

NEW JERSEY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION

STATE HOUSE
TRENTON, NEW JERSEY

*To the Honorable Governor
and Legislature
of the State of New Jersey*

**Report on
Improved Rapid Transportation
for the Metropolitan Region
of New York and New Jersey**

JANUARY 14, 1952

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NEW JERSEY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION

REPORT NO. 1

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**REPORT ON
IMPROVED RAPID TRANSPORTATION
FOR THE METROPOLITAN REGION
OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY**

**Trenton
January 14, 1952**

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NEW JERSEY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION

State House, Trenton

New Jersey

January 14, 1952

**To His Excellency Governor Alfred E. Driscoll and Members of the
One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth Legislature:**

The New Jersey Regional Planning Commission was created under Senate Joint Resolution No. 4 of 1950. The purpose of the Commission was to study problems in the interest of the State and to make definite recommendations to the Governor and Legislature regarding the methods to be followed in the solution of these problems.

The Resolution provides:

That there be appointed a commission to consist of two members of the Senate to be appointed by the President thereof, two members of the House of Assembly to be appointed by the Speaker thereof and five citizens of the State to be appointed by the Governor, to study and recommend to the Governor and Legislature a program designed to provide one or more regional intrastate agencies empowered to perfect and implement plans for supplying the regional projects and services, other than water supply and sewage disposal, deemed necessary in the public interest; said program shall recommend the projects or services subject thereto, and the nature, qualifications and powers of the regional agency or agencies to be created for the effectuation thereof; it being the intent of this resolution that said commission shall

(a) review the reports and recommendations of the various commissions which have in the past years surveyed our regional problems;

(b) prepare a summary of the present and prospective needs of the State, as a whole, with a recommended order of priority and plan of regional financing by which these needs may be met with a minimum of ultimate cost to the taxpayers of the region or regions affected; and

(c) submit specific recommendations for the creation of an agency or agencies qualified and empowered to make and carry out definite plans for the financing, acquisition, construction and operation of the regional works and services necessary to meet public needs in the most economical and efficient manner, such recommendation, however, shall not pertain to works and services involving water supplies and sewage disposal.

The Commission organized on September 28, 1950. At this time Senator David Van Alstyne, Jr., of Bergen County, was elected Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Kenneth J. Hanau of Upper Montclair was elected Vice-Chairman, and Mr. Emerson L. Travis of Morristown, Secretary.

The Commission commenced its work by examining various metropolitan problems coming within the scope of S. J. R. No. 4. It was early decided that one of the most outstanding and neglected of these was the lack of adequate rapid transportation facilities for the metropolitan region of New York and New Jersey.

Rather than examining various problems, and reporting in general terms, it seemed wiser to concentrate on a single important project. As a consequence, this report will be designated as the:

REPORT ON
IMPROVED RAPID TRANSPORTATION
FOR THE METROPOLITAN REGION
OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY

* * *

In order to become acquainted with the transportation needs of the people affected, and to determine what should be done to provide the facilities that would serve these needs, the Commission first wished to know what efforts had been made in the past to solve this problem, what was accomplished, and finally, what must be done today.

The many efforts made by various individuals, groups, and official bodies during the last sixty years, and particularly the last thirty years, were outlined by experts in the field. The Commission was provided with copies of official reports made to the State of New Jersey by the North Jersey Transit Commission, the Port of New York Authority, and by Colonel L. Alfred Jenny, a Consulting Engineer and a specialist in this field, as well as publications of the Regional Plan Association of New York. These reports were carefully studied and discussed.

Representatives of various active commuter organizations were invited to meet with the Commission so as to more fully acquaint the members with specific problems and requirements. These discussions were most helpful. They disclosed the difficult plight of our commuters, the unreasonable time consumed in traveling between homes in New Jersey and places of business in New York, the many transfers required from one mode of transportation to another, of the unsatisfactory service, and the considerable cost of transportation involved.

From the study made it is evident that this serious problem has been needlessly neglected and that facilities should have been created long ago to provide direct rail connections between northern New Jersey and mid-Manhattan. Some of our suburban railroads should have been electrified, more frequent train service should have been provided over these facilities into New York, and last, but not least, ways and means should have been provided to furnish more direct and more adequate intrastate rail facilities, particularly between the northern counties of the State and the City of Newark.

