

no later than 10 days thereafter. If the adverse party does not so respond, a summary decision, if appropriate, shall be entered.

(c) Motions for summary decision shall be decided within 45 days from the due date of the last permitted responsive filing. Any motion for summary decision not decided by an agency head which fully disposes of the case shall be treated as an initial decision under N.J.A.C. 1:1-18. Any partial summary decision shall be treated as required by (e) and (f) below.

(d) If, on motion under this section, a decision is not rendered upon all the substantive issues in the contested case and a hearing is necessary, the judge at the time of ruling on the motion, by examining the papers on file in the case as well as the motion papers, and by interrogating counsel, if necessary, shall, if practicable, ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and shall thereupon enter an order specifying those facts and directing such further proceedings in the contested case as are appropriate. At the hearing in the contested case, the facts so specified shall be deemed established.

(e) A partial summary decision order shall by its terms not be effective until a final agency decision has been rendered on the issue, either upon interlocutory review pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.10 or at the end of the contested case, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.6. However, at the discretion of the judge, for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary litigation or expense by the parties, the order may be submitted to the agency head for immediate review as an initial decision, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.3(c)12. If the agency head concludes that immediate review of the order will not avoid unnecessary litigation or expense, the agency head may return the matter to the judge and indicate that the order will be reviewed at the end of the contested case. Within 10 days after a partial summary decision order is filed with the agency head, the Clerk shall certify a copy of pertinent portions of the record to the agency head.

(f) Review by the agency head of any partial summary decision shall not cause delay in scheduling hearing dates or result in a postponement of any scheduled hearing dates unless the judge assigned to the case orders that a postponement is necessary because of special requirements, possible prejudice, unproductive effort or other good cause.

Amended by R.1990 d.368, effective August, 6, 1990.
See: 22 N.J.R. 3(a), 22 N.J.R. 2262(a).

In (e): added text to provide for an agency head to remand partial summary decisions to judge when deemed appropriate that decision will be reviewed at the end of contested case.

Amended by R.2008 d.151, effective June 16, 2008.
See: 40 N.J.R. 915(a), 40 N.J.R. 3617(a).

Rewrote (a); in (b), added the fourth and fifth sentences; and in (c), substituted "due date of the last permitted responsive filing" for "date of submission".

Case Notes

Commissioner of Education was not required to conduct evidentiary hearing before removing local school board and ordering creation of state-operated school district, where there were no disputed issues of fact material to proposed administrative action. *Contini v. Board of Educ. of Newark*, 286 N.J.Super. 106, 668 A.2d 434 (A.D.1995).

Limitations period for challenge to denial of tenure did not begin to run when president of college advised employee by letter that he agreed employee should have tenure. *Dugan v. Stockton State College*, 245 N.J.Super. 567, 586 A.2d 322 (A.D.1991).

Evidentiary hearing in contested case is not needed if there are no disputed issues of fact. *Frank v. Ivy Club*, 120 N.J. 73, 576 A.2d 241 (1990), certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 799, 498 U.S. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 860.

Fact-finding conference conducted by state Division on Civil Rights could serve as basis for resolution of claim that eating clubs practiced gender discrimination. *Frank v. Ivy Club*, 120 N.J. 73, 576 A.2d 241 (1990), certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 799, 498 U.S. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 860.

Validity of partial summary decision rule upheld; reversed summary decisions in sex discrimination case re: men's eating clubs on jurisdiction and liability, final hearing necessary to resolve disputed fact (cited former N.J.A.C. 1:1-13.1—13.4). *Frank v. Ivy Club*, 228 N.J.Super. 40, 548 A.2d 1142 (App.Div.1988).

Administrative official could not resolve disputed facts without trial-type hearing. *Frank v. Ivy Club*, 228 N.J.Super. 40, 548 A.2d 1142 (A.D.1988), certification granted 117 N.J. 627, 569 A.2d 1330, reversed 120 N.J. 73, 576 A.2d 241, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 799, 498 U.S. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 860.

Plenary hearing is necessary for consideration of petition for issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity in this case to consider mitigating circumstances and permit fuller development of all relevant factors. *Matter of Robros Recycling Corp.*, 226 N.J.Super. 343, 544 A.2d 411 (App.Div.1988), certification denied 113 N.J. 638, 552 A.2d 164 (1988).

Summary disposition by administrative law judge is permissible if undisputed facts indicate that particular disposition is required. *Matter of Robros Recycling Corp.*, 226 N.J.Super. 343, 544 A.2d 411 (A.D.1988), certification denied 113 N.J. 638, 552 A.2d 164.

Former N.J.A.C. 1:1-13.1 through 13.4 cited regarding summary decision; rules held valid. In Re: Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 447 A.2d 151 (1982).

Motion for summary decision granted on grounds that doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred re-litigation of issues (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-13.1). *Lukas v. Dep't of Human Services*, 5 N.J.A.R. 81 (1982), appeal decided 103 N.J. 206, 510 A.2d 1123 (1986).

