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METROPOLITAN RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

*To the Honorable the Governors
and the Legislatures of
the States of New York and New Jersey*

INTERIM REPORT

ON

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION

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FEBRUARY 18, 1955

METROPOLITAN RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

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METROPOLITAN RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

February 18, 1955

To: His Excellency Governor AVERELL HARRIMAN, and
Members of the New York Legislature

His Excellency, Governor ROBERT B. MEYNER, and
Members of the New Jersey Legislature

Introduction

CREATION AND DUTY

The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission, which came into being on June 14, 1954, is a bi-State agency created by Chapter 801, Laws of 1954, of the State of New York and Chapter 44, Laws of 1954, of the State of New Jersey. It is presently financed with appropriations of \$50,000 from each State.

The Commission was created on the recommendation of two predecessor Commissions, the New York Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and the New Jersey Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission, which had appropriations scarcely more than nominal but which coordinated their efforts and filed a Joint Report, dated March 3, 1954, to the Governors and members of the Legislatures of the States of New York and New Jersey.

As stated in Section 5 of the legislation, the Commission was established to "study present and prospective rapid transit needs of the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area and develop, recommend and report as soon as possible measures for meeting such needs." The Commission has no governmental power.

THE OVER-ALL PROBLEM

The Joint Report of March 3, 1954, contained a summary of the views, statistical data and technical information submitted by the responsible organizations and speakers at a Public Forum conducted jointly by the two Commissions on November 12-13, 1953; tabulated material and technical information furnished by the Port Authority, the Regional Plan Association and other civic organizations; and

stated a number of conclusions and recommendations, of which the chief was this:

“A single bi-State agency should be established forthwith to make thorough and comprehensive study and report on ways and means for relieving, presently and in the long-range future, the traffic congestion, frequently approaching self-strangulation, in the Metropolitan Area, particularly in mid-Manhattan; for providing further means and improvement for mass transportation of people and merchandise to, through and from the critical centers of population and business; for considering the transportation needs and civil defense of the whole region; and for promoting the convenience of those who travel and economies in cost and time. Such a study and report, other than as here presented, have not been possible on the limited funds presently available to these Commissions.”

In an extended analysis of the over-all transit and traffic problem in the Metropolitan Area, the Joint Report stated:

“Transit and traffic in the Metropolitan Area have now exceeded the point of full saturation. Self-strangulation is becoming increasingly acute. The needs of this vast region, constituting in essence one great metropolitan community, as they will exist in 1960 and 1970, and as they presently concern its economy, its civil defense and the convenience of its people, are of urgent pressing importance.

“No single formula can solve the complex problem of transit in the New York Metropolitan Area, but any solution must take imagination and courage, and must recognize certain basic fundamentals. These include (among others) the nature and extent of population growth in the area, the tremendously rapid growth of highway transportation, the diversion of traffic resulting in the stagnation and decline of rail transit, the relatively large amount of space required for personalized automobile transportation as compared with rail transit, and the present limitations in mass transportation.

“In short, the problem of mass transportation of people and merchandise is inevitably intermingled with that of automobile and truck transportation, and any over-all approach must seriously consider the interrelationships between the two. * * *

“The problem is a tremendous one and no small plans will work. The first essential, therefore, is an adequate comprehensive study based on all available facts, which will result in

an over-all coordinated plan for transportation in the Metropolitan Area. This study will have to consider all suggested solutions on their merits and weigh them on the basis of a full factual investigation. In addition to traffic considerations, a full scale economic investigation is in order, since one of the most serious aspects of the whole picture is the continuing state of financial crisis which constantly faces most of mass transit facilities.

“The urgency and the complexity of the over-all situation and problem demand and should receive the cooperative and constructive consideration of all agencies concerned therein.”

The Joint Report recognized that no such over-all approach and study could be made by the two Commissions separately, particularly in view of the slight appropriations then available to each. Hence, the Report recommended that the two Commissions should be united in a single bi-State Commission, with a minimum bi-State appropriation of at least \$100,000. The Report clearly and expressly stated that this comparatively small sum, standing alone, would be grossly inadequate for the purposes stated in the Joint Report's recommendations, but it might reasonably be expected to produce useful initial accomplishments if “supplemented by the active assistance and cooperation of the other organizations mentioned.”

Both these recommendations in the Joint Report were thereupon enacted into law by the Legislatures of New York and New Jersey. Thereby the present bi-State agency, the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission, came into being on June 14th last, with an appropriation of \$50,000 by each State.

THE PRESENT EMERGENCY ACCENTUATES THE PROBLEM

Transit in the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area is on the brink of catastrophe.

Congestions have become strangulations. The economic losses are authoritatively estimated at over a billion dollars a year in New York City and may well pass a figure of two billion dollars annually in the entire Metropolitan Area.

The Port Authority has lately reported that more than a million tons of general cargo (which has been this Port's specialty) and more than a hundred thousand tons of bulk cargo (grains, fuels and ores) were diverted to rival ports in the first six months of 1954. The

opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway, estimated to float 50,000,000 tons of freight a year, will vastly increase this diversion unless we now comprehensively plan to set our own house in order and to preserve this Port's preeminence.

The crisis is also continually being deepened by the little-realized but tremendous fact that, although since 1930, billions of public dollars have been spent and are still being spent in the development of tax-exempt or subsidized highways, bridges and other facilities for vehicular traffic, no public funds whatever have been spent during the same period in promoting or improving traffic flow or mass transportation by rail between the New York and New Jersey halves of the Metropolitan Area. One very grave consequence has been the creation of a stupendous cycle of traffic congestion in the streets, constantly calling for still further enormous expenditure of public funds for still further vehicular traffic.

To make the outlook more serious, at the present rate of growth, the population of the Area, now at 15,000,000, will, it is estimated, be 19,000,000 by 1975; and the portions of the Area which are still suburban or semi-suburban will, by 1975, have reached saturation and new outer suburbs will be forming.

Such massive expansion will entail billions of dollars in new public and private investment, employment and values; but, if this growth is to serve the public interest, it will require very much more bold imagination and farsighted coordination and planning than has ever been displayed in the past.

The extent to which the emergency is developing is highlighted by the following recent events:

(1) On November 12, 1953, the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission for permission to abandon its ferry service operating from the Hoboken Terminal to Christopher Street, Manhattan. The Interstate Commerce Commission granted such permission in an Order dated November 10, 1954 and on February 2, 1955 set the date for discontinuance of the ferry service as March 15, 1955.

(2) On December 14, 1954, the New York Central Railroad petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission for permission to abandon its ferry services between the Weehawken Terminal and both

42nd Street and Cortlandt Street, Manhattan. The railroad has also petitioned the Public Utilities Commission of the State of New Jersey and the Public Service Commission of the State of New York for permission to abandon all passenger service on the West Shore Division between Albany and Weehawken and on the Putnam Division between Sedgwick Avenue (Bronx) and Brewster, New York.

(3) The Hudson and Manhattan Railroad was recently placed in the hands of a Trustee for reorganization under Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Laws.

(4) The requests to the Interstate Commerce Commission for discontinuance of services, mentioned above, may be considered to be forerunners of similar requests by other railroads. On November 18, 1954, Chairman Mitchell of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in an Address, decried the efforts of local communities to force railroads to continue operation of unprofitable branch lines. The Interstate Commerce Commission Examiner in the Christopher Street Ferry case, in his Report to the Commission, recommending the granting of the requested permission, stated that—

“Heretofore, the (Interstate) Commission has held that it is contrary to the purposes of abandonment provisions and inconsistent with the purpose of the Act as a whole to require drains upon revenue of an interstate carrier flowing from operation of an unprofitable and unnecessary branch merely because system operations as a whole are profitable. Losses from such operation (in this case the ferry) are inevitably a burden on interstate commerce, whether at the particular time the system as a whole is profitable or unprofitable. * * * The Commission also has urged the carriers to abandon unprofitable train service as a means of ameliorating the huge passenger service deficits. This is exactly what the applicants are attempting to do by abandoning the Christopher Street ferry.”

(5) On January 17, 1955, the Port of New York Authority and the Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority released a Report on the Joint Study of Arterial Facilities in the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area.

This Report recognized the traffic problem within New York City by stating:

“The rapidly growing residential, business and industrial communities in the Northern New Jersey counties, Long Island and Westchester must have convenient arterial highway communications with each other and with the Boroughs of New York City. At the same time, it is imperative that trans-metropolitan vehicular traffic be served by trans-Hudson, Upper New York Bay and East River facilities that will permit this through traffic to move north and south of Manhattan’s congested area, or be carried across the island by way of express routes.”

The study was conducted in recognition of these facts and the findings of the study led to a recommendation to construct:

- (a) A Bridge across the Narrows, joining Staten Island and Brooklyn.
- (b) A lower deck on the George Washington Bridge.
- (c) A new Bridge across the East River between Throggs Neck in the Bronx and Cryders Point in Queens.

These arterial facilities and improvements of the approaches thereto were estimated to cost \$379,000,000, with connecting highways built with other funds estimated to cost \$198,000,000.

In addition, the Report suggested that in the near future it would probably be necessary to construct a fourth major crossing of the Hudson River for vehicular traffic. The Report re-studied the plans for Crosstown Expressways in Manhattan at 30th Street and at Canal Street but did not recommend that the two Authorities concerned should construct them, as they could not be financed on any self-supporting basis.

The Report anticipates that the recommended by-pass routes will divert a maximum of 56% of the present weekday and 70% of the weekend trans-Hudson traffic away from lower Manhattan. However, this will have only a small effect on Manhattan traffic congestion since, to quote from the Report—

“ * * * It is not to be assumed, however, that trans-Hudson traffic is of any controlling magnitude in Manhattan’s street congestion. Surveys made periodically by the Regional Plan Association have found that traffic crossing the Hudson River in the course of a day represents no more than about 10 per cent of the motor vehicles entering Manhattan south of 59th

Street. During weekday peak hours the proportions are approximately the same.”

