
Task Force Meeting

of

ASSEMBLY COASTAL NEW JERSEY EVACUATION TASK FORCE

*"The Task Force will meet to assess current emergency plans
for a coordinated evacuation of coastal communities"*

LOCATION: Monmouth County Library
125 Symmes Drive
Manalapan, New Jersey

DATE: December 20, 2007
10:00 a.m.

MEMBERS OF TASK FORCE PRESENT:

Assemblyman Jeff Van Drew, Chair
Assemblyman Brian E. Rumpf, Vice-Chair
Mariana Leckner
Francis McCall
Gary McTighe
Wayne R. Rupert
Joseph Sever

ALSO PRESENT:

Thomas M. Kelly
Kristin A. Brunner
*Office of Legislative Services
Task Force Aides*



Meeting Recorded and Transcribed by
The Office of Legislative Services, Public Information Office,
Hearing Unit, State House Annex, PO 068, Trenton, New Jersey

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Eric Anderson G.I.S. Coordinator G.I.S. Division Information Services Monmouth County	2
Sergeant David J. Pope Exercise Unit Emergency Preparedness Bureau New Jersey State Police	18
Gary S. Szatkowski Meteorologist-in-Charge Philadelphia/Mt. Holly Forecast Office National Weather Service	24
Lisa Ann Webber Manager Office of Emergency Management New Jersey Department of Transportation	44
Sergeant Frank T. Manghisi Exercise Support Team Homeland Security Branch Emergency Management Section New Jersey State Police New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety	46
Jason Kingsley Emergency Services Response Coordinator American Red Cross of Central New Jersey	67
Trooper Thomas J. Wagner Field Representative Homeland Security Branch Emergency Preparedness Bureau, Central Region Emergency Management Section New Jersey State Police New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety	72

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Lieutenant Kenneth Nelsen Special Operations Group Field Operations Supervisor New Jersey Department of Corrections	72
Michelle Warner Hammel, Esq. Director Office of External Affairs New Jersey Department of Corrections	76
lmb: 1-88	

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: All right. If we're all ready to begin, Assemblyman Van Drew, the Chair of the Committee, is on his way. He asked that we get started as he finishes making his way up the Parkway.

And so at this time, I call to order the meeting of the New Jersey Coastal Evacuation Task Force subcommittee, and ask for calling of the roll.

MR. KELLY (Task Force Aide): Oh, Joseph Sever.

MR. SEVER: Sever (pronunciation). Here.

MR. KELLY: Sever, sorry.

MR. SEVER: That's okay.

MR. KELLY: Wayne Rupert.

MR. RUPERT: Here.

MR. KELLY: Frank McCall.

MR. McCALL: Here.

MR. KELLY: Mariana Leckner.

MS. LECKNER: Here.

MR. KELLY: Gary McTighe.

MR. McTIGHE: Here.

MR. KELLY: Vice Chairman Rumpf.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: Here.

MR. KELLY: Okay.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: And to begin, we'd like to thank Monmouth County for hosting us today and for the refreshments, which is greatly appreciated.

MR. McTIGHE: You're welcome.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: And I thought we should start this morning's presentation with a discussion of the local area, that being Monmouth County. And perhaps we can call upon Eric Anderson to give us a brief overview of what we're looking at. He has some GIS maps we were just taking a little look of, and I know they're recently prepared.

Mr. Anderson.

ERIC ANDERSON: Thank you.

So, yes, I have two maps that have been hung up, there, on the wall. The one on the right was prepared by the Army Corps of Engineers. Joe Gavin, in the Philadelphia Office, and I just reprinted that for discussion purposes, since it has elements like housing units, in a table presented there, by municipality. And the map on the left was prepared by the County GIS Office. It includes the SLOSH model hurricane surge data prepared by the Army Corps of Engineers -- and they use Monmouth County's two-foot elevation data -- so you have a more accurate idea of how far the surge would go inland. And as you can see, as the -- the Category 1 in green, yellow is for Category 2; and then orange and the red for Categories 3 and 4, if such an event would occur. And there's also the 100-year and 500-year flood plain also listed on that map in the two shades of brown.

And what you can tell with Monmouth County-- If really some of the major surge areas you have, from Deal Lake down to the Manasquan River, are definitely affected -- very flat -- the Shrewsbury River and obviously Sea Bright and Monmouth Beach. There are times in the history of Monmouth County where there was direct access to the ocean right through Monmouth Beach or through Sea Bright, where those were islands

or cut off. And that area is tremendously flat, and if you had a Category 1, the Shrewsbury River would roughly double in size. And also in the bay shore area, with the Raritan Bay, a lot of towns like Keansburg, Union Beach, and Northern Middletown would be severely impacted with a surge model.

So we have those low-lying areas, and then you have a ridge line going from Upper Freehold, up through Holmdel, to the Highlands, which has an elevation of 200 feet, over 300 feet. And so that's kind of the high ridge, sort of dividing the watershed areas that flow to the Atlantic Ocean and the areas that flow to the Delaware and the Raritan River.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: Essentially, there are two primary areas of concern -- the most important, I would imagine, for hurricanes and what have you, being the coast on the other side of the ridge line or the tributaries to the Raritan where flooding is experienced as well.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: And it would appear that the Gateway National Recreation Area would be inundated completely with any kind of Category 1.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, that's definitely correct. And like you said, that area is interesting. Because if you go to the Visitor's Center at Sandy Hook, at the Gateway National Park, you'll see that's been an island multiple times throughout history, as well as parts of Sea Bright. So that is a very low-lying area.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: Now, reflected on the GIS maps, or the 100-year storms and the 500-year storms, how about a typical nor'easter that we're prone to see here in the Jersey shore? What would we

equate on the map with a severe nor'easter such as the 1992 storm? How was Monmouth County affected by that?

MR. ANDERSON: Well, during the '92 was before I was working with the County, but it would be -- equate very similar to a 100-year storm, as well as a Category 1, because a lot of the places that are in the green, of a Category 1, were severely impacted by that '92 storm. So that would give you an idea of the damage effected there.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: Okay.

Now, I know this is before your time, but are you aware of there being any evacuation procedures put into place for any storms in the last 20 years here in Monmouth County?

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, absolutely. The Emergency Management Office set up shelters with the Red Cross, as well as pick-up locations, and we've done research on where the senior facilities, critical-care facilities -- identifying those, and where you might need extra help to remove some people and get them out of a flood zone. And so we have done an analysis of how you try to get people out of the coastal areas.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: Yes.

MR. McTIGHE: Just to give you an-- Monmouth County has 650,000 residents in Monmouth County. We have over 60 miles of beaches, beautiful beaches in Monmouth County, from Manasquan Inlet all the way up to Sandy Hook, and then to the bay shore area. We have 53 municipalities. We have over 100 low basins or harbors throughout Monmouth County. So we have a lot of things going on. Our major route for a major hurricane, Category 3, would be reverse 195 getting most of the people out. Probably one of our concerns would be Route 35 Bridge, and

the 70 Bridge from Point Pleasant would be kind of a concern with traffic flow. But other than that, that's where we're at right now.

We do have hospitals, five hospitals, including the Patterson Hospital at Fort Monmouth. And most of those hospitals are along the shore. The only one we have in one -- in Freehold. But they do all have emergency operation plans.

MS. LECKNER: To give you an idea on the '92, the sediment was washed in about four, five, six blocks in many areas, right along the coast. The surge wouldn't come as far in as a Category 1, but the problem is, is that it stays -- the water, the inundation -- stays longer because of the fact that the nor'easter moves slower, and you've got the onshore flow, the northeasterly winds going from the northeast on shore. So you tend to have, through the tidal cycles, that remaining. Probably about two, three days after the storm -- two days after the storm the bulldozers were out bulldozing the sand back from -- I'm sure you've seen the pictures of it. I've got an aerial photo, if you'd like, bulldozing the sand back onto the beaches.

As you mentioned, Sandy Hook actually does get separated. It's been separated several times, probably a half a dozen times during the 20th century, from the mainland of the county.

I think Monmouth County has some pretty good evacuation plans. Manasquan is used to being flooded, they can tell you. They do it with their eyes closed. And there are some pretty good sheltering plans -- the Highlands area. People are very used to where they're supposed to go, those sorts of things.

MR. McTIGHE: Speaking of Manasquan Office of Emergency Management, they do have an alert warning system going out to all the residents either to move your cars to higher ground-- But that is a good program down there and they do a great job.

That '92 storm, just to let you know, that blacktop -- if anybody's familiar with Manasquan -- there's a blacktop that -- like a boardwalk. That was down on Ocean Avenue -- of the '92 storm. So there was heavy damage.

I know some of the hospitals -- the other thing -- some of the hospitals in Monmouth County are -- part of their mitigation is raising their generators up on higher platforms. So if there is some type of flooding, they are on higher ground. So that's part of their mitigation plan. Part of their plan is to work with other hospitals to move patients. And the other thing is, the option is they might have to shelter in place. So that's part of their plan too.

MS. LECKNER: Probably the only other significant area that I can think to point out is that the Parkway does flood on a -- sort of a normal bad rain. And in a storm surge situation, it would be cut off. A lot of people ask, "How come we don't use the Parkway as an evacuation route?" And that's because it's actually within hazardous areas in Monmouth, in particular the Cheesequake area.

MR. ANDERSON: Right. As well as the Manasquan area.

MS. LECKNER: Yes.

MR. ANDERSON: I think it's about 14, 15 feet above sea level. So there is the potential that at the Manasquan River, at the

southern part of the Parkway in Monmouth County, you'd have some flooding.

MR. McTIGHE: Did you put that in the map today?

MR. ANDERSON: It's on there.

MR. McTIGHE: It is on there, the lower part.

MR. ANDERSON: So what you'll notice is that very first-- I can stand up and point that out, if you'd like.

MR. McTIGHE: Do you want to do that Eric--

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, sure.

MR. McTIGHE: --just to give them an example of where the lower area--

MR. ANDERSON: (standing at map) Definitely, you have kind of the worst of the worst situation--

(back at microphone) So where the Manasquan River crosses the -- or the Parkway crosses over the Manasquan River is a couple of miles south of Interstate 195. So in an evacuation route planning, if you're sending several people-- So 195 kind of crosses around there, this is the Parkway right there. And right there is where the Manasquan River crosses the Parkway. So it's a couple of miles due south of where 195 and the Parkway meet. So if you have people coming from south of that location, they may not get to 195 at that area to then go west.

So I guess one of the key things in GIS is we work a lot with elevation data, and it's critically important to understand the elevation of evacuation routes. Because if you are sending people out, they may not be able to pass if that's listed as an evacuation route. And I know the State Police had looked a lot of evacuation routes in the heights that those -- back

about a half dozen years ago. And Mariana was with the State Police at a that time. And I'm not sure if anyone has been in contact with the State Office of GIS, but there's a State -- New Jersey Office of GIS within the New Jersey Office of Information Technology. And I know they're working on a project to develop LIDAR data, which stands for Light Detection and Ranging. It's similar to the concept of sonar, which you use for fish finders. Find out -- you send out a sound, and when those sound waves gets back you know how far the fish are away. It's the same concept for determining the elevation. You'll take the plane, GPS-enabled, and they'll send down a beam of light, and they'll measure the time until the reflection -- till they see a reflection. And they get elevations not just of the ground -- heights of buildings, as well as heights of roads and bridges. So you can really get a good 3-D model of the city or actually the evacuation routes and bridges. So the State's working on LIDAR and developing it for some areas. So I think you'd be wise to contact the State Office of GIS and talk about the LIDAR project, and come up with elevations for all the evacuation routes as kind of a long-term plan.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: Can you tell us a little bit more -- and Mariana, perhaps you're aware -- the area that you referenced on the Parkway just south of 195. Has that been flooded in recent memory where it's impassible?

MS. LECKNER: If we got a heavy rain, a nice, several-day rain -- Gary may know better -- specific days of when you have closures there, or maybe-- Frank or Dave, I don't know if you guys know any time that State Police has to deal with the Parkway, the flooding at the Cheesequake areas,

as far as closures. I know you guys aren't road Troopers, but-- I don't know if anybody is-- I don't know dates off the top of my head.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER FROM AUDIENCE: I don't know the last time.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER FROM AUDIENCE: I don't remember the last time, as well.

MS. LECKNER: Or Gary, if you get reports at weather service of when those are? But it does happen -- Gary, I don't know -- relatively frequently.

MR. McTIGHE: I'm just trying. If there's anything, it would go through our office. With our State Police rep being there, they would notify us. And with the E team-- But I can't recall--

MS. LECKNER: I don't know specific days, but it's on -- the heavier rain storms, it ponds. What happens is, it ponds. The drainage is poor. It's not that an ocean level rises or that a river rises, but the roadway itself ponds, and so that becomes an issue. That's common on a lot of smaller routes. It's not normally common on these very heavily engineered roads, but unfortunately I don't know what the cause is. I'm not a road engineer. But there's ponding that occurs in that area because of the -- it sort of dips down like that.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: So that would likely affect the evacuation planning for Monmouth?

MR. McTIGHE: Probably the northern part of Monmouth County getting out of here.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: And we're speaking of the Cheesequake part--

MR. McTIGHE: The Cheesequake area part -- like she said, where the Parkway and -- in that area.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: That's around 117--

MR. McTIGHE: That would be -- what? -- Matawan, Matawan area?