Some planners have seen the need for all of this. They have made proposals and recommendations for solving these problems. But no group has yet had the courage to implement a program of action.

RAILROAD HISTORY

The railroads serving the New York Metropolitan Region in New Jersey were built about one hundred years ago. They formed a part of the plan of linking the city of New York with all other regions of the country. The Hudson River, located along the boundary line between New Jersey and the city of New York, formed a barrier to the creation of a direct railroad link with the city. This barrier was surmounted by providing a ferryboat service to enable these railroads to convey passengers directly to the city of New York, and thus be able to claim service to and from that city.

Although a century has elapsed since the creation of these railroads, we are still using this outmoded and antiquated century-old system of conveying passengers between the city of New York and the waterfront termin-

als of these railroads in New Jersey. When the tremendous progress made in the field of transportation, or in the field of engineering is considered, particularly in the construction of huge bridges or in sub-aqueous tunnels, it is hard to understand why the greatest city in the world is still served by this century-old, and in many instances dilapidated, ferry system.

The Pennsylvania railroad built tunnels under the Hudson river and brought its passengers to a modern station in mid-Manhattan. It has benefitted tremendously from this foresight, and the courage it displayed. The other eight railroads, namely the West Shore, New York Ontario and Western (via West Shore tracks), the Erie with its several branches or subsidiaries, Lackawanna with its Boonton Branch, Lehigh Valley, Baltimore and Ohio, and the Central Railroad of New Jersey (with the Reading operating over its tracks as Central of New Jersey) were thus left stranded on the Jersey shore.

The Hudson and Manhattan Railroad was built with the encouragement of the Pennsylvania Railroad. It was designed to relieve the Pennsylvania commuter traffic and to permit the Pennsylvania Station in New York to serve primarily the long distance traffic. This furnished some relief for the Erie, Lackawanna and Pennsylvania passengers. But the other railroads were left dependent upon the century-old ferry system—a sorry condition in this modern age of high speed, and transportation miracles.

It should be pointed out here that, even though some relief was thus given to the above named three carriers, this did not relieve them of the necessity of continuing their ferry services. Such service was a part of the franchises granted to these railroads to provide transportation to and from the city of New York. Therefore, until some method is provided for bringing all these passengers into New York on rails, these ferry systems must be kept in operation by the railroads.

The waterfront terminals of these railroads, with the exception of the West Shore Railroad, were located opposite lower Manhattan which, one hundred years ago, was the business center of the city. With the development of mid-Manhattan as a business center, this latter region grew to such

an extent as to outstrip lower Manhattan. The result is that today, about two-thirds of our travelers have destinations between 11th and 59th Streets in Manhattan. This makes it necessary for many of our people from North Jersey points, or points in Rockland and Orange Counties in the State of New York, to first travel south in New Jersey to Jersey City, then over to New York City, and then north to their destination in mid-Manhattan, a roundabout, clumsy, costly and time-wasting method of transportation. When this trend toward mid-Manhattan was observed, something should have been done to bring the railroads directly into mid-Manhattan, as did the Pennsylvania Railroad, so as to more adequately serve our people. One hour per day could thus be saved in traveling time, to say nothing of avoiding many commuter hardships.

PREVIOUS EFFORTS MADE TO SOLVE THE RAILROAD PROBLEM

The great need for solving this acute railroad problem was recognized long ago, and many private as well as public efforts have been made to arrive at some proper solution. The problem received official recognition in 1917 when the States of New Jersey and New York entered into a compact, creating, what was later called, the Port of New York Authority with a mandate to solve the transportation problems of the region. This Authority made a report in 1920, and a "Progress Report" of its "Suburban Transit Engineering Board", dated March 25, 1930. It made three other reports, dated March 1, 1937, March, 1938, and May 18, 1949.