The continuing expansions of the highway system and the system of bridges and tunnels leading toward Manhattan from all directions, constructed at enormous cost, will, in all probability, tend to generate additional traffic to further choke the streets of Manhattan. In fact, the third tube of the Lincoln Tunnel, which is still in the early stages of construction, is, as stated by the Port Authority, already out of date and will be taxed to its peak capacity from the time it is opened to traffic. It was originally planned to have both lanes of this tunnel carry traffic towards New York in the morning and towards New Jersey in the evening in the peak periods, but it is now felt by the Port Authority that it must be operated as a two-way crossing at all times due to the constant increase of the New York-New Jersey traffic.

The \$577,000,000 program recommended in the Port Authority-Triborough study must not be considered as making a mass transit solution unnecessary. To quote from the Report itself—

“The program of Hudson River crossing facilities proposed in this Report is not to be considered as in any way a substitute for a program of improving rail passenger facilities between New Jersey and Manhattan. One program is not an alternative for the other.”

This program of the Port Authority-Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority thus raises the fundamental question of public policy whether any further crossings of the Hudson River should be constructed until it is determined whether future crossings should be designed to encourage rail or vehicular traffic.

The necessity is greater than ever for the study and planning which this Commission was established to make.

MASS TRANSPORTATION ESSENTIAL

The underlying condition of the future of this vast Metropolitan Area and of this great Port, for better or for worse, is *mass transportation*.

An adequate, modernized and scientific transportation system, planned to invigorate the present and the future, is as essential to

the whole Metropolitan organism as is the circulation of the blood to the whole human body.

This system must be so conceived that the various means of mass transportation (rail transit, bus and helicopter) be so coordinated that their services will be complementary rather than competitive and that each medium will make the maximum contribution to the public convenience and necessity. It must be so conceived that maximum use will be made of the facilities existing or to be provided to result in the most efficient operation and maximum revenues. This might contemplate the handling of mail, express and merchandise as well as passengers on rail facilities to be provided and consolidation of present rail terminals and other facilities.

Since such large scale transportation is utilized to capacity during only a few peak hours of the day, we deem it an essential characteristic of such mass transportation in the New York Metropolitan area that its costly rights-of-way be utilized for the carrying of mail, express and merchandise to as great an extent as is feasible and will in no way interfere with expeditious, comfortable and safe transportation of passengers.

In commenting on a proposal for handling freight on a new line into Manhattan, and regarding the consolidation of railroad terminal facilities, the New Jersey Regional Planning Commission, in their Report dated January 14, 1952, stated—

“ * * * the New Jersey railroads are bringing all of their freight into New York on lighters at a very high cost. It has often been stated that this cost alone, per ton, was as great as bringing a ton of freight from Pittsburgh to the New York waterfront.

“Under the plan for bringing these railroads into a Union Passenger Terminal in mid-Manhattan, provision was made, therefore, to bring freight into Manhattan through the tunnels provided, during off-rush hours. * * * In addition to that, the railroads would make other substantial operating savings.

“Much other tonnage (resulting in added revenues) could be brought in, and distributed north and south in Manhattan, over the New York Central West Side tracks, and without using city streets. Freight could be brought into New York without regard to weather. The Hudson River would be relieved of much of its cross-current freight traffic from which other shipping would benefit, the City of New York would be relieved

of much of its north and south trucking from downtown waterfront freight terminals. In other words, all concerned would greatly benefit.

“Consolidation.

“While it may not be possible for the railroads to give up all of their extensive and costly waterfront facilities used in the Manhattan freight service, the question of consolidation and unification of all services and facilities should be given serious consideration, as less of these facilities would be required, and considerable savings could be made. If this whole problem is treated objectively, and in a coordinated and consolidated manner, the chances of economic success are much enhanced.”

That Report further comments:

“* * * We are convinced that this whole problem must be reviewed in its broadest possible aspect, objectively treated, with consolidation of facilities where that is possible, and it must be solved on a regional, instead of a sectional basis. By building also joint, or consolidated facilities in Manhattan, and for certain sections or facilities in New Jersey, mass use can then be made of these mass transportation arteries and this will produce the most economical operation and help to make this undertaking as nearly self-liquidating as is possible.”

Obviously, no single panacea is ready at hand. No small plans will work.

A new and over-all approach must be had; and it must be wholeheartedly pursued, adequately financed, and on an Area-wide scale.

The essential requirements for such a new and over-all approach are five:

- (1) A comprehensive study by the best available, wholly neutral and non-political engineering and scientific organization.
- (2) A resultant comprehensive plan, not only for the present, but for the next twenty-five years at least.
- (3) Adequate funds to ensure the thoroughness, effectiveness and comprehensiveness of such over-all study and plan.
- (4) Wholehearted public and governmental support and co-operation.
- (5) The courage to be as big as the problem and the need.

About such a new and over-all approach there is nothing startling, except the common sense of it and the fact that it has never been undertaken.

Nor is there about it anything unrealistic or impractical or necessarily violative of private enterprise. At this very minute such a study is in full progress in the somewhat similar San Francisco Bay Area, where the State of California and the nine Bay Counties have provided \$750,000 and have employed an outstanding engineering firm for a fee of approximately \$650,000 to submit a comprehensive, scientific transit plan for the whole Area by the summer of 1955.

If the San Francisco Bay Area and the State of California can be thus bold, can our own Metropolitan Area and the States of New York and New Jersey remain untaught or uninspired by the example?

Doubtless, the cost of such study and planning for our Area would approximate \$800,000. But that sum is trifling in comparison with the staggering losses to our Area in the present and future for lack of just such study and planning.

In 1927 the Holland Tunnel, in 1931 the George Washington Bridge, and in 1937 the Lincoln Tunnel were opened exclusively for vehicular traffic. Commenting on the resulting deterioration of rail service the Regional Plan Association, in its Bulletin 77, dated July, 1951, said:

“An objective study is needed to appraise the present policy of allowing the railroad systems to remain static, while concentrating investment in vehicular traffic arteries leading into Manhattan.

“* * * From such a study should come recommendations as to the balanced development of both rail and motor transportation to meet the needs of the region.”

In the 1951 Report of the New York Chamber of Commerce, it was summarized in words even more cogent in 1955:

“This shift from the rails to the highways for commutation has had far-reaching effects.

“It has aggravated the already difficult financial plights of the commuter railroads which have been faced with steadily rising costs, not fully compensated for by rate increases. In the case of many roads, an actual decline in passengers, has led to steady elimination by the carriers of a growing number of unprofitable lines and runs, and to recurring requests for

increased fares. As a result, ever more passengers have been forced to depend on highway facilities, which, in turn, further decreases rail patronage with resultant increased commuter railroad operational losses.

“Insofar as highway facilities are concerned, this shift from rails has contributed greatly to highway congestion, making necessary the construction of additional high-cost road, bridge and tunnel facilities which, in turn, are soon overtaxed and require the planning of still more expensive facilities.

“For New York City, the center of the Area, the tremendous increase in the use of autos and buses has created an almost insoluble traffic and parking problem that is exerting a most damaging effect on the life of the City. * * *

“Clearly, the present trend cannot be allowed to continue. The growing imbalance in commuting passenger transportation, if not corrected, can only lead to ever greater difficulties, which will result in growing social and economic losses for the entire Metropolitan Area.”

A similar appraisal of the consequences of the resultant shift from rail to rubber was set forth by the New Jersey Regional Planning Commission in its Report of January 14, 1952.

Moreover, as we project into the future both the crisis and its causes as thus described, we confront a second and equally overshadowing and critical fact, namely, that presently all prominently announced traffic proposals for the Metropolitan Area, however worthy in themselves, are for the further expenditure of many hundreds of millions of dollars of public funds in the further creation of tax-exempt arteries for the very motorized traffic which is creating the very spiral of congestion which, in turn, creates new call for still further enormous expenditure of public funds.

CIVIL DEFENSE

Prominent in the factors creating an immediate need for over-all planning is the urgent factor of Civil Defense.

Under the “new concept of civilian defense” referred to in President Eisenhower’s budget message of January 21, 1954, plans are under way for “dispersal” of population in populous centers and for hastily transporting peak numbers of passengers to safe places as soon as any danger may seem imminent.

In the event of atomic warfare, the Metropolitan Area would be a prime target for enemy attack. Under present traffic conditions

any expeditious evacuation of the central regions, particularly Manhattan, would be impossible. The congested vehicular traffic would paralyze not only itself but even pedestrian movement. By far the greatest catastrophe in human history could well ensue. Great reliance will be placed upon evacuation by rail.

The problem of evacuation across the Hudson could reach staggering proportions with disruption of electric power service by enemy action. With no ventilation facilities the vehicular tunnels would be useless. In such an emergency trains could possibly operate through railroad tunnels with diesel locomotives but there are only two railroads with tunnels from Manhattan to New Jersey.

In such a situation the present railroad ferries would be invaluable and the Civil Defense officials must be made aware of the importance of maintaining such ferry service even if it should lead to assistance with federal or state funds.

Activities of the Commission

I. Organization

The Commission came into being on June 14, 1954, when the Governor of New Jersey approved the Act of the Legislature of that State, the New York legislation having been previously approved. The Commission held its first meeting on July 8, 1954, at which meeting it—

(a) Elected the following officers:

Charles H. Tuttle, Chairman
 David Van Alstyne, Jr., Vice Chairman
 John F. Kraus, Secretary
 Allen S. Hubbard, Treasurer

(b) Adopted the By-Laws of the Commission

(c) Established the office of the Commission in Suite 2040 at 15 Broad Street, New York 5, New York.

Effective October 15, 1954, the Commission employed as Executive Director, Mr. Frank H. Simon, an expert with long and varied experience in rapid transit and suburban railroading in the New York

Area, for the purpose of arranging and directing the studies to be made for the Commission and to conduct the routine business of the Commission.

II. Negotiations with Other Agencies

During the first discussions of the Commission, it was decided that nothing short of the comprehensive study resulting in an overall coordinated plan, as recommended in the Joint Report of March 3, 1954, could be considered. It was also realized that the funds available to the Commission (\$100,000) were totally inadequate and that help from other agencies would be necessary.