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, just north of Matawan. That would be -- let me just grab the laser. That would be right up top, there.

MR. McTIGHE: Yes. That would probably be right up in that -- probably right-- Is the Parkway there?

MS. LECKNER: Yes.

MR. McTIGHE: We're right there, so--

MR. ANDERSON: The Parkway is this line right there.

MR. McTIGHE: Okay.

MR. ANDERSON: And about there is where the Cheesequake estuary is.

MR. McTIGHE: Right there.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: That did flood during the '92 storm.

MR. ANDERSON: The service area is at mile post 125.5, which I think is Sayreville Township, if you're talking Cheesequake Service Area.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: You're not being picked up, so we'll have to ask you to come up and talk a little bit more about that.

Was there a concern as well, though, about the southern portion of Monmouth County, the Parkway? You had referenced just south of 195 where the Manasquan flows through.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes. I'm just pointing out an example of where the elevation is about 15 feet above, like, sea level.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: Yes.

MR. ANDERSON: So if you did have-- I don't think the flooding is as common as Cheesequake, but it's just an example of where, if you have the worst-of-the-worst-type storm come through, you might wind up with some flooding there, and that would really--

MR. McTIGHE: Would you say like a Category 1 or 2?

MR. ANDERSON: Probably a 3. You would need at least a 3 to cause that, right.

MR. McTIGHE: A 3 -- it might start. Okay.

MS. LECKNER: We'd need a 3 or 4. And by that point, no evacuations would be in place. The important thing to note about that is when you have the extreme flooding, it may take the bridge out. When we look at Lake Pontchartrain, when you see the aerial photos of the destruction of the causeway across the lake, when you see the nine-mile bridge and the Keys destroyed after a hurricane, that's water action, that's wave action, that's nothing else. And so we have to keep in mind that any place where we've got water crossing water can take that concrete and steel apart and can destroy those linkages. And that's important for bringing emergency vehicles back in, for repositioning.

When evacuation ceases, usually it's four hours before anticipated tropical storm-force winds. What you do is, then you secure all your emergency equipment -- all your cones, barrels that you can, everything that you can -- your people, you secure everybody for the storm. So four hours prior to the onset of tropical storm-force winds, up until the

point where those winds cease and people can actually go back out, and police and fire can drive cars, emergency management -- any water that's rising, any winds that are happening, people are on their own. Because this equipment has to be secured, and it needs to be secured in locations where you don't have to worry about water crossings, because you're possibly not going to make it. A lot of times these bridges are taken out. When you have 15 feet of water hitting those bridges in Manasquan, they're probably not going to make it.

MR. McTIGHE: Well--

MS. LECKNER: The evacuation -- sorry, Gary.

MR. McTIGHE: No.

MS. LECKNER: Just real quick, the evacuation plans, the State evacuation plans are engineered such that everybody north of that area will take advantage of 195, and south of that area will head to more southerly routes. So that's the idea -- is to kind of split people to avoid water crossing.

The only other place where this is an issue is in Cape May County, where the Parkway also can flood. But ostensibly, again, their evacuation would be done by then, because you would have to get people off the road, including DOT, including State Police, including everybody else, for their own safety and the safety of the equipment. So it's sort of the aftermath that you're looking at.

MR. McTIGHE: Going back to your bridges -- we have eight drawbridges in Monmouth County along the coastal area.

MS. LECKNER: Very often they put them up.

MR. McTIGHE: And you're talking -- maybe a Category 3 or a 4, those bridges could be heavily damaged.

MS. LECKNER: Yes. Very often, it's common practice to actually put the bridges up. But it's -- I'm not a bridge engineer. You would want to get your--

MR. McTIGHE: No, because I'm going to go back to engineering and ask them about that.

MS. LECKNER: Definitely go to the engineer and make the assessments.

MR. McTIGHE: Yes. We do have -- what? -- eight drawbridges throughout Monmouth County, along the coastal area.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, that's correct.

MS. LECKNER: It's common practice to put them up. And I don't know if that's for bridge safety or to prevent people from trying to cross them, or what that's about, but it's extremely common practice during evacuations and during hurricane events to put the drawbridges up. So you might talk to the engineer and see if that has to do with the safety issue or if that is just to keep traffic management.

MR. McTIGHE: It's probably the guy controlling the bridge, like "Put it up and get the heck out of there."

MS. LECKNER: It very well could be. And it's a good safety measure to keep people from going into harm's way.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: Very good.

I appreciate that.

Any--

MR. McCALL: If I may, Mr. Chairman and either one of you two fellas, you mentioned the 650,000 year-round residents. What does your summertime population look like?

MR. McTIGHE: Our population goes up from probably 800,000 to a million.

MR. McCALL: Okay. You're in the same boat that we're in.

MR. McTIGHE: Yes. So one of our biggest concerns is getting that information out to -- you have a lot of people coming in from the state of New York or Connecticut, or vacationing in the county of Monmouth, and getting that information out to all the residents that there might be a storm coming and to let them be informed. That's one of our biggest concerns.

MR. McCALL: And Gary, if I may. The second part of that -- how many fixed facility nursing homes do you folks have east of the Garden State Parkway? Do you know that number offhand?

MR. ANDERSON: I don't know that number offhand. I'd guess probably about -- at least a dozen, possibly two dozen, because a lot of them are close to the Parkway actually, because that's the easiest access. So a lot of nursing homes are in kind of -- buffer that.

MR. McTIGHE: But I can tell you, as part of our LEPC we do have the nursing home onboard, and so are the hospitals onboard with us, along with Fort Monmouth, and Earle, and all the utilities that are on our LEPC, which is our county planning committee.

MS. LECKNER: There's also a facility for people with mental disabilities that you have east of the Parkway, as well.

MR. McTIGHE: Right. And then we're working with the State Police Office of Emergency Management -- along with our Health Department, Office of Aging, Transportation -- on our special needs. And we're putting that together with our local Office of Emergency Management municipalities, because they basically know where all our special needs are.

MR. McCALL: That's an interesting concept about your drawbridges. We do just the opposite in Cape May County, because the bridges are older. As opposed to leaving them up and having them subject to damage while they're up -- because you never get them down -- we just leave them down. The potential for using them for getting back and forth to the barrier islands is a little bit different than the concept of just having them raised all the time and not being able to get them back down. So it's interesting.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: Can you point out Fort Monmouth on your GIS map there?

MR. ANDERSON: Sure. So both the military installations are kind of in a very light gray, which is difficult to see from a distance. But Earle is kind of this large area right there, and it goes out to the pier there. And Fort Monmouth is kind of at the mouth of Shrewsbury River. So the name Fort Monmouth is right there -- and then the Charles Wood area is a little bit further inland. But this is the main Fort Monmouth. And as you can see, quite a bit of Fort Monmouth would be affected. In like a Category I, there would be definitely some issues because it's at the mouth of Shrewsbury River.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: Do any of the evacuation plans include sheltering at any of the military facilities, do we know?

MR. McTIGHE: They would probably take care of themselves, since they're so close to the coast. They might be getting hammered. And they do have their emergency operation plan, but we don't -- I guess it's a military secret, or whatever.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: They don't share?

MR. McTIGHE: Well, yes. Because if there's so much information-- I guess the Intelligence Division is there. So there's a lot of things that -- if they have to move, they'll move.

MS. LECKNER: Since 9/11, there's been a very distinct separation in planning with military facilities. The Coast Guard in Cape May is very forthcoming about the fact that they're going to leave before even regular evacuations are called. But there used to be, for example, potentials to shelter at McGuire and Fort Dix, and that's no longer an option in a post-9/11 world.

One concern here, also, which I know Gary and the rest of the folks from Monmouth are very aware of, is the fact that you've got the train running all the way from that pier, which will probably no longer exist after a hurricane.

MR. McTIGHE: Yes, that would be probably knocked out.

Just to let you know, we do have a very good relationship with Earle.

T. J., what was that last drill we did with Earle?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER FROM AUDIENCE: Mass casualty exercise.

MR. McTIGHE: When was that, in July? We just did that with Earle, and before that we did a tabletop drill with Fort Monmouth.

So, we're always involved with Fort Monmouth and Earle. Any they are on our, like I said, our county Emergency Management team. So if something should happen, they will be -- one of their reps will be in our office, in our EOC, which is our Emergency Operation Center.

ASSEMBLYMAN JEFF VAN DREW (Chair): Any other questions from the Task Force here? (no response)

Thoughts?

Mariana, you always have thoughts.

MS. LECKNER: I always have. You missed them all.
(laughter)

With Monmouth County, I mean, there are some very critical areas. I think the planning in Monmouth County is, as I know it to be, is very capable. And the 195 reversal is -- it's very generous. It has a large capacity, which is nice for the county. Other than that, the same problems -- the coastal erosion, the fact that your bridges are probably going to be out, coastal roads are going to be out, people probably won't want to leave some of those areas that will become islands.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Very good.

Anybody else?

MR. McTIGHE: The other thing we've got to look at is we have a lot of Spanish-speaking in Monmouth County. So that would be another thing that we're looking at -- put a lot of our plans or getting that information out in Spanish and some of the other languages throughout Monmouth County, so we get the word out.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay. All righty.

Thank you very much.

MR. McTIGHE: Eric, thank you.

MR. ANDERSON: All right. Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: We might call upon you again, so don't run away.

We have, from the New Jersey State Police, the Exercise Support Team, Frank Manghisi and David J. Pope, and they're going to speak about lane reversal, which I actually-- Are we speaking about lane reversal throughout the entire Parkway area, from Cape May on up, or just particularly in the Monmouth area?

S E R G E A N T D A V I D J . P O P E: Monmouth. I can speak about whatever you'd like to, Senator.

Good morning, Senator-elect, Assemblyman, distinguished members of the Task Force. My name is Dave Pope. I'm a Sergeant with the New Jersey State Police. I'm currently assigned to the Exercise Support Team. I've been asked, actually yesterday, to come and give you a presentation. Maybe you can help me focus my testimony here today. What exactly are you looking for, as a Task Force, as far as reverse lane and as far as a report?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: We're going to have, as I'm sure you already know -- at the end of this Task Force, we're going to have a report that's going to be generated. And that report is going to make recommendations that will range from infrastructure, which is obviously -- with the given fiscal condition of the State of New Jersey and actually even the Federal funding -- obviously longer term and more difficult to achieve. But where are we short? We know some of that already. What needs to be done? As well as -- whether it's communications or various forms of

interaction among the counties and the municipalities, to make sure that we're doing everything that we should do.

The Task Force is a bipartisan effort that really reflects the concerns of Vice Chairman Rumpf, myself, and many other members, especially of the coastal delegations, that are concerned that we may not be doing, and we may not be focused on, everything that we should be. While we're doing, I believe, a very adequate job -- better than adequate, an excellent job in many respects -- where can we do better? And that's what we're looking at. And of course, as everybody else, slightly reactive in that everyone saw what happened in Katrina, and we absolutely want to make sure. And we know that it's a different situation. We don't have some of the vulnerabilities and problems they do and do continue to have there. We wanted to make sure, with the vulnerabilities that we do have, that we're absolutely dealing with this in the best way possible, whether it be at the State Police -- as you know, we were at the ROC -- all the way from Cape May County to Monmouth County, to even including parts of Middlesex County with that issue.

Part of that is that we are short on infrastructure and we can't get people out. And whether it is in Long Beach Island, getting people off the island, whether it is in Cape May County, getting them out of the entire county because it's a peninsula, we want to know more about how that relates to Monmouth County, particularly -- where your vulnerabilities are, where we could do better, how we could do better. And most importantly -- not only in the long-term, which we are going to make those recommendations -- but in the shorter term with the given infrastructure that we have, let's be realistic. How can we deal with that?

So one of-- Of course, there's been lane reversal discussions in many roadways, whether it's 47 and 55 in Cape May. But again, you know; for the people who are in the audience that don't know, interestingly enough we found out that that might not be as effective as we had actually hoped. And there's going to be ongoing exercises and discussions as far as lane reversal on the Parkway at the southern-most terminus of it, as well as further up.

The questions for you are: How is that going to work? Is it going to work? How does the fact that the Parkway is so far east in many sections that there are obviously going to be immediate flooding problems that are going to affect it -- how do we address those? Are the timelines falling in quickly? Or, are we saying, "Gee, we're going to have lane reversal, we're going to get people out, but it's really going to be flooded anyhow." So it's a wonderful exercise to do when the storm isn't here, but it's not going to work when the storm is. Those are the questions.

SERGEANT POPE: Okay. Well, I'm in the right place.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: You ask a politician a -- I give you a long answer, right?

SERGEANT POPE: Okay. I'm in the right place then.

There were some very specific suggestions that we made. Let me backtrack here. In the early part of 2007, the exercise support team, along with our partners in Monmouth, Ocean, Burlington, Atlantic, and Cape May counties endeavored to put together an exercise program to test the plans of reverse lane for the major roadways moving east to west. So there is no plan, so to speak, as far as the Garden State Parkway is concerned. There have been a couple of proposals, but there's nothing that

has been adopted by the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management, to this point.

The exercise support team for those people -- I'm sorry if I'm backtracking even more -- the exercise support team is tasked with exercising plans. Okay? And what we did was, we exercised the reverse lane plans for State Highway 72 and I-195 for Monmouth and Ocean counties. I was the lead -- the facilitator for that exercise, the beginning of the series, for Ocean and Monmouth and Burlington counties. Because all those counties touch on those roadways, and they would be affected by the plan.