Initial Decision (2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 806) adopted, which concluded that a teacher's case was moot, where the teacher alleged that her tenure and seniority rights were violated by the board's notice that her employment would be reduced from full-time to 60% but she had been reinstated with no loss of compensation or benefits and thus suffered no loss of position or damage; the board's motion to dismiss on mootness grounds was controlled by N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5. *Price v. Bd. of Educ. of Washington*, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 6121-07, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 259, Commissioner's Decision (January 23, 2008).

When confronted in a disciplinary action with a motion that seeks summary decision both on the issue of liability for the alleged violations and on the quantum of sanctions to be imposed, an opposing party is required to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material disputed fact and, if the opposing party fails to do so, summary decision may be entered without the need for a further hearing on the issue of penalties. *Goldman v. Nicolo*, OAL Dkt. No. BK1 10722-04, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 943, Final Decision (October 12, 2006).

While N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b) states that a motion for summary decision may be filed "with or without supporting affidavits," licensees had to file an affidavit or certification denying some or all of the facts set forth by the Commissioner in order to create an issue of material fact. *Bakke v. Binn-Graham*, OAL Dkt. No. BKI 483-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 60, Initial Decision (February 17, 2006).

1:1-12.6 Emergency relief

(a) Where authorized by law and where irreparable harm will result without an expedited decision granting or prohibiting some action or relief connected with a contested case, emergency relief pending a final decision on the whole contested case may be ordered upon the application of a party.

(b) Applications for emergency relief shall be made directly to the agency head and may not be made to the Office of Administrative Law.

(c) An agency head receiving an application for emergency relief may either hear the application or forward the matter to the Office of Administrative Law for hearing on the application for emergency relief. When forwarded to the Office of Administrative Law, the application shall proceed in accordance with (i) through (k) below. All applications for emergency relief shall be heard on an expedited basis.

(d) The moving party must serve notice of the request for emergency relief on all parties. Proof of service will be required if the adequacy of notice is challenged. Opposing parties shall be given ample opportunity under the circumstances to respond to an application for emergency relief.

(e) Where circumstances require some immediate action by the agency head to preserve the subject matter of the application pending the expedited hearing, or where a party applies for emergency relief under circumstances which do not permit an opposing party to be fully heard, the agency head may issue an order granting temporary relief. Temporary relief may continue until the agency head issues a decision on the application for emergency relief.

(f) When temporary relief is granted by an agency head under circumstances which do not permit an opposing party to be fully heard, temporary relief shall:

1. Be based upon specific facts shown by affidavit or oral testimony, that the moving party has made an adequate, good faith effort to provide notice to the opposing party, or that notice would defeat the purpose of the application for relief;

2. Include a finding that immediate and irreparable harm will probably result before adequate notice can be given;

3. Be based on the likelihood that the moving party will prevail when the application is fully argued by all parties;

4. Be as limited in scope and temporary as is possible to allow the opposing party to be given notice and to be fully heard on the application; and

5. Contain a provision for serving and notifying all parties and for scheduling a hearing before the agency head or for transmitting the application to Office of Administrative Law.

(g) Upon determining any application for emergency relief, the agency head shall forthwith issue and immediately serve upon the parties a written order on the application. If the application is related to a contested case that has been transmitted to Office of Administrative Law, the agency head shall also serve the Clerk of Office of Administrative Law with a copy of the order.

(h) Applications to an agency head for emergent relief in matters previously transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law shall not delay the scheduling or conduct of hearings, unless the presiding judge determines that a postponement is necessary due to special requirements of the case, because of probable prejudice or for other good cause.

(i) Upon determining an application for emergency relief, the judge forthwith shall issue to the parties, the agency head and the Clerk a written order on the application. The Clerk shall file with the agency head any papers in support of or opposition to the application which were not previously filed with the agency and a sound recording of the oral argument on the application, if any oral argument has occurred.

(j) The agency head's review of the judge's order shall be completed without undue delay but no later than 45 days from entry of the judge's order, except when, for good cause shown and upon notice to the parties, the time period is extended by the joint action of the Director of the Office of Administrative Law and the agency head. Where the agency head does not act on review of the judge's order within 45 days, the judge's order shall be deemed adopted.

(k) Review by an agency head of a judge's order for emergency relief shall not delay the scheduling or conduct of hearings in the Office of Administrative Law, unless the presiding judge determines that a postponement is necessary due to special requirements of the case, because of probable prejudice or for other good cause.

Case Notes

Adult classified special education student with disciplinary problems was precluded from attending Senior Prom. *P.P. v. Westwood Board*, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (EDS) 165.

1:1-12.7 Disposition of motions

Disposition of motions which completely conclude a case shall be by initial decision. Disposition of all other motions shall be by order.

(b) Official notice may be taken of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the specialized knowledge of the agency or the judge.

(c) Parties must be notified of any material of which the judge intends to take official notice, including preliminary reports, staff memoranda or other noticeable data. The judge shall disclose the basis for taking official notice and give the parties a reasonable opportunity to contest the material so noticed.

Amended by R.1996 d.343, effective August 5, 1996.
See: 28 N.J.R. 2433(a), 28 N.J.R. 3779(a).

In (a) updated Rules of Evidence citation.