In fact, the necessity for such assistance was anticipated in the Joint Report of March 3, 1954, which stated (p. 24):

“Although such sum (\$100,000) would, if standing alone, be grossly inadequate for the purposes above stated, nevertheless if it is supplemented by the active assistance and cooperation of the other organizations mentioned, useful accomplishments may reasonably be expected.”

The logical places to seek such assistance are the railroads which have a large stake in the solution of this problem and the organizations of business interests having a stake in the continued prosperity of the community, namely the State Chambers of Commerce, the Real Estate Boards, etc.

During the Fall of 1954, the Commission held separate meetings with groups of top executives representing—

- (a) Railroads terminating in New Jersey.
- (b) Railroads terminating in Manhattan.
- (c) The New York and New Jersey Business Organizations.

The Commission asked each of these groups to organize themselves to assist the Commission, to develop plans they could recommend for studies and to offer any other assistance they saw fit.

The railroads replied to the Commission's request with an informal Memorandum, attached hereto as Appendix A. They defined their basic position as follows:

“The railroads feel obligated to emphasize to the Commission that, meritorious as the matter of improved rail trans-

portation to Manhattan may be, it is not a separate project, but to the contrary it is but a segment of the whole problem of commutation and suburban transportation service. Great sums of money are being lost by the railroads on suburban service in the Metropolitan Area. A way must be found to permit the railroads involved the opportunity of meeting their expenses and their liabilities. Continuing financial stability is basic to the continuity of transportation, let alone the important aspect of improved service to the public. If earnings cannot be supplied in realistic amount for present and future traffic as appears to be the fact, the public must face the responsibility for supplementing earnings, probably by the obvious mechanism of substantial tax relief, but as a corollary, with some reasonable freedom to the carriers for control of pricing and schedules."

As to plan, they stated that the construction of a single Manhattan Station for all New Jersey railroads is "impracticable" and would provide no "lasting contribution toward improved service to the public", but that:

"If the Commission feels that it is advisable to recommend partial measures designed to improve the existing situation for the immediate future and not inconsistent with the probable results of a study for the integration of metropolitan transit, it is believed that the Commission is justified in instituting a detailed cost, economic and public interest study for the construction of a double-track loop railroad, connecting the New Jersey Railroads and bus lines on the west side of the Hudson, with the route crossing the river in two places and becoming in Manhattan a north and south route, distributing passengers to its more important working areas. Such a plan, while requiring the transfer of passengers on the Jersey side, could presumably be designed to avoid substantial changes in train service and motive power, and perhaps only limited changes in the terminals of the New Jersey Railroads. The expense of the project could thus be limited to that of a double-track railroad, perhaps 25 miles in length, either elevated or on the surface, or below ground, as detailed engineering studies might prove to be the more feasible."

Under date of December 17, 1954, the Chairman of this Commission sent a letter to the President of each of the railroads involved, requesting that the railroads supply to the Commission information as to whether a study had been made of the costs of construction and

operation of such a loop system, and of anticipated revenues therefrom; and, if not, what estimates and technical supporting data could be supplied. As of the time this Report went to press, no such information has been furnished.

As to the financial assistance to the Commission for the conduct of studies by the Commission, the conferences were barren of results.

The business organizations have, in their turn, undertaken to consider the establishment of an organization which could make available to the Commission their respective technical and statistical studies and to support the Commission in its effort to establish an adequate and comprehensive approach to the whole bi-State problem on a long-range basis.

The Commission was informed by letter dated January 25, 1955 that the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York and the Charter of Commerce of the State of New Jersey have appointed a joint liaison Committee for the purpose outlined above.

The Commission has also been in contact with the Governors of the two States, members of their staffs, members of the Legislatures, Regulatory Bodies and officials of Counties and Municipalities and groups of Municipalities.

All of the business organizations have expressed wholehearted support of the aims of the Commission and some have adopted Resolutions to that effect.

III. Scope of Studies by the Commission

After the preliminary discussions with other agencies produced only the results described above, it became necessary for this Commission to determine the scope of the studies to be conducted, to estimate the cost of such studies and to plan for the provision of funds.

As a first step, the Commission investigated what had already been done and what was being done in conducting studies of rapid transit problems and solutions to such problems in other Metropolitan Areas throughout the country. Our survey covered seven (7) of the largest American cities, namely, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and San Francisco, as well as Montreal and Toronto in Canada and London and Paris.

The Commission was impressed by certain patterns which appear in the rapid transit activities in this group of studies. The studies

themselves were all comprehensive in scope and bold in their concept. All of the completed studies recommended either extension of existing rail transit facilities or the establishment of new rail rapid transit systems. In all cases also, these studies considered, in addition to rail rapid transit, transportation by private motor vehicles and by buses. Another pattern emerging from the survey is that rapid transit has become a metropolitan problem rather than a problem local to a particular political sub-division. For instance, in Chicago, the Transit Authority is empowered to operate in all of Cook County and is not limited to the City of Chicago; the Boston Metropolitan Transit Authority operates in fourteen (14) municipalities; on January 1, 1954, the City of Toronto and twelve (12) adjacent municipalities were federated into the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto with jurisdiction over certain common functions, which includes transportation. In other cities, such as San Francisco, Detroit and Montreal, "Metropolitan" as opposed to local systems have been recommended.

In attempting to reach an estimate of the possible cost of comprehensive studies, as conceived by this Commission, the Commission drew on the experience of the San Francisco Bay Area. Although the population of Metropolitan San Francisco is considerably smaller than that of Metropolitan New York, physical conditions are comparable in that many of the residential suburban areas are separated from downtown San Francisco by bodies of water and lie outside of the political limits of the City and County of San Francisco. The study of the rapid transit problems in that area is now being conducted and is expected to be completed in July of this year. The study was financed with \$750,000, the State of California contributing \$400,000, the Bay Area counties outside of San Francisco contributing \$250,000, on the basis of relative population, and the City and County of San Francisco contributing \$100,000. An outstanding firm of nationally known engineers were retained and the fee for the study is contemplated to be \$650,000.

The Commission's review of these studies and its estimates as to the necessary scope of the comprehensive and overall studies required for adequate planning for the movement of passengers and merchandise by means of mass transit in the Metropolitan Area leads to the conclusion that this Commission would require approximately \$800,000.

IV. Commencement of the Commission's Studies

Realizing that the comprehensive and over-all studies necessary could not be progressed to any great extent within the current appropriation of the Commission, but also realizing the importance of commencing the studies without delaying until such time as adequate financing was arranged, the Commission approved commencement of the studies to the extent to which it was financially able, in accordance with an outline of a comprehensive group of studies prepared by the Executive Director.

One of the first of the preliminary studies in the group is the development of estimates of future population of the various areas comprising the Metropolitan Area to cover the next twenty (20) years. The Regional Plan Association of New York, which has had vast experience in this type of work, was retained to make this portion of the study, and its report was submitted to this Commission on January 31, 1955. A summary of the report is attached as Appendix B.

Another of the necessary preliminary studies, that leading to estimates of local employment opportunities in the various counties comprising the Metropolitan Area for the next twenty (20) years, was commenced by the Commission's staff itself. At the time of going to press this study has not been completed and the results cannot be summarized herein.

V. Negotiations with the Port of New York Authority

After having negotiated with the railroads and other agencies, as described above, and while planning and commencing the comprehensive studies, the Commission believed that the Port of New York Authority necessarily would have an interest in the part played by rail rapid transit in the movement of passengers in the New York-New Jersey Port District.

Negotiations therefore ensued. The Port of New York Authority, realizing the magnitude of the task confronting the Commission and being keenly concerned with means of improving the movement of passengers, as well as freight, within the Port District, approved on January 13, 1955, an Agreement between this Commission and the Port of New York Authority in which the Port of New York Authority will finance a large part of the expense of a comprehensive study of

all phases of the inter-State rail problem in the Area; such studies to be made for the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission for its review and policy recommendations and to be made available to the Port of New York Authority for use in its planning for development of projects within its scope and jurisdiction.

The "Memorandum of Understanding" agreed upon by the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and the Port of New York Authority and the "Specifications" for the studies to be conducted under that Agreement are included in this Report as Appendix C.

As this report is going to press the Commission is addressing itself to the employment of the necessary technical leadership and management in the conduct of the studies contemplated by the "Memorandum of Understanding".

In the "Memorandum of Understanding", it is distinctly stated:

(1) "It is intended that the studies be made for the **Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission.**"

(2) It is intended that the studies will result in "a complete factual report to be presented to the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission for its review and policy recommendations."

(3) It is intended that the studies are to be made by consultants "of such established integrity and reputation that their conclusions will be definitive and will commend themselves to public acceptance" and who "will be engaged, and their assignments clearly outlined, on the basis of mutual agreement between the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and the Port of New York Authority."

(4) It is intended that these studies will cover the extremely comprehensive and detailed factors set forth in the "Specifications", and will anticipate "a recommendation of a comprehensive system of rail rapid transit designed to serve Northern New Jersey and Manhattan for at least the next 20 years", "or such other recommendations for the solution of the New Jersey-New York rapid transit problem as the consultants may consider sound and practicable."

The "Memorandum of Understanding" does not exclude our Commission from making, at our own expense, any additional studies in connection with any phase of transit necessary in the Metropolitan Area which we may desire to make. Nor does it limit our Commission as to any study which it may wish or feel bound to make of

any other transit needs or in other areas, such as Westchester, Long Island, Staten Island and Northern New Jersey, or the unification thereof with any rapid transit system anywhere else in the area. As correctly stated in the editorial in the New York Times of January 4, 1955, concerning the announcement of the "Memorandum of Understanding" and the provision by the Port Authority of an estimated \$500,000 for the purpose:

"The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission can carry on from there with its recommendations of policy."

Other Problems of the Commission

Additional Studies

The studies to be conducted under the Agreement with the Port Authority concern themselves with the transit problems between Northern New Jersey and Manhattan Island. Still to be arranged are studies of the transit problems between Westchester and Manhattan, between Long Island and Manhattan, between Staten Island and Manhattan, intra-State transit in New Jersey, local transit in Westchester, Long Island and Staten Island and the integration of transit in all these sectors into one comprehensive adequate system.

