York, which directed the Board of Transportation to fully cooperate with this study.

The City officials felt that, if and when the City subways should become overcrowded at the Terminal, it would be necessary to establish a wholly independent subway route in Manhattan to care for these New Jersey passengers. After considerable study of such a possible route, the Board of Transportation recommended a route down 5th Avenue, West Broadway, and Broadway to the Battery. As to the level which this route was to occupy it stated that the first subway level below the street was to be reserved for any future city north and south line, and the second level for city east and west arteries. Thus, the third level was assigned to this new subway. It was also stated that, since this route could be tunneled, without tearing up any of the streets, it was certain not to raise objection from adjacent property owners and would also be less expensive to construct.

Detailed plans and profiles to a scale of 1″-200′ were prepared for the whole project, that is the connecting lines in New Jersey, under-river crossings, the Terminal and the line down to the Battery. These plans were reviewed and accepted by the Board of Transportation which also had its engineers check the estimates of cost.

The engineers for the Board of Transportation estimated then that the proposed 2-track subway, with 4-track stations, would be able to handle about 90% as much traffic as the present 4-track subways and that it could be built for nearly one-half the cost of a 4-track line.

It is of interest to point out here that the City of New York, which is naturally very vitally concerned with any plans affecting this City, worked with the engineers of the sponsors in helping to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution.

With the approval of the then Board of Transportation, the 5th Avenue route was shifted from 50th Street to Madison Avenue, with a station at the Grand Central, and then back to 5th Avenue. This would permit many Grand Central passengers to make use of this subway, and relieve the congestion at Lexington Avenue.

In this plan a new Long Island station was proposed, off the Long Island tunnels, at 34th Street and 5th Avenue.

At the public hearings held as aforesaid on November 13, 1953, by the Commissions now reporting, Mr. E. C. Nickerson, Vice-President of the New York Central Railroad in charge of passenger service, stated:

> "In view of the recent trends of volume of travel, the demonstrated ability to handle substantially higher traffic volume than at present, the recent installation of higher capacity cars, and the ability to further increase seats available, through more high-capacity cars, we believe that for the immediate foreseeable future the New York Central can take care of its suburban travel requirements in and out of Grand Central," * * *

The New York Central Railroad handled 3 million more passengers in 1947 in and out of the Grand Central than at present.

6. In 1935, the North Jersey Transit Committee was formed, composed of municipal officials and some outstanding civic leaders. This group addressed over 100 mass-meetings throughout northern New Jersey and Rockland County, in an endeavor to sound out public opinion on this subject. These meetings were attended by from 50 to 300 or 400 people interested in this problem. Various questions were asked, with the following results:

(a) The plan for bringing the New Jersey traffic directly into a Union Terminal in mid-Manhattan was well received by people attending the above meetings.

(b) The loop plan, as a rapid transit solution, with the westerly link of this loop along the westerly base of the Palisades, was deemed not to serve a large segment of the population to

good advantage, as it would be necessary for them to backtrack nearly 4 miles, or travel unecessarily 4 to 5 miles extra, with a resultant loss of time and money.

(c) If a rapid transit plan should be executed, instead of the Union Terminal plan, the said meetings favored the plans which provided an intercepting link across the Meadows from Lyndhurst to North Bergen, which would offer them the most direct line into mid-Manhattan, with no loss of time.

7. In 1936, the same North Jersey Transit Committee sponsored a Bill in the New Jersey Legislature requesting the Port Authority to study this problem and to submit a report with a plan. Such a report was made on March 1, 1937.

The plan proposed a new route in the Hackensack Meadows from Rutherford to North Bergen, then under the river to 51st St., New York, with a link to the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad in 6th Avenue. It proposed rapid transit operation from Paterson, N. J. to New York and over the Hudson & Manhattan to Jersey City and Newark, and via the Central Railroad of New Jersey to connect with Staten Island.

It proposed the acquisition of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad which showed a considerable operating deficit.

8. In 1937, the North Jersey Transit Committee sponsored a Bill in the Legislature requesting the Port Authority to make an up-to-date origin and destination survey on the New Jersey railroads. A report was rendered in March 1938. This report showed the following destination percentages in Manhattan, divided east and west on a line along 5th Avenue in mid-Manhattan and Broadway downtown.

East of this line 51%—West of this line 49%

The division north and south of 11th Street was about 41% north and 59% south.

9. Immediately after World War II, the Department of Economic Development of the State of New Jersey had a re-study made of the plan for bringing the New Jersey railroads into a Union Passenger Terminal in mid-Manhattan. A report was made in May 1946, using the plan and data prepared in the early "thirties", mentioned

above, as a basis. This report also gave railroad and vehicular trans-Hudson statistics, as well as statistics on population and assessed valuations by counties and regions.

This report showed that the division of railroad passengers, between mid-Manhattan and downtown, that is north or south of 11th Street, had shown a reversed trend from that indicated in the 1938 survey, and that a much greater percentage had mid-Manhattan destination, due to the general trend towards that region of Manhattan over a period of many years. Information received from the railroads, whose passengers are brought into mid-Manhattan, showed that, in 1945, 75% of the Pennsylvania commuters, 75% of the West Shore passengers, and 70% of the New York, Susquehanna & Western passengers had mid-Manhattan destinations.

10. In 1948, Governor Driscoll asked the Port Authority to study the problem of providing railroad service between the Airport at Newark and Manhattan. Such a report was rendered on May 18, 1949.

11. A considerable amount of pressure was then being brought to give more intensive consideration to the future of suburban transit, particularly in the light of conditions and forces affecting the development of the Metropolitan Area that are markedly different from those obtaining at the time of the earlier studies noted. As a result of discussions between the Mayor of the City of New York, members of the New York City Board of Transportation, the County Executive of Westchester County, representatives of the Westchester County Department of Planning, and officials of the New York Central and the New Haven Railroad companies, the Committee on New York City Suburban Transit was established on March 30, 1949, to study and develop the procedure for the investigation of the whole problem, which would necessarily call for an extensive study and substantial expenditure. The Committee was enlarged to include representatives of the Pennsylvania and Long Island Railroads and considered the proposition with representatives of Nassau and Suffolk Counties. The New Jersey transit situation was not to be included at this time.

12. On December 1, 1950, the Inter-Municipal Group for Better Rail Service, a group composed of officials of 16 municipalities along the Central Railroad of New Jersey, rendered a report on its activities

and studies made concerning various proposals for improving rail service between New Jersey and Manhattan.

13. In December 1950, the Department of Conservation and Economic Development of the State of New Jersey had a report made giving outlines of all of the then known plans for solving this problem. In the report of February 10, 1951, 17 such plans were outlined with comments and recommendations.

At the hearings on November 12 and 13, 1953, 4 more plans were offered. Thus, at the close of the public hearings, there had come into existence at least 21 plans concerning the New Jersey-New York Metropolitan Area in the matter of the transit "problem".

14. In an endeavor to bring such regional projects to a head, Senate Joint Resolution No. 4 of New Jersey for 1950, created the New Jersey Regional Planning Commission with directions to review such regional projects and to submit specific recommendations as to what must be done, and what agencies should be created to carry out such proposals.

The New Jersey-New York railroad problem received first consideration. The New Jersey Rapid Transit Commission held many meetings and hearings and studied the report on the 17 plans outlined under (13) above, invited the Port Authority and various other bodies that could give useful information to present their views. The problem was discussed with the Governors of both States and, on January 14, 1952, that Commission rendered a report to the Governor and Legislature of the State of New Jersey. The report showed the need for making a factual and economic survey to determine which of the many plans, or combinations, or variations of them, could be made financially self-supporting, or nearly so, and it recommended the creation of a New Jersey-New York Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission to make such an overall survey, and report to the Governors and Legislatures of the two States on its findings, with recommendations as to what must be done to effectuate such a project. As a result of this report, the two Commissions were created.

The New Jersey-New York Problem

The report of the New Jersey Regional Planning Commission made in 1952 showed that there were 2 basic types of solutions for the New Jersey-New York problem, namely, the Rapid Transit Plan, and the Railroad Terminal Plan. The Railroad Terminal Plan, in turn, had 2 solutions, one with the Terminal in mid-Manhattan, and the other with the Terminal in the Hackensack Meadows, thus showing essentially 3 different solutions. They are explained as follows:

1. *The Rapid Transit Plan*

All serious plans made, and previous decisions given by the City of New York, indicate that, if such a rapid transit plan is adopted, a separate and independent north and south subway, outside of the existing subways, must be built to provide distribution in Manhattan for the New Jersey passengers.

Such a rapid transit line would, therefore, intercept the New Jersey railroads in lower Bergen County, say from Lyndhurst to North Bergen in Hudson County, then enter New York about 50th Street, go down through the center of Manhattan toward the Battery, then over to Jersey City with connections to the railroads, and possibly to Staten Island. There would be bus terminals in New Jersey at North Bergen and in Jersey City where bus passengers could transfer to this rapid transit line.

2. *The Union Terminal Plan*

There are 2 types of solutions—(a) a Terminal in mid-Manhattan, or (b) a Terminal in the Hackensack Meadows.

(a) *Union Terminal in mid-Manhattan*—Railroad intercepting arteries would be provided from Newark and Lyndhurst to North Bergen with joint tunnels to a terminal somewhere near 50th St., in mid-Manhattan, connecting with the subway system. Bus terminals would also be provided in New Jersey, as shown under 1.

(b) *Union Terminal in the Hackensack Meadows*—Intercepting arteries from Newark and Lyndhurst would bring the New Jersey railroads to a terminal in the Hackensack Meadows west of North Bergen, where bus station facilities would also

be provided. From here, a rapid transit line would go to mid-Manhattan, toward the Battery and over to Jersey City, with a bus station at that terminal.

The Westchester Problem

With reference to the Westchester sector (assuming that a major improvement is indicated) there are two basic alternatives that require study. One is a railroad transfer station in the Bronx in the vicinity of Mott Haven, where passengers could be discharged into separately operated subways for distribution in Manhattan. A certain number of commuters, destined particularly to the vicinity of the Grand Central Terminal, would continue to use the railroads between their points of origin and the Grand Central Terminal up to the limits of the capacity of the existing facilities.