In addition to these reports, many other efforts were made, and reports rendered, by individuals, private groups and public bodies in efforts to find a satisfactory solution. The Department of Conservation and Economic Development of the State of New Jersey issued two reports, dated May 3, 1946 and February 10, 1951. The last report gives a complete outline of fifteen known efforts made by private and public bodies, with copies of plans, where plans were offered, and descriptions of these plans and comments regarding the various features of these plans. Some of the solutions offered only covered limited phases, while others saw the need for an over-all metropolitan solution and offered plans accordingly.

While it was considered important to cite briefly the many efforts made, it was thought best to merely call attention here to the last report, generally referred to as the **Jenny (1951) Report**.

In summarizing the many efforts made, the **Jenny (1951) Report** states:

“While the many efforts made differ in many respects as to certain details, it is very evident that there are but three types of solutions. They are:

“a. The Rapid Transit Plan.

“b. The Railroad Terminal Plan, with the terminal located in the heart of Manhattan.

“c. The Railroad Terminal Plan, with the terminal located in the Hackensack Meadows, and with a Rapid Transit Line linking this terminal with the city of New York.”

The conclusion to be reached today, therefore, is:

1. Which of these three types of plans will serve the best interests of our people and will best enhance the social and economic well-being of the region served.

2. Which of these plans will, in addition to the above requirement, offer the best chance of becoming self-liquidating, or nearly so.

QUOTATIONS FROM OFFICIAL REPORTS

It was clearly recognized from the beginning that we were dealing with a railroad problem, and that our commuter mass transportation problem could not possibly be solved by an over-extended bus system. On the contrary it had to be handled by the railroads which were organized and equipped for such purposes. It is of interest to quote here statements made by the various public bodies in their reports on this problem:

1920 Report of the New York-New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission (now the Port of New York Authority)

“Our Port problem is primarily a railroad problem,** therefore, the comprehensive plan to evolve which this Commission was created is essentially a railroad plan.** The most pressing element of the entire port problem is that of railroad service to and from Manhattan.”

North Jersey Transit Commission, March 31, 1930 Report:

“In our report of last year, we stressed recommendation for legislation looking to the creation of a regional commission with power to finance and construct a North Jersey Transit System. We renew this recommendation and urge the imperative need for immediate action.

“The enormous investments made and projected by the State in vehicular tunnels, interstate bridges, state highways and viaducts and in county and municipal improvements, cannot be utilized to their fullest possibility in creating a uniform growth and development of the North Jersey metropolitan region until there is linked with them a comprehensive system of high speed electric lines for mass transportation of passengers between population centers in North Jersey and between these centers and New York City.”

Regional Plan Association Bulletin No. 25, June 17, 1935:

“Motor vehicles cannot supplant rail facilities as a means of commuter transportation between New Jersey and Manhattan.”

Port of New York Authority Report of March 1, 1937:

“A real demand now exists for speedier and more convenient access to Manhattan, and there is a growing demand for better intrastate transit. An adequate system of suburban transit would meet the needs of northern New Jersey, and should, at the same time be capable of expansion which would extend its benefits throughout the state. Experience has shown that the sound development of transit facilities adds millions of dollars in economic value to the communities served. Thus it is evident that the development of rapid transit facilities for northern New Jersey will meet an existing need for the people of the district, that it will provide the means of improved communication for the State, and prove of economic benefit to the various communities. The results will contribute to the sound development of the Port District as a whole. The development of rapid transit facilities for northern New Jersey is necessary and desirable.”

“**Thus, an expanded motorbus service, while highly desirable for collection and distribution purposes and for furnishing service in areas not yet ripe for rapid transit, cannot meet a mass transportation need.”

Department of Conservation and Economic Development Report of February 10, 1951:

“THE PROBLEM.”

“1. A way must be found to bring our people into the City of New York on rails, in a direct manner, and with a minimum of transfer.

“2. An adequate, and effective means of distribution of our people within the City of New York, particularly in mid-Manhattan and down to the Battery, must be found.

“3. A means of better intrastate communication must be devised, so that people from northeastern New Jersey may be able to go to Newark without first having to go to New York, and then back again to New Jersey, with attendant loss of time.

"4. A fast railroad link must be provided between the Airport at Newark, or the future Bergen Airport, and mid-Manhattan, where a very large percentage of the air travelers are going.