Case Notes

Official notice may be taken of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the specialized knowledge of the agency or the judge. If the agency bases no belief on some unexpressed agency expertise, it should have noted the same for the record (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.3(b)). *A.C. Powell Health Care Center v. Dep't of Environmental Protection*, 1 N.J.A.R. 454 (1980).

Official notice may be taken of judicially noticeable facts as explained in Rule 9 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.3). *Div. of Motor Vehicles v. Exum*, 5 N.J.A.R. 298 (1983).

Parties must be notified before or during the hearing of the material noticed and the parties will be afforded an opportunity to contest that material of which the judge is asked to take official notice (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.3). In *Re: Perno Bus Co.*, 1 N.J.A.R. 402 (1980).

1:1-15.3 Presumptions

No evidence offered to rebut a presumption may be excluded except pursuant to the judge's discretion under N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.1(c) or a valid claim of privilege.

1:1-15.4 Privileges

The rules of privilege recognized by law or contained in the following New Jersey Rules of Evidence shall apply in contested cases to the extent permitted by the context and similarity of circumstances: N.J.R.E. 501 (Privilege of Accused); N.J.R.E. 502 (Definition of Incrimination); N.J.R.E. 503 (Self-incrimination); N.J.R.E. 504 (Lawyer-Client Privilege); N.J.S.A. 45:14B-28 (Psychologist's Privilege); N.J.S.A. 2A:84-22.1 et seq. (Patient and Physician Privilege); N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.8 and N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.9 (Information and Data of Utilization Review Committees of Hospitals and Extended Care Facilities); N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.13 et seq. (Victim Counselor Privilege); N.J.R.E. 508 (Newsperson's Privilege); N.J.R.E. 509 (Marital Privilege-Confidential Communications); N.J.S.A. 45:8B-29 (Marriage Counselor Privilege); N.J.R.E. 511 (Cleric-Penitent Privilege); N.J.R.E. 512 and 610 (Religious Belief); N.J.R.E. 513 (Political Vote); N.J.R.E. 514 (Trade Secret); N.J.R.E. 515 (Official Information); N.J.R.E. 516 (Identity of Informer); N.J.R.E. 530 (Waiver of Privilege by Contract or Previous Disclosure; Limitations); N.J.R.E. 531 (Admissibility of Disclosure Wrongfully Compelled); N.J.R.E. 532 (Reference to Exercise of Privileges); and N.J.R.E. 533 (Effect of Error in Overruling Claim of Privilege).

Administrative Correction.

See: 23 N.J.R. 847(a).

Amended by R.1996 d.343, effective August 5, 1996.

See: 28 N.J.R. 2433(a), 28 N.J.R. 3779(a).

Updated Rules of Evidence citations.

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.

See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

Substituted "Cleric-Penitent Privilege" for "Priest Penitent Privilege".

Case Notes

Deliberative process privilege did not apply to Department of Insurance documents. *New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Company v. Department of Insurance*, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (INS) 27.

1:1-15.5 Hearsay evidence; residuum rule

(a) Subject to the judge's discretion to exclude evidence under N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.1(c) or a valid claim of privilege, hearsay evidence shall be admissible in the trial of contested cases. Hearsay evidence which is admitted shall be accorded whatever weight the judge deems appropriate taking into account the nature, character and scope of the evidence, the circumstances of its creation and production, and, generally, its reliability.

(b) Notwithstanding the admissibility of hearsay evidence, some legally competent evidence must exist to support each ultimate finding of fact to an extent sufficient to provide assurances of reliability and to avoid the fact or appearance of arbitrariness.

Case Notes

While the writings of an administrative analyst with the New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits were hearsay, as they appeared highly reliable, they were admissible in an administrative hearing under the residuum rule, N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(b), to corroborate a retiree's un rebutted testimony about the advice the retiree received from the Division; therefore, an administrative law judge erred in concluding that there was no corroboration for the retiree's testimony. *Hemsey v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System*, 393 N.J. Super. 524, 925 A.2d 1, 2007 N.J. Super. LEXIS 176 (App.Div. 2007).

"Residuum rule" requires that findings be supported by residuum of competent evidence. *Matter of Tenure Hearing of Cowan*, 224 N.J. Super. 737, 541 A.2d 298 (A.D.1988).

Facts did not need to be proved by residuum of competent evidence, so long as combined probative force of relevant hearsay and relevant competent evidence sustained ultimate finding. *Matter of Tenure Hearing of Cowan*, 224 N.J. Super. 737, 541 A.2d 298 (A.D.1988).

Written, sworn statements of evidence to support charges against tenured, public high school teacher could be hearsay. *Matter of Tenure Hearing of Cowan*, 224 N.J. Super. 737, 541 A.2d 298 (A.D.1988).

Notwithstanding the admissibility of hearsay evidence, some legally competent evidence must exist to support each finding of fact (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.8(b)). In the *Matter of Tanelli*, 194 N.J. Super. 492, 477 A.2d 394 (App.Div.1984), certification denied 99 N.J. 181, 491 A.2d 686 (1984).

