STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Department of Law and Public Safety
DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL
25 Commerce Drive Cranford, N.J. 07016

BULLETIN 2183 May 9, 1975

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STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Department of Law and Public Safety
DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL
25 Commerce Drive Cranford, N.J. 07016

BULLETIN 2183 May 9, 1975

1. COURT DECISIONS - IN RE RUDY CICCHINO - DIRECTOR AFFIRMED.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-2748-73

In the Matter of Disciplinary
Proceedings against RUDY CICCHINO,
trading as Sussex Mall Wines & Liquors

Submitted: February 24, 1975 - Decided March 31, 1975.

Before Judges Collester, Lora and Handler.

On appeal from the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control.

Messrs. Franzblau, Cohen & Falkin, attorneys for appellant Cicchino (Mr. S.M. Chris Franzblau of counsel and Mr. Gary L. Falkin on the brief).

Mr. William F. Hyland, Attorney General, attorney for Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (Mr. David S. Piltzer, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

(Appeal from the Director's decision in Re Rudy Cicchino, Bulletin 2153, Item 3. Director affirmed. Opinion not approved for publication by the Court Committee on Opinions).

2. APPELLATE DECISIONS - 149 WEST FRONT STREET, INC. v. KEYPORT, ET AL.
SCHEKERYK and CSIK v. KEYPORT, ET AL.

149 West Front Street, Inc.,

Appellant,

v.

Mayor and Council of the Borough of Keyport and Dennis Angelo, Inc.,

Respondents.

Peter Schekeryk and Victor Csik,

Appellants,

v.

Mayor and Council of the Borough of Keyport and Dennis Angelo, Inc.,

Respondents.

On Appeal

CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

Unger and Unger, Esqs., by Adrian M. Unger, Esq., Attorneys for Appellant -- 149 West Front Street, Inc.
De Maio & Yacker, Esqs., by Stanley Yacker, Esq., Attorneys for Appellants -- Peter Schekeryk and Victor Csik
Doremus, Russell, Fasano & Nicosia, Esqs., by Benedict R. Nicosia, Esq., Attorneys for Respondent -- Borough of Keyport
Philo, Sawyer and Newman, Esqs., by Sidney I. Sawyer, Esq., Attorney for Respondent -- Dennis Angelo, Inc.

BY THE DIRECTOR:

The Hearer has filed the following report herein:

Hearer's Report

Appeals substantially similar were filed by appellant 149 West Front Street, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 149) and Peter Schekeryk and Victor Csik (hereinafter referred to as Schekeryk) and Dennis Angelo, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Angelo) from the action of the respondent (hereinafter Council), which, by Resolution dated June 24, 1974 granted a person-to-person transfer from Ye Cottage Inn, Inc. (hereinafter referred

to as Cottage) to Angelo. Appellants allege that the said action was improper and should be set aside. As the petitions are grounded on the same facts and advance similar contentions, they were combined in one hearing de novo before this Division, held pursuant to Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15. Full opportunity was afforded the parties to introduce evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. However at the outset of the hearing, counsel stipulated that the facts are not in substantial contention, and may be summarized as follows:

Cottage owned a rather large restaurant in Keyport which was sold to Angelo, who applied for a person-to-person transfer of its license. That application was filed with the Council on June 12, 1974. On June 20, 1974 both 149 and Schekeryk submitted letters to the Council notifying it that each was a prior contract purchaser and requested the Council to defer its action on the Angelo application until their rights were determined. 149 had therefore instituted an action against Cottage in the New Jersey Superior Court to set aside the sale to Angelo, which action is pending. The Council rejected that request and adopted the subject resolution on June 24, 1974.

Based upon this uncontroverted factual background, appellants both advanced the following contentions:

(a) The Council should not have acted upon Angelo's application for a person-to-person transfer once it was noticed that the licensed premises were the subject of the Superior Court action challenging Angelo's right of ownership.

(b) As the date of second publication was admittedly June 21, and the date on which the resolution was adopted, June 24, 1974, between which were a Saturday and Sunday, less than two days had elapsed, hence there was a failure to comply with Rule 7 of State Regulation No. 2.

