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**TENTH ANNUAL
REPORT
1963-1964**



New York Harbor—1964.

Port of New York Authority Photo.

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**WATERFRONT
COMMISSION
OF
NEW
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**TENTH ANNUAL
REPORT
1963-1964**



*To the Honorable NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, Governor,
and the Legislature of the State of New York*

*To the Honorable RICHARD J. HUGHES, Governor,
and the Legislature of the State of New Jersey*

WE ARE PLEASED to forward the tenth Annual Report of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor for the fiscal year 1963-1964. Contained herein is a summary of the Commission's activities of the past fiscal year, together with pertinent observations concerning the Commission's administration and enforcement of the Compact between New York and New Jersey.

It can be reported that the New York-New Jersey port area continued its pre-eminence as the nation's leading ocean gateway. During 1963 its waterborne commerce—domestic and foreign—established a new record with more than 157.7 million short tons of cargo, an increase in excess of 63,000 tons over 1956, the Port's previous record year. Foreign trade also reached a new high with a total of 47.2 million tons, valued at \$9.9 billion. This is the highest figure reported by the Army Corps of Engineers since 1924 when it commenced reporting on the nation's waterborne commerce.

The Port of New York affords shippers a variety of advantages for utilizing its facilities, including its surface and air transportation network, its waterways, the frequency of sailings and arrivals of vessels to and from all parts of the world, its millions of people, and its thousands of industrial plants within a 100-mile radius, all of which offer markets for finished and raw goods.

The Port also continues its pre-eminence in the handling of general cargo in the United States, moving approximately 20 percent of the nation's total tonnage. The volume of this high-valued and high-revenue producing tonnage provides employment for almost 25,000 longshoremen and checkers employed in the Port of New York. Records of the Waterfront Commission for this reported year reveal increased dock employment for moving such cargo.

Hirings in some areas of the Port showed a slight decline. This merely reflects the relocation of pier facilities or moves by shipping or terminal operators to new or more modern docks within the port area. In fact, during the fiscal twelve months, longshore employment increased more than six percent to a total of 4,704,876 hirings.

The reduction in the waterfront labor force from over 51,000 in 1953 to 24,605 by June, 1964, resulting from the Commission's decasualization program, has made it possible for 26 percent of the longshoremen and checkers employed in the Port to earn in excess of \$7,000 last year. At the Commission's inception 10 years ago less than one percent were in this category. According to New York Shipping Association reports, the average annual income for these dock workers for the year ending September 30, 1963, was \$5,236, as compared with \$2,356 in 1953. This represents a 122 percent increase in average annual earnings in the past 10 years even though the hourly pay increase during the same period amounted to 44 percent. The median annual wage in 1963 was \$5,650.

At the end of the Commission's fiscal year, 24,605 longshoremen and checkers were on the Commission's Register. While many days had up to 18,000 hirings, there were some days during the reported year when port employment exceeded 20,000. Although the number registered is about 4,600 more than the number of workers required on peak days, experience has shown that a Register of approximately 24,500 men is necessary to accomplish the work in the Port. This is because the full registered work force is never available on any given day. Usually thousands of longshoremen do not make themselves available for work because of sickness, vacation or other personal reasons. For example, in the month of May, 1964, of the total work force of 24,500, the average number of men reporting for work daily was slightly less than 18,000. In fact, a Commission survey shows that each month approximately 1,400 regular employees pre-ordered for work the night before, including gang members, absent themselves more than 20 percent of the time. Indeed, even with a total Register of 24,500, shortages frequently occurred. The reported unfilled job calls for this fiscal year totalled 14,097 longshoremen and 1,305 checkers. While such shortages

are not serious under present conditions, any substantial reduction in the size of the Register would quickly magnify the situation and rapidly lead to serious shortages. This is especially true since each year approximately 1,500 men leave the waterfront industry through death, retirement or for work in other industries.