Some of the things that we found as a result of our exercise were internal, as far as county-to-county communications. Communications in any exercise is always going to be the number one concern, as far as running into problems as far as frequencies, as far as phone numbers, points of contact. These things are usually hashed out during the exercise and they can be corrected at the county level or even the municipal level. During our exercise for Monmouth, Ocean County, and Burlington County, we had four State agencies which were involved in that exercise. The three county OEMs were involved in that exercise, and I believe we had seven municipalities, which touched on the roadways which would be reverse-lane activated during any type of an emergency.

Some of the things that we found that can be addressed, especially on your level, Senator, is that there were some problems as far as command and control was concerned, as far as who was actually in control of establishing an evacuation order -- whether that comes from the Governor's Office or whether that comes from the county or New Jersey

OEM -- something that has to be hashed out on your level as far as maybe some sort of a bill. That the Governor would make a declaration that an evacuation is in order, or a suggestion is in order -- that is something that was not truly written in stone anywhere in the plan. Another point--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Clarify that a little bit more for me. Explain that a little bit more, what you just said.

SERGEANT POPE: What happens is, is that there are time frames that are involved in an evacuation. There are three numbers that you should always remember: Number one is 96. Ninety-six hours. It will require 96 hours for us to evacuate our special needs populations within Ocean and Monmouth counties. That's a pretty aggressive number, as well. We have -- I believe it was in Ocean County alone -- 107 communities within Ocean County that are deemed to be senior assisted-living type of communities. Not all these people have transportation, not all these have-- They have medical needs which would required such things as oxygen, as far as special vehicles to come pick them up to evacuate them from areas. So 96 hours would probably be the edge where you would have to start to evacuate the special needs population in Ocean County and Monmouth County, as well as probably Atlantic and Cape May, I would imagine.

The next one is 72 hours for the general population. You need to start your evacuation 72 hours prior to a landfall, or as Mariana has so deftly put it is, she said, "Four hours before gale force winds hit this state everything is going to shut down." We're going to tie down and we're going to make sure that the evacuation is going to, in a sense, stop. Because we can't assure that the bridges and the roadways in which people are going to be traveling over are going to be safe enough. So they will be asked to

shelter in place at that point. The road signs, any type of debris or flying debris that might result from hurricane or gale force winds obviously has to be secured or else it becomes a problem during that time. So 72 hours out, you have to start evacuating.

And then the last number would be four hours. Four hours before the gale force winds hit the State of New Jersey, you would have to start tying everything down. Now, when we start talking about numbers like 96 hours, 72 hours, as far as gale force winds hitting this state, it becomes a political issue. Because most of the time these storms are off the coast of either South Carolina or Florida at that time and it will be traveling up the coast. Now, as we've seen in weather patterns in the history of New Jersey, I believe the last time we were hit with a major hurricane was '55. Was Diana the last one or was it--

MS. LECKNER: Well, it depends if you're talking direct hurricane or not--

SERGEANT POPE: Exactly.

MS. LECKNER: --and whether or not Floyd was actually a hurricane.

SERGEANT POPE: Right.

MS. LECKNER: But Floyd would be the last hurricane-type event.

SERGEANT POPE: Tropical depression.

MS. LECKNER: Isabel impacted Cape May a little bit, but no direct hits.

MR. McCALL: Hurricane Gloria was--

MS. LECKNER: Inland rainfall.

SERGEANT POPE: We could consider that a tropical depression at the time, I believe, when it came to New Jersey.

MS. LECKNER: Gary can address the--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: They always make me do this. I'm sorry. I apologize. Blame the Office of Legislative Services. We welcome your input. You have to speak into the microphones. Pop up for a second. Sure, come on up.

That just goes for anybody in the audience. If you're called upon to speak, please, because we really want to keep everything recorded. Just feel free to just hop right up and get in front of the microphone, identify who you are.

GARY S. SZATKOWSKI: All right.

Good morning, again, to the Task Force.

My name is Gary Szatkowski. I'm the Chief Meteorologist with the National Weather Service over in Mt. Holly.

Again, regarding the question, yes. There's been a number of near misses. But if you want, I think for coastal areas, because this has been, I think, what the Task Force has been focusing on, I really go back to the hurricane in 1944. Because even though that wasn't a direct hit on New Jersey, it brought hurricane force winds to the Jersey shore, for much of the Jersey shore, and it did a lot of things. It breached barrier islands, took out the fishing piers, took out portions of boardwalk, caused a lot of property damage. And so that kind of -- we've had some other ones that came in and produced some brief gusts and produced some flooding. But if you want kind of like a real -- for those who went through it and felt like, yes, that was really a hurricane that we went through -- 1944.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I know that -- this is just an aside -- the '62 nor'easter was obviously not a hurricane. Which did more damage -- and I know it was a different kind of damage -- the '44 or '62?

MR. SZATKOWSKI: I think the '62, because of the longevity of the storm. It just wouldn't go away. It went through four or five tidal cycles.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay. Okay.

Any other questions for Gary? (no response)

Okay, thank you.

MR. SZATKOWSKI: All right. Thank you.

SERGEANT POPE: So, as you can see, we are not inundated as a state with hurricane events -- thank God -- on a regular basis, such as Florida, Louisiana, and the Carolinas would usually be -- are the states in the United States that would be affected more often by hurricanes.

So what we have is a 96-hour window in the State of New Jersey to start evacuations for special needs populations within Ocean and Monmouth counties. The storm at that time would reasonably be on the coast of either South Carolina, Northern Florida, which would give us about five days to start evacuating that population.

Here comes the political aspect of it. Who has the courage to order an evacuation of the New Jersey shore during a Summer month of August -- our prime time for tourism in this state -- who has the political courage to start that order?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Assemblyman Rumpf told me he does. (laughter)

SERGEANT POPE: Okay. As long as we know who is going to make that order--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Now we know. We're going to put that in legislation as well. (laughter)

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: All right.

SERGEANT POPE: Because, as we've seen time and time again, as these hurricanes start tracking up our East Coast, it suddenly might veer off to the right and we might only get the tail end of it, meaning heavy rains and maybe some sustained winds for a few hours. But the worst-case scenario -- at a Category 1 through 3, or a Category 4 -- hurricane hitting our coast would be disastrous in the low-lying areas, and especially as far as evacuation is concerned, especially for special needs populations.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Do we realistically -- and anybody up here can answer this -- I mean, real world now. Do we realistically think we would ever start that evacuation four days out?

MS. LECKNER: Never.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I can't imagine that.

MR. SEVER: No.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

MR. SEVER: It will never happen.

MS. LECKNER: It has to go with the forecast. One thing to consider also, again, is the forecast. And I was thinking this morning, when I was getting ready, the crux of this really for me goes back to the tide telemetry system. If we don't have the ability to predict wave heights and know where things are going to happen, none of these plans and none of

these orders are really necessarily going to be accurate. We'd have to make sure that we know what's happening. And making sure that we have the plans and the exercises definitely help us meet each other and know what's going on, but we've got to have the data. If we lose systems that provide us the data, it doesn't matter anyway.

With 96 hours out, there's not enough confidence in the forecast. I would say 24 to 36 hours for looking at enough confidence for somebody to actually say, "Yes, we really think this is coming our way." I don't think in my opinion and my experience, and my experience with other states -- 96 hours isn't an option.

In New Orleans, the Army Corps of Engineers had calculated their reverse lane evacuation over the city at 72 hours. They evacuated all but 150,000 people, roughly, of the 2-point-whatever million people in 36 hours -- thank God -- with the lane reversal. But again, even there -- and people blamed the Governor, blamed this, blamed that -- I don't realistically see that people would even heed an evacuation order 96 hours out. I'm in the business, and I certainly wouldn't. I would want to say, "Hey, wait until 36 hours. Let me see what that two-day forecast is, then make decisions." I don't think people will move. I think it's best to plan for what you believe will happen, not plan for what you want to happen. Because what you--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And Mariana, that's my point.

MS. LECKNER: Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And realistically -- and I don't mean to be irreverent here but -- we talk about that 96 hours. We base

plans upon that 96 hours that I've been hearing and learning about as we've gotten through those hearings. I don't understand the efficacy of that. Because anybody I've spoken to -- most especially off the record -- says, "It's not going to happen." Ninety-six hours is not going to happen. So in a sense, I mean again, just from whatever we recommend from this Task Force, which everybody will agree upon, I don't know that we should recommend or base anything upon 96 hours, nor do I really think that the State of New Jersey should. Because I just can't see it happening.

SERGEANT POPE: Okay. Senator, I'm sorry--

Mariana-- And believe me, 96 hours is not something that I came up--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And that's not being critical of you. No, I know.

SERGEANT POPE: This is something that we exercise. This is something that the counties--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Absolutely.

MS. LECKNER: Yes.

SERGEANT POPE: --and the local governments have stated is a requirement for them to fulfill that mission -- to go out and get those people and remove them from the area. They would need 96 hours. That's not something that the State Police has come up with. That is a figure that the counties have adopted into their own plans in saying that we have to start thinking about getting these people out 96 hours prior to an event

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I absolutely know that. And again, that wasn't being critical.

SERGEANT POPE: Oh, no.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: As just for us to discuss-- To be realistic, I don't really understand that, because it seems to me that the storm would never-- I always share, with Mr. McCall here, remembering a storm when I was on the Board of Freeholders, and the difficulty with the State of New Jersey and county government. It was very difficult to call the storm, because you're impacting people's lives. You're impacting their revenue, especially if it's the wrong time of year. You call a storm that doesn't happen -- you call it four days out and it doesn't happen, and you start moving people out-- Not only all the costs associated with moving them out--

SERGEANT POPE: Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: --but the affect that you can have on local businesses and everything else.

SERGEANT POPE: It's huge.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: It is huge.

So realistically, to me -- I've often wondered about this -- it doesn't seem like that would happen. And my bigger question for everyone is why we base plans on 96 hours.

MS. LECKNER: We shouldn't. It's a theoretical-- And I try to always encourage people to plan on the reality of it. There are things you can do 96 hours out. What you can do is, you can test your call-out lists. You can get the phone calls going, the conference calls going. You can have the Red Cross and CERT teams and other volunteers go to special needs facilities and start working with people to make go-kits. Now, they sell the big Zip-loc bags, instead of just the little ones -- or backpacks or anything. There are things, I think, that you can plan between the 96 hours and the

36 hours, and then things you plan from, say, even 48 hours down to hour zero, which is really four hours before landfall. It's just a matter of the reality of it. I think that the effort is so difficult to coordinate though, when you say, "What is it we're going to do?" And maybe this goes back to what Dave is saying, where it really needs to come from higher to say, "You know, the most practical thing for us to do is, at 96 hours to 72 hours, this is what we recommend your municipality to do, this is what we recommend the county to do, this is what we recommend the State do." From 72 to whatever, break it down into increments or just by days. If people don't like thinking in hours say, "At day No. 6, or day No. 5, or day No. 4."

But one thing that I always encourage every municipality, every county to do: when you see a storm off the coast of Florida, no matter where it's going, try your call-out lists. See who you can't get a hold off. See which generator doesn't start. Go out, see if all your generators-- Pump up all these things, because that's going to save time at hour 36 when you do actually call it. The other thing is, you can't start the reversals that far in advance. You can't start the evacuations, but -- people still have to go to work. You have to have tractor trailers able to bring gasoline in. You have to have the vans bringing in prescriptions and things to the grocery stores. You can't close the roadways to evacuate that far out. It's not practical to social organizations. People are not going to heed it. And truck traffic is very important, not just to our economy, but we're a transit state. We start closing our roadways for reversals and reverse the Parkway, now you're impacting -- people in New York can't get their pharmaceuticals and people down in Delaware and Maryland aren't getting things that are

supposed to be coming from up north. It's a greater issue than what does it take to get people out of this area.

And again, it's "run from the water, hide from the wind." We don't have to move the entire state of New Jersey into Pennsylvania. We need to move people out of storm surge areas into stable facilities. It doesn't have to be across the Delaware River or it doesn't have to be 50 miles inland. Run from the water, hide from the wind. I think we need to think about what is realistic and what we can actually handle. Educate people about the process; that we will expect them to have go-kits, and blankets, and pillows. Work on those sorts of steps.

Personal opinion.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Very good. Very good.

MR. McCALL: Mr. Chair?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes, Mr. McCall.

MR. McCALL: If I may?

Dave makes some dramatic but very, very influential points here that need to be considered. And it's not so much the challenge to who is going to make the call, as to what resources are available once that call gets made. There's a whole -- we talk about infrastructure -- there's a whole infrastructure that needs to be set in place once it's determined who is going to make the call. And whoever that person is, is going to have to feel very, very confident and very, very secure that once that decision is made that there is an infrastructure of resources that is going to allow that evacuation to take place.