The New Jersey Department of Conservation and Economic Development, in its Report dated February 10, 1951, defined the type of over-all project required to meet the needs of New Jersey commuters as follows:

"1. A way must be found to bring our people into the City of New York on rails, in a direct manner, and with a minimum of transfer.

"2. An adequate, and effective means of distribution of our people within the City of New York, particularly in mid-Manhattan and down to the Battery, must be found.

"3. A means of better intrastate communication must be devised, so that people from northeastern New Jersey may be able to go to Newark without first having to go to New York, and then back again to New Jersey, with attendant loss of time.

"4. A fast railroad link must be provided between the Airport at Newark, or the future Bergen Airport, and mid-

Manhattan, where a very large percentage of the air travelers are going.

"5. A way must also be found for solving this problem in a manner that would not only serve the people in New Jersey opposite Manhattan, as has so often been done, but also the people from the Newark region and points south on the Central Railroad of New Jersey.

"That, briefly, is the problem facing New Jersey.

"An effort should be made to bring about a completely coordinated system of metropolitan transportation that will serve all regions, and which, because of its inter-relation may be established at less cost, and with a greater chance of financial success, than if it were tackled so as to serve only a portion of this area.

"We have had proof on innumerable occasions that when attempts were made to solve any of these problems separately, it was shown that the expense would be too great for the results obtained and that any such makeshift project never could solve our far greater over-all problem.

" * * * When we speak of a coordinated system of transportation, we mean a system so devised as to have the railroads handle that traffic which they are best able to handle, and that the buses be given territories to serve as can not properly be served by the railroads, particularly outlying regions and to serve as feeders for the railroads. Once such an over-all goal has been set as a fixed policy of procedure, the solution will be relatively simple."

In the case of the Westchester-Fairfield County and Long Island sectors of the Metropolitan Area, through-train service to mid-Manhattan exists, but there are indications that such may not always be the case. The present management of the New Haven Railroad has announced that it is studying the possibility of building a large New York Terminal in Westchester County, which, if accomplished, would lead, no doubt, to a reduction of service into Grand Central Terminal. The New York Central Railroad has indicated its intention of petitioning for permission to discontinue service on its Putnam Division and is seriously concerned with the cost of continued operations of Grand Central Terminal. If these two Railroads or either of them should eventually give up the line into Grand Central Terminal, a very serious transit and traffic problem for the entire Area and for Westchester in particular would assume proportions scarcely capable of exaggeration.

Although Long Island is served by a comprehensive commuter railroad system, the Long Island Railroad is operated at about full capacity of the "bottlenecks" on the Railroad, namely Jamaica Station and the East River Tunnels, and the continued large increase in the population of Nassau County and Suffolk County could soon create a mass transportation problem on the island. Studies to meet such a problem are required.

Staten Island has a large area available for residential development but its population has remained small and its character has remained essentially rural due to the fact that it has inadequate means of transportation to the center of the City and has very limited local transportation by rail. With large areas suitable for residential development disappearing rapidly in the Metropolitan Area, consideration must be given now to planning transit for Staten Island to open up that area for development.

In addition to the local problems outlined above, there remains the problem of transportation between the various sections of the Metropolitan Area. It is impossible at this time, for instance, to travel by mass transportation means between New Jersey and Long Island, between New Jersey and Westchester County or between Long Island and Westchester County without one or more transfers. With the rapid development of outlying centers, the demand for such transportation is increasing, and the mass transportation problem has become one that requires a regional solution. Studies must be conducted to coordinate the mass transportation systems of all sections into one comprehensive system.

In considering these problems, several ideas have been presented to this Commission for consideration, such as—

1. Extension of the Long Island Railroad into New Jersey either from Pennsylvania Station or from the Flatbush Avenue Terminal in Brooklyn.

2. The integration of certain lines of the Long Island Railroad, such as the Port Washington Branch, into the New York City Transit System to allow expansion of service on other branches of the railroad.

3. Expansion of the plans for the 2nd Avenue Subway to include extensions to provide service into Westchester County.

4. A new rapid transit line on the West Side of Manhattan reaching into Westchester County and connecting with rapid transit lines which may be projected across the George Washington Bridge or which may be developed at other Hudson River crossings in accordance with the studies now being commenced. Such a line might utilize a portion of the right-of-way of the New York Central Railroad; it might be placed on a second level of the West Side Highway, or it might be built as an elevated structure between such Avenues as 9th and 10th Avenues where the existing buildings are all of comparatively low value.

5. Transit use might be found for the Harlem River Line of the New Haven Railroad from New Rochelle and the Hell Gate Bridge route to give access to Long Island City, Pennsylvania Station or points in Brooklyn.

6. Extension of the Newark City Subway from its present terminus to, perhaps, Paterson with eventual extension east to Hackensack or Englewood and south on Broad St. and other streets to Elizabeth or Irvington. This line might become the nucleus of a New Jersey belt transit line.

In this discussion, the Commission makes no attempt to indicate that any of the ideas described above are either physically or economically feasible. They are mentioned here to point out that studies to determine such feasibility must be made.

If the studies referred to in this Section were conducted concurrently by the same consultants employed to perform the studies under the Agreement, much duplication of effort could be avoided and there could be large savings in cost. It is estimated that by using this method, the additional studies could be made for approximately \$300,000.

Interim Matters for Consideration and Action

The legislation establishing this Commission charged it with the responsibility of studying present rapid transit needs as well as prospective rapid transit needs, and this Commission recognizes that there exist certain immediate railroad passenger service problems, some of which were outlined in the Introduction of this Report, which must receive immediate study on which the Commission can base

recommendations for meeting such problems, with the aim of maintaining and improving service pending, or possibly in lieu of, more comprehensive solutions.

Although detailed studies of these immediate problems are contemplated in the Agreement with the Port of New York Authority, there is still a great deal of work that the Commission can do on this subject outside of the scope of the Agreement, and the Commission is making every effort in this direction.

Aims of the Commission

In addition to the conduct of the studies described in this Report, the Commission has the following aims and objectives:

(1) This Commission intends to give active and strong consideration to mass transportation by rail.

The Joint Report of March 3, 1954 discussed in some detail the decline in the use of railroads with the resultant deterioration of service and aggravation of the difficult financial plight of the commuter railroads, leading to the requested discontinuances of service and, in some cases, bankruptcy, which were outlined above. This trend cannot be allowed to continue; solutions must be found.

The growth and stability of the value of realty in the central portions of New York City and the large suburban settlements in all sections of the Metropolitan Area were created by rail transportation and depend on rail transportation for maintenance now and in the future. Examples of the development of real estate values caused by rail transportation may be found in the following areas:

(a) The Wall Street District, which was served originally by railroad ferries, later by elevated lines and finally by an extremely comprehensive network of subways.

(b) The 14th Street shopping district which is served by the 14th Street Crosstown subway in addition to the trunk-line subways.

(c) The Herald Square District which is served primarily by the Pennsylvania and Long Island Railroads into Pennsylvania Station and the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad, in addition to subways.

(d) The Grand Central District which is served by the New York Central and New Haven Railroads, and the Flushing and Astoria rapid transit lines in addition to the North-South subways.

Other examples of great growth due to rapid transit may be found along the Grand Concourse in The Bronx and Queens Boulevard, although these developments have been residential rather than commercial. Most of the growth in Westchester County, Long Island and in New Jersey has been along the routes of railroads. In contrast, Staten Island, which has no direct rail connection with the rest of New York City, is comparatively rural in character.

(2) This Commission will continue to take steps to study existing urgent problems concerning commuter transportation by rail and also to study interim action wherever deemed desirable and feasible.

The first group of studies arranged by this Commission, which is described in this Report, the Specifications for which are attached to this Report as Appendix C, include "a study of existing immediate railroad passenger service problems and possible methods of meeting them in order to maintain an improved service pending, or possibly in lieu of, more comprehensive solutions."

On January 31, 1955, a Committee of this Commission acted as friendly host at a meeting of representatives of the New York Central System and a Steering Committee of the organization of Mayors of municipalities along the route of the West Shore Division of the New York Central between Weehawken, New Jersey and West Haverstraw, New York.

The purpose of the meeting was to explore whether there were any methods whereby a compromise could be reached to effect continuance of passenger service on the West Shore Division rather than have a limited choice between bankruptcy and complete abandonment of passenger service.

Present at the meeting were—

Representing the New York Central System

Mr. E. C. Nickerson
Vice President, Passenger Services

Mr. W. R. Main
Director, Passenger Services Economics

Mr. John S. Gallagher, Jr.
Manager, Passenger Traffic Research

Mr. A. F. Coon
Research Engineer

Representing the Mayors' Committee

Hon. T. J. Brown
Deputy Mayor of Teaneck

Hon. E. Merrill Seaberg
Member of the Board of Freeholders and Chairman of the
Transit Committee of Bergen County

Hon. Joseph J. Hishon
Mayor of Dumont

Hon. Charles F. Krause, Jr.
Mayor of Weehawken

In presenting their viewpoint, the representatives of the railroads stated that out-of-pocket losses amounted to approximately \$1,700,000 in the operation of train service and approximately \$1,200,000 in the operation of ferry service. They also cited the continuing decline of passenger traffic on the West Shore Division, in spite of the tremendous growth in the population of the area served, and gave as reasons therefor the vast sums of money spent on improving facilities for use by their competitors, namely, the buses and private automobiles; the growth of employment opportunities in Bergen County, which percentage-wise was greater than the growth of population; and certain sociological changes, such as the shorter work week, development of local shopping and entertainment centers, and the extension of television entertainment. It was their firm position

that no privately-owned corporation could continue to absorb such losses.

In presenting their viewpoint, the representatives of the Mayors expressed their interest in seeing that railroad service was maintained and asserted that suspension of the service would cause widespread deterioration of property values and would place such extra burden on the highways as to seriously inconvenience all residents of their municipalities. They indicated that they will oppose suspension of this service through every available means. It was further pointed out that consideration of civil defense of the area required that the ferries be kept in operation, as disruption of transportation via bridges and tunnels through enemy action would leave the ferries as the only means for mass communication between New York City and the area West of the Hudson River.