The respondents deny both contentions and answer that these allegations are without substance. The Council insists that it is beyond its jurisdiction to resolve differences among contenders for ownership of licensed premises. The Council further contends that the receipt of letters of the attorneys noticing it of the impending disputes between the contracting rivals did not constitute "objections" within the meaning of Rules 7 and 8 of State Regulation No. 2.

Appellant 149 further contended that as the application for transfer of the license was not attested to by the corporate secretary of respondent Angelo corporation, and therefor, was incomplete and should not have been accepted. Angelo admitted the absence of the corporate seal and signature of the secretary on the application when filed, but asserted that that oversight was corrected as soon as the absence was noted.

I.

From the earliest days following enactment of the Alcoholic Beverage Law (N.J.S.A. 33-1 et seq.) it has been uniformly held that, in the absence of a showing that persons, other than the licensee, have an interest in the license, there may be no collateral attack upon the ownership of such license. Howard v. Somers Point, Bulletin 193, Item 1. The then Commissioner D. Frederick Burnett held, in a similar factual complex:

> "It is no function of a license issuing authority to adjudicate the conflicting possessory rights of Brown and Jones." Jones v. Sea Girt, Bulletin 167, Item 14.

Later, in a parallel situation, it was held that:

> "A local issuing authority is not the proper forum to try technical title or the definitive right to possession to real and personal property." Naopli v. Bayonne, Bulletin 836, Item 3.

In the instant matter, the Council was presented with a valid application for transfer, with proper consents of the transferor and, having such, the only issue before it was the qualification of the applicant to hold such license. There being nothing in the record to challenge Angelo's personal right to hold a license, coupled with a favorable report by the police department, the Council acted in the proper exercise of its discretion.

II.

The more vexing problem revolves about the contention that the Council acted improperly because insufficient time elapsed between the date of last publication, i.e., June 21, Friday, and the date of the hearing, i.e., June 24, Monday, as required by Rule 7 and Rule 9 of State Regulation No. 2.

Rule 7 of State Regulation No. 2 provides that "the date fixed for such hearing shall not be less than two (2) days after the second insertion shall have been published and should not be more than fourteen (14) days."

Rule 9 of State Regulation No. 2 provides that:

> "If a resolution or motion granting application for license is adopted before two (2) whole business days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays), shall have passed following publication of the second Notice of Application, the resolution or motion shall set forth a special condition that the license shall not be issued unless and until such two (2) whole days shall have elapsed after the second publication of Notice of Application not counting the day on which such second publication may be made; and if within such period or at any time before the

> license is issued written objection to issuance of the license is filed, the license shall not be issued pending the further determination of the issuing authority."

It is thus uncontroverted that two full days had not elapsed between the date of the last publication of the notice and the date of the hearing. Hence the dispositive issue is: was the failure to have allowed sufficient time to elapse between those vital dates such as to nullify the effectiveness of the Council's action.

To determine that issue, reference must be made to Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 2 which provides:

> "Each municipal clerk shall immediately upon receipt of a written objection, duly signed by an objector, transmit forthwith to the issuing authority of the particular municipality said objection, and everything pertaining thereto, whereupon it shall become the duty of each issuing authority to afford a hearing to all parties and immediately notify the applicant and the objector of the date, hour and place thereof."

The Rules constituting Regulations in this Division must be viewed in pari materia as they relate one to another. Rule 7 of State Regulation No. 2 requires a lapse of two days between last publication and hearing. No reference is therein made to Saturdays or Sundays. Hence, the hearing held on June 27 following publication of June 24 was not violative of that Rule.

However, the issuance of a license following a hearing held within two business days, Saturdays and Sundays being excluded, from the date of the last publication may be challenged when such issuance was not conditioned upon it being held for a two-day period, as required by Rule 9. In the instant matter, the license was issued following and on the same day of the hearing, i.e., June 24. Had the Council merely granted the application for transfer but conditioned the issuance of the license thereunder not to occur before June 27, there would have been compliance. Thus, it must be determined whether the issuance of the license as hereinabove stated is fatal to the grant of transfer.