We've had a number of discussions over the years about who's going to do that. For example, in 1985 with Hurricane Gloria, that

evacuation call of Cape May County was a local call, and what was not taken into consideration with that call, rightfully or wrongfully -- and I'm not a Monday morning quarterback -- but there was no infrastructure outside of the county set in place to accommodate that call. When we take a look at some of the other discussions, and regardless of what the number is -- if it's 96, 72 or four hours out -- we in Cape May County do not have the resources to implement things like a counter-flow of the Garden State Parkway. We do not have the infrastructure, resource wise, to aid nursing homes to get out in a timely fashion. That's all left to their own devices. And if we're to take -- and I think my peers in emergency management continue to beg for what we refer to as the regional approach to emergency management: that once something is done and said, and we're going to evacuate, that there's an infrastructure that exists throughout the state that allows for the accommodation of residents being asked to leave and go somewhere. That includes-- And if we just start with the very, very basic-- We in Cape May County do not have the resources to implement a counter-flow of the Parkway. We're trying to negotiate with the State Police -- and there's a whole infrastructure at the State level -- it's the State Police, it's DOT, it's DEP, it's Department of Community Affairs -- need to be enjoined in all of this to make sure that there is an infrastructure of sheltering resources, there's an infrastructure of personnel that allows for a mass movement of folks.

I was not surprised to hear Gary relate numbers that are comparable to what Cape May County has. So if we're looking at 850,000 out of -- to a million out of Monmouth, we're suggesting 850,000 out of Cape May-- I'm sure Atlantic is going to have a number east of the

Parkway that's comparable to that, as, I'm certain, Ocean does. To be able to say that once it's defined, if it's the Governor who is going to make the decision, that that Governor has the ability to recognize that the infrastructure is set behind him to allow for this movement to take place. So I think that approach, starting with who does it-- I know the Cape May County Coordinator in 1985 was given that responsibility to call for an evacuation, and it did not have regional support.

The Governor at this point in time, if we're talking about someone giving statutory authority or the courage to do that, I don't believe has the support to be able to effectuate this effectively today.

SERGEANT POPE: Because of the home rule policy?

MR. McCALL: Yes.

SERGEANT POPE: Yes.

MS. LECKNER: That's not actually the law. New Jersey State law -- at local levels, municipal levels, county levels, and State levels -- anybody can call for an evacuation who is, by their law, allowed to do so. So at local, it's usually the mayor, the emergency management coordinator, whoever the mayor gives the power to -- the county, it's freeholders, or OEM coordinator, sheriff, etc., state -- the Governor gives that to the GAR. And they're equal to -- equal in weight -- the penalties for not heeding a mandatory evacuation for the general public are the same, whether it's an evacuation that's called locally, county, or state.

The thing with the lane reversals is that that plan is owned and maintained dually by the DOT and OEM. And so it's called for at the State level. The county cannot call a reversal, the locals cannot call a reversal. The county and locals can certainly evacuate.

A second clarification with Monmouth: Monmouth may have the population of a million, but when you look at the numbers, the demographics on a Category 1, there are 16,000 households vulnerable to storm surge in Monmouth County; 174,000 in a Category 4. It's not a million people per county that are evacuating -- again, run from the water, hide from the wind. The storm surge maps are tied in, in a GIS fashion, with layers to show how many households. It doesn't go by people, but -- households. You can do some extrapolation for the exact demographics, but 174,000 households in New Jersey, I think, has an average of 2.6 people per household. You can do that.

Cape May is different, because in a Category -- pretty much a Category 1 or 2, you will be moving the entire county. Atlantic, Monmouth, and Ocean are not that way.

MR. McCALL: And your point is well-taken, Mariana, and it goes back to what -- how are we going to supply or support the infrastructure of resources and personnel that's needed to effectuate all of that? If the local coordinator makes the call, we can accommodate that one town at the county level. If we make the call on behalf of 16 municipalities, currently I don't believe there's an infrastructure set in place that allows for an accommodation of that evacuation.

MS. LECKNER: Yes. And I agree with you. I think regional planning is the way to go. I don't think it's a simple thing. Because again, when we look at these maps, we can't be misled into thinking it's the entire county and that every county is going to have the same thing. These maps are drawn up so that each town, storm surge height, and number of people evacuated -- is if they are the worst in that event. This a montage, I

guess, of all the worst-case possible scenarios all the way up. So if the worst-case scenario -- if the storm is actually coming up the Delaware and making it a worst-case scenario for Cape May, you may have no evacuations really necessary in some areas -- say inside Sandy Hook and some of these areas. Whereas, if the storm was going parallel up the shore, Cape May may not have as much inundation, where you might have some other problems in other areas. The SLOSH models are actually a dynamic model that can be run in an animation, so you can actually put them in different directions and see where things are going. And I think the planning needs to take that into account. But regionally, if the storm has certain characteristics -- this is how scenario *A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H*-- I mean, there are so many different scenarios. The entire coast will be affected just because of the smallness of the state. But keep in mind that the worst-case scenario on the SLOSH is built as a montage of each one having the worst possible thing happen to it. So obviously, with the peninsula of Cape May, that puts it in a different category, and Long Beach Island is in a different category. Ocean has a huge problem with that. But I think you're right. It's regional planning, and it does take a lot of thought. It takes a lot of science behind it and then looking at the resources of what is needed.

Sorry Dave, for just rolling over you.

SERGEANT POPE: No.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: No. Very good. Actually, a very good conversation.

Thank you for your testimony. (laughter)

No, no. It was--

SERGEANT POPE: And I understand what Frank is saying. As far as -- and I understand what Mariana is saying as well -- there is a need, though, for State-level input as far as advisories and as far as commitment to evacuating certain parts of the population.

Let's face it. The State carries a lot more weight-- When New Jersey OEM makes an advisory that you are to evacuate or you should start thinking about evacuating, that should be placed into the process. And all the weight should not be placed on the counties or the local OEMs to determine whether or not that advisory would go out to their citizens in that region. And that's -- I wasn't trying to get away from home rule. I understand New Jersey's home rule better than anybody.

MS. LECKNER: No, and I agree with you.

SERGEANT POPE: So, I mean as far as--

MS. LECKNER: Dave, you know I agree-- Dave and I have worked many, many, many hours together. And you know I agree with you. I was just saying that the law currently doesn't state that.

SERGEANT POPE: Right.

MS. LECKNER: The law currently says everybody can do their-- And it's not a home rule thing, more Federal. But it's just, it's -- that's how the law states. Yes, it's not coordinated.

SERGEANT POPE: Right. And that's what -- one of the things that came out of our exercising is that there should be that cooperation, coordination between the Governor's Office, New Jersey OEM, the county OEMs, and the local OEMS -- is that everybody is on the same page as far as advisories. And perhaps it should come down from on top,

instead of the local OEM having the onus of putting that advisory out to their citizens. That was just one of the suggestions.

But if I may move on to another point. Another thing that I've heard this panel and this Task Force discuss is numbers. And that was another thing that was brought up as a result of our exercise -- is that in the past, New Jersey Department of Tourism, or I believe it was some department in Commerce, would have reasonably accurate numbers for the counties as far as their influx of tourism during any given season, especially during the Summer season. Whenever we asked people like Monmouth, or Ocean, or Atlantic, or even Cape May for that matter, do they have accurate numbers on how many people are in their jurisdictions at any given time during the Summer, they can give us estimates. But these estimates were usually refined at the State level. Previous to -- I believe it was two administrations ago, they stopped taking the census numbers as far as for shore communities during Summer months. And as far as the influx of the amount of people that are coming into the Jersey shore on a Wednesday, as opposed to a Saturday, it's a rather significant number. Not only as far as people, but as far as traffic that would be utilizing our roadways should we be required to use them for an evacuation in a 36-hour time period.

So this was another thing that was brought about, or was brought to light as far as our exercise was concerned -- is that we don't really have accurate numbers, or numbers that the counties and the local governments can rely on, as far as evacuating populations; which was provided to them in the past at the State level, whether it was the

Department of Tourism or the Department of Commerce. I'm not sure exactly where those came from.

Are there any questions as far as that's concerned? (no response) No. Okay.

One of the other items that we brought up was the strengthening of-- We realized that during any type of an evacuation notice that there would be a declaration by the Governor. And in that declaration, obviously, the State and the county OEMs would have a lot of input into what would be going into that declaration. We found that during an evacuation with a possible hurricane that boats and trailers would be a major issue for reverse lane, for counter-flow operations. It's something that would need to be strengthened at the legislative end. It would be something that during the course of an emergency -- and I am sure that it would say it within the declaration by the Governor -- that no boats or trailers may be used on the reverse lane roadways at this time. But to tighten that up legislatively, to say that State, county, and local governments can confiscate those trailers if they are to be brought onto the roadways during an evacuation or proceeding an evacuation. I don't have to tell you what would happen if gale force winds -- and we have boats and trailers out on our roadways. Every has a good imagination, so we can just skip over that. As far as your job and something that you could look into, would be legislatively addressing that issue.

Getting back to -- and I don't want to beat this dead horse -- but as far as local issues, one of the things that we found during our exercises is that-- When you're talking about Ocean County-- And I'm sorry that Ocean is not here -- it's just Monmouth.

MR. RUPERT: Yes.

MR. SEVER: He's right here.

SERGEANT POPE: Oh, I'm sorry.

When we're talking about Ocean County, we're talking-- When we're talking about State Highway 72, primarily, and their responsibilities during an evacuation, those bridges that go from the mainland of New Jersey out onto Long Beach Island are controlled by local governments -- namely, Stafford Township. And they would be tasked with creating traffic patterns for a reverse lane to evacuate that area. So it wasn't clear -- and I'm sorry if I -- but it was not clear as far as whether Stafford Township is the -- whether they initiate the evacuation order or the reverse lane, or whether it came from the State. Now granted, if it came from the State and it came from the Governor in form of a declaration, then obviously the local government would adhere to the declaration and start the reverse lane. But it is controlled locally by Stafford Township. Those bridges that -- those causeways that go over Barnegat Bay. So that was another issue that needs to be refined and addressed, as far as whether it would come from the county making the declaration to start the reverse lane across the 72 bridges -- the causeway coming from Long Beach Island -- or whether it would be Stafford Township or the State.

Did you wish to address that?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Any comment on that, Wayne?

MR. RUPERT: Yes. We have worked with the municipalities on Long Beach Island and Stafford Township, and Barnegat Township -- because that's the next town up -- as well as with the State Police Office of

Emergency Management on that issue. And it felt that if we're going to have to issue an evacuation order for the island, we'll go into that mode at that time. We'll go into that reverse lane. The idea being to get as many people off of that island as we possibly can in the shortest amount of time. When we're looking at the numbers that you quoted before, what we try to do with folks down there is, "Yes, there's a hurricane coming. If you're not comfortable, leave." And we always tell them, there's no prize for being the last guy off the island. All right? We try to get-- Our basic philosophy is, try to get the renters -- let them go home. Let them get off the island and go home. And then the residents. Now, getting the long-term residents off Long Beach Island is like trying to pull teeth. I've been on the island 30 years, and I've not drowned yet.

SERGEANT POPE: The operative word *yet*.

MR. RUPERT: Yet. (laughter)

MS. LECKNER: That's the prize if you don't get off.

MR. RUPERT: Yes. But once we have done this-- And what we do on these things is, we do it in coordination with the State Office of Emergency Management through a series of conference calls to all of the counties, and we start expressing our concerns to the State and say, "Hey, look. We really think we've got to get these guys off the island. If this thing continues on its present course, at a certain time in the future we are going to make a decision to have an evacuation, and we'll notify you at that time, and we expect your support." And it's not done in a vacuum.

SERGEANT POPE: As we said, we only-- And Mr. Rupert, I don't wish to be critical here. We deal with plans. If it's not written in a plan, it doesn't exist to us in the exercise support team. So if it's not

memorialized in a plan, that's what our function is, is to incorporate these into your emergency operation plans. And that was just one of the suggestions.

MR. RUPERT: Yes. I think one of the things that everybody does need to recognize when it comes to plans, as General Eisenhower said, "Plans are nothing, planning is everything."

SERGEANT POPE: Exactly, exactly.

MR. RUPERT: And there's a certain point at which you look at the plan and you say, "Yes, I know I'm supposed to do this, but right now I'm flying by the seat of my pants because of a situation that occurred that nobody was able to foresee."

SERGEANT POPE: Right.

MR. RUPERT: And those things do happen.

SERGEANT POPE: But as far as the plan is concerned--

MS. LECKNER: It's in the Stafford plan. What it is, is it was a three-phase-- It started because--

SERGEANT POPE: I understand that.

MS. LECKNER: Yes.

SERGEANT POPE: But it's not memorialized in the State plan as far as the--

MS. LECKNER: Because-- Let me explain why.

MR. RUPERT: It is in the county plan.

MS. LECKNER: It is in the county, it's in the local. Because what it is, is that they-- It would be before the State makes their decision, Ocean and Stafford and the towns on Long Beach Island figured they're going to make a decision, which they can under New Jersey law, and so

what they-- Stafford was the original one to develop the reversal just to get people across the causeway, not to send them all the way out to Red Lion or anywhere else like that. The State plan comes in when the desire is to get people out there. Stafford, and the county, and the towns of Long Beach Island have their plan for emptying the island if the State takes no action; which again, they're actually required to have some kind of plan by law. So it's written in their plan. The reason it's not in the State plan is because the State doesn't manage that. Stafford and Ocean -- Ocean would notify-- When the State says, "Hey, we're going to call it--"

SERGEANT POPE: It's not even mentioned in the State plan as far as the county -- deferring to the county or the local. And that's what I was addressing, is that we--

MS. LECKNER: It's not the same event, that's why.

SERGEANT POPE: Okay.

MS. LECKNER: The State reversal is separate and apart from their ability and their plans for emptying the island into Stafford Township. Again, the State plan is to move people all the way across 72.

SERGEANT POPE: Right.