During the past two years, the United States Department of Labor has conducted an extensive study of manpower utilization and job security in the longshore industry as it concerns the Port of New York and other East and Gulf Coast ports. The Waterfront Commission was asked to assist in this study and it supplied statistical data and information to the Department of Labor. In its recently issued report, the United States Department of Labor said in part:

“ . . . During the past ten years the work force in the Port of New York has changed from one of casual employment to one of relative stability, largely through changes in the hiring system. Since 1953 a register of longshore workers has been maintained by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, a bi-state agency established by the governments of New York and New Jersey. Only men who are registered with the Commission may be employed on the waterfront. The Commission also administers a decasualization program which removes from the register those workers who fail to meet fixed minimum work requirements during a given period. This program has reduced the supply of labor to levels more closely related to demand.”¹

At the establishment of the Commission in 1953, the law required that the Commission eliminate the pier-head “shaph” and regulate hiring in designated employment information centers. The limited time to meet the effective date of the Compact compelled the Commission to accept whatever quarters were available for its hiring purposes. Some of these quarters were not entirely adequate as permanent hiring facilities. As soon as possible, the Commission embarked on a program of modernization and relocation of its centers whenever its leases for the existing premises expired. During the past year the Commission has continued this program of improving its facilities for the employment of longshoremen and checkers.

New identification cards to replace the present registration cards for all longshoremen, checkers, chenangoes, marine maintenance men, marine carpenters, coopers, pier guards, security officers and pier superintendents are presently being distributed. Developed by the Commission, these cards are expected to fill a long-standing need in the maritime industries. Practically indestructible, they are adaptable to electronic processing and can be utilized in payroll operations as well as security and identification procedures at piers and terminals.

¹ For a more complete discussion of the U. S. Department of Labor Reports—Manpower Utilization—Job Security in the Longshore Industry see Addenda, page 19.

The coded cards can also be used for the compilation of data for pensions and welfare funds, holidays, vacations and other industry uses. Since they include a full-color identification photo and physical description of the registrant or licensee, these plastic-encased cards cannot be altered or exchanged fraudulently without quick detection.

In an important ruling by the United States Supreme Court, the Commission this past year successfully sustained the constitutionality of the statute authorizing it to grant witnesses in its investigations immunity from prosecution. This decision has far-reaching application since in effect it sustained the validity of state immunity statutes.

The Commission has also continued its efforts to solve the problem, common to all ports, of cargo thefts. In these efforts the Commission will constantly seek the cooperation of shipping companies, terminal operators, marine insurance underwriters and other members of the insurance industry. Continued efforts by all parties who are directly affected by cargo thefts should result in further improvements in cargo security on the piers.

Laminating Waterfront Commission-developed identification cards.



INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION

THE RATE OF assessment on longshore payrolls of the shipping industry in the Port of New York to meet the Commission's budget was not increased from the 1.25% rate fixed for the previous fiscal year despite the general rise in the cost of governmental operations. The Waterfront Commission was able to keep this assessment constant through economies, tight budget controls and a continuous review of expenditures.

The operating budget for the fiscal year of 1964-1965, approved by the Governors of the States of New York and New Jersey, has been established at \$2,402,004.

The Commission during the past fiscal year accelerated its program to modernize and better equip its employment information centers. Physical changes adaptable to seniority hiring were also made in the centers. Pay increments to Commission personnel were granted to meet the increased cost of living and keep pace with increases given in comparable government offices.

The Commission's Accounting Department, responsible for auditing the Commission's budget as well as conducting audits of employer payrolls for assessment purposes, was placed under the Director of Administration, who also supervises clerical and stenographic services, purchases, property leases and service contracts.

Howard E. Finney, former Police Commissioner for the City of Buffalo and on leave as a deputy inspector from the New York Police Department, was sworn in as the Commission's Executive Director on October 1, 1963.

We record with sorrow the deaths during the past year of the following Commission employees: Nicholas Sabatino, Investigator; John J. Riordan, Office Manager; John J. McLaughlin, Senior Clerk and Herbert Middendorf, Senior Clerk.

The Commission expresses its appreciation for the cooperation received from federal, state and municipal agencies in assisting the Commission to accomplish the objectives of the Compact.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ON THE WATERFRONT

Embezzlement of Union Funds

THE COMMISSION HAS continued to unearth and expose embezzlement by union officials of funds belonging to the membership of ILA union locals.