It also was suggested that consideration be given to the acquisition of the railroad ferries by a bi-State Authority to relieve the railroads of the large operating losses.

- (3) This Commission intends to do everything in its power to plan now for expediting the formation of a comprehensive transportation scheme for the Metropolitan Area which may result from the Commission's studies.**

This Commission will confer with the governmental agencies of both States responsible for the design and construction of expressways, parkways, turnpikes and other such grade-separated highways, for the purpose of arranging that the future planning and construction of such roads make provision for future rapid transit lines, as is being done in other Metropolitan Areas. Thus, at a small present cost, provision can be made for the future savings of large sums for acquisition of rights-of-way for transit purposes.

The construction of subways is said to be so expensive as to make the cost of providing a system of underground rail rapid transit reach extremely high levels. A less expensive method may well be to make full use of existing railroad lines now used for commuter services. Also, the least expensive source of right-of-way for rapid transit is the center mall of a grade-separated highway, when included in the original design. It has been estimated that rail rapid transit rights-of-way, so provided, can be obtained at a cost on the order of 10% of the cost of subway construction. It is of utmost

importance that any grade-separated express highway projected in the Metropolitan Area be thoroughly studied from the viewpoint of future rapid transit needs and that provisions be made for transit if the studies so indicate.

Without advocating the suspension of any construction presently in physical progress, we do strongly recommend that *every projected* grade-separated highway should provide center mall rights-of-way for transit now. There will be no waste if rapid transit does not prove feasible, as the center mall can then be used to increase automotive capacity of the highways, and experience has shown that such highways soon become saturated and additional capacity is required.

An example of this is the New Jersey Turnpike which carried 18,239,527 vehicles in 1952 and in 1954 carried 24,705,851 vehicles, a traffic level not anticipated until 1981. This increase in traffic is causing the Authority to widen the Turnpike from 4 to 6 lanes between interchanges #4 and #11, a distance of 56 miles, and between interchanges #16 and #18, a distance of 5 miles.

In Chicago, the Congress Street Superhighway is being constructed to embody this idea. The median strip for the first five miles is wide enough for a 4-track rapid transit line; for the next five miles it is wide enough for a 2-track line. The Chicago Transit Authority cannot yet see its way clear to construct the rapid transit line, but the opportunity to provide rights-of-way was not neglected.

The same philosophy was expressed in the rapid transit and expressway plans for Detroit, and it was estimated that a median strip designed for rapid transit would add only 9% to the cost of the expressways.

A long term expressway plan, prepared in 1944 by the Express Highway Committee of the Regional Association of Cleveland, recommended this scheme and it has since been proposed for the Cedar Expressway in Cleveland.

A similar scheme has also been proposed for Los Angeles.

On the same theory discussed above, the Commission also intends to favor provision for future rail rapid transit in plans for all such crossings as the lower deck of the George Washington Bridge, the proposed Narrows Bridge and the proposed Throggs Neck Bridge.

As to the George Washington Bridge, the Report on Joint Study of Arterial Facilities in the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area,

issued by the Port of New York Authority and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority on January 17, 1955, states:

“In the opinion of the Port Authority, the public interest requires that the George Washington Bridge be able to accommodate rail rapid transit at any future time. It is solely because of this look to the future that the second deck of the Bridge will be designed to permit conversion of two vehicular lanes to rapid transit use. Rail rapid transit across the Hudson does not appear to be in immediate prospect.

“The New York City Transit Authority has indicated that the Eighth Avenue Subway at present is operating at its full train capacity so that a direct track interchange between a Bergen County rapid transit line and the City subway system would not be feasible. In addition, many complications would arise from the mingling of different types of rolling stock as well as the collection of fares.”

Although, as stated in the above quotation, it would not be feasible to unite physically for through-traffic a bridge rapid transit system with the 8th Avenue subway line, some other plans for bringing such a system into midtown Manhattan present themselves for consideration, such as a connection with the West Side line of the New York Central Railroad, or carrying the line across Manhattan in the vicinity of 178th Street and along the Harlem River to a connection with the future 2nd Avenue Trunk Line Subway.

The same Report eliminated consideration of rapid transit facilities on the Narrows Bridge because “According to the New York City Transit Authority, the existing Fourth Avenue Subway line in Brooklyn is now operating at capacity, both as to its ability to handle new equipment and additional passengers on the available cars. A Narrows Bridge subway link would therefore require the construction of an entirely new North-South subway line running through Brooklyn. In addition it would be necessary to augment the East River Tubes which already constitute a ‘Bottleneck’ for Brooklyn-Manhattan subway transport.”

The 1st Annual Report of the New York City Transit Authority includes information as to “scheduled morning peak hour service (trains and cars)” which indicates that the Fourth Avenue Subway could handle an additional 9 trains or 111 additional cars in the peak hour. The East River crossings could handle an additional 19 trains

or 197 additional cars in the peak hour. Also included in the Report is the Authority's Rapid Transit Construction Program which indicates that the planned elimination of the "bottleneck" at DeKalb Avenue Station will permit the operation of 18 more trains per hour in the Fourth Avenue Subway, tentatively assigned 9 to the Sea Beach Line, 5 to the West End Line and 4 to the Fort Hamilton Line, which could, of course, be changed. Further, the Report indicates a drop in rapid transit passengers on the entire system of 11.14% during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954.

Even if the available capacity described above proved to be insufficient for future needs and a new subway in Brooklyn were required, the advantages to the City of the development of real estate on Staten Island due to provision of rapid transit would make such construction highly desirable.

An alternate route for rapid transit from Staten Island to Manhattan is via the Bayonne Bridge, the Central Railroad of New Jersey tracks which would require electrification, a connection to be constructed to the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad in Jersey City and the Hudson Tubes to Manhattan. This route was proposed for study by the Port of New York Authority in a Report dated March 1, 1937 entitled, "Suburban Transit for Northern New Jersey."

The proposed Narrows Bridge and the Bayonne Bridge present far too important opportunities for the development of mass transportation by some form of rail not to challenge and receive thorough scientific study of their availability for such purpose, either separately or in conjunction, before the final commitment of either to some other method of transportation exclusively.

From the point of view of cost, it must be remembered that these bridges either separately, or if possible in conjunction, have potentials for two major opportunities which may be capable of creating vast economic values to people, business and real estate. These opportunities especially concern the downtown area in Manhattan and the vast rural area of Staten Island. The so-called "uptown" trend in Manhattan and the movement of business and employment to adjoining regions are basically due to the inevitable magnetism between business and convenient residential locations. The consequent threat to investments in the lower areas of Manhattan and to the City's revenues, is very real. As a counter to this threat Staten Island is

at hand. Its opening up by creating convenient mass transportation between it and downtown Manhattan and business concentrations in Brooklyn is a solution which cannot easily be thought supplied by pouring more automobiles into these congested areas. Further beneficial results would be the enormous residential and business development of comparatively rural Staten Island, and the vastly increased revenues therefrom to the City and State.

Hence, scientific study should be given at once to three major questions related to mass transportation by rail:

1. Whether a route via the Bayonne Bridge or a route via the Narrows Bridge would provide the more economical, efficient and time-saving mass transportation system between Staten Island and Manhattan and would be more likely to relieve the present street traffic congestion in the Metropolitan Area and particularly on the streets of Manhattan.

2. What are the possibilities if both routes are considered in conjunction.

3. Which course would be more likely to stimulate the early development of Staten Island and serve the best interests of the business areas in Brooklyn, Manhattan and New Jersey.

We deem it an important part of our investigation to explore each of these questions.

Pending the completion of such studies, any plans for the construction of the Narrows Bridge and for the construction of an additional level on the Bayonne Bridge should make provisions for the possibility of future rail transit across those Bridges.

Appropriations and Expenditures

This Commission has been financed for the fiscal year 1954-1955 with an appropriation of \$50,000 from the State of New York and an appropriation of \$50,000 from the State of New Jersey.

As of February 1, 1955, expenditures for salaries, office rent and other necessary expenditures of the Commission amounted to \$17,-

915.80, and it is estimated that additional expenditures to the end of the fiscal year will amount to \$35,000.

Under the Constitution of New York State, expenditures may be made from an appropriation within two years of the Appropriation Act. Under the Constitution of the State of New Jersey (Article VIII, Section II, Paragraph 2), monies for the support of State purposes shall be provided for in one general appropriation law covering one and the same fiscal year. It will be necessary for each State to reappropriate the unexpended balance as of the end of the 1954-1955 fiscal year, and to appropriate an additional sum sufficient to provide the Commission with \$50,000 from each State for the fiscal year 1955-1956 to cover its necessary administrative expenses anticipated during that year.

As indicated elsewhere in this Report, an additional appropriation of \$150,000 from each State will be necessary for conduct of the studies required.

Recommendations

1. That the Legislature of the State of New York take the necessary legislative action to extend the life of this Temporary Commission.

2. That the States of New York and New Jersey reappropriate for the next fiscal year the unexpended portion of the current appropriations which remain at the end of the fiscal year 1954-1955 and that each State appropriate an additional sum sufficient to make available to the Commission for the fiscal year 1955-1956, the sum of \$50,000 from each State. These funds will be used for carrying out the administrative functions of the Commission, including employment of its required office staff, payment of rent for the Commission's offices, and other necessary expenditures.

3. That the States of New York and New Jersey each appropriate \$150,000 to finance the additional studies required for the completion of the Study Program of the Commission in connection with regions in the Area not included in the Memorandum of Understanding with the Port of New York Authority, in connection with local intrastate transit and in connection with coordinated transit facilities in all regions of the Metropolitan Area.

Proposed legislation to make effective the above recommendations follows immediately after the end of this Report.

Respectfully submitted,

METROPOLITAN RAPID TRANSIT COMMISSION

Commissioners from New York

Commissioners from New Jersey

CHARLES H. TUTTLE
Chairman

DAVID VAN ALSTYNE, JR.,
Vice-Chairman

ALLEN S. HUBBARD, *Treasurer*

JOHN F. KRAUS, *Secretary*

WILLIAM ZECKENDORF

CHARLES F. KRAUSE, JR.