Audiotaped statement of non-testifying female dancer admitted at hearing, but would not be used to impute actual knowledge of prostitution to ABC licensee's management because the licensee did not have the opportunity to cross-examine her. *N.J. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. S.B. Lazarus, Inc.*, OAL Dkt. No. ABC 2309-07, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 342, Initial Decision (June 2, 2008).

ALJ dismissed one charge of abuse against a certified nurse aide because it was based entirely on hearsay. *N.J. Dep't of Health & Senior Services v. O.B.*, OAL Dkt. No. HLT 2051-07, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 263, Initial Decision (May 15, 2007).

Initial Decision (2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 725) adopted, which concluded that it could not be found that a certified nurse aide threw a wet pad at a resident of a long-term care facility where there was no competent legal evidence to corroborate the resident's hearsay statement that the act had occurred. *N.J. Dep't of Health & Senior Services v. Turner*, OAL Dkt. No. HLT 2091-06, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 872, Final Decision (September 20, 2006).

Administrative cases are unique in that N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(b), entitled the "residuum rule," allows hearsay to be admitted, but it also requires the ultimate findings be supported by residuum of competent evidence; the residuum rule is consistent with the principle that, like judicial proceedings, administrative adjudication must include procedural safeguards, including notice and an opportunity to be heard and opportunity for cross-examination, defense, and rebuttal — essential for reliable fact finding. *2 Lars, LLC v. City of Vineland*, OAL DKT. NO. ABC 8875-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 730, Initial Decision (September 12, 2006).

Competent evidence refers to evidence that would ordinarily be admissible in a court under the rules of evidence; while hearsay is admissible in an administrative proceeding, the ultimate finding must be based upon competent evidence and may not be based solely upon hearsay. *2 Lars, LLC v. City of Vineland*, OAL DKT. NO. ABC 8875-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 730, Initial Decision (September 12, 2006).

Hearsay cannot be "boot strapped" from a municipal hearing into an administrative hearing by shifting the burden of proof to the licensee; if the municipal hearing was built entirely upon hearsay and the hearsay was accepted by the ALJ at an administrative hearing, it would turn it into a rubber stamp and the administrative process would be rendered meaningless. *2 Lars, LLC v. City of Vineland*, OAL DKT. NO. ABC 8875-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 730, Initial Decision (September 12, 2006).

Where the city's case relied solely on hearsay, as the city's witness to a fight in the licensee's establishment was not presented as a witness at the administrative hearings and her admissions or statements made to the officers were thus out-of-court statements offered for the truth, the licensee was not afforded procedural safeguards, including opportunity for cross-examination, defense and rebuttal; the city therefore failed to establish by competent evidence that the licensee violated N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1(a). *2 Lars, LLC v. City of Vineland*, OAL DKT. NO. ABC 8875-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 730, Initial Decision (September 12, 2006).

Student accused of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute failed to present any evidence rebutting the police detective's report that he possessed six bags of marijuana, and the fact that the detective's account of the marijuana found with the student was hearsay did not automatically render the evidence incompetent under N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(a) and (b). The student himself offered into evidence three exhibits that described circumstances leading to the student's apprehension and possession of marijuana, and while the reports were all hearsay, they nonetheless corroborated each other and were from three separate individuals, one of whom was a witness to the car stop and police activity, and while the witness's statement did not directly refer to the student, it did corroborate facts in police reports. *P.G. ex rel. M.G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Woodcliff Lake*, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 7495-03, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 572, Commissioner's Decision (June 28, 2006).

In a proceeding against respondent for operating a solid waste facility without a permit, respondent's exception to an investigator's hearsay testimony failed, where the investigator had testified that the individual he observed dumping solid waste (who did not testify) said he had permission from respondent to do the dumping. Applying the residuum rule requires identifying the ultimate finding of fact that must be supported by a residuum of competent evidence, and here, the Solid Waste Management Act imposes strict liability. Thus, the ultimate finding of fact that the dumping occurred was well supported by the investigator's

sworn testimony of observed actions corroborated by photographs taken by the investigator depicting the individual dumping solid waste into a container on the property occupied by respondent. *N.J. Dep't of Env'tl. Prot. v. Circle Carting, Inc.*, OAL Dkt. No. ESW 05939-03, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 227, Final Decision (February 21, 2006).

Hearsay opinion in police report, when successfully rebutted, was not a sufficient basis to require licensee to undergo driver re-examination. *Division of Motor Vehicles v. Cioffi*, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (MVH) 57.

Hearsay medical reports not sufficient to show police officer permanently and totally disabled for accidental disability retirement purposes. *Mercier v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System*, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (TYP) 94.

Residuum rule requires that notwithstanding the admissibility of hearsay evidence, some legally competent evidence must exist to support each ultimate finding of fact (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.8). *Div. of Medical Assistance v. Kares*, 8 N.J.A.R. 517 (1983).

Letters from real estate agents held admissible hearsay (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.8(a)). *Country Village v. Pinelands Commission*, 8 N.J.A.R. 205 (1985).