Although the checker's union constitution required payment of a \$500 initiation fee for membership in the local, no one in authority had ever made an inquiry as to whether such fees were being paid by the new members despite large increases of names on the membership books. Business agents who issued union books took advantage of this lack of interest and charged these new members whatever the traffic would bear, pocketing the sums collected.

Recently, a business agent for a checker local was found by the Commission to have supplemented his \$10,000 salary, plus expenses, by such misappropriation of the local's funds. The Commission has barred him from working on the waterfront on the ground that he committed fraud, deceit and misrepresentation in sworn testimony by denying that he received initiation fees which he withheld from the union.

Although not re-elected as a business agent, he is still being provided for, by receiving the same pay he formerly collected as business agent, \$200 a week, plus expenses, as a "messenger" for the ILA. This matter has been forwarded to the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York.

Using the same tactics, two other checker union officials, who held office for many years, embezzled union funds in New Jersey. Evidence obtained by the Commission disclosed that between them they pocketed at least \$1600 in one year. Upon this evidence, the United States Attorney for New Jersey obtained indictments charging embezzlement against both officials. One official was convicted after trial; the other died before the trial of the indictment.

Evidence concerning four other checker union officials who engaged in similar embezzlements has been referred by the Commission to the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.

Loansharking on the Waterfront

The loanshark is a vicious racketeer who thrives on human misery. On the waterfront, men who at times and for various reasons find themselves in need of funds become victims of loansharks. While the loans made to these longshoremen are usually not large, the racket is lucrative because of the substantial number of borrowers.

In addition to loansharking being a vicious practice *per se* it has more serious connotations on the waterfront. Once a longshoreman gets into the clutches of a loanshark, he is often victimized and is compelled to steal cargo in return for the

right to borrow additional money, or to obtain the indulgence of the loanshark for slow repayment. In some instances, pier guards hired to protect cargo, but enmeshed in the grasp of loansharks must shut their eyes to stealing on the piers.

Threats and force are used to collect debts from borrowers to meet their payments. Not only is the borrower himself subject to physical harm, or threats of such violence, but often his immediate family is also subjected to such methods of collection.

In the decade of its existence, the Waterfront Commission, with the cooperation of other law enforcement agencies, has on numerous occasions been successful in breaking up loanshark activities. To illustrate, during the past year an ILA representative, who was also a gang foreman, conducted a loanshark business at Port Newark and used his automobile as an office, providing his own form of drive-in banking facilities in the parking lot of a bank. With the assistance of the Essex County Prosecutor, and the Port Authority and Newark police, the Commission arrested him in February, 1964 and seized his records. These records indicated outstanding loans totalling approximately three thousand dollars on which he was charging interest of \$450 a week. The loanshark was immediately suspended from working on the waterfront and his registration revoked after a hearing.

In another case a gang foreman who conducted a loanshark operation on four separate piers on the North River was arrested by Commission investigators. His main office was the men's room on one of the piers, where he regularly occupied a cubicle. Longshoremen would "queue-up" to transact their business.

At the time he was apprehended the loanshark had in his pocket a switch-blade knife, \$1,150 in cash and records of his lucrative loansharking racket. His registration as a longshoreman was immediately suspended pending a hearing and a New York County Grand Jury returned an information charging him with violation of both the New York State banking and weapons laws.

Loansharking is a practice in which the victims are usually terrified and will not come forward to complain and identify the perpetrators. Indeed, those complaints received by the Commission are usually in the form of anonymous letters from the wives of longshoremen who are enduring terrible economic hardships and are unable to clothe and feed their families because of their husbands' entanglements with loansharks.

The loanshark practice is carried on clandestinely and it is only through intensive effort that a loanshark is apprehended with evidence sufficient for criminal prosecution. Even when the borrowers are identified and asked for their testimony they remain mute. They would rather incur whatever legal penalties may be imposed for their silence than reveal the criminals. In this connection, the Commission recently recommended, in hearings held by the New York State

Commission of Investigation, that there should be a specific prohibition against this type of activity in the Penal Laws. At present law enforcement agencies have to resort to banking laws, dealing with the licensing of small loan businesses, in order to prosecute the criminals in this widespread racket. The Commission further recommended that loansharking should be classified a felony, and that mere possession of loanshark records be made a crime. This would be an effective tool since a loanshark must keep records to operate his racket.