CARL WHITMORE

ALEXANDER H. ELDER

FRANK SCOTT, JR.

Draft of Proposed Acts

STATE OF NEW YORK

AN ACT

To continue the life of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission as a temporary bi-State Commission to study the prospective rapid transit needs of the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area, and to develop and recommend measures for meeting such needs; and making an appropriation therefor.

The People of the State of New York, represented in the Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

WHEREAS the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission was created as a temporary bi-State Commission by Chapter 801 of the laws of 1954 of the State of New York and by Chapter 44 of the laws of 1954 of the State of New Jersey; and

WHEREAS the Commission has submitted a preliminary Report to the Governors and the Legislatures of the States of New York and New Jersey, together with certain recommendations; and

WHEREAS the Report of the Commission states that the Port of New York Authority is providing the sum of \$500,000 for studies by the Commission of means of improving rapid transit services between New Jersey and New York within the Metropolitan Area, but that an additional sum of \$300,000 is required so to extend such studies as to include the improving of rapid transit services within the Metropolitan Area in regions exclusively within New Jersey and exclusively within New York respectively, in coordination with the studies first above-mentioned;

Section 1. The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission as now constituted and empowered by law is continued as a temporary bi-State Commission.

Section 2. The Commission shall continue to study present and prospective rapid transit needs of the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area and develop, recommend and report as soon as possible measures for meeting such needs. The Commission may enter upon public or private property of either State in order to carry out its functions.

Section 3. All agencies of either State, having information, records or data helpful to the Commission, are hereby authorized and directed to render such assistance to the Commission as it may request, within the limits of available staffs and facilities.

Section 4. All railroads and other transportation services operating within either State are requested and authorized to provide the Commission with such technical and operating information and data as the Commission may request, within the limits of staffs and facilities.

Section 5. To cover the administrative expenses of the Commission, there is hereby appropriated and made available to the Commission a sum, which together with the unexpended portion of the Commission's present appropriation remaining at the end of the 1954-1955 fiscal year, will amount to \$50,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, out of any moneys in the state treasury in the general fund to the credit of the state purposes fund not otherwise appropriated. Such moneys shall be payable out of the state treasury on the order and warrant of the comptroller on vouchers certified or approved by the chairman of the Commission or by an officer or employee designated by him.

Section 6. For the purposes of the cost and conduct of the studies by the Commission, there is hereby appropriated and made available to the Commission the sum of \$150,000 or so much thereof as may be necessary, out of any moneys in the state treasury in the general fund to the credit of the state purposes fund not otherwise appropriated. Such moneys shall be payable out of the state treasury on the order and warrant of the comptroller on vouchers certified or approved by the chairman of the Commission or by an officer or employee designated by him. This Section shall take effect immediately upon the enactment into law by the State of New Jersey of an

equal appropriation. The sums appropriated in this Section and in Section 5 hereof shall be over and above the sum of \$500,000 made available to the Commission by the Port of New York Authority as aforesaid.

Section 7. This Act shall take effect immediately.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

AN ACT

To make an appropriation to the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission for the purpose of conducting studies of the prospective rapid transit needs of the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area and to develop and recommend measures for meeting such needs.

The People of the State of New Jersey, represented in the Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

WHEREAS the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission was created as a temporary bi-State Commission by Chapter 801 of the laws of 1954 of the State of New York and by Chapter 44 of the laws of 1954 of the State of New Jersey; and

WHEREAS the Commission has submitted a preliminary Report to the Governors and the Legislatures of the States of New York and New Jersey, together with certain recommendations; and

WHEREAS the Report of the Commission states that the Port of New York Authority is providing the sum of \$500,000 for studies by the Commission of means of improving rapid transit services between New Jersey and New York within the Metropolitan Area, but that an additional sum of \$300,000 is required so to extend such studies as to include the improving of rapid transit services within the Metropolitan Area in regions exclusively within New Jersey and exclusively within New York respectively, in coordination with the studies first above-mentioned;

Section 1. For the purposes of the cost and conduct of the studies by the Commission, there is hereby appropriated and made available to the Commission the sum of \$150,000 or so much thereof as may be necessary, out of any moneys in the state treasury in the general fund to the credit of the state purposes fund not otherwise appropriated. Such moneys shall be payable out of the state treasury on the order and warrant of the comptroller on vouchers certified or approved by the chairman of the Commission or by an officer or employee designated by him. The sums appropriated in this Section shall be over and above the sum of \$500,000 made available to the Commission by the Port of New York Authority as aforesaid.

Section 2. This Act shall take effect immediately upon the enactment into law by the State of New York of an equal appropriation.

APPENDICES

- Appendix A.** Informal comment of the New York-New Jersey Railroads in cooperation with the activities of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission.
- Appendix B.** Summary of Report from Regional Plan Association on estimates of future population.
- Appendix C.** The Port of New York Authority and the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission—Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between the two agencies on studies designed to determine means of improving Interstate Rapid Transit Service between New Jersey and New York.

APPENDIX A**Informal Comment of the New York-New Jersey Railroads
In Cooperation With the Activities of
The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission**

The railroads appreciate the opportunity of conferring with the Commission and expressing their views on major considerations with respect to the metropolitan transit situation.

The railroads feel obligated to emphasize to the Commission that, meritorious as the matter of improved rail transportation to Manhattan may be, it is not a separate project, but to the contrary it is but a segment of the whole problem of commutation and suburban transportation service. Great sums of money are being lost by the railroads on suburban service in the metropolitan area. A way must be found to permit the railroads involved the opportunity of meeting their expenses and their liabilities. Continuing financial stability is basic to the continuity of transportation, let alone the important aspect of improved service to the public. If earnings cannot be supplied in realistic amount for present and future traffic as appears to be the fact, the public must face the responsibility for supplementing earnings, probably by the obvious mechanism of substantial tax relief, but as a corollary, with some reasonable freedom to the carriers for control of pricing and schedules.

The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission for primary reasons of policy and responsibility has the opportunity of choosing between a more permanent solution to the problem, as against the expediency of local improvements in the existing situation. It is the feeling of the railroads that it is highly desirable for the Commission to approach this subject on the basis of the needs of the New York metropolitan area for the next 50 years, giving appropriate consideration to the area's growth potential and the importance of improved transportation to its economic success. From this standpoint there is indicated the desirability for studying an integrated transportation system perhaps replacing, perhaps superimposed upon, perhaps independent of existing transit and extending possibly 30 miles from the heart of Manhattan. The capital investment and operating cost of such a system and methods of financing it can appropriately be studied after the system itself is determined upon.

There are some aspects of the metropolitan transit problem peculiar to the New Jersey-Manhattan situation, and in this connection it is the considered opinion of the New Jersey Railroads that:

1. The construction of a single Manhattan station, to be reached by all of the New Jersey Railroads, and handling commutation as well as other passenger traffic, is impracticable and not desirable from the standpoint of making a genuine and lasting contribution toward improved service to the public.

2. If the Commission feels that it is advisable to recommend partial measures designed to improve the existing situation for the immediate future and not inconsistent with the probable results of a study for the integration of metropolitan transit, it is believed that the Commission is justified in instituting a detailed cost, economic and public interest study for the construction of a double-track loop railroad, connecting the New Jersey Railroads and bus lines on the west side of the Hudson, with the route crossing the river in two places and becoming in Manhattan a north and south route, distributing passengers to its more important working areas. Such a plan, while requiring the transfer of passengers on the Jersey side, could presumably be designed to avoid substantial changes in train service and motive power, and perhaps only limited changes in the terminals of the New Jersey Railroads. The expense of the project could thus be limited to that of a double-track railroad, perhaps 25 miles in length, either elevated or on the surface, or below ground, as detailed engineering studies might prove to be the more feasible.

The railroads emphasize their desire to cooperate with the Transit Commission in every practicable way. The Jersey Railroads would specifically cooperate in studying the plan involved in item 2 above. All of the railroads would cooperate with the Commission if it decides that circumstances permit its recognizing the opportunity to perform the more lasting public service indicated in the third paragraph of this memorandum.

APPENDIX B

Summary of Report from Regional Plan Association, Inc. on Estimates of Future Population

(The Regional Plan Association was retained to provide the 1954 population and estimates of population in 1965 and 1975 of small sections of the five (5) New Jersey Counties closest to Manhattan.

The municipalities in each County were grouped into sections according to logical geographical considerations for the purpose of assisting in future construction of estimates of commuter travel potentials for the next 20 years.

The estimates of population are presented herewith merely as a matter of interest and cannot be used in our Study except in conjunction with various other factors which must be developed through our Studies.)

List of Municipalities Contained in Designated County Sections

County Section	Municipalities
1	BERGEN: Cliffside Park, Edgewater, Englewood, Englewood Cliffs, Fairview, Fort Lee, Leonia, Palisades Park, Ridgefield, Tenafly
2	BERGEN: Alpine, Closter, Cresskill, Demarest, Harrington Park, Haworth, Northvale, Norwood, Old Tappan, Rockleigh
3	BERGEN: Bergenfield, Dumont, Emerson, Hillsdale, Montvale, New Milford, Oradell, Paramus, Park Ridge, River Edge, Rivervale, Washington, Westwood, Woodcliff Lake
4	BERGEN: Bogota, Little Ferry, Ridgefield Park, Teaneck
5	BERGEN: Carlstadt, East Rutherford, Hasbrouck Heights, Lyndhurst, Moonachie, North Arlington, Rutherford, Teterboro, Wallington, Woodridge
6	BERGEN: East Paterson, Garfield, Hackensack, Lodi, Maywood, Rochelle Park, Saddle River Township, South Hackensack