Appellants contend, however, that such two-day extension of time would not have been curative as Rule 9 terminates with a mandate that "and if, within such period, or at any time before the license is issued, written objection to issuance of the license is filed, the license shall not be issued pending the further determination of the issuing authority." The respondents maintain that the previously received letters of the attorney for appellants objecting to the issuance of the license was not

in fact an objection addressed to the application for transfer to respondent, Dennis Angelo, Inc., but was really a request that the Council should not take any action respecting the license until the contractual obligations noted had been aired in the civil courts. Since there were no other objections, respondents insist that the action taken was proper.

The reasoning of respondents is not pursuasive. Certainly, appellants made their objections clear, and the Council was apprised of their position. Essentially, appellants told the Council that they wished no action taken on the transfer until their interests were evaluated in court. The Council had that question before it, and that was a definite, stated objection. There was no objection raised as to the qualification of respondent Dennis Angelo, Inc., to be a proper licensee, nor was any reason whatever advanced by appellants that the transfer should not be approved other than their desire to assert their property interests in the licensed premises. The Council, having no power whatever to weigh the respective rights of the contending parties, properly moved ahead on the application. Cf. Wilson v. Union, 133 N.J.L. 474 (1939).

I, thus, find that the Council did not have jurisdiction to issue the license since it failed to fully comply with Rule 9 of State Regulation No. 2.

The Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Director of this Division have the "force and effect of law". Cino v. Driscoll, 130 N.J.L. 535, 540 (1943); Grant Lunch Corp. v. Driscoll, 129 N.J.L. 408 (1942).

Rule 9 of State Regulation No. 2 requires the passage of two whole business days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) from the date of publication of notice to the issuance of license. That portion of the rule presents a requirement independent of the filing of objections.

It is, therefore, recommended that the action of the Council be reversed, and the matter remanded to the Council for reconsideration and action upon compliance with the applicable statute and Division rules and regulations.

Conclusions and Order

Written exceptions to the Hearer's report, with supportive argument, were filed on behalf of the respondent, Dennis Angelo, Inc., pursuant to Rule 14 of State Regulation No. 15.

I have examined and analyzed the said exceptions and find that they have either been correctly resolved in the Hearer's report, or are clearly lacking in merit.

The attorney for appellant, 149 West Front Street, Inc., by letter dated January 20, 1975, properly noted that the Hearer had

incorrectly referred to the provisions of State Regulation No. 2 instead of State Regulation No. 6, with respect to the subject application. In its exceptions, the respondent conceded that the language of the Rules under both regulations is substantially similar and thus, do not affect the Hearer's ultimate findings and recommendations.

It is also noted that, in the opening paragraph of the Hearer's report, the respondent Dennis Angelo, Inc., is referred to as an appellant. This is obviously an inadvertence.

Having carefully considered the entire record herein, including the transcript of testimony, the exhibits, the Hearer's report, and the exceptions filed with respect thereto, I concur in the findings and recommendations of the Hearer, and adopt them as my conclusions herein.

Accordingly, it is, on this 27th day of February 1975,

ORDERED that the action of the respondent Mayor and Council of the Borough of Keyport be and the same is hereby reversed; and it is further

ORDERED that this matter be and is hereby remanded to the Council for its reconsideration and action upon due notice and hearing, and upon proper compliance with the applicable statute and rules and regulations of this Division.

Leonard D. Ronco
Director

3. APPELLATE DECISIONS - REMINSKY v. PATERSON.

Aloys Reminsky & Phyllis Reminsky, t/a Wagon Wheel Tavern,	)	
Appellants,	)	On Appeal
v.	)	CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER
Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control for the City of Paterson,	)	
Respondent.	)	

Saginario and Wiener, Esqs., by Philip J. Saginario, Esq., Attorneys for Appellants
Joseph A. LaCava, Esq., by Ralph L. DeLuccia, Esq., Attorney for Respondent

BY THE DIRECTOR:

The Hearer has filed the following report herein:

Hearer's Report

This is an appeal from the action of the Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control for the City of Paterson (hereinafter Board) which, on July 18, 1974, suspended appellant's Plenary Retail Consumption License C-73, for premises 366 Union Avenue, Paterson, for forty days after finding appellants guilty of a charge alleging that they permitted their licensed premises to be operated as a nuisance on varied dates in 1973 and 1974, in violation of Rule 4 of State Regulation No. 20. The effective date of suspension was stayed by Order of the Director dated August 15, 1974, pending this appeal.