Truck Shakedowns

A major part of the cargo imported and exported through the port is moved to and from the piers by truck. As reported last year, because of congestion on some piers, the long lines of trucks waiting for cargo have led to the pernicious practice on the part of some waterfront workers of soliciting bribes from the truckers for preferential treatment in these truck lines. Because this situation begets such a practice, it is suspected that at some piers congestion is intentionally aggravated to increase the "take".

During this past year existence of this practice was illustrated in the case of two waterfront workers in charge of the checkers and loading machine operators at a Brooklyn pier. They regularly engaged in a shakedown of the truckers for priority in loading. As a result, those who paid were sometimes able to pick up more than one load each day while those who refused to pay might have to stand in line more than a day in order to receive their cargo. The cost of the delay or the bribe was, of course, passed on to the ultimate consumer. For their operation of this racket, which apparently existed for some time, these men were stricken from the longshoremen's Register. Investigation into this practice is continuing.

Larceny on the Piers

Thefts from the piers are frequently accomplished through collusion of a checker, a machine driver and a truck driver. This type of activity was exposed when a truck carrying 100 cases of cashew nuts, valued at \$2700 and stolen from a nearby pier, was stopped in Brooklyn by Commission investigators. Obviously, the truck driver alone could not have loaded one hundred cases, each weighing more than one hundred pounds. Of necessity he must have had assistance on the pier. Further investigation implicated a pier checker and a machine driver in the larceny. As a result of this investigation, arrests were made and the registrations of the checker and the machine driver were revoked.

In another instance, two pier guards were apprehended by Commission investigators and a New York City detective placing cargo stolen from the piers in the basement of a private home. A search of the premises pursuant to a warrant revealed a basement full of valuable imported cargo ranging from cases of harmonicas to sets of damask table linen. As a result of these arrests,

both pier guards were removed from the waterfront and convicted of larceny in the criminal courts.

Barring Criminals from Union Office

The Commission also referred to the Prosecutor of Essex County, New Jersey, a matter involving an international vice-president of the ILA who was also president of two locals and the trustee of a pension and welfare fund. During the past year in Nashville, Tennessee, he was convicted and sentenced to the legal maximum of five years in prison and a \$5,000 fine for the crime of tampering with the jury that tried James R. Hoffa, president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Because this ILA official has not yet resigned from his numerous positions, he is in possible violation of the Waterfront Commission Act, which makes it a crime for anyone who has been convicted of a felony to hold office as a union official.

Banning Undesirables

Using evidence obtained by its investigators, the Commission during the past year has permanently or temporarily barred from waterfront work 267 persons who violated the Waterfront Commission Compact. The offenses involved included larceny from piers, bookmaking, policy, assault, burglary, carrying dangerous weapons, robbery and violations of hiring regulations.

CARGO PROTECTION

TO ASSURE IMPROVED property and cargo protection, the Commission determined to strengthen the training course for its licensed pier guards. To achieve this goal, the qualifying training program was revised to include six two-hour lectures which utilize audio-visual teaching techniques as to pier protection duties. Lectures cover post assignments, record-keeping, physical layouts of docks, safeguarding of cargo and property, proper attire, and procedures in safety and fire protection.

Successful completion of this course, which includes a written examination given by the Commission, is required for licensing as a pier guard. Also a five-hour refresher course is required for renewal of a port watchman's license every three years.

The Commission reiterates that improved protection can be achieved to some degree under the present system by up-grading the watching personnel through a further lowering of age limits for applicants, constant review of physical standards and more comprehensive training programs. Sincere cooperation from the shipping industry and its agencies has been sought in the past. It is the intention of the Commission to continue to seek such cooperation in the future. The well-



Contraband recovered by Waterfront Commission investigators.

being of the Port of New York depends to a major degree upon the presence of an efficient and effective security corps to deter pier thefts and thus establish the reputation of New York as a low pilferage port. This, of course, calls for greater initiative on the part of private industry and increased cooperation with the agencies specifically charged with waterfront law enforcement. Otherwise, such a reputation may become a reality only by the establishment of a port-wide government operated policing unit, uniformed, trained and disciplined in the all-important task of guarding cargo and docks.