"5. A way must also be found for solving this problem in a manner that would not only serve the people in New Jersey opposite Manhattan, as has so often been done, but also the people from the Newark region and points south on the Central Railroad of New Jersey.

"That, briefly, is the problem facing New Jersey.

"An effort should be made to bring about a completely coordinated system of metropolitan transportation that will serve all regions, and which, because of its interrelation may be established at less cost, and with a greater chance of financial success, than if it were tackled so as to serve only a portion of this area.

"We have had proof on innumerable occasions that when attempts were made to solve any of these problems separately, it was shown that the expense would be too great for the results obtained and that any such makeshift project never could solve our far greater over-all problem.

"**when we speak of a coordinated system of transportation, we mean a system so devised as to have the railroads handle that traffic which they are best able to handle, and that the buses be given such territories to serve as can not properly be served by the railroads, particularly outlying regions and to serve as feeders for the railroads. Once such an over-all goal has been set as a fixed policy of procedure, the solution will be relatively simple."

Regional Plan Association Bulletin No. 77, July 1951:

"The Paramount Public Need"

"These facts lead us to one inescapable conclusion. An objective study is needed to appraise the present policy of allowing the railroad systems to remain static, while concentrating investment in vehicular traffic arteries leading into Manhattan.

"The issue here is the paramount public need for a well-balanced regional transportation system of highway, parkway AND railroad development connecting each part of the Region with every other part in accordance with present and future traffic needs."

"Recommendation."

"Primarily this is the responsibility of the Port of New York Authority and is its duty under existing statutes. We recommend that it renew its studies of the regional transportation system in its entirety with a fresh approach.

"If, in view of its present important and notably useful commitments in vehicular facilities, the Port Authority is unwilling or unable to assume this task with a view to achieving an equally important improvement in the railroad field, we then recommend that a special interstate commission be established for this sole purpose.

"From such a study should come recommendations as to the balanced development of both rail and motor transportation to meet the needs of the Region."

The advice given in the above quotations is sound and if it had been followed as a balanced program in vehicular and rail transportation, we would

not find ourselves today in such a serious predicament. But on the contrary, buses and private cars have been encouraged to use our highways and vehicular trans-Hudson facilities created at a cost of many hundreds of millions of dollars of public funds, with the consequent public subsidization in competition with the railroads. What has been the result?

EFFECT OF HIGHWAY USE ON OUR RAILROADS AND REGIONS

The creation of trans-Hudson vehicular facilities, and of the great arteries leading to the tunnels and bridges, has had a disastrous effect upon the railroad passenger service. Bus routes, which were opened all over the region, picked up passengers nearer to their homes and delivered them either in mid-Manhattan, via the Lincoln Tunnel, where most of these travelers have their destinations, or brought them via the George Washington Bridge to New York subways leading directly to their points of destination.

Reduction of Railroad Service

The railroads have in many instances increased their fares to about double what they used to be, reduced the train service, abandoned railroad stations, and even main line tracks, all of which did much to hurt the railroads locally. This, in turn, not only resulted in driving more people away from the railroads, but had a serious effect upon the broader economy of the whole region served. The railroads still form the "life-blood arteries" of these regions. A community is no better than its transportation and discerning people hesitate to establish themselves in suburban communities that do not have adequate railroad transportation.

As a result of highway competition, several of the railroads have gone into bankruptcy. Some lines which, only a few years ago were furnishing good train service, have today reduced this service to such a low point as to amount to practically no service. As an example, the Northern Railroad of New Jersey, which had cut its train service to less than one-half of what it was in the late twenties, was still running fifteen trains per day in each direction in 1939. This road is now running only three such trains, while the

New Jersey-New York Railroad is only running five trains. It is not necessary to be an expert in this field to appreciate the very serious and harmful economic effect upon the regions served as a result of this poor train service.