MS. LECKNER: The Stafford plan, the county plan is just to take people off the island. So there are two separate plans.

MR. RUPERT: And we did have State input into those plans at the time.

SERGEANT POPE: Right.

MR. RUPERT: The delivery.

SERGEANT POPE: I'm just saying, in our after-action report after the evaluation team's -- suggestion was that it be tightened up in the

State EOP, as far as on our end. I'm not saying-- I'm not putting the onus on you at the township or at the county level at all. I'm saying as far as the State. We were testing the State plan. We weren't testing the local plans during this.

I'll just finish up with one other point that we found was necessary. And that was a family plan for our emergency response personnel -- that there should be, on the county level, State level, a plan that puts into account the families of the emergency response personnel that will be effecting an evacuation or any type of an emergency event. Because as we found in Katrina, what happens when emergency response personnel, who are not sworn members, are required to come to an event? They're at home trying to get their families squared away to get them out. If there's no plan in place for them, if they don't require that plans be initiated on the county or local level -- that each emergency responder have an evacuation plan for their family -- then we are missing that personnel that would be required to effectuate either an evacuation or some sort of an emergency response.

This is something that came up during-- It wasn't something that was to be tested. It wasn't one of our objectives. It came out during the course of the exercise. And I thought it was so substantial that I should bring it up to you now -- is that there should be-- The State of New Jersey shouldn't have -- or should learn from the mistakes of other people's disasters, such as Katrina, where we found that emergency responders were more concerned with the welfare of their families than the welfare of the citizenry. And I don't think that the Senator would find any fault with that. But there could be a step in there for State, county, and local

governments to address a shortcoming, where we require, or advise, suggest that every emergency responder -- whether it be from the New Jersey State Police, whether it be the civilian personnel of New Jersey OEM, or the county OEMs, or whether it even be people like DOT who would be intrinsic in any type of an evacuation -- reverse lane or any type of mass migration across the state. DOT is not sworn members, and they are not required by law to be there.

And Lisa, I'm sure, will probably come and address that. Lisa, did you want to come up and address that issue as far as personnel and DOT?

Lisa Webber, from New Jersey DOT.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thought you were safe, didn't you, Lisa?

L I S A A N N W E B B E R: Lisa Webber, from the Department of Transportation. He's correct. We have 1,500 people in operations that support the State Police during disasters, and none of them -- even though they're required, they're essential personnel, and we tell them that they are required to be at disasters, there's nothing that is going to say that they have to be there. If they don't want to be there, which we saw even during -- when it was the budget situation -- they got annoyed because we told them that they're essential employees, and then they said, "We're essential, and now you're telling us we don't have to come to work." So if we tell them that they're essential-- And they're going to put their families first before they put someone they don't know. So we have to have a plan in place for them so that we can tell them that their families are taken care of.

It's a very important issue. It's come up over at Homeland Security at many of the presentations there. A lot of the speakers that have come -- that they have seen that in many places before: that if you want your people to come and take care of issues, that you need to make sure that the workers have their families taken care of.

SERGEANT POPE: Senator, that really-- I'd like to bring up Frank Manghisi now, from my unit. He'll speak a little bit about Atlantic County and Cape May County. They weren't reverse lane per se -- they had 47 and 347, which they exercise on a tabletop level. But he said they had some ancillary issues that they wanted to cover, and I'll hand it over to Frank.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you.

MR. McCALL: Mr. Chairman?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

MR. McCALL: Before Dave goes--

The point that Mariana brings up, I think, is a really terrific point, and it lends itself so well to having this umbrella -- under the regional approach to emergency management -- when it comes to evacuations. Everybody needs to go somewhere. Little old Avalon -- a little town in Monmouth County -- they're going somewhere. And I think, on a regional basis, we need to know how that either counter-flow or just the evacuation of that community is going to affect other communities in their traffic patterns. So I think the more we can expand it into a superstructure of an evacuation process, and lay the whole state out as if it were one entity -- forgetting the jurisdictional prerogatives for this discussion -- lay it out as one entity, so there's an understanding of what the impact of a given

community or county will be on another community or county throughout the state. And I think that's someplace, Dave, I think we're all trying to get to.

SERGEANT POPE: Sure. And just in closing, Senator, I made copies -- I didn't know how many people were going to be on the Task Force. When you exercise, you create an after-action report. I'm sure you're aware of that. I made, I believe, six copies of the "ACE of Spades," which was the evacuation for Ocean, Monmouth, and Burlington counties. And I also made the matrix, and I know that this is what everybody flips to first -- is the matrix -- so they can-- It has the tasks, the recommendations, and I made 11 copies of those. I'll pass those out to your members or I'll leave them here for you to be passed out.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Leave them with Mr. Kelly.

Thank you.

SERGEANT POPE: Okay. So you can peruse them at your leisure.

I'm sorry, Frank.

SERGEANT FRANK T. MANGHISI: Thanks, Dave.

Good morning.

I'm Frank Manghisi. I'm Dave's counterpart. I also work in the exercise unit for the State Police. Todd Berger wasn't able to be here today. He actually was the facilitator for the Atlantic County exercise. I know that, from reading Todd's after-action report, some of their pitfalls were crossover roadways if we were to go to a reverse lane strategy and a unified command. I think we come into the problem-- We're depending on the severity of the storm -- whether we have one reverse lane strategy or a

conglomerate of all scenarios depending on how bad the storm is going to be. If we wind up implementing all the reverse lane strategies at one time, we come into a unified-command or a communications problem. How are those individuals -- law enforcement, fire, EMS -- going to communicate with each other, that are actually out at the post? We do have a good relationship with everybody -- county, and State level, and municipality level -- where the leadership will be able to communicate, but that is getting all that information out to the people out in the road -- when to start the reverse lane strategy and when to terminate the reverse lane strategy, not to come into a problem where we have cars left out on the roadway.

I know why-- I've heard -- Dave has stolen a lot of thunder, I'm sure, which I was happy about -- but we talked about the 96-, 72-, 36-hour time frame. And I think working with Frank -- myself and Frank McCall were co-facilitators on an exercise that we conducted in Cape May County where we had over 300 participants. We ran a series of exercises starting on June 13 and ending on August 22. What was great about the exercise is we created an awareness, if anything. We brought in the private sector, we brought in campgrounds. The marinas we brought in, the ferry. We brought in a lot of individuals that shed some light on the issue. And actually, there was resources there that we could tap into that we really didn't even realize we had.

On the flip side of that, on the negative side, I think one of the biggest issues that we came across were resource issues. There's nearly not enough resources -- and I know Frank keeps going back to that regional approach. And Frank knows that between all these gap analyses that are being conducted now -- I think FEMA Region II is conducting one -- if we

have a storm and it involves other states that are on the East Coast, we're going to have a problem with gaining these resources just for New Jersey. So we can't depend on that. We have to do this gap analysis at the State level and the county level. I'm not privy to the results and what those gap analyses have provided, and I don't know if they've been completed. But I think where we come into that problem is for resources in general, and every municipality conveyed that during every week of that exercise that we showed up at Cape May County and the EOC.

Another issue, similar to what Dave said, was family preparedness for our emergency workers. Cape May is in a very unique location, being the sixth most vulnerable area in the country when it comes to evacuations or trying to get out of that area -- right behind the Florida Keys. So I think to them, to Cape May County, it's a major concern. They're going to have a dual role as emergency workers and victims. They're going to be victims at the same time. Their families are going to be there. We have to find a way to get them out and to have a staging area for those law enforcement, fire, EMS officials.

I think the good thing that came out of our exercise was that we have defined certain staging areas -- to move resources and equipment to Woodbine Developmental Center was one of them, and the Cape May Airport. Another great thing that came out of the exercise was -- I spoke to Frank about this morning -- is there's been local agreements that have been cemented right now. I don't know if-- Have they been completed?

MR. McCALL: They're in the process.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: They're in the process of being completed. So it's not just something where, like Dave said, we exercise

plans not people. These are things that are going to go down, and we're going to write them and we're going to put them in a plan now. Before it was known to some individuals that, "Yes, Woodbine may have been a good spot to go to," but now they're going to try to have that local agreement and contract put in place. So there were some good things that came out of the exercise.

We did not focus on solely the reverse lane strategy. What we did was, we gave a Category 3 scenario and we went through public notification of preparedness reentry recovery. What we did after that was, we brought in Prosecutor Taylor, from Cape May, and he gave about a 30-minute block on what the plan was, to give an awareness to every municipality and every member of that county -- what we would do with the reverse lane strategy of the Garden State Parkway. And what we found, once again, is it's very labor-intensive and very resource-intensive. And Frank knows, as well as I know, that it will have to be a regional approach, and a lot hinges on this gap analysis of whether we can actually conduct a reverse lane strategy on the Parkway.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay. So if I was to ask you, very directly, a couple of questions -- some you may even be able to answer, and some you may not. One, how long a period of time could the reverse lane strategy be in place? And we always use that Cat 3 storm, without water impinging and not allowing traffic to flow -- would be my first question. My second question is, if a Category 3 storm was to hit tomorrow, would we use the lane reversal strategy on the Garden State Parkway or not? And thirdly, would we use lane reversal not only on the

Parkway, but also on the Route 47/55 corridor down south? And I'm sorry to give you so many questions -- we'll go back over them.

How is that-- I always think of this funnel effect. In other words, if you're moving them out of Cape May, then you hit Atlantic County. You've got the Expressway area, and you're moving all the people out of the casinos. Then you move up to Ocean County -- where does it block up? Where does it get relief? Has there been a coordinated strategy from county to county on how we move these people out? I'm still trying to get this straight in my head.

This is the one part-- You know, if there's anything that comes out of this Task Force, I just don't -- hopefully, it won't be just a book that sits on a shelf and gets dusty like everything else -- that there could be at least a few recommendations that come out that are very practical. You know, we should build Route 55. It's not going to happen tomorrow. We should, I'm sure, do a lot more with Route 72. That's not going to happen, perhaps, tomorrow either. But what can we do functionally that, if a storm hit next year, would actually make this better? That's what we want to know in real terms.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: Okay. First and foremost, I think -- not to belabor -- but we're talking about the time frame. We looked at reverse lane strategies, and I've seen it written down several times that it is the last resort. And the other thing that Mariana alluded to earlier is the time from that 96-hour window. There is a lot that goes on at that time -- they're on conference calls and whatnot. The Prosecutor Taylor says that his reverse lane strategy on the Parkway alone takes four hours -- a minimum of four hours just to set up. So we have to once again have

confidence in the forecast. A collaborative effort -- it's not going to be the superintendent or the colonel. Whether he makes a call to say, "Let's do this or do that," he's on conference calls with at least 75 other people, including taking into account HURRIVAC, the National Weather Service -- this collaborative effort. So a decision is going to be made by many. One person may have the voice, but the decision is going to be made by many.

I think the time frame is an issue with me, sir, so I don't have an exact answer for you, if that's what you're asking for.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: The issue with the time frame to me -- again, just being a layperson, just listening now over a good number of hours, is that -- and I think the Committee will discuss that. But the 96 hours is not really practical. It just isn't a practical time frame.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: And I agree with that.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And I think, except for the things that you spoke of -- I think there are some areas that both of them spoke of where you can get ready, you can get prepared. Any of the stuff that you would have needed to get done later, you can get done earlier. That's a good thing. I know the politics of it. I know the way that it works. You're not going to evacuate people out. Even special needs people you are not going to evacuate them out 96 hours ahead of time.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: That's where the number is. I'm sorry, Senator, I didn't mean to interject.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: But that's what the number relates to.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I know it does.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: Special needs. It doesn't relate to the general population.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I don't see that. And maybe I misunderstand and maybe I'm not seeing that-- I don't see that happening 96 hours out.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: Right. But I have to tell you that there is good news as far as that's concerned. That the counties, as far as Ocean, Monmouth, and Burlington counties, have identified the areas and have reached out to those communities to make sure that they are included -- or that they're included in their databases as far as evacuations and needs that they would need in order to get those people out of those communities. Identifying them and identifying their needs. I think that the counties are doing a great job in being proactive in identifying those members in our society that would require county or State, or even local government, help to evacuate. And then put it out to them. Do you wish to go to a facility? Do you wish to leave your homes? And that's -- as we said.

MS. LECKNER: That's actually a very important point. Because right now that is voluntary in the State of New Jersey. When you get to places like Florida, it's actually mandatory. It's mandatory for communities to provide a special needs registry. It's voluntary in the State of New Jersey. There was legislation in, that I saw just before I left State Police, but it didn't have the word *mandatory* in it, and it said that the registry would be coordinated by the Court Clerk, or something bizarre like that; where it really should be local police, local OEM, because they're the ones that would be retrieving those people. A problem in that -- and the planning is fantastic -- the problem on the flip side of that is, two of the

most resistant populations to leave their home -- the literally shut-off-the-lights-and-hide type people -- are elderly and special needs. Very fearful of leaving their home, and especially if they're special needs where they're relying on all sorts of equipment, bars, things like that in their home. So it's a double-edged sword. The planning actually can be very easy and very progressive, but the flip side is actually trying to convince individuals to register. They're afraid of violations of HIPAA laws, all sorts of stuff.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: What I'm saying though, Mariana, is shouldn't the model be changed if we realistically know?

MS. LECKNER: Yes. Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Right.

MS. LECKNER: I believe so.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: It's not going to be 96 hours--

MS. LECKNER: Yes -- no.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: --so shouldn't we be true to ourselves? This is not your fault. That's what you've been told.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: Right. No, I understand.