The second subject for study might be to consider whether or not it would be possible to adopt some through movement of commuters, integrated with the City Subway System to reach lower Manhattan.

Either procedure presents many complications, uncertainties and difficulties and it is impracticable in this report to attempt to express any decided opinion as to the proper solution.

The Long Island Problem

With reference to the Long Island sector, there are also two basic factors for study. One subject would be the greater integration of Long Island commuter services with the New York City Transit System. This might be by way of operation of City rapid transit services on some of the Long Island Railroad routes with connections to be built to existing or expanding City owned routes, for example, that now underway on the Rockaway Branch of the Long Island Railroad.

The second is a commuter station on Long Island where passengers could be discharged to buses or subways for distribution to Manhattan and Brooklyn, with those destined for the west side of Manhattan in the Pennsylvania Station area to continue on as at present.

APPENDIX B

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES TO NEW JERSEY RAILROADS DUE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOTOR TRAFFIC

In the explanation of Exhibit 8, attached to this report, showing all trans-Hudson traffic, it has been pointed out that during the first depression years of 1930 to 1933 inclusive, the overall trans-Hudson traffic had been reduced by about 18% due to this depression.

Since the total trans-Hudson traffic began to rise in 1933, and the total railroad traffic had begun to level off from 1933 to about 1941, when it too started to rise again, it was felt that, in order to present a fair comparison of relative gains or losses, the study should begin with 1933.

Railroad and Vehicular Trans-Hudson Passengers

(in thousands)

(Source: Public Service Commission and Port Authority)

	R.R. Commuters	Others	Total R.R. Passengers	Bus Passengers via P.A. Crossings	Total Vehicular Passengers
	*	*	*		
1930	68,458	11,755	80,213	5,272	52,969
1933	47,722	10,119	57,841	12,261	65,477
1935	43,145	10,891	54,036	15,151	72,214
1940	38,572	11,776	50,349	32,153	103,742
1945	32,308	15,635	47,943	57,032	115,207
1950	†	†	†	63,040	162,824
1952	†	†	†	68,860	193,638

* These figures are the annual railroad commuters and other passengers as reported by the railroads to the Public Service Commission of New York. They include the following railroads: West Shore, Ontario & Western, Susquehanna, Erie, Lackawanna, Lehigh Valley, Baltimore & Ohio, and Central Railroad of New Jersey.

† Data not available at this time.

Port Authority Bus Traffic Compared With Traffic on West Shore and Erie Railroads Combined

(Source: Public Service Commission, New York, Regional Plan Association and Port Authority. The figures are in Thousands.)

	RAILROAD PASSENGERS							
	Commuter	Loss From 1930	Loss From 1933	Total	Loss From 1930	Loss From 1933	Passengers in Buses*	Gain From 1933
1930	36,943			40,157			0	
1933	23,206	13,737		28,102	12,055		14,047	
1935	19,138	17,805	4,068	24,224	15,933	3,878	14,631	584
1940	15,584	21,359	7,622	19,022	21,125	9,080	25,396	11,349
1945	12,332	24,611	10,874	15,636	24,521	12,466	28,944	14,897
1950	11,855	25,088	11,351	†	†	†	63,871	49,824
1952	†	†	†	†	†	†	88,444	74,397

* George Washington Bridge (opened in 1931) and Lincoln Tunnel (opened in 1937) only.
† Data not available at this time.

The two railroads which are serving the northeastern section of New Jersey, that is the West Shore and the Erie Railroads, with the several Erie branches, were affected more seriously than were the other railroads by the construction of the George Washington Bridge and the Lincoln Tunnel. In the above Table, a comparison is made between the losses of these two railroads and merely the gain in bus traffic over these two Port Authority facilities. While the car passenger traffic has been heavier over these two facilities, it is believed that the buses formed the most serious competitors to the railroads.

In 1950, the total number of bus passengers was 5½ times greater than the combined commuter traffic of these two railroads serving the territory immediately affected.

Some of the Erie branches have suffered more than others. The Northern Railroad of New Jersey, the branch serving the Englewood and Nyack, N. Y. region, and the nearest to the George Washington Bridge, lost so much that one of the two tracks on this line was taken up and several stations were abandoned. The train service was reduced from about 30 in each direction a day to 3 per day.

On the New Jersey & New York Railroad, serving the Hackensack, Westwood and New City, N. Y., region, the portion north of Nanuet, N. Y., was abandoned and on the balance of the line one of the 2 tracks was also taken up and the service was reduced from over 30 trains per day in each direction to 5 one way and 6 the other way per day.

While the population has grown very considerably during this period, the transportation has been principally by bus for many of the large development centers. Such a condition merits serious consideration.

Every time passengers left the railroads to use the buses, the train service was reduced. Many people, instead of using the remaining trains, found it more convenient to use the buses. The railroads asked for fare increases, resulting in a still further loss of passengers, with more train reductions and more rate increases. It has proved to be a vicious circle.

When the growth of bus and passenger car traffic into New York is considered, it is plain that the effect of this growth has been a serious handicap to many of the railroads.

Growth of Trans-Hudson Passenger Vehicular Traffic via Port Authority Arteries

(in thousands)

(Source: Port Authority)

	Bus Passengers	Auto Passengers	Total For Port Authority	Total All Facilities
1930	5,272	23,967	29,239	52,969
1933	12,261	35,632	47,893	65,477
1935	15,151	37,274	52,425	72,214
1940	32,153	51,713	83,866	103,742
1945	57,032	51,542	108,574	115,207
1950	63,040	94,220	157,260	162,824
1952	68,860	121,103	189,963	193,638

This shows that in 1952, 13 times as many bus passengers and 5 times as many car passengers used the Port Authority facilities as was the case in 1930. There are today 6½ times as many bus and car passengers using these facilities.

While the railroad ferries handled more of these people in 1930 than did the Port Authority, this ferry traffic has been reduced to negligible proportions today, being only about 1.9% of the total as reported by the Port Authority.

As an example, the effect of this on another railroad, for which statistics are available, was as follows:

Hudson and Manhattan Railroad Passengers

(in thousands)

(Source: H. & M. R. R.)

	Uptown	*Downtown*	*Total*
1930	31,652	71,311	102,963
1935	20,944	52,493	73,437
1940	19,463	43,295	62,758
1945	21,479	46,955	68,434
1950	18,870	30,428	49,298
1952	14,581	24,111	38,692

Pennsylvania Railroad

In comparison with the above recorded losses, it is of interest to indicate the actual gains made by the Pennsylvania Railroad. Since these gains are included in the total railroad traffic between New Jersey and New York, as shown by Exhibit 8 attached to the report, this Exhibit may be regarded as not presenting an accurate picture insofar as the other railroads are concerned.

Division of Pennsylvania Railroad Traffic Into New York

(in thousands)

(Source: Pennsylvania Railroad)

	Commuters			**Others**			**Total**		
	U	**D**	**Total**	**U**	**D**	**Total**	**U**	**D**	**Total**
1930	487	2,626	3,113	11,570	1,051	12,621	12,057	3,677	15,734
1933	265	1,692	1,957	6,380	681	7,061	6,645	2,373	9,018
1935	262	1,698	1,960	6,146	667	6,813	6,408	2,365	8,773
1940	1,575	1,802	3,377	10,822	329	11,151	12,397	2,131	14,528
1945	4,705	1,526	6,231	33,045	841	33,886	37,750	2,367	40,117
1950	2,832	1,543	4,375	17,321	227	17,548	20,153	1,770	21,923
1952	2,865	1,494	4,359	17,519	217	17,736	20,384	1,711	22,095

NOTE—"U" is uptown into Penn Station and "D" is downtown traffic.

The Pennsylvania Railroad has shown that people will use the railroads if high speed service is rendered, bringing them into mid-Manhattan where a majority have destinations. In the mid-thirties, this carrier handled about ¼ million commuters per annum in the Pennsylvania Station in New York. This commuter traffic rose to nearly 5 million in 1945, the war year, but it has levelled off since 1950 at a little under three million, or about 10 times as many as it had in the mid-thirties. This was accomplished while most of the other roads lost much of this traffic, and in spite of the fact that this carrier makes an extra charge above the regular fare of 10¢ per commuter trip and 15¢ for other passengers for the privilege of being brought into a modern terminal in mid-Manhattan.

A similar situation has developed on the New York, Susquehanna and Western Railroad and the Northern Railroad of New Jersey. Both of these carriers had been losing heavily in their passenger traffic, partly due to bus competition, and partly due to the fact that both of these railroads terminated in Jersey City, making it necessary for their passengers to first go down to Jersey City in New Jersey and then come uptown again in New York, where many of them had their destination.

In August 1939, in an effort to recoup some of these passenger losses, the Susquehanna built a station at the highway approach to the Lincoln Tunnel, where these passengers could transfer to buses operated in connection with this experiment and which brought these pasengers into mid-Manhattan. In 1940, hourly train service was inaugurated between Paterson and this new station, called Susquehanna Transfer, and the Northern Railroad of New Jersey joined in this transfer operation.

The following table shows the resultant gain in the number of passengers carried thus into mid-Manhattan.

(Source: NYS&W RR)

	N.R.R. of N.J.	N.Y.S. & W.	Total
1940	3,546	272,126	275,672
1943	12,792	1,008,486	1,021,278
1946	20,241	1,244,233	1,264,464
1949	30,975	1,032,264	1,063,239
1952	13,682	810,534	824,216

The loss in traffic since 1946 is explained to be due primarily to the private car competition, particularly the many car pools which were being operated. It may also be due partly to the fact that over 50% of the passengers from New Jersey have destinations east of 5th Avenue.

If the mid-Manhattan business is compared with the downtown business, we find that the growth in the traffic on the Susquehanna has been due primarily to its mid-Manhattan service.

	To mid-Manhattan	*Downtown*
1940	272,126	
1943	1,008,486	492,805
1946	1,244,233	544,774
1949	1,032,264	645,973
1952	810,534	556,294

At the hearing on November 13, 1953, Mr. Henry K. Norton, President of the Susquehanna, stated that this growth in passenger traffic into mid-Manhattan was accomplished in spite of the fact that, in addition to the regular fare to New York, via Jersey City, an additional bus fare of 25¢ per round trip is charged. He attributed this growth to the fact that this service saves his passengers 35 to 40 minutes in traveling time. He admitted, however, that this bus service was not a permanent solution, which could only come by bringing these people into mid-Manhattan on rails.