The petition of appeal contends that the determination made by the Board was against the weight of the evidence. This contention was denied by the Board, which defends that the evidence presented before it was substantial, and that the penalty imposed was justified.

A de novo hearing on appeal was held in this Division pursuant to Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15, with full opportunity afforded the parties to introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses. A transcript of the proceedings held by the Board was received into evidence pursuant to Rule 8 of

State Regulation No. 15. In lieu of the presentation of witnesses for either party, counsel agreed to present oral argument and to rely upon the evidence as contained in the transcript of the proceedings before the Board.

At the proceedings before the Board, Detective Lawrence Goffredo of the Paterson Police Department Narcotics Squad related a series of visits to appellants' premises, beginning August 29, 1973. He was then searching for the barmaid's son whom he later arrested some distance from appellants' premises.

On September 7, 1973, he discovered one Robert Giliberti lying comotose on the sidewalk in front of appellants' premises, the apparent victim of an overdose of narcotics. On September 24, 1973 he arrested Robert B. Wood, Joseph Natoli and John DePadua in the appellants' premises, on varied charges, including possession of narcotics.

On October 1, 1973 he again arrested John DePadua at the appellants' premises on similar charges. On January 15, 1974, he arrested a Nicholas Rusin there on a concealed weapons charge. On February 27, 1974 he arrested Anthony Maguire in appellants' premises as a parole violator, on drug charges. On June 3, 1974, he arrested three young men in the parking lot next to appellants' premises.

The Detective provided a list of sixteen young men who are known narcotic users, and who have frequently been seen in the vicinity of appellants' premises. Six of those named have been frequently seen within appellants' premises and, if apprehension is needed, a visit to the premises would usually reveal their presence.

When asked if he had alerted the appellants to the continual presence of the narcotic users, the Detective asserted that he had requested appellants that they "keep their place clean" (of narcotic users); to which appellant replied "I am here to make a living; what am I going to do?"

In making routine searches of the establishment, no narcotics were discovered but residue in the form of tinfoil and empty glassine envelopes were found in the men's room and in the alley adjacent to the licensed premises.

Appellant Aloys Reminsky testified that, of all of the persons mentioned, he knew of none who were narcotic users and, save for their visits as patrons, had no knowledge of any of their past convictions or indictments. He denied that any detective had cautioned him concerning any of his patrons, adding that, had he have been alerted that the presence of these identified persons constituted a nuisance, he would have barred them entry.

The day bartender, William C. Massaker testified that he saw no arrests within the premises while he was in charge. He, however, admitted that detectives of the narcotics squad did come in every month or so, and searched different patrons. He assumed such searches to be the result of police vigilance, particularly because the neighborhood had changed and residents with unsavory reputations were in the area. He acknowledged that several of the persons named by Detective Golfredo were frequent patrons of the establishment.

As early as in Conte v. Princeton, (1936) Bulletin 139, Item 8, this Division has held that a licensee is responsible for conditions both in and outside of his licensed premises which are caused by patrons thereof. Cf. Garcia v. Fair Haven, Bulletin 1149, Item 1; Double E, Inc. v. Jersey City, Bulletin 2137, Item 5.

Appellant cites Ishmal v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 58 N.J. 347 (1971) as a basis for his defense, asserting that in view of the fact that the area now has an inordinate number of narcotic users, appellant should not be chargeable with maintaining a nuisance merely because such people frequent his establishment. Ishmal is clearly distinguishable from the instant matter, however, in that constant requests to the police in Ishmal led the Court to require an opportunity for a place-to-place transfer of the licensed premises from the narcotics saturated area. Here no such police intervention was sought, and, in contrast, the testimony shows that appellants refused to cooperate with the police.

Ishmal, has been followed by Caje v. Paterson, in an unreported case of Appellate Division, cited in Bulletin 2114, Item 1, as well as Greenstein v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (App. Div. Docket No. A-920-73) set forth in Bulletin 2435, Item 4. Both of these later cases, under the circumstances therein, afforded an opportunity for appellants to effectuate removal of their licensed premises from the troubled area.