SERGEANT POPE: We're testers; we're not planners.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Exactly. But I mean, shouldn't we be true--

SERGEANT POPE: Mariana -- she wrote it, sir. She wrote it.
(laughter)

MS. LECKNER: No, I didn't. I have nothing to do with it. I've been saying plan realistically -- 36 hours -- for years and years and years and years.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: So let's really know what we're up against, because the 96 isn't going to happen. So everything even that happens 48 hours out, and 36 hours out, and 24 hours out in our plans, if I understand it right, is based upon the fact that you already would have done certain -- initiatives would have taken place at 96 hours out that really aren't going to happen. So that affects the plan later on. So I don't know why we do that.

MS. LECKNER: I'm actually surprised, because I've never heard of that before. State Police, when I was there, never used 96 hours. We used five days out -- we would start coordination with DOT, with the counties, that sort of thing. We never talked about moving people outside of 36 hours. This is actually the first I've heard of it.

SERGEANT POPE: No. That would be the initiation of special needs population, that's--

MS. LECKNER: And even then we didn't do special needs outside of 36 hours. Now, back then also, there wasn't this new initiative in the four counties with special needs. But the plan back then was always within 36 hours.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: And when you talk about clearance times -- correct me if I'm wrong, Mariana -- people look at clearance times differently. Clearance from the storm surge, out of harm's way, or clearance times where -- out of the county or out of the state? I mean, are you back to your home? You have a tourist population that Frank alluded to earlier. We could have 800,000 people in Cape May at peak tourist season. I know you had the statistic of over three days in a row over 90 degrees. There's

the probability or possibility you may have a million people in Cape May County. Whether that's true or not, I think--

MS. LECKNER: When the Corps of Engineers says clearance times and the lane reversal, that has a very specific definition, actually. And I think you're right. I think everybody is using their own definition of what's clearance -- clearing the state, clearing this, clearing that. The clearance times that are associated with those maps are from the time the evacuation order is called to that four hours where you stop it prior to the onset of tropical storm-force winds. That's what the Army Corps calculates that you will need in order to take those people -- start and stop the evacuation. In theory, if it 36 hours, if it's a Category 3 and the clearance comes at 36 hours, that means that 40 hours out, essentially, you could start your prep-up. Do your four-hour prep that's standard for all the reversals. And at 36 hours you call that evacuation. And at 32 hours (*sic*) you stop your evacuation and you spend the next four hours getting everything off the road. The Corps of Engineers are very specific that that clearance time does include making that roadway free. Is that going to happen? No. That's another thing. There are always going to be people stuck on the road, that sort of thing, people who delay the evacuation, people who refuse and decide at the last minute now they want to get out. They're the ones who are stuck. Anybody who falls within that evacuation order, and if it's carried out correctly-- And again, the Corps calculations for New Orleans were 72 hours, and it only took 36, which is a great thing. You don't want it to go the other direction.

Also, with the Category 1 and 2 storms -- Frank also alluded to this -- the reason that the Corps doesn't recommend doing them for

Category 1 and 2 is because it doesn't wash in the cost-benefit analysis. If your evacuation time is less than 20 hours, the engineering recommendation is to do a regular evacuation. Because in the four hours it takes to set up and the four hours it takes to take down, now you're actually almost doubling-- You can-- You know, if you've only got a 10-hour evacuation in Monmouth -- in a Category 1, I think is 10 hours -- you're actually almost doubling your evacuation time, plus personnel, and everything else. So that's why it's Category 3 for that.

But you bring up some good points with that. Everybody is using their own definition of clearance time, and I think maybe there should be a guide with terminology so that people realize what -- this clearance time may not be the same as somebody who wrote a plan in some municipality -- what they're considering clearance time. It's not clearance of people to New York, or Pennsylvania, or wherever their home is; it's clearance of that roadway from point *A* to point *B* of the reversal, period.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: And I think special needs, from everything that we've gathered, is going to be our main component. Not just the registry, because I think we're on board with that. I think we are identifying who is in what counties. That's not going to be the problem. Once we find out who we have and where we have them, it's going to be when do we get them out. Because I know you have fixed facilities -- Cape May Regional Hospital and-- What's your other hospital in that area? You have a second.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Shore Memorial, it's in Atlantic County.

MR. McTIGHE: And we have 11 fixed-facility health care.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: And not to throw in a wrench or anything, but the South Region representative, Pat Gorman, he was involved with this exercise with myself and Frank. And they go on response calls from time to time. He had a response call where they had to move five to seven, or five to 10 special needs people, and he said the monumental task of just moving 10 people with special needs was unbelievable, the amount of resources. So I think what we have to look at now is, once we have these people identified, is maybe exercising or training on how we are going to move these people in a faster time.

MS. LECKNER: I recommend you talk with Atlantic City. They actually, in the past 10 years, twice have had to evacuate a tower, a residential facility -- I believe Section 8 -- with primarily special needs personnel. The first time they did it, they had no plan and it took them about 12, 14 hours. They just did it, I think, two years ago, a year and a half ago -- and I can give you the guy's name, actually, who is in charge of this -- and they did it in like three hours. But they actually had a plan. So it's possible, but it does take sometimes two people, two responders per individual.

MR. McTIGHE: Another big issue is pets and animals. A lot of our special needs and a lot of our seniors have animals. And they're not going to leave their homes unless Fluffy is with us, so that's another big issue.

Another thing, we have Monmouth Race Track and we have Freehold Race Track, with thoroughbred million-dollar horses during the Summer. So that's another part that we've been working on with the breeders. I know that they'll probably get out ahead of time, but that's

another issue. You've got these horse trailers with these million-dollar horses getting out of here -- that's another thing we have to look at.

SERGEANT POPE: Yes.

And, Senator, just to let you know that exercising is an ongoing process: During our two tabletops, we split ours in half, we didn't cover that issue. There are a multitude of issues that would happen during any type of an evacuation.

MR. McTIGHE: Yes.

SERGEANT POPE: We have outstanding people at New Jersey OEM that work on these issues. People like Kathy Lear, who is our pet sheltering--

MR. McTIGHE: Right. The CART.

SERGEANT POPE: And CART. Yes, as far as-- And we have CERT, and we could have brought in a lot of different participants. And what we did was, we started the process last Spring with the evacuation and reverse lane. Obviously, during the Summer months, it's very hard for Monmouth, Ocean, and Cape May, and Atlantic counties to do their regular business and exercise on top of their regular responsibilities and roles during the summertime. So we were hoping that in the beginning of this year we would start kicking off our response and our recovery type of exercises, doing tabletop exercises; and somewhere in the future, hopefully in next Fall after the hurricane season is over, work it into a functional exercise at the Battle Lab down in Fort Dix. So this is an ongoing process.

And as Mr. McTighe has said is, that yes, there are some issues that have not been addressed in our exercises that were just conducted in the Spring, but they will be addressed in future exercises.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay.

One quick question, last question. As of now, would the lane reversal be used on the Parkway if a Category 3 hit tomorrow? Does it work; we're not sure yet?

SERGEANT POPE: I think the best person to address that question would be the person that would be -- the person that would order it. And seeing that there is no plan, you would ask the Governor that. Ask the Governor and the Director of New Jersey OEM -- would be Rick Fuentes, and his deputy is Acting Major--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: What a good answer, what a good answer. (laughter)

SERGEANT POPE: I guess he's still a captain -- is--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: You've got a future in the State Senate as well. (laughter)

SERGEANT POPE: These are the people who are going to make those decisions.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you very much.

SERGEANT POPE: Thank you for your time.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Any other questions from the Committee?

Mr. McCall.

MR. McCALL: If I may? When we talk about the evacuation, and we talk about a regional approach and say -- in a framework of connecting the roadways between the municipalities and the counties and throughout the state, and regardless of what the time frame is-- And Mariana, the 96 hours come out of DHSS, and they're rethinking that. But

if we're talking about an evacuation of a special needs population, the question that I have to ask regionally-- I don't have the confidence today that there are facilities or shelters set up that can accommodate the special needs population. And if I just pick on little old Cape May for a second, and I say we've got somewhere around 25,000 who in some way, shape, or form fall under the special needs population category, and I'm to ask them to go someplace or order them to go someplace, there is not a definition of where they can go and where they can be housed to meet their special needs accommodations. And if that's the first population we're moving, and then we talk about evacuating the other folks-- And you're right, we're not working with a million people. We're probably working with 25,000 to 30,000 people, and we're going to ask those people to go-- We're going to evacuate the county and we're going to go to a shelter. I think the first question that they're going to do is raise their hand and say, "Well, what shelter am I going to?" And I don't suspect -- and I don't say this critically, it just doesn't -- it's not part of the plan. There is not an identification of locations to go to. And then if you do pick a building, what's the assurance that you're going to have the sufficient number of personnel trained to be able to manage that building or that shelter? And that's again, I think -- I keep going back to the regional approach to emergency management. I think we should be able to define this on a large map somewhere and say, "Cape May, you're going to evacuate. And here's a region, and there's going to be 100 shelters set up and we think we can open 75, or 60, or 50 of them." I don't think we can do that today.

MS. LECKNER: I think that also you need to look at the legislative responsibility for sheltering -- does not fall to NJ OEM, does not

-- even for the regional or statewide sheltering -- does not fall to the counties. It's a -- DCA has primary responsibility, with DHS having secondary responsibility. What they choose to do is, they use the Red Cross -- which is a voluntary use; they do not have to. You can use any organization you want to primarily run the shelters in New Jersey. What that means is that if a shelter is requested, it goes to the Red Cross. If the Red Cross is unable to open that shelter, then a secondary organization is selected, such as the Salvation Army, such as a municipality, such as Dave's house, or whatever, for that shelter. I think that there is a huge need -- this is personal opinion, I'm only representing myself -- a huge need to look at that.

Frank, I agree with you 100 percent, there should be a shelter task force, because that is a complete and separate issue. It has-- Again, NJ OEM doesn't even have -- even if Dave came up with a plan tomorrow, and NJ OEM came up with a plan tomorrow, unless DCA and DHS said, "Yes, we like that plan," it would not go into effect. They don't have the authority there. It's a matter of seeing who has the authority. This has been an issue for years. I started out in this probably 12 years ago with the Red Cross. And it's always been an issue because of the fact nobody wants to take that hot potato. And there are no special needs shelters, medical-- Sometimes they're called *special needs shelters*, sometimes *special needs medical shelters*. There are none in the State of New Jersey. I'm actually, right now -- yesterday I was working on preparing some guidance for Salem County, in case they want to start it. They're normally run through departments of health in states -- Florida and other states are run through department of health -- not through OEM, because of critical nature, those sorts of things.

The transportation is a part of that also. Usually the special needs transportation, special medical needs sheltering go hand in hand. And I think that's something to address with DHS, with DHSS, and with DCA.

MR. McTIGHE: Mr. Chairman?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

MR. McTIGHE: As part of Monmouth County's plan, we have our CERT teams, which are our Community Emergency Response Teams, that work directly with the Red Cross sheltering and getting trained. We also have our MRC, which is our Medical Reserve Corps, through our Health Department. So as part of our plan, we do have those people. We have over 800 in Monmouth County, and we have 300 medical staff -- which could be a nurse, could be a doctor -- on board to help us out if we do need extra resources. So that's part of it.

We've been working with the Red Cross looking at special needs, and even the animal shelters. So if we have to do that, or put something together, we're looking at our Medical Reserve Corps, our CERT teams to help us out with that.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: So you kind of feel that you're ready if it happens, from that special needs?

MR. McTIGHE: Well, we-- I'm not saying we're there 100 percent, but we are working on that, because we're looking at different avenues, like I said. Our Monmouth County Health Department and our MRC, Medical Reserve Corps, is helping us. We have our CERT teams on board getting trained through the Red Cross in shelter management. So hopefully it will help us out.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay. Thank you very much.

SERGEANT POPE: Thank you, sir.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: Thank you, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you.

Yes? Come forward.

MS. WEBBER: I'm Lisa Webber. I just wanted to add -- on that issue you were just talking about on special needs -- that the State Police has a task force, a Special Needs Task Force, that has representatives from several agencies: from Office of Preparedness, Special Needs from Department of Health, from Department of Transportation, quite a few different agencies. They've actually received grant moneys to identify where the people with special needs are in the different counties.

MR. McTIGHE: Right. Through Delta. That Delta has the grant.

MS. WEBBER: Yes. And we've been meeting to identify these people.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Which is identifying where they are, but not where we're going to put them yet.

MS. WEBBER: Actually, that's some of the next steps. They're actually setting up pilots for those different needs. There's different steps that we're going to follow. First we're identifying where they all are; and then part of the process is transportation -- how we would get them from where they are to where the locations are, once we identify where we can put them -- how we would get them there. And also, one of the things you mentioned is, who could take care of them in the locations, because these people will need specially trained people to take care of them in the shelters. You can't have just anybody in the shelters taking care of

them, they need special people, special nurses, doctors at the shelters. It's not a regular shelter.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Questions?

MR. SEVER: The question I had in all--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I know Mr. Rupert did, as well. I think he was first in order, then--

MR. RUPERT: Okay, there's a couple things that bother me. First of all, I think that the nursing homes, particularly, should -- as a cost of doing business -- have a plan to move their people with their personnel.

MS. LECKNER: They're legally mandated to.