This would seem to indicate that, if proper rail service were inaugurated between New Jersey and mid-Manhattan, with a distribution down through the center of Manhattan, many more people would use this facility in place of the present costly private car service or bus service with several transfers, and that they would do so even if an extra charge is made for this improved service.

APPENDIX C

ABSTRACT OF DATA INTRODUCED AND STATEMENTS MADE AT THE PUBLIC HEARINGS HELD IN NEW YORK ON NOVEMBER 12 AND 13, 1953

Much has been said about the serious traffic congestion in the City of New York and the need for relief. Many suggestions had been offered, from time to time, for bringing the people from New Jersey into Manhattan on rails instead of rubber, and for developing better underground distribution of these passengers, as well as the passengers from Westchester and Long Island.

New Jersey had made many studies by private and public bodies and public hearings had been held and certain decisions had been reached. One report gives outlines of 17 different plans offered for improved rail service between New Jersey and New York.

In order to obtain the views of the people of New York on the seriousness of the present street traffic congestion and on plans offered for improved rail facilities, public hearings were held in New York on November 12 and 13, 1953, where many organizations and individuals were heard and their statements were recorded and the data offered was made a part of the Record.

At this hearing, 4 more plans were offered for solving the New Jersey-New York rail problem. There are, therefore, a total of 21 plans now before this Commission for review.

The following is a list of the organizations and individuals participating at the hearings and a summary of their respective expressions of opinions and recommendations:

List of Persons and Organizations Represented as Registered at the Hearing Held on

Thursday and Friday, November 12 and 13, 1953

in the

Auditorium of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York

ALBRIGHT, J. T.	Socony Vacuum Oil Co. (Traffic Bureau)
ALLEN, George N.	Television News Show — WPIX (Sponsored by Columbia University)
ANDERSON, Max E.	Regional Plan Association, Inc.
AUGUSTUS, G. L.	N. Y. Chamber of Commerce

BABCOCK, D. E.	80 Park Place, Newark, N. J.
BANKS, W. Foster	Empire State Highway Transportation Assn.
BENSON, C. B.	N. Y. Public Service Commission
BERGERMAN, Milton M.	Citizens Union
BINGHAM, Robert C.	Westchester County Dept. of Planning
BINGHAM, Col. S. H.	General Manager — N. Y. C. Transit Authority
BLAISDELL, Paul H.	Citizens Traffic Safety Board
BJORKNER, A. E.	Asst. Supt.—Central Railroad of N. J.
BONGARTZ, Richard R.	Gen'l. Att'y — Pennsylvania Railroad
BOTWINICK, Benjamin	President — Taxicab Bureau, Inc. Chairman — Traffic Committee — Commerce & Industry Association of New York
BRAINERD, Harry B.	Architect & City Planner
BROWN, Harry	Retail Store Adv. — N. Y. Journal American
BROWN, L. D.	Hudson & Manhattan Railroad Co.
BRUNO, Jacob	Engineer — Industrial Real Estate
BURANELLI, Albert	Rotogarages, New York, Inc.
CALLAGHAN, C. H. (Ret.)	Maritime Assoc. of the Port of New York
CAMING, H. W. William	Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.
CAPLAN, David	Dept. of City Planning
CARMICHAEL, G. T.	Vice-President — N. Y., N. H. & H. RR.
CARPENTER, Herbert L.	Commerce & Industry Association Chairman — Transit Comm.
CARR, Amos A.	Cold Spring, N. Y.
CHAFEY, Donald E.	Commerce & Industry Assoc. of N. Y.
CHAPIN, William S.	Triboro Bridge & Tunnel Authority
CLINGO, Dr. Bernard	Newark, N. J.
CLUTZ, John J.	Pennsylvania Railroad
CONWAY, Robert	New York News
COON, A. F.	Asst. to Vice-President — N. Y. C. Railroad
CRANWELL, James L.	Vice-President — Pennsylvania Railroad
DAVIS, B. C., Jr.	Exec. Vice-President — N. Y. Chamber of Commerce
DAVIS, Rowland L., Jr.	Gen'l. Counsel — DL&W. RR. Co.
DECHAMP, Robert B.	Clifton, N. J.
DESEL, John	West Side Taxpayers Assoc., Inc.
DICK, Corwin	Port of New York Authority
DREVLER, R. V.	70 Gamewell St., Hackensack, N. J.
DRIEFOOS, B. H.	Member Inter-Municipal Group Roselle Park, N. J.
DREIER, Augustus S.	Counsel, Inter-Municipal Group, 203 Park Ave., Plainfield, N. J.
DWYER, J. C.	General Electric Co.—570 Lexington Ave., N. Y.
EICHLER, George M.	921 Bergen Ave., Jersey City, N. J.
ELDER, Alexander H.	Glen Ridge, N. J.
ENGELMAN, A. J.	120 East 88th St., New York 28, N. Y.

FAGIN, Henry	Planning Director — Regional Plan Assoc.
FARRELL, James E.	Board of Public Utility Commissioners, N. J.
GARFIN, Ansel	Regional Plan Association
GOLDBERG, Fred	L. S. Construction Associates 2275 Barker Ave., New York 67, N. Y.
GOLDBURG, Jules	State Law Reporting Co.
GOLDSTEIN, Robert C.	1407 Broadway, N. Y. City
GOLDTHWAITE, George E.	The Citizens Union
GROSSO, Michael B.	Fifth Avenue Association
HADJIN, James	Park Row News Service
HASTINGS, John A.	420 Lexington Ave., N. Y. C.
HASTINGS, John B.	15 Canterbury Road, Great Neck, N. Y.
HATLER, L. G.	Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 661 Summit Ave., Jersey City, N. J.
HEDDEN, Walter P.	Port Development Consultant The Port of New York Authority
HEIL, Eugene J.	423 West 126th St., N. Y. City
HENLEIN, Millard	Avenue of Americas Association, Inc.
HILL, Duncan E.	Chairman of Joint Committee — Municipal Groups of Northern New Jersey
HOLLEY, Miss C.	Asst. to Gen'l Mgr — N. Y. C. Transit Authority
HOLMAN, J. C.	A. J. Contracting Company 25 West 45th Street, N. Y. City
HOTCHKISS, B. L.	Herald-News, Passaic, N. J.
INSLEY, John R.	Chairman, Morris Co. Transportation Comm. (New Jersey)
JOHNSON, C. C.	c/o Bar Assoc., 42 W. 44th St., N. Y. C.
JONES, Charles R.	841 Morningside Rd., Ridgewood, N. J.
KOZIAR, Ted	Newark Evening News
KANTER, L.	720 West End Ave., N. Y. City
KEMPF, Otto J. J.	342 Madison Ave., N. Y. 17, N. Y.
KRONE, Geo.	84 Ryerson, Paterson, N. J.
LANCE, Wesley L.	Glen Gardner, N. J. (State Senator Elect., N. J.)
LANG, Clifford B.	Hill Bus Co., Bergenfield, N. J.
LASSOW, William	Admin. Asst., N. Y. C. Transit Authority
LEAVENS, John M.	Citizens Budget Commission
LEIPER, Joseph M.	Hudson & Manhattan Railroad Co.
LIPMAN, Sol	Jamaica Chamber of Commerce
LIPTON, Al	136 E. 57th St., N. Y. City
LIVINGSTON, Goodhue	720 Park Ave., N. Y. City
MacLEAN, Carleton Grant	Chairman, Transit Committee of Bergen Co. Woodcliff Lake, N. J.
MacMASTER, Frank J.	L. I. Daily Press
MARSHALL, R. C.	Washington, D. C.
McCARTHY, John J.	71-05 37th Ave., Jackson H'gts, N. Y.
McKEOWN, Frank	Real Estate Board of New York

MELLOR, C. H.	111 8th Ave., N. Y. City
MERCADO, Alfred	Knappen, Tippetts, Abbett & McCarthy 62 W. 47th St., N. Y. City
MOLINA, Henry G.	San Juan, Puerto Rico (MU 2-0606)
MURPHY, Charles J.	N. Y. Board of Trade, Inc.
NICKERSON, E. C.	Vice-President — N. Y. Central Railroad
NORTON, Henry K.	President — Susquehanna Railroad
NORTON, C. McKim	Vice-President — Regional Plan Assoc.
OSBORNE, Harold S.	President — Regional Plan Assoc.
PALMER, Harry	Hudson & Manhattan Railroad
PARTEE, Paul K.	General Manager — B&O Railroad
PATTERSON, G. R.	33 West 46th St., N. Y. City
POMEROY, Hugh R.	Westchester County Planning Commission
POWER, Frank B.	Chairman — Traffic Comm., Tuckahoe, N. Y.
PRIEST, Daniel B.	N. Y. Central Railroad
QUINBY, H. D.	51 Broadway, N. Y. City
RAUSCHLING, H. T.	Citizens Budget Commission
REID, William	Hudson & Manhattan Railroad (President)
RITTGERS, Verden A.	Hill Bus Co., 288 Blvd., New Milford, N. J.
ROBINSON, T. J.	Representing H. A. Weiss, Passenger Traffic Manager, LI. RR.
RONEN, William J.	Graduate School of Public Administration New York University, Washington Sq., N. Y.
ROSSI, C.	Room 1009, 7 East 42nd St., N. Y. C.
SASS, Fred J.	N. Y. Times Photographer
SAUNDERS, George E.	General Electric Company
SAVINO, Guy	Newark News
SCHROEDER, Rudolph	Attorney, Weehawken, N. J.
SCHWARTZWALD, Sam	1110 E. 165th St., Bronx, N. Y.
SCHWEBEL, Robert	General Attorney — B&O RR
SIVEL, W. T., Dr.	Director of Research Parsons-Brinkerhoff-Hall-MacDonald
SKUTT, W. E.	Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 1948 Franklin Rd., Valley Stream, L. I.
SMITH, D. H.	Bell Telephone Laboratories
SPINRAD, I.	Hudson & Manhattan Railroad Co.
STEVENS, J. E., Jr.	Previews, Inc., 49 E. 53rd St., N. Y. C.
STIMSON, Henry J.	Long Island Railroad, 122 E. 42nd St., N. Y.
STONIER, Charles E.	Dept. of Commerce, School of Business Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.
STRICKLAND, Richard	Port of New York Authority
SULLIVAN, Bill	Newsday Photographer — Garden City, N. Y.
SWINBURNE, Edward M.	36 W. 44th St., New York 36, N. Y.
TEGNELL, G. G.	New York Chamber of Commerce
THEISINGER, Earl F.	McGraw Hill Company