Although three of the incidents related by the detective manifestly did not occur within the licensed premises, the remainder did, and from the earliest of them, the appellants or their agents knew or should have known of the dangers inherent from encouraging the patronage of those persons who were continuously under police surveillance.

The constant visitation of the persons identified by the Board's witness to the appellants' premises leads to the conclusion, and I find that appellants permitted their premises to become a nuisance.

The twenty day suspension was merely salutory in this

instance, and, under the circumstances herein was modest. The additional twenty day suspension imposed was based on appellants' adjudicated record of two prior offenses within the past five years; the first resulting in a suspension of sixty days on a charge that appellant had permitted premises to become a nuisance, and the second for twenty days in consequence of an "hours" violation. Such additions to suspensions are regularly imposed in disciplinary proceedings in this Division where prior records are considered in imposing suspensions. Hence the penalty administered by the Board was not, manifestly severe or unreasonable.

I, therefore, find that appellants have not maintained their burden of establishing that the action of the respondent was erroneous and should be reversed, as required by Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15. It is, thus, recommended that the action of the Board be affirmed, the appeal dismissed, and the Director's order staying the suspension imposed by the Board pending this appeal be vacated.

Conclusions and Order

Written exceptions to the Hearer's report, with supportive argument, were filed by the appellants, and a written answer to the said exceptions was filed by the respondent pursuant to Rule 14 of State Regulation No. 15.

One of these exceptions argues that Rule 4 of State Regulation No. 20 was inapplicable because the language of the said rule is "not specific enough when alleged against the Appellant", and the charge was "not, in fact, proved." The proofs are to the contrary, and the charge falls clearly within the orbit of that rule. I have examined and analyzed the other exceptions and find that they have either been satisfactorily resolved in the Hearer's report, or are without merit.

Having carefully considered the entire record herein, including the transcript of the testimony, the Hearer's report, the exceptions filed with respect thereto, and the answer to the said exceptions, I concur in the findings and recommendations of the Hearer and adopt them as my conclusions herein.

Accordingly, it is, on this 5th day of March 1975,

ORDERED that the action of the respondent Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control for the City of Paterson be and the same is hereby affirmed, and the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that my order dated August 15, 1974 staying the suspension theretofore imposed by the Board pending the determination of this appeal, be and the same is hereby vacated; and it is further

ORDERED that Plenary Retail Consumption License C-73, issued by the Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control for the City of Paterson to Aloys Reminsky & Phyllis Reminsky, t/a Wagon Wheel Tavern, for premises 366 Union Avenue, Paterson be and the same is hereby suspended for forty (40) days, commencing at 3:00 a.m. Thursday, March 13, 1975 and terminating at 3:00 a.m. on Tuesday, April 22, 1975.

Leonard D. Ronco
Director

4. APPELLATE DECISIONS - DANNY'S LOUNGE INC. v. PATERSON.

Danny's Lounge, Inc., t/a Danny's Lounge, Appellant, v. Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control for the City of Paterson, Respondent.	On Appeal CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

Carmen A. Ferrante, Esq., Attorney for Appellant
Joseph A. LaCava, Esq., by Ronald S. Fava, Esq., Attorney for Respondent

BY THE DIRECTOR:

The Hearer has filed the following report herein:

Hearer's Report

This is an appeal from the action of the Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control for the City of Paterson (hereinafter Board) which, on February 27, 1974, denied appellant's application for a place-to-place transfer of its plenary retail consumption license from premises 791 Main Street, to 839 Main Street, Paterson.

In its petition of appeal appellant contends that the Board's action was arbitrary in that application of the distance requirements of the local ordinance resulted in a hardship on appellant. The Board in its answer alleged that its denial of appellant's application for transfer was mandated by the provisions of the local ordinance defining distances within which transfers could be made (Ordinance 2:3-3).

An appeal de novo was held in this Division, with full opportunity afforded the parties to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses, pursuant to Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15. Additionally, a transcript of the proceedings before the Board was received in evidence pursuant to Rule 8 of State Regulation No. 15.

The applicable section of the prevailing municipal Ordinance, Section 2:3-3 of Chapter 3 "Licenses" provides in pertinent part:

> "In the event a licensee desires to transfer to another premises he shall be permitted to do so within 600 feet of the premises wherein he is located at the time of said transfer...."