REGULARIZATION AND STABILIZATION OF WATERFRONT LABOR

Prior to the advent of the Waterfront Commission, the Port of New York had a vast oversupply of labor—over 51,000 men seeking some 20,000 jobs. These men were selected for employment at a pier head “shape-up”, the principal cause for many of the ills that plagued the waterfront. It had been condemned for over half a century by every person, group or government body which studied waterfront problems.

This depressing and degrading system of hiring spawned kickbacks, loan-sharking and extortion, and compelled workers to engage in unlawful labor disputes and criminal activities. It made it possible for unscrupulous union officials and criminals to unlawfully control the hiring and dominate the waterfront. Employment for waterfront workers was irregular. Intimidation, insecurity and inadequate earnings held the longshoreman in complete bondage to the bosses. In short, the “shape-up” and the oversupply of labor resulted in the loss of the fundamental rights of labor, impaired the stability of the Port, threatened its pre-eminence and completely weakened law enforcement on the waterfront.

To eliminate the oversupply of labor and the resulting evils, the Commission when established was given the authority to regulate the size of the work force in the Port. To free the longshoremen from the peonage of the “shape-up”, the Commission was directed by law to establish employment information centers through which all longshore labor would be employed and to initiate equitable hiring procedures.


The Size of The Work Force

To prevent an oversupply of labor the Commission cancels the registration of persons who do not make a bona fide effort to work regularly on the waterfront. Twice each year, the Commission removes from the Register those persons who failed during the preceding six months to have worked, or to have sought work, as longshoremen in the Port for a required number of days per month established by the Commission. In 1952, before the establishment of the Commission, as many as 51,282 longshoremen shared the work in the Port. By 1955, the Commission had reduced this number to 27,284. Further reduction of the labor force has resulted in a dramatic improvement in the economic status of the full-time longshoreman. For example, in 1954, 406 longshoremen, or less than one percent of the total working force, earned \$7,000, or over, annually. By 1963, 7,380 longshoremen, or over 26 percent of the total working force, earned \$7,000 or over. In 1954, 3,797 longshoremen, or less than 10 percent of the total working force, earned \$5,000 or over. Nine years later, 17,134 long-

shoremen, or over 60 percent of the total working force, earned \$5,000 or over. This striking improvement in the economic status of the longshoremen in the Port cannot be attributed to the increase in hourly earnings, which would have meant little if the work of the Port had to be shared among the 50,000 longshoremen on the waterfront before the Commission's decasualization program.

This year the Commission's decasualization program has continued as an effective means of controlling the size of the work force. In the current year the Commission decasualized 3,619 men as against 2,194 last year. It reduced the Register to 24,605 as of June 30, 1964, as compared with 27,194 a year ago. Thus, even though all applicants who qualified under law were registered, the Commission has substantially reduced the size of the longshore work force.

The decasualization program has been tested for almost 10 years and has proved itself to be an effective, fair and flexible method of regulating the size of the labor force. It permits sincere and able persons to become part of the waterfront work force without discrimination. Thus, in recent years, a sub-



COMPARISON OF EARNINGS OF LONGSHOREMEN AND CHECKERS

	<u>1954</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>
\$7,000 and over.....	406	7,475	7,380
\$6,000 to \$7,000.....	802	4,935	5,193
\$5,000 to \$6,000.....	2,589	4,238	4,564
\$4,000 to \$5,000.....	6,330	2,856	2,807
\$3,000 to \$4,000.....	7,013	1,916	1,789
Under \$3,000.....	24,193	5,714	6,491
Total Reported.....	41,333	27,134	28,224
Total Earnings.....	\$102,061,108	\$145,533,208	\$147,887,899
Total Hours Worked.....	37,813,991	42,023,133	40,201,000
% Hours Overtime.....	24.3	23.4	25.6
Average Annual Wage*.....	\$2,469	\$5,364	\$5,236

* Does not include fringe benefits.