TOBIN, Austin J.	Executive Director, Port of N. Y. Authority
TURNER, F. M.	General Electric Company
VAN ALSTYNE, D., Jr.	Chairman, N. J. M. R. T. C.
UHRBROCK, E. Frederic, Jr.	Asst. Vice-Pres., N. Y. N. H. & H. RR
VISACANE, Caroline	1050 2nd Ave., N. Y. C.
WALSH, Arthur A.	West Side Association of Commerce, Inc.
WEISS, H. A.	Passenger Traffic Manager, L. I. R. R.
WIDLICKA, Leo	Herald Tribune, New York, N. Y.
WILLIAMS, Arthur B.	State Dept. of Public Works, Babylon, L. I.
WILLIAMS, Leon A.	Pennsylvania Railroad
WISMAR, A.	35-22 80th St., Jackson H'gts, N. Y.
YOUNGSON, Alexander C.	Youngson & Ciampa, 140 Cedar St., N. Y. C.

ABSTRACT OF DATA INTRODUCED AND STATEMENTS MADE AT THE PUBLIC HEARINGS

New Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission

Statement by Col. L. Alfred Jenny, the New Jersey Commission's Consultant

The New Jersey Commission has maintained from its inception that this problem of rapid transit is one with which the City and State of New York are just as vitally concerned as is New Jersey, and that the problem can only be solved if it is reviewed in a broad regional manner in which the New York and the New Jersey Commissions are working as a unit and in close harmony.

Col. Jenny presented copies of three official reports on this problem which were issued in New Jersey in recent years. They are:

1. Because of the general approval given in New Jersey to an earlier plan for bringing the New Jersey railroads, except the Pennsylvania, into a Union Passenger Terminal in mid-Manhattan, the Department of Economic Development of the State of New Jersey had an up-to-date study made concerning this project, and a report was rendered in May 1946. This report gives, besides a copy of the plan and estimates, statistical graphs on passenger traffic in and out of New York, population by counties, assessed valuations, etc.

2. In 1950, the New Jersey Department of Conservation and Economic Development (formerly the Department of Economic De-

velopment) had a report prepared summarizing all previously known efforts made for solving this railroad problem between New Jersey and New York City, with copies of the plans, where possible. This report, which was issued on February 10, 1951, gives an outline of each of 17 plans then known to exist, with comments on these plans and recommendations.

This report states that, while there are many different types of solutions, these plans can be classified into 3 categories as follows:

(A) The Rapid Transit Plan, with an east and west artery in the Hackensack Meadows intercepting the railroads there, where transfer stations would be provided, then entering New York about 50th Street and running down through central Manhattan to the Battery, thence to the Jersey Central Railroad in Jersey City, with possible links with the Grand Central Terminal and the Long Island Railroad. Bus transfer stations would be provided at North Bergen and Jersey City. Numerous plans show this, or a similar solution and several of them also provide a link, physical or otherwise, with Staten Island. The line in Manhattan would have two tracks with four track stations.

(B) The Railroad Terminal Plan, with new arteries in New Jersey from Newark to North Bergen, and Lyndhurst to North Bergen, thence a joint tunnel route to a new Passenger Terminal at about 50th Street in Manhattan, with an independent subway from there to the Battery and Jersey City, as outlined under (A) above. Bus transfer stations would be provided in New Jersey, as shown under (A) above.

(C) The Railroad Terminal Plan, with the terminal located in the Hackensack Meadows near North Bergen, with a rapid transit line from there to about 50th Street, New York, and down through Manhattan and over to Jersey City, with bus terminals in New Jersey, as shown under (A) above.

3. Under Senate Joint Resolution No. 4 of 1950, the State of New Jersey created the New Jersey Regional Planning Commission for the purpose of studying regional problems affecting New Jersey, and of recommending the creation of Commissions or Authorities to carry out its recommendations. After long and detailed study of the railroad transportation problem, including a review of the 17 plans

reported above, this Commission recommended the creation by the States of New Jersey and New York of a Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission to make a thorough factual and economic survey, review all known plans for solving this problem, determine the plan to be adopted, and make recommendations on how it can be effectuated and financed.

He gave an outline of certain actions taken and official decisions reached in New Jersey concerning this problem and quoted from the Act creating the New Jersey Commission to show the definite instructions issued to it as to what it must do. This Act states, among other things:

> "It is plainly apparent from some seventeen known efforts of public and private bodies that any realistic approach to metropolitan rapid transit will require the fullest possible interstate co-operation to produce a regional solution for a regional problem;" * * *

He stated that the New Jersey Regional Planning Commission was strongly of the opinion that this serious problem could not be solved by any partial or sectional plans, but had to be reviewed in an overall broad regional manner with all of the many ramifications involved, and that if such a project were built along such lines, it would have a far better opportunity of becoming self-supporting than would any sectional solution, as was clearly evidenced from the study of such sectional plans.

Report of the Mayor's Committee on Management Survey of the City of New York

Under date of March 30, 1953, the Mayor's Committee on Management Survey of the City of New York submitted to Mayor Impellitteri its "final report".

Such "final report" was frequently referred to at the public hearings. It contains the following references to the New York and New Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commissions, and it also contains the following statement concerning "Broad Requirements" for "Improving the Management of Public Transportation" (p. 166):

> "Approaching the problems from the immediate management standpoint, it is our feeling that:

"The first requirement is a modern and efficient organization to operate and maintain the City-owned transportation facilities under modern business principles and procedures.

"The second requirement is a comprehensive and coordinated planning and policy control over the development of all facilities which serve the transportation and traffic requirements of the people of the City. For example, it would only add to present confusion if the plans for automobile traffic are developed without reference to the mass transportation facilities or to the off-street and on-street parking facilities and control.

"The third requirement is that all measures adopted now looking toward an immediate solution of our transit problems shall be so designed as not to stand in the way of the larger and more comprehensive efforts which may be anticipated from the regional and inter-state approaches which are now being initiated.

"The recommended institutional approach to these ends is presented in Section V of this chapter. In the following pages we present certain suggestions on internal organization and management, drawn in part from the transit surveys made for this Committee.

"From the standpoint of the long-range problems involved, the Committee regards it as fortunate that the State of New York and New Jersey have recently taken action to explore together the interstate aspects of the metropolitan transit question through the creation of the temporary Interstate Commissions to study Rapid Transportation Facilities of the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area, which have been authorized to call on the Port of New York Authority as a research resource. We feel that the City of New York should not only co-operate to the full with the new Commission, but should immediately initiate its own studies designed to help the Commission and to protect the interests of the City."

And at page 136 the same Report of the Mayor's Committee on Management Survey of the City of New York also states:

"As a result, transportation and traffic today are probably the City's greatest and most difficult problems. Upon their solution depends in large measure not only the future growth of the City, but also the continued health and vigor of the economic and social life of the community. The management and financial difficulties of transportation, public and private, thus go beyond the scope of any one department. They affect the entire life of the City."

Hon. Edward C. Maguire—Chairman, Transit Advisory Commission

At the public hearings there was read into the record the following letter, dated November 9, 1953, from Hon. Edward C. Maguire, as Chairman of the Transit Advisory Commission, City of New York:

"Dear Mr. Tuttle:

Since talking with you and accepting your kind invitation to appear in my capacity as Chairman of the New York City Transit Advisory Commission, I have discussed the matter with both the Mayor and the Mayor-elect.

Our Commission is not a policy making body but is rather an investigatory and fact-finding body for the Board of Estimate, and it limits its activities to an examination of the conditions of the privately operated surface transportation lines of the City. The facts which we have available all bear on such private bus lines and studies which we have made of bus operations in other cities of the state and nation.

From the press you undoubtedly know that an arbitration award vitally affecting the private bus lines of this City is expected to be handed down either late this week or early next week. If I were to testify publicly and in advance of our report to the Board of Estimate on the factual situation as we now find it, it might well affect the judgment of the arbitrators if their award has not been rendered up to that time, or if it has, it might serve to limit at least in the public mind, the scope in which the Board of Estimate might act on our report and the award. Under these circumstances, therefore, I feel it advisable to refrain from making public statements on the findings that our examinations and studies have disclosed, but I can assure you, and on this I have the approval of the Mayor and the Mayor-elect, that there will be submitted to you in sufficient time for analysis and incorporation into your report, the material which we have.

"I hope you will understand the problem with which we are confronted at this particular time. I want to assure you that it is our definite purpose to cooperate in every respect consistent with the public good."

Hon. Robert Moses—Represented by Col. Wm. S. Chapin

On the need for extending railroad commuter facilities, use made of other facilities, and possible relief to the railroads, Col. Chapin read an extended letter from Mr. Moses stating in part:

"Generally, with the exception of the New York City subway lines, there is little need for an expansion of railroad commuter facilities in the New York metropolitan area. Over the years on many lines the number of rail commuters has decreased and the problem is one of keeping and improving the facilities we now have, but at reasonable fares. The financial troubles of the railroads go back a number of years and during the depression it became evident that the railroads would have to be relieved of some of their obligations, and particularly such costs as grade crossing eliminations made necessary by the tremendous increase in automobile travel. As a result of the adoption of the grade crossing amendment proposed by the 1938 Constitutional Convention, much has been accomplished but because of narrow interpretation of its intent further action must now be taken to eliminate the so-called railroads' share of all but directly and distinctly railroad benefits and to provide more state funds for the increased cost of the state share. In addition to relieving the railroads of all capital costs in grade crossing elimination construction, they should not be expected to pay taxes on improvements made as a result of such eliminations. There should also be serious consideration given to scaling down by law real estate and other taxes for railroads providing commuter service in the metropolitan areas. * * *

"Although the commuting railroads have lost passengers, the subway system has gained over a period of years. The need for expanding the subway system by constructing new trunk lines in Manhattan and extensions in outlying boroughs has been demonstrated and the people in 1952 voted to authorize the city to issue $500 Million in bonds outside of the debt limit. As a result of the huge operating deficit and the transfer of operations from the Board of Transportation to the Transit Authority there have been delays in much of this construction program. In addition to the increased use of the subway system, a large number of passengers are now traveling on buses and forming car pools. The car pool arrangement is particularly advantageous in areas where good mass transportation facilities are not available.