Casino Control Commission determined that the residuum rule did not apply to hearings conducted pursuant to the Casino Control Act. The standard to be applied (N.J.S.A. 5:12-107(a)(6)) permits the Commission to base any factual findings upon relevant evidence including hearsay, regardless of the fact that such evidence may be admissible in a civil action, so long as the evidence is the sort upon which responsible persons are accustomed to rely upon in the conduct of serious affairs (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.8). *Div. of Gaming Enforcement v. Merlino*, 8 N.J.A.R. 126 (1985), affirmed 216 N.J.Super. 579, 524 A.2d 821 (App.Div.1987), affirmed 109 N.J. 134, 535 A.2d 968 (1988).

Hearsay evidence allowed subject residuum rule. *In Re: White Bus Co.*, 6 N.J.A.R. 535 (1983).

Law Review and Journal Commentaries

Approaching Hearsay at Administrative Hearings: Hearsay Evidence and the Residuum Rule. Joseph R. Morano, 180 N.J. Lawyer 22 (1996).

1:1-15.6 Authentication and content of writings

Any writing offered into evidence which has been disclosed to each other party at least 10 days prior to the hearing shall be presumed authentic. At the hearing any party may raise questions of authenticity. Where a genuine question of authenticity is raised the judge may require some authentication of the questioned document. For these purposes the judge may accept a submission of proof, in the form of an affidavit, certified document or other similar proof, no later than 10 days after the date of the hearing.

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.

See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

Substituted "10" for "five".

1:1-15.7 Exhibits

(a) The verbatim record of the proceedings shall include references to all exhibits and, as to each, the offering party, a brief description of the exhibit stated by the offering party or the judge, and the marking directed by the judge. The verbatim record shall also include a record of the exhibits retained by the judge at the end of the proceedings and of the disposition then made of the other exhibits.

(c) Upon transmitting the record, the agency with the predominant interest shall pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8 request an extension to permit the rendering of a final decision by the agency which does not have the predominant interest.

SUBCHAPTER 18. INITIAL DECISION; EXCEPTIONS; FINAL DECISION; REMAND; EXTENSIONS OF TIME LIMITS

1:1-18.1 Initial decision in contested cases

(a) When a case is not heard directly by an agency head, the judge shall issue an initial decision which shall be based exclusively on:

1. The testimony, documents and arguments accepted by the judge for consideration in rendering a decision;
2. Stipulations; and
3. Matters officially noticed.

(b) The initial decision shall be final in form and fully dispositive of all issues in the case.

(c) No substantive finding of fact or conclusion of law, nor any concluding order or other disposition shall be binding upon the agency head, unless otherwise provided by statute.

(d) All initial decisions shall be issued and received by the agency head no later than 45 days after the hearing is concluded unless an earlier time frame is mandated by Federal or State law.

(e) In mediations successfully concluded by initial decision, the decision shall be issued and received by the agency head as soon as practicable after the mediation, but in no event later than 45 days thereafter.

(f) Within 10 days after the initial decision is filed with the agency head, the Clerk shall certify the entire record with original exhibits to the agency head.

(g) Upon filing of an initial decision with the transmitting agency, the Office of Administrative Law relinquishes jurisdiction over the case, except for matters referred to in N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.2(c)1 through 5.

Amended by R.1987 d.462, effective November 16, 1987.
See: 19 N.J.R. 1592(a), 19 N.J.R. 2131(b).

Added text to (h) "except for matters ..."
Amended by R.1992 d.46, effective February 3, 1992.
See: 23 N.J.R. 3406(a), 24 N.J.R. 404(a).

Revised (d); deleted (e); redesignated existing (f)-(h) as (e)-(g).
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

In (d), deleted the last sentence.

Case Notes

Administrative Law Judge's finding of fact rejecting the conclusion of a witness, a firefighter for a local fire department and the team leader in the arson investigation unit, regarding the cause of the fire as "not

persuasive" and relying instead upon the ALJ's own involvement in fire investigations and teaching a course on fire investigation, was totally improper; the witness was an expert witness, he had specialized knowledge and experience in fire investigations, he was on the scene of the incident as "suppression efforts were just being completed," he was a firsthand witness to the damage which he carefully reviewed to determine the cause, he took pictures of the damage at that time and contemporaneously recorded his observations in a report, his presence at the fire scene was to determine the cause, and he made a determination after reviewing the fire scene that the improper use of an extension cord in the bedroom, which improperly ran under the bed caster and a rug, caused the fire and burnt away the rug in that area, proceeding in a "classic V-pattern" toward the outlet, window, and air conditioner. Div. of Developmental Disabilities v. Cruz, OAL Dkt. No. HDD 777-2005S, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 524, Final Decision (June 22, 2007).

1:1-18.2 Oral initial decision

(a) The judge may render the initial decision orally in any case where the judge determines that the circumstances appropriately permit an oral decision and the questions of fact or law are sufficiently non-complex.

(b) The decision shall be issued, transcribed, filed with the agency head and mailed to the parties with an indication of the date of receipt by the agency head.

(c) In an oral decision, the judge shall identify the case, the parties, and the issue or issues to be decided and shall analyze the facts as they relate to the applicable law, and make findings of fact, conclusions of law and an appropriate order or disposition of the case. The decision shall include the statement at N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.3(c)12, and the judge shall explain to the parties that the decision is being forwarded to the agency head for disposition pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10, and that exceptions may be addressed to the agency head. The judge need not specifically include in the oral decision the other material required by N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.3(c) as long as it is otherwise contained in the record.