Economic Effect

We are in agreement with certain statements made concerning the overall economic effect upon the region before a joint commuter rate hearing of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Board of Public Utilities Commission of New Jersey, held at Newark on September 24 and 25, 1951:

"Time and again the railroads have come to ask for increased fares or reductions in trains, or abandonment of stations, or even of tracks. The results have been invariably that when rates went up the people took to the buses, or when trains were taken off, the people did not use other trains, but they deserted the railroads and patronized their competitors. The result was that the railroads invariably came back to prove reduced revenues and ask for higher fares, and, or train reductions, or both, thus driving still more people into the laps of the competitors of the railroads, reducing railroad travel, and creating more requests for fare hikes, and train reductions. This whole procedure represents a vicious spiral. It does not matter whether the request is for fare increases or for train reductions. Both have the same effect ultimately.

"Everybody knows that there is something radically wrong with this whole procedure. We must acknowledge that we can not go on like that any longer. The time has come for a great decision to be made. I shall try to go to the root of this problem, point out what is wrong, and what should be done to overcome this.

"Many people seem to have forgotten that these railroads still form the life-blood arteries of the communities or regions which they serve. For that reason they must not be permitted to deteriorate. On the contrary, they must be made more efficient and more useful transportation arteries so as to better support the over-all economy of the regions which they serve.

"We have become too much highway minded and many people have been forced against their wishes to depend upon highway transportation between their homes in New Jersey and their places of business in New York because of the lack of adequate railroad service. It is high time that our authorities realize this error and do something constructive to bring about an adequate solution of our mass transportation problem.

"We have spent many hundreds of millions of dollars of public funds in improving our highway systems, but we have not spent one dollar on the only form of transportation that would be able to serve us adequately and efficiently, that is railroad transportation. All authorities are agreed that our problem can only be solved by improved railroad transportation with a direct railroad link with the City of New York.

"The vast highway improvements made have only aggravated our highway traffic problem and have created congestion and confusion, calling for still more hundreds of millions of dollars for new arteries and new improvements, with no end in sight

in this spending, and, what is worse, without ever solving our commuter problem which can only be solved by properly improving that service and of returning our mass transportation to the railroads which are in far better position to cope with it than are the buses."

Commuter and Population Data

(Source, Reg. Plan. Assoc. Bulletin No. 77)

	1930	1950	Percent In- crease	De- crease
Commuter Traffic between New Jersey and New York				
Railroad	111,600	78,200		29.9
Local H and M	47,600	27,650		42.0
Auto and Bus*	19,850	80,000	303.0	
Total	179,050	185,850	3.8	
*Most of these commuters travel by bus.				
Population (N. J. Region)	3,221,534	3,809,110	18.2	
Families	781,228	1,088,000	39.0	

In 1930, auto and bus commuter travel represented only 17.8 percent of the total number of railroad commuters, whereas in 1950 the auto and bus commuters were 1.8 percent greater than the total number of railroad commuters.

This clearly shows the direction in which we are headed if this trend is not reversed. People must be brought back to the railroads if we hope to solve the mass transportation problem.

Effect Upon the City of New York

The effect of this vast highway transportation upon the city of New York has also been most serious. It has resulted in extreme traffic regulations, the establishment of one-way main arteries, etc., causing inconvenience and financial loss to the business establishments in the areas primarily affected. Thus, not only New Jersey, but the city of New York as well, requires relief from this burden.

WASTE IN USE OF EXISTING FACILITIES AND POSSIBLE SAVINGS

Improper Use of Waterfront Areas

It must be obvious to any student of this problem that the railroad passenger terminals, located along the New Jersey waterfront, and which contain considerable areas of valuable land, could be utilized to far better advantage if they were devoted to steamship or other industrial waterfront uses from which both the railroads, as well as the communities involved, would benefit greatly. The railroad passenger terminals of these carriers no longer belong there, and they should be removed either to some Union Passenger Terminal, located in the heart of mid-Manhattan, or at some appropriate location in the Hackensack Meadows, as is proposed under some of the plans. This would benefit the railroads financially to a considerable extent, and they could use the extra revenues to help defray the cost of the new facilities.