"There are always those who glibly advocate an official, all-powerful regional agency to take over these problems on the curious assumption that difficulties will disappear with regional consolidation. * * *

"Similarly, any serious suggestion that the city subway system be integrated with private lines or controlled by an agency also having jurisdiction over the commuting railroad lines would immediately develop strong sentiment in the City of New York for unloading the subway problems, including the deficit, on the new

regional agency. The subway expansion program voted by the people in 1952 would vanish overnight and further decline of the subway system would quickly begin. * * *

"This brings me logically to vehicular transportation. We have been making steady progress in the construction of an arterial system of highways, expressways and parkways in the New York metropolitan area. Construction is under numerous agencies including the Federal Bureau of Public Roads, New York State Department of Public Works, New York State Thruway Authority, State and County Park commissions, New York City Borough Presidents and Park Department, Triborough Bridge and Tunnel and Port of New York authorities, New Jersey State Highway Department and New Jersey Turnpike Authority, and the Palisades Park Commission which is an inter-state agency. The cooperation which has been developed between all of these different agencies in planning and constructing a coordinated system of arteries demonstrates what can be done under our democratic system. It is not essential that a highly centralized regional agency be established to coordinate and construct the arterial system. As a matter of fact, it would be impossible for a single agency to tap the various sources of funds and carry out a complicated program of this magnitude. We are all cooperating and getting along well. We need no more machinery. In the State of New York the Temporary Highway Finance Planning Commission has been investigating ways and means of financing a program to bring New York State's highways and arterials up to date. This commission has been at work for some period of time and will report to the Governor and the Legislature in the near future. It is anticipated that the recommendations of this commission will meet the highway problem.

"In conclusion, there is no patent remedy or single formula which can be applied to solve the various metropolitan mass transportation problems. Each must be considered on its merits by the responsible agencies. Putting all of the problems into a big new shiny basket is just a way of hastening their trip to the dump heap or the incinerator. As indicated above, there are areas in which relief can be given the commuting railroads. These include the assumption by the state of all costs of railroad grade crossing eliminations except for the direct and distinct railroad benefits, and the relief from other tax burdens including real estate, franchise and utility taxes. We no doubt need some smarter, more forceful and more independent people in the existing agencies, here and there less pride of authorship and more sacrifice for the common good, but we don't need powerful, new, expensive bureaucratic regional administrations staffed by ambitious second

rate planners, railroads eager to rid themselves of their less profitable business, and public officials anxious to dump their tougher problems on someone else."

Mr. Austin J. Tobin—Port of New York Authority

In 1927, the Port Authority organized the Suburban Transit Engineering Board which studied this problem and rendered reports which were made available to the New Jersey and New York Commissions.

The 1930 report shows that this Board made a traffic survey for Westchester and Long Island and accepted the 1924 survey made for New Jersey by the North Jersey Transit Commission, a member of that Board.

For Long Island it recommended a loop plan from Jamaica to mid-Manhattan, down central Manhattan to the Battery and back to Jamaica with a link over to North Bergen in New Jersey and a link from the Battery to the terminal of the Central Railroad of New Jersey at Jersey City. It suggested the extension of the line from North Bergen west across the Hackensack Meadows towards Lyndhurst so as to intercept the traffic of all railroads in northern New Jersey.

In 1937, the Port Authority issued a report on "Suburban Transit for Northern New Jersey" and a copy of this report was made available. The solution offered is as follows:

An intercepting artery across the Hackensack Meadows from the Erie Railroad below Rutherford to North Bergen, from there to 51st Street, New York, and then linked with the Hudson & Manhattan in 6th Avenue, with rapid transit trains running from Paterson, N. J. via Erie Railroad and the new line into New York and over to Hoboken and Newark via the Hudson & Manhattan. Another possibility shown was operation from Staten Island via the Central Railroad of New Jersey and linked with the Hudson & Manhattan. It proposed the acquisition of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad which showed a considerable operating deficit.

The plan was reviewed by a New Jersey Joint Legislative Committee which reported January 9, 1941 as follows:

"To provide adequate facilities for suburban transportation by rail will involve the expenditure of large sums for new con-

struction, and there is no prospect that any such system will be self-supporting. The deficits may be substantial. This raises two fundamental questions,—*first,* what is the most practicable method of raising public moneys to provide against prospective annual deficits in a constitutional manner; and *second,* whether it is sound public policy to proceed with the project at all at the present time? These are important questions of general State Policy which cannot be summarily answered."

A study for a rapid transit connection between Newark Airport and points along the Jersey waterfront and Manhattan which would include a transfer connection between the Central Railroad of New Jersey tracks, the Pennsylvania, and Hudson & Manhattan Railroad lines into Cortlandt Street and the Susquehanna line to Susquehanna transfer where bus transfer service is available through the Lincoln Tunnel to the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan was made for the Port Authority and interested railroads by Coverdale & Colpitts, Consulting Engineers, who reported May 18, 1949 as follows:

"As a result of our study of the route and facilities planned for the proposed New Jersey Rapid Transit System and the estimates that we have made for its traffic and operations, we are of the opinion that the construction and operation of the proposed system would be physically and operationally feasible. However, our estimates of its operating expenses, rentals and other charges, on the bases described hereinafter indicate that it would not be financially self-supporting to the extent of approximately $1,228,900 a year if its revenues were based on comparable rapid transit fares."

Repeated studies by the Port Authority, Transit Commissions, railroads, and by eminent consultants covering both a comprehensive system of rapid transit connections between New Jersey and New York and of particular segments of such systems, uniformly and repeatedly result in the conclusion that such projects will not be self-supporting to the extent of many millions of dollars.

On the basis of 1951 construction prices, an inter-state rail project capable of carrying standard railroad cars into Manhattan, with adequate real estate and terminal construction, would cost in the neighborhood of $300,000,000 to $400,000,000 and that the annual deficits would be approximately $15,000,000.

The Port Authority Commissioners pointed out that the principle of self-support is the whole strength of the Port Authority's ability

to carry forward the programs of terminal and transportation development entrusted to it by the two States on a revenue bond basis; that the Port Authority's credit structure would be seriously impaired if there was any implication that the Port Authority was even considering the financing of rail transit; that any amendments to the Port Compact under which the Port Authority would have recourse to public subsidy from tax levying sources in support of its projects would destroy the entire concept and character of the Authority.

Walter P. Hedden—Port of New York Authority

Brief summary of physical problems involved in metropolitan suburban transit and the objectives sought by some of these studies.

Westchester-Connecticut Plans—A connection into Manhattan supplemental to the Park Avenue line to Grand Central Terminal.

Long Island-Manhattan Plans—Supplemental entrance into Manhattan to take some of the load off the East River tunnels and the Pennsylvania Station.

New Jersey-New York Plans—The lack of direct rail tunnel connections into the northerly area of New Jersey. The route of the Hudson & Manhattan is not sufficiently fast and direct to attract most of the passengers seeking midtown Manhattan.

Other connecting links than those described by Mr. Tobin are the Bayonne Bridge and George Washington Bridge on which provision was made for suspension of a lower rail transit level underneath the vehicular roadway.

Standard Trains to Manhattan vs. Subway Loop Trains—It is perhaps appropriate at this point to distinguish between two contrasting approaches to the problem of connecting Manhattan with the suburban areas. The first approach has as its target the carrying of passengers to destination, say midtown Manhattan, in the standard passenger car equipment operated by the several roads in their suburban service, in a manner similar to the movement of Pennsylvania Railroad trains into Pennsylvania Station or New York Central and New Haven trains into Grand Central. Such an attack requires planning of relatively large diameter under-river tubes, the provision of a terminal with numerous supporting tracks for storage or turn-

around of empty cars after the morning rush hour and before the evening rush hour. It also presents the problem of providing special motive power into Manhattan in order to eliminate the mechanical problems caused by the diversity of present day operation (overhead catenary alternating current power, third rail direct current power, diesels, or steam engines). Such an attack also precludes utilization of some of the present tubes, such as the Hudson and Manhattan for portions of a loop system.

The other attack contemplates that the new tube connections to Manhattan should be based upon the dimensions or operating characteristics of a multiple-unit motor powered train of which the New York City Subway is typical. Such a system would make possible loop systems without storage tracks or stub end terminals in Manhattan, smaller diameter under-river tubes, and would simplify the motive power problem. Such a system would be cheaper and more flexible than the first, but would require changes by the passengers at the points where the multiple unit (subway type) car service starts.

Changing Pattern of Suburban Development and Travel—This refers to the necessity of considering the changes over the past 25 years of industrial, commercial, cultural, and residential development of the metropolitan regions by reason of highway construction and automobiles.

The Regional Plan Association of New York has analyzed and published a report, in bulletin form, on this subject.

The total passengers crossing the Hudson River has not materially changed since 1930. The mode of travel has changed substantially (1930-1950 figures).

A 1953 survey of passengers carried into Manhattan in private cars shows that 45% have Manhattan destinations and 55% are going beyond, which indicates the value of by-pass routes to the north and south, such as the New York State Thruway Bridge and the proposed Narrows Bridge.

Passengers in automobiles destined to points in East Bronx, nearby Queens, and Brooklyn and the east side of Manhattan will be aided in reaching their destination by such arteries as the Washington Heights tunnels connecting with the Trans-Bronx Expressway and Harlem River and East River Drives. This type of planning is

foremost in our consideration of programs for improving connections to existing trans-Hudson facilities and the planning for new crossings.