County Section	Municipalities
7	BERGEN: Allendale, Fair Lawn, Franklin Lakes, Glen Rock, Hohokus, Mahwah, Midland Park, Oakland, Ramsey, Ridgewood, Saddle River Borough, Upper Saddle River, Waldwick, Wyckoff
8	HUDSON: Bayonne
9	HUDSON: Jersey City
10	HUDSON: East Newark, Harrison, Kearny
11	HUDSON: Guttenberg, Hoboken, North Bergen, Secaucus, Union City, Weehawken, West New York
12	ESSEX: Irvington, Newark
13	ESSEX: Belleville, Bloomfield, Nutley
14	ESSEX: East Orange, Glen Ridge, Maplewood, Millburn, Montclair, Orange, South Orange, West Orange
15	ESSEX: Caldwell Borough, Caldwell Township, Cedar Grove, Essex Fells, Livingston, North Caldwell, Roseland, Verona, West Caldwell
16	PASSAIC: Clifton, Little Falls, Passaic, West Paterson
17	PASSAIC: Haledon, Hawthorne, North Haledon, Paterson, Prospect Park, Totowa
18	PASSAIC: Bloomingdale, Pompton Lakes, Ringwood, Wanaque, Wayne, West Milford
19	UNION: Elizabeth
20	UNION: Cranford, Fanwood, Garwood, Kenilworth, Plainfield, Roselle, Roselle Park, Scotch Plains, Westfield
21	UNION: Clark, Linden, Rahway, Winfield
22	UNION: Berkeley Heights, Hillside, Mountainside, New Providence, Springfield, Summit, Union

Population Estimates¹—1954, 1965 and 1975
By Designated County Sections in
Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Passaic and Union Counties

County Section ²	County	1954	1965 ¹	1975 ¹
1	Bergen	114,000	143,000	168,000
2	"	23,900	46,000	64,000
3	"	104,900	180,000	243,000
4	"	62,500	73,000	81,000
5	"	100,900	114,000	126,000
6	"	125,000	144,000	160,000
7	"	109,600	190,000	258,000
	Total	640,800	890,000	1,100,000
8	Hudson	76,400	73,000	69,000
9	"	295,200	288,000	273,000
10	"	54,800	54,000	51,000
11	"	216,800	215,000	207,000
	Total	643,200	630,000	600,000
12	Essex	504,500	517,000	524,000
13	"	117,200	155,000	167,000
14	"	266,000	317,000	351,000
15	"	59,600	111,000	158,000
	Total	947,300	1,100,000	1,200,000
16	Passaic	143,500	157,000	171,000
17	"	177,800	180,000	185,000
18	"	40,200	53,000	64,000
	Total	361,500	390,000	420,000
19	Union	111,400	112,000	113,000
20	"	149,100	195,000	209,000
21	"	70,800	101,000	110,000
22	"	111,400	162,000	178,000
	Total	442,700	570,000	610,000
	Morris	196,000	270,000	380,000
	Somerset	116,000	160,000	230,000
	Monmouth	262,000	390,000	530,000

1. These figures are derived from a breakdown of the preliminary county forecasts contained in Regional Plan Association Bulletin No. 85 dated November 1954 and are subject to the qualifications of those forecasts.

2. See attached list of municipalities in each county section.

APPENDIX C**THE PORT OF NEW YORK
AUTHORITY**

AND

**THE METROPOLITAN RAPID
TRANSIT COMMISSION****Memorandum of Understanding**

o n

**Cooperation Between the Two Agencies on Studies
Designed to Determine Means of Improving Interstate
Rapid Transit Service Between New Jersey and New York**

The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and the Port of New York Authority recognize the need for a comprehensive and competent study of all phases of the problem of maintaining an adequate and feasible system of rail rapid transit service between New Jersey and New York in addition to the mass transportation services now being provided by bus.

The Port Authority realizes the magnitude of the task confronting the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission. The development of any practical plan for rail rapid transit requires something more than engineering and economic studies of the economic practicability of various plans for maintaining and improving rail passenger traffic between New York and New Jersey. There must first be a thorough appraisal of the future volume and the origin and destination of metropolitan passenger traffic, and particularly of commuter traffic during week-day peak hours. The integration of rail transit lines with feeder bus lines and with private automobile travel at the railheads, including the development of suitable parking areas and interchange facilities will also have to be studied. Finally, it is the conviction of the two bi-state agencies that no study of the rail commuter's problem would be realistic without developing a constitutionally sound, financially practicable and politically feasible plan of meeting deficits and debt charges if it is determined that such deficits appear to be inevitable.

Because the resources of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission are limited and because of the Port Authority's concern with means of improving the movement of passengers as well as freight in the New Jersey-New York Port District, the Port of New York Authority will finance a large part of the expenses of a comprehensive study of all phases of the interstate rail transit problem in the area.

The two agencies have agreed:

1. That the scope of such studies have been clearly defined and specified to the end that their objectives will be comprehensive, realistic and financially practicable, and are attached hereto.

2. That the studies will be carried on by consultants (engineering firms, economists, taxation, public administration and regional planning experts) of such established integrity and reputation that their conclusions will be definitive and will commend themselves to public acceptance.

In order to undertake these extensive studies the most competent consultants and experts on various phases of the problem of commutation by rail to and from New Jersey and New York will be engaged, and their assignments clearly outlined, on the basis of mutual agreement between the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and the Port Authority. A project director will be engaged in accordance with the paragraph headed *Organization* in the attached specifications, whose sole function will be to coordinate the studies into a complete factual report to be presented to the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission for its review and policy recommendations, and will be available to The Port of New York Authority for use in its planning of projects within its scope and jurisdiction. Throughout the studies, liaison between the two agencies for any policy decisions on the conduct of the studies will be handled by the Executive Directors of the two agencies.

The two agencies will invite the New Jersey railroads, bus companies and other interested official and civic agencies to designate representatives to confer on phases of the studies which are of particular concern to them.

In undertaking these comprehensive studies, the two agencies give full recognition to the framework within which the Port Authority is able to undertake transportation and terminal facilities which can be financed by revenue bonds only if competent estimates indicate that in the long run they will be self-liquidating in and of themselves. Over the past 30 years the Port Authority has repeatedly made studies of the New Jersey-New York rail rapid transit problem, and has reported on many occasions to the Governors, Legislatures and other

official agencies of the two states. These studies have always shown that the maintenance and improvement of the systems of metropolitan rail transit which were considered could not be economically self-supporting. The two agencies recognize also that nearly every metropolitan area which is trying today to improve its rapid transit facilities, has had to consider some form of financial aid from tax-supported sources to insure adequate funds to supplement user revenues in meeting debt charges for rapid transit.

However, the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and the Port Authority will carry out the most comprehensive studies ever undertaken of the New Jersey-New York rapid transit problem without any preconceived conclusions as to the interstate transit requirements of the area, or the best means of accomplishing the objective of maintaining and improving rail transit service.

The two bi-state organizations recognize that there is no conflict between the effort to maintain adequate rail transport and to provide new by-pass arteries for highway traffic such as are now being studied jointly by the Port Authority and Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority in an effort to detour large percentages of the present through traffic between New Jersey and New York away from Manhattan, and so reduce congestion on the approaches to the trans-Hudson vehicular facilities.

Specifications for Study of New York-New Jersey Transit Improvements

Sponsorship

It is proposed that this study be undertaken by appropriate agreement between the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and The Port of New York Authority.

It is intended that the studies be made for the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission by appropriate nationally-known consultants acceptable to the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and The Port of New York Authority. The Port Authority will pay for the services of the consultants and their report will be available to the Port Authority for use in its planning of projects within its scope and jurisdiction.

Purpose

1. To establish conclusively the facts as to:

(a) Controlling factors bearing on the bi-state transit problem such as future growth and distribution of population, industry, commercial centers and other land utilization, and the origin and destination, and riding habits of commuters, etc.

(b) Feasibility of typical transit improvements. Various proposals will be specifically defined and evaluated in terms of population and commuter areas served, tax rates affected, and feasibility of administrative integration with existing transit operations where such integration is involved. Such projects as are not eliminated as unfeasible will then be subjected to detailed engineering and economic study as to capital cost, gross and net operating revenues, taxes, depreciation, interest cost and overall economics.

(c) Administrative and fiscal devices adopted or under consideration in other metropolitan areas for construction, operation and regulation of multi-community transit systems which might have an application to the New York-New Jersey problem.

2. To prepare recommendations as to:

(a) The most feasible system of integrated rapid transit for interstate transit between New Jersey and Manhattan and such related local intrastate transit as may be feasible in connection therewith. The recommendations to cover the needs for at least the next 20 years, broken down into stages of development.

(b) The type of transit agency, private, state or bi-state that should operate the transit system.

(c) A constitutionally sound, equitable and financially feasible plan of how financial deficits, if any, can be met.

(d) Measures to expedite and improve common carrier service by bus to "feed" the recommended rail route or independently to service the public where rail rapid transit is not feasible.

(e) Provision of parking areas on the New Jersey side for passenger interchange from private automobiles to interstate common carrier service both rail and bus.

Organization

A properly qualified consultant will be retained full time to coordinate the studies and efforts of the various engineers, economists, taxation, public administration and planning experts, into a complete and comprehensive factual report to be submitted to the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission for its review and policy recommendations, and will be available to The Port of New York Authority for use in its planning for development of projects within its scope and jurisdiction.

Liaison between the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission and The Port of New York Authority on conduct of the project will be maintained by their respective Executive Directors.

Preliminary Factual Studies

GROUP I—Studies of the Future Demand for Mass Transportation

At the outset studies will be undertaken which do not involve analysis of specific plans for improved transit but rather the broad question of the future demand for mass transportation in the metropolitan area as a whole, and between specific sectors, and by various media.

One series of studies, utilizing census data, industrial plant records, and other pertinent data will seek answers to the following questions:

1. What will be the anticipated resident population and how will it be distributed between the boroughs of New York City and each of the surrounding suburban areas?
2. What part of the resident population of each area must be considered as potential employables, needing transportation during commuter hours from residence to place of employment and return?

3. What is the indicated volume of employment in each area and the net excess or deficit in employment opportunities versus resident employables?

4. To what extent and from where are large industrial plants in given communities, drawing their employees from points likely to create a demand for mass transportation?

5. To what extent are commercial and cultural centers other than industrial plant locations (department stores and other shopping areas, theaters and other amusement places) expanding in the suburban areas as against the older central areas such as Manhattan?