MR. RUPERT: Yes. And they should be doing that. They shouldn't be relying on the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management or the county offices to relocate their residents. That's just a cost of doing business, as far as I'm concerned. And I also think that they need to move their personnel--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Does anybody know-- They are supposed to. Do we check that they have it and that it is functional?

MS. LECKNER: It's a licensing requirement--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

MS. LECKNER: --and it's supposed to be reviewed when they get their license. But it's not developed as well as it should be.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Probably--

MS. LECKNER: What's basically checked is, can they evacuate people, sort of fire-drill style; and they don't really look at can they bring them somewhere else. A lot of nursing homes do have mutual agreements,

but it might be with somebody in the same town. So if your town is inundated, you're going to move your people to this--

MR. RUPERT: We've had to move folks. During that big forest fire down in the southern part of Ocean County, we had to move a couple of nursing homes. And there were plans in place. One of the problems we came across was that they were relying on local first aid squads and other ambulance providers to move some of their people who were not ambulatory. And those ambulances were tied up handling emergencies generated by the fire. I think that-- Something on the nature of a hurricane, you can talk about all the mutual aid plans that the New Jersey State First Aid Council has -- and it's wonderful and in some cases it will work fine -- but something that's going to impact the entire State of New Jersey is going to keep those ambulances in their own hometown handling their problems. And that's only right.

As I said, those long-term care facilities need to have their own plan in place approved by the DHSS and the Health Department that, really, the Emergency Management shouldn't have to worry about beyond, "Did they get out?"

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: They have them, make sure they work.

Joe is next.

MR. SEVER: Yes. I had a couple comments.

I wanted to talk about the plans we dealt with recently within the last year. We had a facility that had a fire, and we had to do an evacuation at one of the facilities. They had agreements with basically a lot of their sister facilities, which were scattered all over the state, to which --

took our resources to other counties, transporting the people. So that's an issue. I think if they're going to review these plans, I think they need to come into the counties' offices of emergency management so we can look at all the facilities within our county to make sure that they're not using -- relying on the same resources, the same ambulance firms, and so on, that do all their transportation.

The second thing is -- it's troubling to me -- is that a lot of facilities, when they become -- when they know an event is going to happen -- hurricane scenarios, so on, northeast storm -- a lot of the medical facilities, particularly hospitals, go into a mode where they're downsizing or releasing patients that can be sent home to home health care, to reduce their population so that they can take other hospital's population from the Jersey Shore inland, particularly in Cumberland County. We have a hospital that is reviewing that procedure as we speak. The problem is they're sending individuals out to home health care, and we're sitting here talking about nursing homes and hospitals, but we're not talking about the home health-care issues -- that you can have individuals as sick in an home health-care atmosphere as you would have in a nursing home, because they have resources, can take care of them at home. So when we're talking about evacuation and we're talking about a special needs population and a shelter, and we're talking about making or identifying them -- but who manages them? Who takes the ultimate responsibility? I have met with my Red Cross Chapter on a number of cases, and every time their answer is, they are not in that business. They take care of the general population, not people with special needs. Where are we putting these special needs?

That's the question I have. Because we're struggling with that in our county, the same issue.

And we did something that I don't know if other counties did. We took some of our Homeland Security funds and we're using a portion of our Homeland Security funds this year to look at sheltering operations in Cumberland County, identifying facilities, and actually having a firm come out and evaluate those facilities for wind loads and different things like that.

MS. WEBBER: Right. That's some of the grant moneys that were being used.

MR. SEVER: But then my question is, where are we going to put them -- the special needs? We're saying we're going to identify facilities, but who's going to manage those facilities?

MS. LECKNER: And that's what I'm saying. Usually it falls under, in other states-- Again, New Jersey has no precedent. We have no county who does it right now. But in other states, it's health--

MR. SEVER: The Red Cross is still not in that business, right?

MS. LECKNER: No.

MR. SEVER: Okay.

J A S O N K I N G S L E Y: Hi. I'm Jason Kingsley. I'm the State liaison for the Red Cross to New Jersey.

A couple of things with the special needs. First is, we haven't gotten a consistent definition from anybody on exactly what special needs is. The definition ranges from people who are completely invalid, or on ventilator dependent, all the way to "I'm deaf, I'm blind," that sort -- all being categorized, depending on who you're talking to. I most recently

spoke to -- or was at a meeting where the New Jersey State Police spoke, and one of the representatives said, "If you're homeless or financially disabled, you're technically--" Or not financially disabled, financially--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: That would put most of New Jersey in special needs, financially--

MR. KINGSLEY: Exactly. And his point was, this pretty much broadens the spectrum to include almost everybody into special needs. So what I wanted to say was the Red Cross is basically looking at-- You mentioned medical special needs. If you at home can take care of yourself on a regular day-to-day basis without considerable medical assistance, you're completely appropriate to be in the shelter. Deaf is fine, blind is fine, in a wheelchair is fine. If you can get yourself onto a toilet and take care of yourself basically that way, you're completely appropriate in a Red Cross shelter.

The ones that we can't take into the shelter include those who require specialized medical assistance -- basically one-on-one care from a doctor, a nurse, or a special aide. Because although we will have a nurse, or a few nurses in our shelter, the potential is we're going to have hundreds or even thousands of people in the shelter, and the ratio is just terrible for that one nurse. In our shelters, our nurses are almost more public-health oriented. They want to watch for major contagious diseases coming in. If you come in and you're having a basic complaint, they are going to evaluate you for appropriateness to be in that shelter. And if you are not appropriate for some reason, some medical condition going on, they will then refer you to whichever unit the county or the State has designated at that point. So the biggest issue with us in special needs is figuring out just

what that definition is. So when I say *special needs*, you all are thinking exactly the same thing I am.

Again, most special needs people, according to the State's new definition -- if that was the official one -- most of them are actually welcome in the shelters. The ones we can't do are the ones that need that specialized individual medical assistance.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Understood.

MR. KINGSLEY: Are we in the business of special needs? Not medical special needs, but if you open up a medical special needs shelter, we can support it with equipment, with cots and blankets. We can even co-locate a special needs shelter. So if we have a large facility where the Red Cross has a shelter on this side and there's some kind of physical barrier -- so it's shown that this special needs section is not Red Cross-managed, we can work with caterers, we can do all kinds of feeding, we can provide some of the cots and the blankets, we can feed the people, we can feed the staff. We just have to have it known that there is a physical separation -- this side is Red Cross-managed, this side is managed by whoever the government has decided is responsible for that. So I just wanted to make that clear, because a lot of people have a very wrong impression that the Red Cross just isn't interested in dealing with special needs folks. The fact is, we don't have the medical capability to deal with somebody who needs one-on-one, individualized care when our shelters may have hundreds or thousands of people in them.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Well, I think that's a good point; and I think, as both Wayne and Mariana pointed out, there are some responsibilities in these facilities -- are ready to locate other facilities where

they could go, and be able to get them there. However, we're not sure if they are really completely fulfilling their mandate to do that, number one. And secondly, I'm not sure if I understand how practical that is. In other words, is it really -- this isn't your issue -- but would they be using tools, would they be using vehicles, would they be using facilities that in a practical storm would be almost in as bad a shape, or could be having the same conditions that they do? So one of the recommendations of this Task Force might be to fine-tune that in a way that really, again, practically works. That's something that's within our purview that we should be able to do, even with the given resources that we have now.

I think what they said makes sense. I mean, that should be their responsibility. There are going to be so many other responsibilities in that type of a storm, that at least the responsibility of a facility should be: "We know how we're going to get them there, we know we're going to move them, we know when we're going to do it -- once we're given the go-ahead that we need to do it and that we have both the vehicles, the equipment, and a facility that really could harbor them in a safe way." That should be something that we need to work on. That is something that is actually very doable, I think, again without committing more State resources.

So I thank you for your input.

Gary, I think you had something else? (no response)

Frank, was that--

MR. McCALL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With the fixed facilities -- and it's not a Red Cross responsibility -- but very clearly, in the licensure of those out of DHSS, it puts the onus and responsibility for the evacuation on the emergency

management community. You appropriately suggested that the emergency management community may not have the resources or wherewithal to do this. And it very clearly -- and it comes out statutorily in the licensing -- puts the onus responsibility back on the nursing home to accomplish their evacuation. And if you do the numbers -- it's private industry, it's private business, and this is America -- but if you do the numbers, and it's four grand a month to stay in a facility, you take 200 people in a facility per month and you multiply that by 12 months a year, I think for a little over \$9 million they should have the ability to be able to take care of those folks on a sunny day, and then be able to take care of those folks when the folks that they are charged with -- for the care of -- are in a desperate need.

There is no staying power in the emergency management community to enforce that. We don't have enforcement jurisdiction, as emergency management and coordinators. That clearly lies on those who issue those licenses.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes. And I think we can reinforce that and fine-tune that in some ways -- hopefully, legislatively -- or at least recommend that.

Vice Chairman.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: I don't think I have anything to add.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay.

Thank you very much.

Okay, we have -- T. J. Wagner is here, from the State Police. Are you just observing and helping, assisting?

TROOPER THOMAS J. WAGNER: (speaking from audience) Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay. Thank you for being here.

And we have Mr. Nelsen, Kenneth Nelsen, from New Jersey DOC.

LIEUTENANT KENNETH NELSEN: Good afternoon.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: How are you?

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Good.

I was asked by Michelle Hammel, our Legislative Liaison, to come in and give you a brief overview on the Department of Corrections and our evacuation plans for a coastal emergency.

A little bit about the unit. I'm currently the unit head for a Special Operations Group -- our group is comprised of a canine unit, hostage negotiators, fire arms unit, and then a tactical team -- which is in excess right now of 225 officers. We also recently started an emergency management branch for our unit. Our unit handles any escapes, disturbances. Any time an institution loses their lighting, we're called in if their generators aren't working. Mass evacuations we handle, and emergency planning. We'll also work with outside law enforcement agencies, whether it's supplying them canine units or the State Police during like the Republican National Convention, things like that.

Our Department currently has 14 main facilities across seven counties. There's also some smaller satellite units, one up at Stokes State Forest in Sussex County, and things like that. The facilities currently have in excess of 23,000 inmates, and they're basically cities within cities. Each

facility is required to have emergency operations plans. The plans range from escape plans to plans for work stoppages, whether it's staff doing the work stoppages or inmates. We deal with fire plans, large disturbance plans; and mass evacuation, which I believe is the topic today.

All of our plans are an all-hazard approach. So if we have to move a large quantity of inmates for a fire, it's one plan. For a coastal emergency or a hurricane, the same plan is used for that. Each facility is required to have 72 hours of food on hand for their population. Now, one of the things we get into is if we have to move one facility to another, they're not going to be able to support a full 72 hours for two facilities for food and things like that.

I think our biggest concern, when we talk about coastal emergencies, is from Mr. Sever's county in Cumberland County -- the Southern State Correctional Facility. Southern State is made up of all trailers, which gives us a problem any time we incur large winds, things like that. I believe it was 2003 or 2004, we did evacuate the entire facility, and it was moved to South Woods State Prison, also in Bridgeton, in Cumberland County. The evacuation at that time took over 12 hours to complete. So listening to the discussion today about reverse lane operations, talking 96, 72, 36 hours in advance, our Department would have to be out before any type of a reverse lane operation started. And very simply, we don't have the resources to move the entire facility -- Southern State, say for example, that has 2,200 inmates, to South Woods -- in one shot. We're talking trips back and forth with buses, security details, check points along the way, things like that. So we would need to be out before that.

Now, as Assemblyman Van Drew said, realistically are we going to move the inmates 96 hours in advance? No. Our Commissioner and I don't think the Governor's Office would make that determination, because it is a large dollar figure that you're talking about to move 2,200 inmates. So again, it would be a last-minute type thing; hopefully 36 hours in advance. But what if the storm turns? We're at the same thing, now that we just moved 2,200 inmates and they're not going to be affected.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: There is a specific plan in place for moving them though? In other words, when you do -- when the call is made, and yes, you've got to move them out, you've got a whole system in place I would assume.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Yes, sir.

Each institution is required to have a mass evacuation plan, whether it's in Cumberland County, right up to Essex County. Each facility has a set plan how they go about it. And most of the plans pretty much say that the Special Operations Group will come in and run the evacuation. But they get into very specific things: who's moving the inmates' medical records, who's taking their bedding -- because another institution isn't going to have 2,300 extra mattresses laying around for them. Their medications is probably the biggest thing. Some inmates are allowed to keep certain medications on them. Others, like anti-depressant medications, things like that, they're not allowed to keep. So again, we have to move our pharmacies from one institution to the next because they're not going to have enough to supply their institution and the other inmates that we're moving there.

ASSEMBLYMAN RUMPF: If I may, what did you mean when you said Southern State is comprised entirely of trailers?

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: All the units are trailers there. There's a couple main buildings, basically a visitor hall, an administration building, and stuff like that; but nothing that houses the inmates.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Because of fiscal reasons, they were supposed to be temporary, never were made permanent, and for fiscal reasons we've never had-- I've had legislation in to put a permanent facility in there, and obviously you know the numbers -- what's going on with the State budget -- those dollars aren't there. There's even been fires, as you know, in the past.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And actually, they've been refurbished to make them more secure and better. They are beyond their life expectancy, again, where they should have been.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: They already should not even be there any more. They're more of a temporary nature. However, again the dollars aren't there. And so we've had to utilize them.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: And there's several facilities that have the trailers, too. It's not just Southern State. Southern State is the biggest one, because it's comprised mostly of all trailers.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: What's the most vulnerable facility to a storm, do you happen to know?