Thus, proper planning to promote vehicular by-pass routes around congested areas, to provide adequate under-river tunnel lanes to prevent approach backups (as is in progress at the Lincoln Tunnel), to make proper connections between arterial routes, to establish bus terminal facilities and parking areas at strategic points, will all minimize the use of the City street systems in the heart of the region. However, street traffic congestion, whether in Manhattan or the suburbs of White Plains, East Orange, or Westport, will yield only to local planning and enforcement on the principle that highways are for vehicle movement, not to be tied up with parking or loading operations.

When asked for an opinion about the many plans that had been worked out in the past, he stated:

> "I would hesitate to say to you that any specific plan that was drawn up fifteen or twenty years ago or even 10 years ago, should be accepted in all its details. I think, however, it is fair to say that the basic problem—let us take Jersey, for instance—is the same as it was then; namely, to get into midtown Manhattan with a direct connection and to link up certain lines to the south which do not now have anything but ferry connections".

Godfrey L. Augustus—New York Chamber of Commerce

To an extent not matched by any other region of the nation, the New York Metropolitan area requires large-scale, mass passenger transportation. The area is expanding and is expected to increase in population from the 14,000,000 of today to 15,500,000 in 1970. The area will also expand from the present 420 square miles to 1,200 square miles in 1970.

Only a thoroughgoing study can develop sound solutions to this difficult, complex, and important problem.

The New York Legislature should appropriate a minimum of $100,000 to permit the Commission to continue its work and that New Jersey make a similar appropriation. (See pages 4 and 5 of this Report for further remarks by Mr. Augustus.)

Harold S. Osborne—Henry Fagin of Regional Planning Association

Mr. Fagin explained the following maps and charts covering the New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut Metropolitan Region:

1. Key groups of Counties, showing—
   Principal Manufacturing Counties
   Counties growing in Manufacturing Importance
   Others in Area
2. Population Growth and Commuters 1930-1950.
   (Separate Bulletin giving details and highlights)
3. Commuters by facility used, 1930, 1940, and 1950 by sectors.
4. Growth of Employment 1942-1951.
5. Growth in Manufacturing Employment 1942-1951.
6. New Factories 1946-1950.
7. Balance of Resident Manufacturing Workers and Local Manufacturing Jobs.
8. Branching out of Central Stores.
9. Suburban Branch Stores.
   (Separate Bulletin of Dec. 1951 giving details and highlights)
10. Population Changes 1925-1942.
11. Trends in Population Increase 1940-1950.
12. The Fastest Growing Areas.
13. Number of Homes in Region.
14. Land Uses.

Harold S. Oborne, President stated that:

"We believe that the best solution, based on today's information and estimates of future requirements, will be arrived at by modification or integration of the plans that have been proposed, rather than by adopting any one of them as it stands".

Today's plan should meet the following conditions:

(a) A careful study of all the plans which in the past have been suggested applying to various parts of the region.

(b) Close cooperation with all public bodies and companies directly concerned.

(c) Endeavor to make maximum use of existing facilities. This involves bringing about maximum coordination of use between the subway and bus systems of New York City and the rail lines entering or approaching the City.

(d) Recognize the probability that for major capital expenditures a public subsidy will be necessary.

(e) Take account of current and expected future trends of dispersion of industry and population throughout the area and of the reaction of these trends on the volume and location of transportation requirements in determining the recommendations to be made.

(f) Include in their proposals the rail facilities for handling materials as well as those for handling people.

The Association also recommends that the Metropolitan Commission be continued and adequately financed and that their first responsibility be an immediate study of the need and means for improvement of rail transportation in the area.

James S. Carson, President—Avenue of the Americas Association, Inc.

He outlined the fact that this Association had given serious consideration to this problem for a long time and had reviewed various proposals made for its solution and he offered some opinions regarding certain solutions or statements made.

He stated that, since New York City, and particularly Manhattan, was the financial, industrial, and cultural capital of the World, and since nearly 10% of the population of the United States live and work within this City and its surrounding areas, it was dependent upon adequate transportation facilities if it wanted to maintain its pre-eminence as such a center.

He then outlined the facilities created to the north and east of Manhattan and the lack thereof to the west, across the Hudson River and New Jersey and that, because of this, these areas remained inaccessible and undeveloped in comparison with the areas to the north and east.

The eight great transcontinental railroads which directly or indirectly serve many millions of people in various states of the nation, have never had direct connection with or reasonable access to Manhattan. They depend upon the antiquated ferries to reach Manhattan, which ferries the railroads have to operate at substantial losses.

These railroads should have a modern passenger terminal in mid-Manhattan into which they could bring their trains and convert their passenger terminals at the New Jersey waterfront into good revenue-producing freight or industrial facilities.

This can readily be accomplished by linking the railroads in New Jersey with tunnels leading to such a terminal in mid-Manhattan where subways would serve as distribution arteries.

The areas served would realize social and economic benefits many times the cost of constructing the facilities needed to serve them.

The Port Authority's investment, amounting to $437,530,000 in 17 facilities, not all self-supporting, does not include any railroad or rapid transit facilities.

The third tube of the Lincoln Tunnel, now being constructed, will simply relieve vehicular cross-Hudson traffic, and add to the congestion and confusion in Manhattan.

In this connection Mr. Carson, continuing with the statement of the Avenue of the Americas Association, said:

> "It is hard to understand how anyone interested in the future development of Manhattan knowing of its traffic problems and knowing of the already vast construction by the Port Authority of vehicular tunnels and bridges and the added congestion to the city streets, should contemplate the erection of additional vehicular tunnels and completely ignore railroad and rapid transit development." * * *
>
> "Now the Port Authority, having determined that the proper remedy for this major transportation problem is improvement and development of railroad and rapid transit facilities, has nevertheless devoted its major activities to the development and construction of vehicular tunnels and from its public announcements, plans to continue to expend additional large sums for the construction of new and additional vehicular tunnels notwithstanding the additional burdens placed on the City streets.
>
> "In the face of the fact that the great transcontinental railroads have no proper access to Manhattan and are suffering an annual loss believed to be in excess of from $3,000,000 to $5,000,000 because of their inadequate terminals and facilities

and in addition their loss of good-will and the inconvenience to the public and their passengers and also in face of the deplorable position of the New York-New Jersey commuter and others we cannot understand how it is possible for progressive and far-sighted men not to take every possible step to remedy these conditions.

"Highway traffic must not be increased. It must be controlled. People must be transported in large numbers on steel rails and not on rubber tires. We believe it is unsound for anyone to spend additional millions of dollars of public money financed by Port of New York Authority bonds on additional vehicular tunnels and thus make traffic confusion in New York City twice confused."

Mr. Carson recommended bringing these 8 transcontinental railroads into such a terminal in mid-Manhattan, with rapid transit lines operating through these same tunnels, and stated that such a program would not involve the financial difficulties of a rapid transit system as such.

Speaking of the street congestion in New York, he stated that all people who live or work in New York, or visit it, are suffering from this congestion, which is causing large organizations and taxpayers to move into the surrounding areas.

Manhattan needs more people and not more automobiles in the streets. People who can be brought into and out of its midtown area safely, rapidly, conveniently, and economically, and who can be brought in and distributed underground.

We must not confuse this New Jersey-New York problem with solutions for Westchester or Long Island, but treat it as a separate problem and as a first step in an overall solution.

He cited various sources of income, such as the air-rights development over the terminal area, stores, concessions, etc., which could be developed by private sources who would pay more than the mere interest and amortization charges to carry the real estate that would have to be acquired and that thus this area would be free to the Authority creating the terminal.

He quoted a statement by Mr. David I. Mackie, Chairman of the Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, made in an address at Toronto, Canada, on September 24, 1953, as follows:

"The Eastern railroads stand ready to join hands with the Port Authority and all interested parties in the solution of these problems. * * * Obviously the railroad industry would expect to

pay its fair share of user charges sufficient to cover the costs of building and maintaining the facilities so provided for our use, and may I suggest that all other users of publicly provided facilities do likewise."

Herbert L. Carpenter—Commerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc.

The Association has maintained a continuing interest in City transit matters for many years and has supported the exemption from the City debt limit of the $500,000,000 for the Second Avenue subway as a necessity.

The Association is aware of the study and report made by the New Jersey Commission and a number of solutions offered by others, but does not believe that sufficiently conclusive current plans and data are at hand to make the vital long-range decisions which are required.

Attention is called to the question of helicopter service, and the need for further study of the merits of rail vs rubber transportation.

Recommends that the life of the New York Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission should be extended, with sufficient funds appropriated to develop proposals commensurate with the problem faced.

Mr. Benjamin Botwinick, Chairman of Traffic Committee of the Commerce and Industry Association and President of the Taxicab Bureau of New York

Asked that taxis be shortened 2 to 2½ feet and that they be permitted to use various makes of cars.

Goodhue Livingston, Commissioner—New York City Planning Commission

It is clearly evident that to move millions of people who travel daily in, out, and around New York City, rail transportation must be maintained and improved.

He proposed a Regional Transportation Authority be created to control all New York City transport, the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad, the Long Island Railroad, the Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority and such Port of New York Authority structures as the George Washington and Bayonne Bridges. This Authority would receive additional revenue from parking meters and new parking garages and by charging tolls on present toll-free bridges.

Such a dominant Authority should be under the control of the States of New York and New Jersey and under the supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission as far as public charges are concerned. In other words, he thought that a complete reorganization of the functions of the existing Authorities in this area might prove the key to the transportation problem.