Another series of studies in this general group, utilizing data collected directly from commuters in private automobiles as well as rail and bus common carriers and other sources, will analyze the commuter travel habits and the factors influencing these travel habits. Among the questions to which answers will be sought are:

6. What are the up-to-date facts on origin and destination of passengers traveling between the suburbs west of the Hudson River and Manhattan by rail, bus and private car?

7. By what transportation media do employees travel between their homes and typical industrial plants?

8. What factors in the judgment of the commuters themselves influence them to use their present mode of travel and what elements (comparative travel time, frequency of service, fares, availability and cost of car parking, or other) in the commuters' judgment would influence them to shift to a mass transit system if one were available?

9. In other metropolitan areas where mass transit improvements have been inaugurated, what factors have encouraged commuters to use them?

10. To what extent do mass transportation passengers use supplemental personal auto transportation to reach the first train or bus stop and what portion of this personal automobile use requires all day parking in the vicinity of the initial transit station?

The results of these inquiries would be recorded, tabulated, machine sorted and analyzed to determine the extent of the future traffic potentials for mass transportation systems between the suburban areas west of the Hudson River and the central business areas.

GROUP II—*Studies of the Feasibility of Specific
Transit Proposals*

The studies in this field would choose a typical project in each of the following general classes and define it as to area served, physical characteristics, general alignment, number of tracks, terminals, proposed frequency of service, required equipment and rolling stock. Each would then be analyzed and considered as to feasibility. This preliminary analysis would determine whether each is physically feasible, of sufficient potential service to commuter needs to warrant further consideration, and within the realm of administrative practicality, if it involves integration with existing municipal or private rail operation. If the preliminary feasibility is established, each project would then be evaluated from a complete engineering and economic standpoint.

The general classes from which typical projects would be chosen for preliminary evaluation would include the following:

(a) An independent bi-state loop system connecting all or substantially all of the New Jersey railroad commuter lines, at appropriate passenger interchange points, with stations in Manhattan Island south of 59th Street. Such an electrified line would have its own tunnel or bridge connections across the Hudson River and be equipped with its own rolling stock and operated independently of either the New York City subway system or existing rail tubes unless it were found possible to incorporate existing Hudson River rail tunnels into the system without sacrifice of operating efficiency and capacity.

(b) Construction of new Hudson River tunnels with appropriate track connections in New Jersey to connect with units of the New York City subway system such as the 14th or 41st Street crosstown lines, the stub end BMT line ending north of 42nd Street or any other available subway line. Such new trans-Hudson and New Jersey construction to be offered

under lease or other agreement to the New York City Transit Authority for the operation of New York subway trains through to New Jersey.

A basic factor in the preliminary studies of this project would be the question of the capacity of the New York City subways to absorb additional traffic from New Jersey during peak hours and the willingness of the New York City authorities to consider such an operating proposal.

Before engaging in any detailed engineering and economic study of such an extension of the New York City subway operations into New Jersey, there would be a preliminary discussion with the New York City authorities to determine their willingness to entertain such a proposal, providing details of operating authority, financing, schedules of service, fare divisions, liability, etc. could be worked out.

(c) A bi-state system of Hudson River tunnels with connecting trackage on both sides of the River of dimension and operating characteristics suitable for handling standard railroad passenger cars to a destination or destinations in Manhattan without passenger transfer in New Jersey. Such a system would contemplate the offering to commuters of a through service in midtown Manhattan similar in character to the service offered by the Pennsylvania Railroad to Penn Station or the New York Central and New Haven Railroads to Grand Central Station. Such a project would require tunnel diameters substantially larger and more expensive than the subway-type train and more extensive terminal yards in Manhattan than would the loop system described under (a).

(d) A bi-state grade-separated, high-speed system of the monorail or streamlined, column-supported aerial transit type between Manhattan and the New Jersey side of the Hudson River. Sponsors of the monorail system have proposed such a system for Los Angeles, Montreal and other communities. Sponsors of the aerial transit system with electrically driven, automatically dispatched, rubber tired cars, operating on a one track structure, supported on a single column over the sidewalks in cities and on surface rights-of-way in the open country, have advanced this system for San Francisco. Thus

far no definitive plan or alignment, particularly for a Hudson River crossing, has been proposed for such a system between New York and New Jersey, but the general type of operation has been suggested as "the next thing around the corner."

In order to study a specific project rather than a nebulous concept, it will be suggested that the sponsors of the monorail and aerial transit systems be asked to make a preliminary suggestion of a suitable alignment, including a Hudson River crossing and a Manhattan loop or terminus for such a project so that a preliminary study can be made of its feasibility and utility in this area as a mass transportation instrument.

(e) A study of existing immediate railroad passenger service problems and possible methods of meeting them in order to maintain and improve service pending, or possibly in lieu of, more comprehensive solutions. The existing rail service between New Jersey and Manhattan now furnished by railroad ferries or the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad would be diminished if the railroads are successful in petitions for abandonment of ferry and train service or if the bankruptcy of the Hudson & Manhattan results in deteriorated service.

This group of studies should include:

- (1) Construction of a line to provide a convenient passenger transfer between the Central Railroad of New Jersey and the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad. Previous studies on this subject are available for review.
- (2) An arrangement whereby the Erie and the DL&W would be allowed to discontinue ferry services and in lieu thereof make the necessary arrangement for proper division of fares with the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad.
- (3) A project whereby the services of the NYS&W, the NJ&NY, the Northern Railroad of N. J. and the West Shore Division of the New York Central Railroad would be extended via a line across the George Washington Bridge to a terminal in the vicinity of 175th Street, Manhattan, where transfer would be available to the New York City Transit System.

- (4) An arrangement whereby the West Shore Railroad would provide a service by bus to midtown Manhattan from some transfer point in Weehawken or in the vicinity of North Bergen, in substitution for the ferry service. This arrangement to be similar to that at Susquehanna Transfer.

This group of studies should also include an analysis of the application to the New Jersey railroads of a redevelopment plan, similar to that which resulted in the reorganization of the Long Island Railroad, by constructive initiative between public agencies and privately-owned railroads under the leadership of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission.

(f) A study of means of improving common carrier bus transportation where new investments in rail lines do not appear justified. Such a study would include procedures to expedite travel time by such separation as may be practicable of bus lines from other vehicular traffic to encourage speedier operation, particularly at points of extreme traffic congestion during peak hours. This study would also include questions of integrating feeder bus routes with transit railheads and the provision of off-street bus terminals to eliminate surrounding vehicular street congestion and the provision of adequate private automobile parking areas in the vicinity of strategic bus stations.

GROUP III—*Financial and Administrative Devices
Utilized in Multi-Community Transit
System Operation*

This would be an investigation of the experience or contemplated experiments of other metropolitan areas in administering multi-community rapid transit systems, including those requiring financial support to meet deficits. Such studies would be accompanied by research into the legal, administrative and financial framework of the New York-New Jersey area to determine how applicable such administrative schemes would be to the New York metropolitan region.

While it would be highly gratifying if an adequate rapid transit project for the New Jersey-New York area could be found to be wholly self-supporting, including interest on debt, proper depreciation re-

serves, and perhaps payment of at least some contribution in lieu of taxes, the possibility of a deficit must be recognized and means for meeting it must be studied.

Where the area to be served by a transit system extends beyond a large central city into numerous suburbs, divided into small administrative and political units, the matter of scaling down or eliminating property taxes or of guaranteeing bonds or supporting annual deficits involves many problems. In certain metropolitan areas, such as Boston and Toronto, a degree of limited federation among municipalities, at least with respect to waiving property taxes and sharing financial responsibility for transit operations, has been accomplished. Certain of these may not be applicable in New Jersey or New York because of constitutional provisions and court decisions interpreting these provisions.

It is significant that in the comprehensive study of the San Francisco transit problem, which is now being carried on by the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission, the engineering and economic studies are being supplemented by a study of the financial and organizational aspects of the Bay Area rapid transit program. These financial and organizational studies include a review of the general property taxes in effect in the various municipalities in the area and the creation of a set of guiding principles that could be used in the allocation of any financial burden (either capital funds or operation deficits) among the various geographical areas embracing nine counties and numerous municipalities.

Recommendations

1. Following upon the three groups of preliminary inquiries above outlined, the studies would anticipate either a recommendation of a comprehensive system of rail rapid transit designed to serve Northern New Jersey and Manhattan for at least the next 20 years, broken down into an initial stage and any future indicated extensions, or such other recommendations for the solution of the New Jersey-New York rapid transit problem as the consultants may consider sound and practicable.

If a comprehensive system of rail rapid transit is recommended, it would include general engineering designs of the complete system

and detailed designs of the initial stage construction and equipment. For this recommended plan the following details would be included:

(a) Estimated travel time between various suburban points and Manhattan and estimated passenger usage.

(b) Stations to be included in the line, with such adjacent vehicular parking lots and transfer facilities from feeder bus lines as may be required in connection therewith.

(c) Estimates of capital cost of construction and equipment of the initial stage and such future extensions as may be indicated, and

(d) Estimates of gross revenue from passenger fares and other sources (advertising, concessions, lease of air rights, parking facilities, carriage of mail or express and such other goods as could be accommodated on a transit system without, however, any attempt to convert the line into a freight operation with extensive belt line connections, yards and terminals).

(e) Estimates of operating expenses and net operating revenues.

(f) Estimates of interest charges, annual depreciation reserves and resulting net annual surplus or deficit.

(g) A study of whether it would be possible to pay any contribution in lieu of taxes to the communities through which the line would run or in the alternative the prospective loss of tax ratables which the communities might face. As a corollary there would be an attempt to evaluate the general effect of a transit line in specific communities in enhancing or depreciating the total ratables of the community.

(h) In the event that the project shows an indicated deficit or such a narrow surplus margin that it is deemed impossible to finance without supplemental guarantees, a financially and politically acceptable method of meeting such a deficit or of guaranteeing the financing.

(i) The form of transit agency best suited to administer the recommended system and the legislation necessary to effectuate it.

2. In addition to the recommendations with respect to a rail transit line, the report would also include supplemental recommendations for methods of expediting and improving common carrier bus service in territories in which adequate rail service is not feasible and generally to minimize traffic congestion by proper routing and terminal facilities for bus traffic.

January 4, 1955



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