Amended by R.1996 d.57, effective February 5, 1996.
See: 27 N.J.R. 4039(a), 28 N.J.R. 813(a).

In (a) deleted "on the record before the parties" following "orally", and in (b) substituted "the conclusion of the hearing" for "rendering an oral decision".

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

Rewrote (b).

1:1-18.3 Written initial decision

(a) If an oral decision is not issued, the judge shall issue a written initial decision.

(b) The written initial decision shall be filed with the agency head and shall be promptly served upon the parties with an indication of the date of receipt by the agency head.

(c) The written initial decision shall contain the following elements which may be combined and need not be separately discussed:

1. An appropriate caption;
2. The appearances of the parties and their representatives, if any;

3. A statement of the case;
4. A procedural history;
5. A statement of the issue(s);
6. A factual discussion;
7. Factual findings;
8. A legal discussion;
9. Conclusions of law;
10. A disposition;
11. A list of exhibits admitted into evidence; and
12. The following statement: "This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by (the head of the agency), who by law is empowered to make a final decision in this matter. However, if (the head of the agency) does not so act in 45 days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10."

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
Rewrote (b).

Case Notes

Evidence that failed to particularize foundation failed to support decision that sergeant was totally and permanently disabled. *Crain v. State Dept. of the Treasury, Div. of Pensions*, 245 N.J.Super. 229, 584 A.2d 863 (A.D.1991).

Administrative law judge delayed petitioner's application to the DEP for approval of construction of a mobile home park. Petitioner may meet with DEP to formulate method of testing for nitrates acceptable to both parties within 30 days of order. Normally, once an initial decision is rendered, it is returned in its entirety to the agency for final disposition. The OAL would retain sufficient jurisdiction, with the permission of the agency, to resolve disputes arising out of the development and implementation of the testing program (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.3 and 4). *Andover Mobile Home Park v. DEP*, 4 N.J.A.R. 420 (1981).

1:1-18.4 Exceptions; replies

(a) Within 13 days from the date the judge's initial decision was mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the agency head. A copy of the exceptions shall be served on all other parties and the judge. Exceptions to orders issued under N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.2(c)4 shall be filed with the Director of the Office of Administrative Law.

(b) The exceptions shall:

1. Specify the findings of fact, conclusions of law or dispositions to which exception is taken;
2. Set out specific findings of fact, conclusions of law or dispositions proposed in lieu of or in addition to those reached by the judge;
3. Set forth supporting reasons. Exceptions to factual findings shall describe the witnesses' testimony or docu-

mentary or other evidence relied upon. Exceptions to conclusions of law shall set forth the authorities relied upon.

(c) Evidence not presented at the hearing shall not be submitted as part of an exception, nor shall it be incorporated or referred to within exceptions.

(d) Within five days from receipt of exceptions, any party may file a reply with the agency head, serving a copy thereof on all other parties and the judge. Such replies may address the issues raised in the exceptions filed by the other party or may include submissions in support of the initial decision.

(e) In all settlements, exceptions and cross-exceptions shall not be filed, unless permitted by the judge or agency head.

Amended by R.1987 d.462, effective November 16, 1987.
See: 19 N.J.R. 1592(a), 19 N.J.R. 2131(b).

(a) substantially amended.
Amended by R.1990 d.483, effective September 17, 1990.
See: 22 N.J.R. 2067(a), 22 N.J.R. 3003(b).

Change at (a) from ten to thirteen days.
Amended by R.1991 d.44, effective February 4, 1991.
See: 22 N.J.R. 3278(b), 23 N.J.R. 293(a).

In (a) and (d): deleted filing of documents with the Clerk and added text indicating which documents shall be filed with the judge.
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

In (d), substituted "may address the issues raised in the exceptions filed by the other party or may include" for "may include cross-exceptions or".

Case Notes

State Interscholastic Athletic Association regulation excluding males from female athletic teams did not violate federal equal protection, State Constitution, or statute prohibiting sex discrimination in education. *B.C. v. Cumberland Regional School District*, 220 N.J.Super. 214, 531 A.2d 1059 (App.Div.1987).

Within 10 days from the receipt of the judge's initial decision, any party may file written exceptions with the agency head and with the clerk (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.4). *De Vitis v. New Jersey Racing Commission*, 202 N.J.Super. 484, 495 A.2d 457 (App.Div.1985), certification denied 102 N.J. 337, 508 A.2d 213 (1985).

Error in failing to serve jockey in administrative proceeding was harmless. *Moiseyev v. New Jersey Racing Com'n*, 239 N.J.Super. 1, 570 A.2d 988 (A.D.1989).

N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4 makes no provision for replies to reply exceptions, and thus they were not considered. *El-Hewie v. Bd. of Educ. of Bergen County Vocational School Dist.*, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 7673-06, Commissioner's Decision (April 10, 2008).