Union Passenger Terminal in New York

As shown in the **Jenny (1951) Report**, there are many other ways in which added revenues can be obtained if the new facilities are properly designed. One such important item is the development of the air-rights over the proposed Union Passenger Terminal area in New York. If a comprehensive, modern development of buildings is established over that area, similar perhaps to Rockefeller Center, this development will bring in substantial net revenues that could be applied to cover carrying charges of the terminal itself, thus reducing to a considerable extent the expenses chargeable to the railroad project. It is not inconceivable that these net revenues would be in excess of one million dollars per annum. In addition perhaps another half million dollars could be obtained from stores and other concessions in the area of the terminal devoted to railroad purposes.

Ferry Deficits

If the railroad passenger terminals are removed from the New Jersey waterfront, and direct rail facilities are provided for bringing these passengers into New York on rails, the carriers could thus be relieved of the

great financial burden of operating their ferries between New Jersey and the city of New York. From information received from the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of New Jersey, the railroads which would use the new terminal facilities, and which have ferry operations, have claimed ferry operating deficits as follows:

Carrier		Deficits
West Shore	1948	\$1,764,429
Lackawanna	1947	1,164,425
Erie	1949	800,000*
Central of N. J.	1950	757,000*
		<hr/>
Total		\$4,485,854

*these were estimated by the Commission's staff from data furnished by the railroads.

This very considerable saving could also be applied to help defray the costs of the new project without asking the railroads to increase their present operating expenses.

It is of interest to point out here just what this would mean in support of meeting the costs of the proposed project. At 3% interest, and a 50 year amortization period, this sum alone would cover the annual carrying charges on an investment of about \$115,000,000. When we speak, therefore, of substantial savings, or extra revenues that could be obtained if this project were developed along very broad lines, we are dealing with some very worthwhile economies.

Freight to and from Manhattan

In addition to the above benefits, we call attention to the fact that the New Jersey railroads are bringing all of their freight into New York on lighters at a very high cost. It has often been stated that this cost alone, per ton, was as great as bringing a ton of freight from Pittsburgh to the New Jersey waterfront.

Under the plan for bringing these railroads into a Union Passenger Terminal in mid-Manhattan, provision was made, therefore, to bring freight

into Manhattan through the tunnels provided, during off-rush hours. The resulting revenues were estimated conservatively to be about \$600,000 per annum in 1946, on the tonnage destined for mid-Manhattan alone. This was based on a rate per ton to be charged to the railroads for the use of the facilities. In addition to that, the railroads would make other substantial operating savings.

Much other tonnage (resulting in added revenues) could be brought in, and distributed north and south in Manhattan, over the New York Central West Side tracks, and without using the city streets. Freight could be brought into New York without regard to weather. The Hudson River would be relieved of much of its cross-current freight traffic from which other shipping would benefit, and finally, the city of New York would be relieved of much of its north and south trucking from downtown waterfront freight terminals. In other words, all concerned would greatly benefit.

Considerable portions of the huge freight waterfront terminal areas of these railroads in New Jersey would be released for more remunerative commercial or industrial developments, as well as a large portion of the high cost of maintaining about forty freight pier facilities in Manhattan alone. If full advantage is taken of such a comprehensive program, the annual savings will amount to many millions of dollars.

Consolidation

While it may not be possible for the railroads to give up all of their extensive and costly waterfront facilities used in the Manhattan freight service, the question of consolidation and unification of all services and facilities should be given serious consideration, as less of these facilities would be required, and considerable savings could be made. If this whole problem is treated objectively, and in a coordinated and consolidated manner, the chances of economic success are much enhanced. It has never been treated in this manner.

BENEFIT OF A DIRECT RAIL LINK WITH MID-MANHATTAN

The Pennsylvania Railroad has demonstrated what can be accomplished by providing a direct rail link with mid-Manhattan, and by furnishing high-speed, and comfortable electrified service.

In the mid-thirties it handled over its main line in and out of its station in New York, about one-quarter million commuters per annum. This rose to about five million during the war year of 1945. Since the war year it has levelled off to about three and a half million, or about fourteen times as many as it handled in the mid-thirties. Because of its direct service into mid-Manhattan, the Pennsylvania Railroad accomplished this in spite of heavy bus competition, and at a time when all other railroads were losing a large percentage of their former commuter business because of poor and roundabout service.