The ordinance further prohibits any transfer within 1000 feet of another licensed premises except

> "...where the licensed premises is being taken for any municipal, county, state or federal project, or where the licensed premises is destroyed to the extent that it can no longer be used for the purpose for which the license was issued and it is not intended to restore the same...."

Appellant concedes that the distance between the existing location and the proposed premises is 608 feet. Furthermore, it failed to produce any evidence indicating that the present premises were being taken for governmental use; thus it did not come within the "hardship" provisions of the said ordinance.

Testimony in this Division by one of the corporate officers of appellant, a Passaic County detective and the Secretary of the Board revolved about prior excursions from the literal application of the ordinance by the Board, all of which testimony was irrelevant to the issue involved herein.

The applicable legal principle has been clearly set forth in Petrangeli v. Barrett, 33 N.J. Super 378, 384 wherein the court stated:

> "It has long been established that a local governing body has no jurisdiction to grant or transfer a license in violation of the terms of a local ordinance. Bachman v. Inhabitants of the Town of Phillipsburg, 68 N.J.L. 552 (Sup. Ct. 1902). The rule is aptly stated in Tube Bar, Inc. v. Commuters Bar, Inc., supra (18 N.J. Super. at page 354):
>
> 'When a commission, board, body or person is authorized by ordinance, passed under a delegation of legislative authority, to grant or deny a license or permit, the grant or denial thereof must be in conformity with the terms of the

> ordinance authorizing such grant or denial. 9 McQuillen, Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 1950) § 26.73; Bohan v. Weehawken Tp., 65 N.J.L. 490,493 (Sup. Ct. 1900). Nor can such commission, board, body or person set aside, disregard or suspend the terms of the ordinance, except in some manner prescribed by law. Public Service Ry. Co. v. Hackensack Imp. Com. 6 N.J. Misc. 15 (Sup. Ct. 1927); 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 439." "

In view of the total absence of evidence indicating circumstances under which the mandate of the applicable ordinance could be set aside or disregarded, the Board properly concluded that appellant's application for transfer of its license must be denied.

It is, therefore, concluded that the appellant has failed to sustain its burden of establishing that the action of the Board was erroneous and should be reversed, as required by Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 15.

It is, accordingly, recommended that the action of the Board be affirmed, and the appeal be dismissed.

Conclusions and Order

Written exceptions to the Hearer's report, with supportive argument, were filed by the attorney for appellant, pursuant to Rule 14 of State Regulation No. 15. No answer to the said exceptions was filed by the attorney for the respondent.

Having carefully considered the entire record herein, including the transcripts of the testimony, the exhibits, the Hearer's report, and the exceptions thereto which I find have either been satisfactorily resolved in this report, or are lacking in merit, I concur in the findings and conclusions of the Hearer and adopt his recommendations.

Accordingly, it is, on this 14th day of March 1975,

ORDERED that the action of the respondent Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control for the City of Paterson be and the same is hereby affirmed, and the appeal herein be and the same is hereby dismissed.

Leonard D. Ronco
Director

5. STATE LICENSES - NEW APPLICATIONS FILED.

Oton M. Baro
t/a B.E.S.T. Wine Distributors
335 E. Jersey Street
Elizabeth, New Jersey
Application filed April 28, 1975
for place-to-place transfer of
Limited Wholesale License WL-20
from 224 Rahway Avenue, Elizabeth, N. J.

Almet, Inc.
75 Claremont Road
Claremont Professional Building
Bernardsville, New Jersey
Application filed April 29, 1975
for place-to-place transfer of
Limited Wholesale License WL-35
from Main Street, Bedminster, New
Jersey and to include additional
space at licensee's licensed
warehouse at Cokesbury Road &
Route 78, Lebanon, New Jersey.

Middlesex Brookdale Beverage Distributor, Inc.
Route 9, Madison Twp.
PO Old Bridge, New Jersey
Application filed April 30, 1975 for
person-to-person transfer of State
Beverage Distributor's License SBD-82
from Rocco N. Inneo, t/a Middlesex
Brookdale Beverage, Distributor.

Leonard D. Ronco
Director