Because the Board did not file exceptions to the ALJ's June 6, 2007 decision until June 25, 2007, the exceptions were untimely and were not considered by the Commissioner. *Kohn v. Bd. of Educ. of Orange Twp.*, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10582-06, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 532, Commissioner's Decision (July 19, 2007).

Because there was no indication that a letter to the Commissioner of Education "taking exception" to the Initial Decision was also served on either the Board of Examiners or the Administrative Law Judge, the Commissioner did not consider petitioner to have filed exceptions. *Muench v. N.J. Dep't of Educ.*, State Bd. of Examiners, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 08369-06, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 96, Commissioner's Decision (January 9, 2007).

Exceptions are required to be filed within 13 days after the Initial Decision, including partial summary decisions, and although an end-date for filing exceptions was not specified in the order for extension, it was

SUBCHAPTER 19. SETTLEMENTS AND
WITHDRAWALS

1:1-19.1 Settlements

(a) Where the parties to a case wish to settle the matter, and the transmitting agency is not a party, the judge shall require the parties to disclose the full settlement terms:

1. In writing, by consent order or stipulation signed by all parties or their attorneys; or
2. Orally, by the parties or their representatives.

(b) Under (a) above, if the judge determines from the written order/stipulation or from the parties' testimony under oath that the settlement is voluntary, consistent with the law and fully dispositive of all issues in controversy, the judge shall issue an initial decision incorporating the full terms and approving the settlement.

(c) Where the parties to a case wish to settle the matter and the transmitting agency is a party to the case, if the agency head has approved the terms of the settlement, either personally or through an authorized representative, the parties shall:

1. File with the Clerk and the assigned judge, if known, a stipulation of dismissal, signed by the parties, their attorneys, or their non-lawyer representatives when authorized pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-5.5(f); or
2. If the parties prefer to have the settlement terms incorporated in the record of the case, then the full terms of the settlement shall be disclosed in a consent order signed by the parties, their attorneys, or their non-attorney representatives when authorized pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-5.5(f). The consent order shall be filed with the Clerk and the assigned judge, if known.

(d) The stipulation of dismissal or consent order under (c) above shall be deemed the final decision.

Amended by R.1987 d.461, effective November 16, 1987.
See: 19 N.J.R. 1593(a), 19 N.J.R. 2131(c).

(b)1.-2. added to clarify that in those cases where the agency head, either in person or through counsel, has consented to the settlement terms.

Amended by R.1995 d.300, effective June 19, 1995.
See: 27 N.J.R. 1343(a), 27 N.J.R. 2383(a).
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

In the introductory paragraph of (a), substituted "transmitting agency is not a party" for "agency head has not consented to the settlement terms"; and rewrote (c).

Case Notes

Emotionally disturbed child and his parent were "prevailing parties". E.P. by P.Q. v. Union County Regional High School Dist. No. 1, D.N.J.1989, 741 F.Supp. 1144.

Initial Decision (2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 261) adopted, which concluded that the terms of an unsigned "draft" agreement between a teacher and board of education constituted the terms of an agreed upon settlement that bound both parties, subject to approval by the Commissioner; the teacher's attorney had advised the school board that the settlement was acceptable, but the teacher objected to it. In re Tenure Hearing of Jones, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 8618-05S, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 494, Commissioner's Decision (August 9, 2007).

N.J.A.C. 1:1-19.1 does not require that respondent specifically state under oath that the settlement was voluntary. The ALJ may determine from the entirety of the sworn testimony (including certifications) of all the parties whether a voluntary settlement exists (decided under former version of rule). In re Tenure Hearing of Jones, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 8618-05S, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 494, Commissioner's Decision (August 9, 2007).

1:1-19.2 Withdrawals

(a) A party may withdraw a request for a hearing or a defense raised by notifying the judge and all parties. Upon receipt of such notification, the judge shall discontinue all proceedings and return the case file to the Clerk. If the judge deems it advisable to state the circumstances of the withdrawal on the record, the judge may enter an initial decision memorializing the withdrawal and returning the matter to the transmitting agency for appropriate disposition.

(b) When a party withdraws, the Clerk shall return the matter to the agency which transmitted the case to the Office of Administrative Law for appropriate disposition.

(c) After the Clerk has returned the matter, a party shall address to the transmitting agency head any motion to reopen a withdrawn case.

Amended by R.1990 d.71, effective February 5, 1990.
See: 21 N.J.R. 3589(a), 22 N.J.R. 334(b).

In (a): deleted language specifying the entering of an initial decision for withdrawals and added, "discontinue ... for appropriate disposition".

In (b): specified that Clerk shall return matter to agency which had transmitted the case to OAL.

In (c): deleted language referring to decision granting withdrawal.
Amended by R.1991 d.44, effective February 4, 1991.

See: 22 N.J.R. 3278(b), 23 N.J.R. 293(a).

In (a): deleted "in writing" from withdrawal procedure request.

Law Review and Journal Commentaries

Law Against Discrimination. Judith Nallin, 138 N.J.L.J. No. 15, 23 (1994).

Case Notes

Discharged employee's election to file national origin discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission pursuant to federal law precluded employee from bringing state court national origin discrimination claim after the EEOC determined that employee failed to demonstrate probable cause for administrative determination of discrimination. *Hernandez v. Region Nine Housing Corp.*, 286 N.J.Super. 676, 670 A.2d 95 (A.D.1996).