The Pennsylvania Railroad has today many commuters traveling between Princeton, or Trenton and New York—distances of about 55 and 58 miles respectively, and they can make that trip in one hour. In contrast with this, in one hour from mid-Manhattan, it is possible to travel only distances varying from 12 to 15 miles on many of the other railroads. In other words, because of proper and adequate service, the Pennsylvania Railroad has brought Princeton and Trenton actually four times nearer to the heart of mid-Manhattan than are the stations on other railroads.

It is not necessary to be an expert to realize the serious economic impact upon the regions served by other railroads, and what it will mean to these regions if one hour of traveling time can be saved each day, as conservatively claimed, by the creation of the proposed project. Stated differently, one could travel two to three times as far on these railroads in the same time as it takes today to travel only 12 to 15 miles. The economic benefit to that whole region would be very great.

In connection with this problem we should not lose sight of the fact that not only the immediate commuter region in New Jersey will benefit from the creation of this project, but all of the regions served by these railroads in New Jersey, and over a great hinterland. Buffalo, Chicago, St.

Louis and points beyond would benefit greatly, since these regions would have their trains brought directly into New York, and the people would avoid the transfer to ferries at the New Jersey waterfront, with transfers to other facilities in Manhattan to reach mid-Manhattan. It can thus be seen that the benefit would be spread over a considerable segment of continental United States and the project would become a matter of national importance.

NEED FOR THE IMPROVEMENT

It hardly seems necessary to discuss this subject further. Our problem was called acute over three decades ago when the two states created the Port Authority to solve it. It is more serious, and much more complicated today, and it is steadily growing worse.

Civil Defense

One fact, however, which has only recently been called to our attention in a rather unfortunate and forceful manner, and which has a vital bearing upon the need for the creation of these facilities, is the possibility of a military emergency affecting the city of New York.

Few people have taken the trouble to review New York's transportation problem in case it should ever become necessary to evacuate a large portion of its population in a hurry, or should there arise a vast exodus of its population to safer areas, or should our harbor facilities be blocked, which would be quite possible, and it becomes necessary to feed New York in some other manner than by harbor craft, upon which it depends. The place which most of the people would chose to go to would be directly across the Hudson River to New Jersey, the portal to the vast hinterland where refuge could be had.

If a city like Chicago, St. Louis, or Kansas City, with their twenty or more railroad lines radiating in all directions, would have to be evacuated, that would be a relatively simple matter. But, when one realizes that New York, the largest city in the world, has only one railroad linking it directly

with New Jersey and this hinterland, it becomes apparent that the project in question becomes an absolute necessity from a civil defense angle. Since eight different railroads would be served by such a facility, radiating in all directions from this region, the widest possible distribution could be had with the least confusion.

WHAT IS OUR PROBLEM AND HOW SHOULD IT BE SOLVED TODAY?

Our problem today is the same that existed three decades ago. It has, moreover, become much worse, and is steadily growing in magnitude, in its serious effect upon the travelers and in the economic stability of the region involved. The only way in which it can be solved is to bring railroad trains directly into mid-Manhattan, in underground facilities, and to keep this traffic underground in New York, either via existing subways, or via new arteries to be built there to serve the people from New Jersey. In addition to that, a way must be found to provide better intrastate railroad service in New Jersey.

As outlined before, the problem not only involves the facilities to serve the New Jersey regions, but some way must also be found to provide a better distribution of the Long Island passengers in Manhattan, since about fifty percent of these, the same as exists for New Jersey, have destination east of 5th Avenue.

If a tunnel is built between the Battery in New York and the Central Railroad of New Jersey terminal at Jersey City, as is provided in some of the plans mentioned, it would also be a relatively simple matter to provide direct rail facilities for the people on Staten Island, via the New Jersey facilities, and this, in turn, would help to defray the costs of that facility.

We are convinced that this whole problem must be reviewed in its broadest possible aspect, objectively treated, with consolidation of facilities where that is possible, and it must be solved on a regional, instead of a sectional basis. By building also joint, or consolidated facilities in Manhattan, and for certain sections or facilities in New Jersey, mass use can then be made of these mass transportation arteries and this will produce the most

economical operation and help to make this undertaking as nearly self-liquidating as is possible.