Commissioner Livington further said:

> "In many ways, such an Agency would resemble the London Passenger Transport Executive which came into being in 1933 under Act of Parliament for reasons similar to those which are causing you to explore our transit mess. The London operation covers an area of 2,000 square miles in and about London and has proved for the most part extremely satisfactory, able to finance itself, improve service and maintain equitable fares. For diverse reasons a complete replica of it could not be established here, but I recommend that your Committee take a good long look at its history and structure. Such a dominant Authority would be in a position to really plan and cooperate with local planning boards. It would work out mutually satisfactory arrangements with the main line railroads, particularly important for the Jersey side. Such railroad lines as the circular railroad crossing Hell Gate Bridge, bisecting Queens, tieing in with the Pennsylvania Railroad through its 34th Street tunnel and with the Bay Ridge Branch of the Long Island Railroad, could be put to more extensive use. The Jersey side of the harbor lends itself to many railroad tie-ins, which in turn would improve rail travel as well as port operations. Today such comprehensive undertakings are nearly impossible because of the number of agencies engaged in transit affairs. These for the most part work at cross purposes following no general plan. It would seem elementary that this is the chief reason for our travelling conditions deteriorating and vehicular traffic becoming more and more intolerable. Such an Authority as I am describing should have broad scope and plenty of elbow room to work in, but their goal should be clearly defined and they should be compelled by law to stick to their purpose which alas has not been the case with our present Authorities in this region. In connection with that statement, I want to be on the record as saying that both these Authorities have done many fine and constructive things, but the Port Authority has never achieved what it originally was set up to do and in my opinion they are in the process of doing something now which will not be beneficial to the life of this city, namely, building a third tube to the Lincoln Tunnel which will pour 1200 more cars an hour into Midtown Manhattan, an area which is now strangling to death."

William Reid, President—Hudson & Manhattan Railroad

Advocates the improvement in rail transportation in order to stop the tremendous shift from rail to rubber. He thought that the continued construction of vehicular facilities by the States and Authorities should be stopped and the importance of rapid transit rail transportation be given concentrated thought.

He proposed a plan to provide a modern rapid transit system for commuters between New York City and New Jersey to be built in two stages. Each stage costing about $125,000,000. The first stage requiring about 2 years to build and the second about 3 years.

The proposed Transit System would provide direct rail service between all New Jersey railroads and the principal New Jersey highways to and from both midtown and downtown Manhattan.

Stage 1 would involve the construction of a new line from the Hudson & Manhattan Journal Square Station to North Bergen where a 1,000 car parking lot would be built. The Jersey Central passengers would transfer to the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad at a point 3½ miles east of Newark (''Meadows Transfer''). This would make possible the abandonment of the Jersey Central ferry service.

Stage 1 also provides for a large parking lot near the present H&M Grove Street Station so that automobiles using the New Jersey Turnpike Extension may be parked and their riders use the H&M to lower Manhattan. Stage 1 also includes the purchase of 364 passenger cars costing approximately $80,000 each.

Stage 2—Construction of a tunnel loop under Bergen Hill, the Hudson River and Manhattan Island. This uptown loop would serve three stations in Manhattan while proceeding east under 50th Street, south under 5th Avenue, west under 35th Street, and back under the river to New Jersey. One of these stations would be at Rockefeller Center, another under 5th Avenue between 42nd and 45th Streets, just west of Grand Central Terminal, and the third at 7th Avenue and extending between 8th and 6th Avenues.

Mr. Reid suggested that with tax exemptions, similar to Authority and Parkway projects, this proposed rapid transit scheme would be a financially successful operation.

Charles E. Stonier, Assistant Professor of Transportation
The Pennsylvania State College

This paper is a "Summary of a plan for the solution to the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Transit Problem".

The object is to make it possible for commuters from Long Island, Westchester, and especially New Jersey, to reach midtown and downtown Manhattan without changing.

It is a loop plan to eliminate turn-around movements and the provision for storage tracks.

The Plan proposes a tunnel under the Hudson River at 50th Street to Rockefeller Center, down Madison Avenue and Lexington Avenue to Broad Street, thence across the Hudson River to New Jersey. It considers the possible use of parts of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad.

Report of Inter-Municipal Group for Better Rail Service, New Jersey
(Augustus S. Dreier, Counsel)

This Group, composed of municipal officials of communities along the Central Railroad of New Jersey, has for many years taken a keen interest in developing improved railroad service between New Jersey and Manhattan. It has intervened in rate cases in the interest of commuters and has a long record of other accomplishments.

The report presented gives the facts relating to the cases in which this Group participated since 1945.

The Group has long contended before regulatory bodies and governmental agencies that one of the keys to the long-range solution of the mass transportation problem in New Jersey lies in consolidation of competing railroads with wasteful and expensive duplicating facilities.

In the Spring of 1946, the Group took up the study of the Col. Jenny Plan and recommended it for publication by the New Jersey State Department of Conservation and Economic Development and distribution to all North Jersey communities. In 1947, the Mayors of this Group waited upon the Governor, presented the problem, and asked for his aid in its solution. The Governor has considered the problem so important that he found it desirable to refer to it many times.

Col. S. H. Bingham, General Manager—New York City Transit Authority

The first logical step in looking for a solution of the Regional Transit problem would be a new study by a body organized to hire the necessary engineering consultants to prepare a comprehensive study of the transportation facilities and needs of the entire area.

After this study, a Master Plan for transportation should be prepared and the necessary legislation enacted to implement such a plan.

This detailed design of a long term plan would, of course, be flexible enough to permit adjustment to meet later developments.

The development of highway facilities has been followed by increasing traffic congestion. It seems to me that we have arrived at the time when we must re-evaluate the costs of traffic congestion and the costs of relieving it by providing highway facilities for private car owners; and balance these as against the results that might be achieved by concentrating our attention to a greater extent upon the development of mass transportation facilities which up to now have not had equal consideration.

Therefore, commutation, especially by rail, must be stimulated by giving the railroads an opportunity to improve their service and buy new equipment and generally make their service more attractive to the commuter.

He suggested as a possible relief of overcrowded streets the use of conveyor systems.

In conclusion—

> "We must focus our attention on the problem of moving people instead of vehicles".

Mass transportation systems such as railroads, rapid transit lines and buses are much more efficient movers of people than private cars and the mass transportation facilities must be encouraged.

Col. Bingham further said:

> "I have long felt that the problem of transportation in the Metropolitan Area is one that requires the co-ordinated study of a group of business men such as this. The problem transcends the lines establishing local political sub-divisions as well as the state lines. It must be studied on a regional basis because the transportation needs of the nearly 15,000,000 people residing in

this Greater Metropolitan Area are not governed by political jurisdictions.

"My views and those of all students of the problem are necessarily based on our individual knowledge and intimate association with the current state of affairs, because the last comprehensive study of the entire area that I have been able to find is the study made by the Regional Plan Association about 25 years ago. Therefore, it seems to me that the logical first step in looking for a solution to this increasingly serious problem would be a new study by a body organized to hire the necessary engineering consultants to prepare a comprehensive study of the transportation facilities and needs of the entire area.

"After this study has been made and the needs determined, a master plan for transportation should be prepared and the necessary legislation enacted to implement such a plan. * * *

"I have seen every development in highway facilities followed by ever increasing traffic congestion. It seems to me that we have arrived at the time when we must re-evaluate the costs of traffic congestion and the costs of relieving it by providing highway facilities for private car owners; and balance these costs against the results that might be achieved by concentrating our attention to a greater extent upon the development of mass transportation facilities which have up to now not had equal consideration. * * *

"Because of the costs to the community as a whole of providing automobile access to these central areas and parking space within them, it is obvious to me that commutation by mass transit carriers is the most efficient way of moving people into them. I therefore feel that commutation, especially by rail, must be stimulated by giving the railroads an opportunity to improve their service, to buy new equipment and generally to make their service more attractive to the commuter."

Mr. Paul H. Blaisdell, Acting Executive Director for the Citizens Traffic Safety Board, Inc.

This Board found the economic drain from the New York City traffic congestion to be in excess of one billion dollars per year; and that, had the survey covered the so-called entire Metropolitan Area, the waste from traffic inefficiency would easily pass the two billion mark annually.

The Board does not suggest any plan for solving the problem, but if traffic and transportation, regardless of the public and private nature thereof, may be regarded as a single-going business, any im-

provement program seeks the elimination of a two billion dollar annual deficit.

In the interest of early relief, the Board suggests, *first,* the improvement of things as they are, and *second,* the addition of new carefully planned facilities.

Pamphlet—"The Cost of Traffic Congestion and Traffic Accidents in the City of New York

Description of methods used in developing the "Deficits" and sub-division of the excess costs into 15 items.

Mr. A. B. Williams for the Department of Public Works State of New York

Statement of activities since 1926 with map showing New York City Arterial Highway System.

Considered that the New York City Arterial System of highways and those planned to be built in the future will go a long way towards relieving the flow of traffic to and from New York City.

Mr. John A. Hastings—The Hastings' Transportation Plan for New York

The Plan submitted contemplates the construction of four 1-track tunnels from North Bergen in New Jersey to the Sunnyside Yard of the Pennsylvania Railroad in Long Island City. The claim is made that this Plan "is a constructive answer and a positive solution". "Its application is simple and can be immediate. Its effect on the local, regional, and national economy will be profound, startling, and permanently beneficial".

He proposes the creation of a bi-State Authority with adequate power to do this. The Long Island Railroad is to be acquired by purchase or condemnation and its roadbeds and rolling stock modernized to provide safer, faster, cheaper, and more economical services and operations.

The proposal is made for instituting the so-called postalized fare system with speeds at 100 miles per hour at a fare of $1.00 per hour. For his Plan, he suggests a 15¢ fare one way from New Jersey to the New York Terminal, or for any trip up to 15 miles.

A quotation is made to the effect that "This Plan will eventually reorganize the New York Metropolitan Region on a scientific basis. When it is carried out, the satellite communities, linked to the Metropolitan Center, will be models for the world to follow. Under this Plan, midtown Manhattan will achieve its destiny, not as the greatest conglomeration of brick and mortar ever erected by man, but as the best integrated cultural, business, and government center the world has ever known".

Mr. Roland Davis, Jr. for Mr. Shoemaker, President of the Lackawanna Railroad

The problem of the railroad's passenger operations was stated to be their ferry operations and suburban passenger service.

The ferry operation in 1952 resulted in a deficit of approximately $1,125,000 which was attributed to two causes—increased expenses due primarily to increased wages and decreased patronage, which has resulted from diversion to other means of transportation using publicly supported facilities, namely, the George Washington Bridge and the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels. The total passengers crossing the Hudson River between New York and New Jersey by ferry, tunnel, bus, and automobile (Port Authority) numbered 280,516,000 in 1952 compared with 261,764,000 in 1930. The total vehicular traffic across the Hudson River in 1952 amounted to 69,486,890 of which only 2,673,124 used railroad ferries.