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Southern State.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Southern State.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Definitely. Because the winds -- they're in a flood-prone area. And I'd follow that up with Bayside, which is right next door to it. The good thing about Bayside is the buildings are more structurally sound. They're block, cement, things like that. But definitely Southern State.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: For those that don't know this, this is the eastern part of Cumberland County, affected by the bay.

Michelle, how are you?

MICHELLE WARNER HAMMEL, ESQ.: Hi. Michelle Hammel, the Director of External Affairs for the Department of Corrections.

Assemblyman Rumpf, just to your concerns-- I mean, the Department does continually make capital budget requests to improve the structure. So I don't want you to think that just because it hasn't happened we are not aware of it, that we're not trying to do something. Our Division of Administration has continually updated through our capital budget planning process, and does a continual needs assessment about what our structural deficiencies are.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Cumberland County alone has over 7,500 inmates housed there in the three facilities. And that being one of the counties that we're talking about coastal flooding, it is a major concern for us. And it depends on the nature and the level of the storm where we're going to move them. Some of the plans now call for one institution to move to the next. But if it's a major storm affecting all three of those, now you're talking moving 7,500 inmates to the north. So it is a problem, and financially it's going to be huge.

And then as far as Southern State goes, if we lose the trailers because of the storm, now we have over 2,000 inmates that we have to house in other locations.

But again, getting back to the plans, every institution has a plan. I know the guys from the exercise support team won't like to hear it, but it's one of those plans that never gets exercised because it's pretty hard to move 2,200 inmates to make sure it works.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Is there anything in your mind other than actually moving them -- which I could understand, in a sense, why it doesn't get exercised, because of the cost factors and everything else. Is there anything else that we should do? Form an exercise that wouldn't be extremely expensive, that would be practical to make sure that the systems in place work and are good? Do you know what I mean? In other words, if we're to make a recommendation, a practical recommendation, would you say, "Gee, I wish we could do this to really ensure that we're doing this the right way." This is not a critical question. It's actually to try to help.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Right, right. I don't know if there--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: You don't have to answer that now. You can always send us something.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Yes. I don't know if there is one, really.

MS. HAMMEL: I know we've done tabletop exercises. Let us take that back to the Commissioner and see, from the Commissioner and Operations and Administration, what they think would be most helpful, and we will get back to you.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay, good.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: (standing) I was just going to bring up an actual occurrence.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: You have to identify yourself again for them.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: I'm sorry.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: It's okay.

SERGEANT MANGHISI: Frank Manghisi, from the State Police.

I just want to want to bring an actual occurrence up. I know you had to move a large number of inmates from Essex County Jail to the new facility, when Doremus Avenue opened up. So maybe take a look at some of the pitfalls and some of the obstacles there were of that actual move. I know there were several inmates you had to move at one time when they constructed the new facility. I mean, I know it wasn't under emergency situations, but I know there was a lot of logistical efforts that went into that. I know the State Police personnel -- we were tapped in to try to assist with that. So it kind of tapped on some of our resources as well. Maybe look at that. I'm sure somebody did an after-action plan on that. Just some food for thought.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: The desire of the Task Force -- and I know that you do, and that's why it's to reassure everybody here -- was to ensure that there's a system in place. You know, residents, constituents worst imagination is, "My God, not only does the hurricane hit and all these other things are happening, all of a sudden there are prisoners running loose because we don't have that under control." And I know that

we do. But it would be interesting if there's anything that we can do to make that more fluid for you or to help.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Right. I can pretty much assure you, you won't see any of our inmates on any overpasses during the hurricane, but--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Exactly.

Make a great movie, though, wouldn't it? (laughter)

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Yes.

MS. HAMMEL: And again, in addition to our Special Operations Group, we have an entire central transportation unit at the Department of Corrections, who -- their sole function is to move inmates all day, every day, for court trips, for medical trips, for inmates who have disciplinary infractions at one facility and need to move to another, special needs inmates who need to be moved from a facility to another location that has more appropriate treatment for them. So it's a coordinated effort, not just Special Operations, which oversees all of our emergency planning. But we already have a function in place. It's not like this will be the first time we've ever moved inmates.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Sure.

MS. HAMMEL: Inmates are moved all day, every day, by people who are specially trained in--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Who notifies you all? I mean, how do you fall into the link when all these notifications are going out? Frank? Wayne?

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Because we're a State agency, we do fall under Emergency Management.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Actually, it would be Joe.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: We do have representatives that go to Emergency Management when the ROC is activated. And then the State EOC -- we do staff the State EOC with them -- so we have liaisons there. We get all the weather reports that come out from the ROC, and things like that, that we monitor.

As far as the mass movement of inmates, after we moved Southern State, there was an after-action report. One of the things that took so long was the fact that we had to ID the inmates two or three times before they left the building, and then again when they got there. Since that move, the Department has more computers and stuff like that. Whereas the move took 12 hours before, we're confident that it could be done in less than eight hours now. And again, we said, "Okay. Why are we identifying them three times before they leave the facility?" Identify them before they leave and identify them when they get there.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: If you have time left over, you can move the folks out of the nursing homes.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Exactly.

We do have handicapped buses and things like that, because of the inmates.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you.

Joe, did you have any thoughts? I mean, these are the facts -- I think one out of every four incarcerated individuals is incarcerated in Cumberland County.

MR. SEVER: We were just talking about State institutions. I also have a Federal institution. I have a county jail and a juvenile detention center -- that brings it up to right around 9,500 inmates per county.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: And I believe part of the county jail's evacuation plan included them moving to Bayside State Prison--

MR. SEVER: And to South Woods.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: --and to South Woods. Right.

MR. SEVER: South Woods, yes. We move over there if we have a problem.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: So there are MOUs for that.

MS. LECKNER: And the FCP for the 347 is Bayside, as well.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Right.

MR. McCALL: Mr. Chairman?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes. Mr. McCall.

MR. McCALL: The Cape May County Correctional Center, as you're well aware, is east of the Parkway. And between now-Marshall Plousis, myself, and the warden at the Correctional Center wrote the emergency operations plan for the evacuation of the Cape May County Correctional Center, which was built for 180 people. And as we speak today, there's over 300 inmates being housed there. Our plan calls for movement to the Bayside Prison for an evacuation of a storm. And we go through that-- We recently met with the emergency management community. I suspect, Joe, it was back in March or April? We met in Gloucester County with folks from Corrections to talk about the problems, not just with coastal evacuation but for any movement of Corrections' facilities today, under the general heading of Department of Homeland

Security issues or problems, if somebody had to move. The warden from Camden County -- and I forget the number, it was over 3,000 in the Camden County correction center -- wanted to know if they could come to Cape May County, if they had a problem, to house some of their people. So I think when you alluded to the trailers at Southern State and some of the other temporary facilities, I think Corrections becomes a major, major issue -- whether it's coastal evacuation or whether it's for other events that may fall under the Department of Homeland Security -- where I think there's a dramatic need to be able to address that circumstance.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Which brings up a good point, Mr. McCall. Is that all coordinated? In other words, they're going to move folks from Cumberland County institution, Cape May County institution to Bayside. Is that correct?

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And Southern State, if there was a problem, would go to South Woods?

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: But suppose Bayside had a problem? Is that all -- are we all communicating?

MR. SEVER: We communicate well with the Department of Corrections. We have a county LEPC meeting that they are regular participants in. They've exercised with us, and they're also very active in their municipal EOCs in Maurice River Township. So we have a great working relationship. And anything that goes on down there, we're notified. We get a phone call immediately, and they advise us.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And so the plans are coordinated as well -- is what I'm asking.

MR. SEVER: Oh, yes. We work together.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Is that correct?

MR. McCALL: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

And we actually took -- wrote the plan, tabletop exercised it, and we actually moved in one day, actually moved all the prisoners and all the sheriffs' officers from the Cape May County Correctional Center to Bayside. So that's been tested, and we think today that we're confident that we can do that. But what happens -- and I guess it's not our responsibility. I hate to say that, but we need to work with you if you're going to have a further relocation for some reason.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And you may not be able to answer this now -- if you could you get back to us if you can't. In a Category 3 storm, I know what happens to Southern State. What happens to Bayside? Is it pretty much okay, or are we not sure?

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: As far as winds and stuff?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: I think they would be okay. Flooding may be a different issue. We did have some bad flooding down there last year.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Because it still speaks to -- maybe the one piece of information-- It may be hard to actually put our finger on this, but what happens in that Cat 3 if we are moving people from Cumberland County and Cape May County -- and I know you'll have the responsibility of Southern State -- but what happens at Bayside, especially if

people are moving into Bayside, and actually you've got to move people out?

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: We would have to move our inmates up north further, whether it's the Trenton Prison--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And so would these?

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Right, right. But that would have to be something that we would work out. We can't expect-- And our Commissioner does oversee the county corrections. Responsibly, would he just tell them, "You guys are on your own"? Absolutely not. We would find room for them, whether it's in a gymnasium at one of the facilities further north, than that's what would have to be done. I don't think that's something that we can-- We can plan for it, but that's probably the worst-case scenario -- that we can't accept them at one of the facilities. But it's definitely something that we'll have to look at.

MS. LECKNER: I want to point out, though, also, to keep the perspective, nobody would be moved from the time it's tropical storm-force winds to after the storm is over. So that's before Category 1.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Right.

MS. LECKNER: So if people are at Bayside, they're going to be there -- flood up, flood down -- and then they'd be moved to a facility if Bayside suffers flood damage. The way to think about Bayside is, it's kind of built on a little mound, and what is expected and what shows up on the modeling is flooding around it and partially into some buildings. But they're sort of strategic locations -- like a forward command post for the lane reversal is actually there. And they do have the ability, for example, to receive helicopters post-storm, you know, if EOC types have to be

evacuated. And of course, the waters would recede relatively quickly after the storm. But from the time of tropical storm-force winds where there's no flooding, until the storm is over, whoever is there is there, period. No movement of prisoners or EOC personnel.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Do you know what I'm doing if we have a very bad storm? I'm finding Mariana. I'm following her wherever the heck she goes. (laughter)

MS. LECKNER: That's why I live in Pennsylvania. (laughter)

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: There you go. I'm only kidding.

Any other questions?

MS. LECKNER: I want to bring up a good point, a happy point, about Corrections. And I've worked very much with -- as was when Lieutenant Swain was in charge, or second in charge I should say -- but Corrections has 7,500, I believe, sworn officers -- somewhere in that.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Yes.

MS. LECKNER: So if nothing happens to Corrections, they are one of the best kept secrets in the State of New Jersey as far as resources go -- very hard workers, show up on time, do the job well, and again, are sworn officers. So always has been a great asset.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And I it well. I have a tremendous number of them in my district, as you all know, and I agree with you. And actually, sometimes underutilized. I think we could do more with our Corrections' officers to help in emergency situations.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Yes, definitely.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And they desire to do so.

MS. LECKNER: I believe they are underutilized, completely.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

MS. HAMMEL: And we've had extensive training on the emergency management, the NIMS training for the officers, for senior staff at the Department. Everyone has been trained.

MS. LECKNER: And they're used to dealing with angry people, which works well in an evacuation. (laughter)

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And the prisoners as well. (laughter)

Thank you very much for being here. Thank you.

LIEUTENANT NELSEN: Thank you.

MS. HAMMEL: Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay.

I don't think we have any further testimony. That is it.

First of all, I want to thank everybody on the Task Force for the wonderful work they've done. Each of you have really done a wonderful job and contributed a great deal. We are not done yet. What is going to happen now is, there is going to be a preparation of a good number of ideas and thoughts of what came out of this. You will receive that information, as well as eventually we're going to issue a final report. I want everybody's input, obviously, in that report. It's going to be in draft form before it's finalized. We wouldn't finalize it -- tell me if I'm going wrong -- without everybody pretty much being-- I want consensus on this, obviously.

Secondly, what I would very much like from everybody is a practical response to my question of: What is it that we can do, that isn't extremely costly, in the short term and make this work better? The one

area where I still have -- and maybe it's me, I'm not always the quickest on the uptake -- but I still wonder about the coordination of everything, number one, and how we can be more effectively coordinating what we need to do. Secondly, in the longer term -- which there would be expense involved infrastructure-wise -- what it is that you believe, in your various counties, communities, and so forth, to improve the situation as well. And any other input that you have.

The only thing that I really ask is -- I know we're going to have the long-term goals, which are good -- but I would love to have something in the short-term that really makes sense, that is very practical, that we can sell to the Governor's Office, that we can sell to the Legislature. And actually -- and again, I'm going to repeat myself -- but not have a Task Force document that sits and gets dusty and nothing has occurred from it. We've spoken about a lot of really good ideas. And I think if every person who is involved in the process could hear everything that happened over the course of these hearings, we would be the better for it; and that, hopefully, we can relate some of that and actually get some practical results from it.

What am I leaving out, Mr. Kelly?

MR. KELLY: I think you've got it all there.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay.

So I hope to hear from each and every one of you. Again, you will get some information from us. We may be able to just communicate through the Office of Legislative Services. If I feel that we need one more meeting because there is some divergent ideas that we can't agree upon, we might have one more meeting. Okay?

Thank you very much.

Happy holidays.

(MEETING CONCLUDED)