There are those who believe that, if all of the above named elements are considered, and consolidated facilities are provided, and other consolidations are made as suggested, and a consolidated balance sheet were prepared, it would show that the facilities which would have to be built would more than pay for themselves.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

Creation of a Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority

It is recommended that a New Jersey-New York Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority be created by the Legislature of the two states of New Jersey and New York for the purpose of solving this problem.

This recommendation is made in the belief that this Authority would ultimately become the agency that would actually build and operate the proposed project.

Traffic and Economic Study

In view of the need for a traffic and economic survey of this whole problem, it is recommended that the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority be directed to make such a survey, and to make a full report to the 1953 Legislatures of the two States. Such report should outline the procedure followed in making the survey, the decisions reached as to how the facilities are to be created, and the submission of a general plan of the project. This plan should indicate how the project will be operated, the results of its economic study, and, if the estimates show that there will be deficits, make recommendations as to how they are to be met, or what other steps should be taken by the two states in support of this undertaking. It should conclude in a recommendation as to who should be directed to build and operate this project in the interest of the affected region. In this connection it should also make such further recommendations for legislation needed by the agency which is to carry out this project.

Scope of the Survey

1. The taking of a passenger census of both the railroad and bus passengers going from New Jersey to New York with information as to destination in New York and routes followed in reaching such destinations.

2. With this data determine what facilities should be provided to bring these passengers into New York, and of distributing them in that city, in a manner as to best serve the interest of these travelers.

3. Hold public hearings to determine which of the various types of plans proposed will best serve the needs of the passengers.

4. Prepare an estimate of the possible number of passengers, commuters and others, that may be expected to use the facilities to be created.

5. Establish close contact with the interested railroads to determine their needs, and the scope of the facilities to be created, and arrange for the creation of a Union Terminal Company, composed of all interested railroads to take over the operation of the proposed railroad facilities.

6. Prepare an estimate of the cost of the plans considered to serve the requirements, so as to determine which of these plans, or combinations thereof, would be economically the most feasible.

7. With this information prepare a general plan for the project as a whole, following the accepted most economical solution, or the solution that would serve the best interests of all concerned, and determine the cost of this accepted plan.

8. Make an economic study to determine:

- a. The annual carrying charges of the project and other expenses of the Authority owning the facilities.
- b. Rentals to be charged to the railroads for the use of the facilities to be operated by them.
- c. Revenues to be obtained from the passengers using these facilities.
- d. Revenues to be obtained from concessions, or leases, or from various other sources.
- e. Savings that may be made by the railroads by virtue of the creation of these facilities.

- f. The net result of these revenues and expenses to determine as to whether or not there are apt to be deficits, and, if so, how much.

Port of New York Authority to Assist

The Port of New York Authority should be requested to provide the funds to make such a survey. It should also be requested to make its previous studies and current data, as well as staff consultation, available to the Metropolitan Transit Authority, and to undertake such tasks in connection with this survey as, in the opinion of the Transit Authority, the Port Authority is well equipped to do and thus help to expedite the work of the Transit Authority.

Cooperation of All Concerned

The Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the State of New Jersey, the Turnpike Authority, as well as other state organizations that may have data needed by the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority, should be directed to render such assistance as may be requested from time to time. All affected transportation agencies should be asked to cooperate to the fullest extent with the Transit Authority.

Procedure

The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority should be authorized to establish office facilities at such location as would be most convenient for the development of the duties assigned to it, and within easy reach of others who may be required to work with the Authority. It should be authorized to engage such staff assistants or consultants as may be required.

Appropriation

It is recommended that each of the states of New Jersey and New York appropriate the sum of \$50,000 to cover the contingent expenses of the Authority.

Action by the State of New York

It is recommended that copies of this report be sent to the Governor and Legislature of the State of New York so that parallel action may be taken in the creation of the by-State Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority.

Respectfully submitted,

David Van Alstyne, Jr.
Chairman

Kenneth J. Hanau
Vice-Chairman

Emerson L. Travis
Secretary

John J. Brixie

Carlton W. Cox

Elden Mills

Edward J. O'Mara

Frank Scott