Both New York and New Jersey have constructed parkways, superhighways, a turnpike and other routes providing quick and convenient connections with the Port Authority facilities which has resulted also in the substantial loss of train passengers to buses and private automobiles.

The use of the public highways by buses and the Port Authority facilities at a nominal charge allows the buses to compete favorably from a fare and time standpoint.

The bus passengers increased 652% comparing 1930 with 1952 and auto passengers increased over the same period 184%.

One of the problems brought to the Commissions' attention for consideration is the New Jersey tax situation and its effect on the railroads.

In October 1951 at a joint hearing before the I. C. C. and the N. S. B. of P. U. C., Mr. Shoemaker made two suggestions:

"1. The States of New Jersey, New York and/or the Federal Government, by a new agency, or through an existing agency, to construct the river crossings and Manhattan stations; to underwrite such changes in equipment and cost of establishing connecting facilities as will be necessary for practicable operation, and to operate and support a Terminal Company for use by the interested New Jersey railroads connecting to it.

"In the division of revenues between the Terminal Company and the railroads, a major premise to start with should be that the railroads would receive their full costs of operation including taxes and a reasonable return.

"2. The State of New Jersey to take over complete financial responsibility for New Jersey suburban passenger train service; the railroads involved to operate whatever service is deemed necessary as agents for the State. Under such a plan the State would own all of the cars and locomotives. The income to the railroads for such service must be sufficient to meet their full costs of operation, including taxes, and a fair management charge. In other words, under this proposal, the railroads would operate their suburban passenger and commutation service on a cost-plus basis, with all details of changed river crossings being worked out cooperatively by the railroads with the State of New Jersey and whatever other agency or agencies might be involved."

We are willing to cooperate fully with the Commissioners and furnish any data or give you any opinons that we have.

Mr. Hugh R. Pomeroy—Westchester County Planning Commission

This Commission believes that the following considerations are essential to a competent study of the transit needs of the Area.

1. That we are not dealing with a static condition subject to fixed definition nor with trends that are statistically predictable with a high degree of accuracy. The past 20 years have seen marked shifts in the mode of passenger transportation, a decline in commuter traffic in relation to increase in population, and greater increase in the number of families; decrease in the number of commuters per 1,000 families while the number of manufacturing workers per 1,000 families has continued to increase.

2. That a system of transit facilities not only provides for travel needs but exerts a powerful influence on the pattern of community development.

3. That a study of transit for the area must take into account the inter-relation of all forms of transportation. Highways and related thoroughfares are undergoing rapid expansion while, as a planning matter, only minor consideration has been given to their relation to rail transit.

In view of the foregoing considerations, a transit plan for the metropolitan area must follow an examination of and selection among alternative objectives for the development of the entire region and for the functional distribution of economic activity in Manhattan and the formulation of policies expressing the chosen objectives.

The Westchester Commission calls attention to the matter of providing additional or supplementary facilities for delivering the Westchester-Fairfield traffic to a specific terminal point or provide a passenger station in the Bronx properly related to loop subway service around Manhattan for distribution to all parts of Manhattan.

Mr. E. C. Nickerson, Vice-President—New York Central System

"In view of the recent trends of volume of travel, the demonstrated ability to handle substantially higher traffic volume than at present, the recent installation of higher capacity cars, and the ability to further increase seats available through more high-capacity cars, we believe that for the immediate foreseeable future the New York Central can take care of its suburban travel requirements in and out of Grand Central."

The Port Authority facilities across the Hudson River have drained off the bulk of the traffic of the privately-operated ferry and railroad suburban passenger services, leaving them operating at a substantial deficit.

We are prepared to cooperate with this Commission in studies and surveys as they may undertake.

Mr. Richard R. Bongartz, General Attorney—Pennsylvania Railroad

We wish to assure you that we would like to cooperate with you in any way possible, and to that end we will be glad to furnish you with all the available information at our disposal, should you desire it.

Mr. Arthur A. Walsh appeared for Mr. James W. Danahy, Vice-President West Side Association of Commerce

This Association recommends that a careful study be made of the Hudson River ferry crossing situation with the viewpoint of providing a modified river-crossing service which will be acceptable to the various areas served and which can be operated on an economical basis. Suggested faster and larger boats built exclusively for passengers.

Mr. Henry K. Norton, President—New York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad

Suggests that the Commission take into account some of the background of the present transit problems in order that it may deal with causes rather than the effects.

During the last 30 years or so, the States of New York and New Jersey, the City of New York, and the Federal Government have spent billions of dollars in tunnels, bridges, and connecting highways and parkways leading into and out of New York City. As a result, thousands of people now use buses or drive to work in their own cars.

These bus lines have not only taken away from the railroads the larger portion of their passenger traffic, but they have taken the best paying part, that is the shoppers, theater-goers, etc., who travel on round-trip tickets which pay the railroads a slight amount above the cost of operation. The Susquehanna lost over 2/3 of its passenger traffic in 10 years following the opening of the George Washington Bridge. As a result of this, 5 of the New Jersey railroads were forced into reorganization.

Manhattan is now so crowded with cars that its citizens find their cars practically useless for daytime transportation within the City.

It is obvious that the only relief for this situation is to improve the facilities for *mass* transportation. If one-quarter of the money that has been spent to make it easier for motor cars to get into Manhattan were spent on interurban and urban transit facilities, the area could have one of the best transit systems in the world, instead of the worst.

He pointed out that his railroad established a station in New Jersey at the road leading to the Lincoln Tunnel and inaugurated bus service from there to the Port Authority bus terminal in New York so as to accommodate the growing number of passengers whose destination is in mid-Manhattan.

The charge made for this bus service, in addition to its regular fare to New York, is 25¢ a round-trip. As a result of this operation, its passenger traffic has increased and, today, about 3,000 people a day are willing to pay this extra fare because they can thus save from 35 to 40 minutes in travelling time.

He stated that while this was a very partial solution to the New Jersey problem, which needs a study of the possibilities for a rapid transit system for the whole Metropolitan Area, such a system, even though it might be expensive, would save the City hundreds of millions of dollars in hidden losses, delays, and lost services due to the present intolerable congestion in the City streets.

Mr. Edward M. Swinburne on behalf of a Group headed by Mr. Amos Carr of Cold Spring, N. Y.

Proposes a new four-track rail tunnel under the Hudson River and re-arrangement of the existing trackage so as to bring all New Jersey railroads into a large new central junction development from which all trains will be routed through the new tunnel to a new downtown station to be erected between Barclay and Worth Sts., from Church Street to West Broadway. Construction of a new subway which will carry the New Jersey trains from the downtown Manhattan station to a new main terminal to be erected in midtown Manhattan, south of 23rd Street and west of Broadway. This Terminal to equal in size, architecture, etc., the Grand Central or Pennsylvania Terminals.

Suitable accommodations will also be available to subways and surface lines in Manhattan, Brooklyn, Bronx, etc.

It is proposed to form a coordinated rapid transit system for all northern New Jersey within a radius of approximately 25 miles of midtown Manhattan.

The rush hour train schedule calls for a departure at 15 minute intervals.

The entire project is expected to be self-supporting from non-operating station revenues, a flat 25¢ rail fare, elimination of taxes and miscellaneous rentals. The plan would result in many benefits to northern New Jersey. The cost would be *over* $1,000,000,000.

Mr. Augustus S. Dreier—Inter-Municipal Group for Better Rail Service (New Jersey)

The decline in rail transportation between New York and New Jersey resulting in a tremendous increase in bus and private automobile travel which is overcrowding the highways and over-burdening the parking situation in New York City is a problem of serious consequence to the Metropolitan Region.

The result of permitting this trend to continue can only lead to the movement from New York City of shopping centers and commercial organizations.

While we do not sponsor any particular plan, it is our sincere belief that the States of New York and New Jersey must cooperate in setting up an Authority for the construction and operation of a means of ingress and egress by railroads, either over or under the Hudson River.

Mr. Carleton Grant MacLean, Chairman—Transit Committee of Bergen County (New Jersey)

Railroads are necessary for efficient mass transportation.

Suggests a loop railroad tapping all "radiating" New Jersey railroads and entering the City via a rail tunnel, continuing possibly as a 5th Avenue subway southward to the Battery and thence via tunnel to Bayonne and northerly; then forming a continuous loop railway with simultaneous passenger traffic in all directions.

Mr. J. R. Insley, Chairman—Morris County Officials Association Committee on Transportation

Recommends activities with the objective of obtaining the most efficient railroad plant.

This can only be accomplished through the joint efforts of the railroads and the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commissions of New York and New Jersey.

Mr. Duncan Hill, Co-Chairman—Transit Committee of Bergen County

He stated that the solution of this problem was vital to the progress of the region as well as to national defense.

The trend from rail to rubber is due to the failure to make comparable investments in railroad improvements as was done for the motors.

Our problem is steadily growing worse, requiring ever increasing numbers of police to cope with it. Accident rate is mounting and so are auto insurance rates, with seven such increases since World War II.

Failure to solve this problem now can only result in the eventual breakdown of our primary transportation system.

Mr. James R. Farrell for Board of Public Utility Commissioners State of New Jersey

He stated that the Public Utility Commission had no particular plan to offer, but that President John E. Boswell of the Commission wished to say that his Commission and its staff will fully cooperate in the effort being made to find a solution to this problem vitally affecting the interest of so many.

Mr. Milton M. Bergerman, President, The Citizens Union

He disagrees with the statement made by Commissioner Robert Moses and says we would be turning back the clock if we followed that advice.

Mr. Bergerman said:

> "It is simple enough, indeed, although it has been done with great skill, to build facilities to have automobiles of all sorts come rushing into New York without any consideration whatsoever of the very important effect that automobile transportation will and can have and must necessarily have on the problem of transportation that affects the millions of people who have to get around within the Metropolitan Area.
>
> "—The effect on the problem of providing reasonable and cheap transportation by syphoning off a marginal, a substantially marginal quantity of users, has not been considered before.
>
> "In other words, every effort has been made to provide one form of ready transportation without any consideration of the effect of such important social changes on the over-all transportation problems of our City."

Mr. Lowell H. Brown—Former State Senator

He is interested in reducing the cost of bus operation. He asked if he presented a statement to the Commission later if it would be accepted and considered. The Chairman assured him on both points.