Law Against Discrimination did not jurisdictionally prevent plaintiff from filing complaint in superior court after withdrawing her administrative complaint. *Aldrich v. Manpower Temporary Services*, 277 N.J.Super. 500, 650 A.2d 4 (A.D.1994), certification denied 139 N.J. 442, 655 A.2d 445.

SUBCHAPTER 20. MEDIATION BY THE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1:1-20.1 Scheduling of mediation

(a) Mediation may be scheduled, at the discretion of the Director, when requested by the transmitting agency, or by all parties to a hearing or when requested by an agency with regard to a matter which has not been transmitted as a contested case. Mediation may be scheduled in any matter where the transmitting agency has a mediation program available to the parties to the case only upon request of the agency head for good cause and with the consent of the Director.

(b) When a request for mediation is granted, the Office of Administrative Law shall supply the parties with a list containing not less than six administrative law judges as suggested mediators. Each party may strike two judges from the list and the Office of Administrative Law will not assign any judge who has been stricken from the list to conduct the mediation. The Office of Administrative Law shall notify the parties of the assigned mediator.

New Rule, R.1999 d.413, effective December 6, 1999.

See: 31 N.J.R. 2290(a), 31 N.J.R. 2717(a), 31 N.J.R. 3999(a).

Former N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.1, Conduct of mediation, recodified to N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.2.

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.

See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

In (a), inserted "or when requested by an agency with regard to a matter which has not been transmitted as a contested case".

Amended by R.2008 d.151, effective June 16, 2008.

See: 40 N.J.R. 915(a), 40 N.J.R. 3617(a).

In the second sentence of (a), substituted "may" for "shall not" and inserted "only upon request of the agency head for good cause and with the consent of the Director".

1:1-20.2 Conduct of mediation

(a) Mediation shall be conducted in accordance with the following procedures:

1. Discovery to prepare for mediation shall be permitted at the discretion of the judge.
2. All parties to the mediation shall make available for the mediation a person who has authority to bind the party to a mediated settlement.
3. All parties must agree in writing to the following:
 - i. Not to use any information gained solely from the mediation in any subsequent proceeding;
 - ii. Not to subpoena the mediator for any subsequent proceeding;
 - iii. Not to disclose to any subsequently assigned judge the content of the mediation discussion;
 - iv. To mediate in good faith; and
 - v. That any agreement of the parties derived from the mediation shall be binding on the parties and will have the effect of a contract in subsequent proceedings.

4. The mediator shall, within 10 days of assignment, schedule a mediation at a convenient time and location.

5. If any party fails to appear at the mediation, without explanation being provided for the nonappearance, the mediator shall return the matter to the Clerk for scheduling a hearing or for return of the matter to the agency and, where appropriate, the mediator may consider sanctions under N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14.

6. The mediator may at any time return the matter to the Clerk and request that a hearing be scheduled before another judge or that the matter be returned to the agency.

7. No particular form of mediation is required. The structure of the mediation shall be tailored to the needs of the particular dispute. Where helpful, parties may be permitted to present any documents, exhibits, testimony or other evidence which would aid in the attainment of a mediated settlement.

(b) In no event shall mediation efforts continue beyond 30 days from the date of the first scheduled mediation unless this time limit is extended by agreement of all the parties.

Amended by R.1991 d.279, effective June 3, 1991 (operative July 1, 1991).

See: 23 N.J.R. 639(a), 23 N.J.R. 1786(a).

In (a)5, revised N.J.A.C. citation.

Recodified from N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.1 and amended by R.1999 d.413, effective December 6, 1999.

See: 31 N.J.R. 2290(a), 31 N.J.R. 2717(a), 31 N.J.R. 3999(a).

In (a), deleted a former 2, and recodified former 3 through 7 as 2 through 6. Former N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.2, Conclusion of mediation, recodified to N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.3.

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.

See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

Added new (a)1; recodified former (a)1 through (a)6 as (a)2 through (a)7; in (a)5, inserted "or for return of the matter to the agency" and "the mediator"; and in (a)6, inserted "or that the matter be returned to the agency".

1:1-20.3 Conclusion of mediation

(a) If the transmitting agency is a party to the mediation, successful mediation shall be concluded by a mediation agreement.

(b) If the transmitting agency is not a party, successful mediation shall be concluded by initial decision. The initial decision shall be issued and received by the agency head as soon as practicable after the mediation, but in no event later than 45 days thereafter.

(c) If mediation does not result in agreement, the matter shall be returned to the Clerk for scheduling appropriate proceeding or for return to the transmitting agency.

Amended by R.1997 d.158, effective April 7, 1997.

See: 29 N.J.R. 282(a), 29 N.J.R. 1295(a).

In (c), inserted "or for return to the transmitting agency".

Recodified from N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.2 by R.1999 d.413, effective December 6, 1999.

See: 31 N.J.R. 2290(a), 31 N.J.R. 2717(a), 31 N.J.R. 3999(a).

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.

See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).

In (b), inserted the last sentence.