NOTE: This table includes craftsmen such as carpenters, coopers, maintenance men and miscellaneous personnel required to be registered as longshoremen effective May 27, 1957. Similar tables in Annual Reports prior to that of 1957-58 included earnings of longshoremen and checkers only, as reported by the New York Shipping Association whose fiscal year ends September 30.

SOURCE: New York Shipping Association for fiscal year ending September 30, 1963.

stantial number of persons from minority groups have established themselves as part of the regular work force on the waterfront. Not only do the present registration and decasualization systems prevent an oversupply of labor, but they are responsive to the ever changing labor requirements of the Port, hence preventing any serious shortage of labor in periods of unusual port activity.

The Hiring System

Upon the establishment of its employment information centers, the Commission promulgated regulations which encouraged employers to select and list their regular employees with the centers. This created a practice whereby an employer would notify his employees to report for work for the following day, eliminating the necessity for the employees to show up at the pier in the morning to learn whether they were wanted or not. Thus, employees became formally identified with particular employers and piers. This program was substantially enhanced in 1955 when the Commission adopted new regulations establishing a gang hiring system. Under these regulations, employers listed gangs as organized units attached to particular piers or terminals. This completed the Commission's program of identifying a regular work force with a particular pier and employer.



Today, approximately 90 percent of the workers are notified of their employment by 4:00 P. M. the previous day. Persons not ordered are thus afforded an opportunity to seek work at other piers through Commission-operated centers. The Commission's hiring system also makes labor available to employers in organized units. When they are not employed by their regular employer these units can be ordered by other employers. Because of this mobility of labor, employment opportunities for longshoremen are increased.

As a further step in its efforts to improve the economic stability of the Port, the Commission encouraged industry and labor to adopt a seniority system based on objective standards which would establish hiring priorities according to the workers' length of service on the piers. In 1959 labor and industry formally agreed to a seniority system of hiring, and the Commission altered its hiring procedures to accommodate that agreement.

Many employers and union officials, however, did not act in good faith and never properly implemented the agreement. Employers and union representatives observed their seniority agreement only when it was convenient for them to do so. One center alone reported an average of 50 to 75 violations of seniority hiring daily. Complaints of such violations from aggrieved longshoremen to their union representatives were to no avail, and many longshoremen turned to the Commission for help. These circumstances led the Commission, on May 6, 1963, to adopt new hiring regulations incorporating and enforcing the hiring priorities in the seniority agreement between management and labor.

During the time these regulations have been in effect, violations of seniority have practically disappeared. Longshoremen are now hired in strict accordance with the Commission seniority regulations which protect their rights under the seniority agreement. Under the present hiring procedures each man knows where he stands. If his rights are violated it becomes immediately evident. Licensed employers and their licensed hiring agents now hire in strict accordance with Commission regulations to protect their licenses.

The Commission finds and determines that public necessity exists for the continued registration of longshoremen, the continued licensing of the occupations as required by the Waterfront Commission Compact and the continued operation of Employment Information Centers as provided in Article XII of the Compact. Continuation of these measures is deemed necessary to maintain the well-being of the vital Port of New York and to achieve the objectives of the Compact.

Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH KAITZ
Commissioner for New York

WILLIAM L. KIRCHNER, JR.
Commissioner for New Jersey

Cargo vessel at berth, Port Newark.



Addenda

COMMISSION LITIGATION

As in past years, the Waterfront Commission during 1963-1964 was engaged in litigation in courts of New York and New Jersey on all levels and once again in the Supreme Court of the United States.

The case of *Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor*, 378 U. S. 52 (1964) involved a fundamental constitutional question of far-reaching importance not only to the Commission but to all state law enforcement officials throughout the United States. The decision in this case upheld the constitutionality of state immunity statutes which are so vital to effective law enforcement.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey had held two ILA officials in civil contempt for their refusal to answer questions in an investigation by the Commission into a possibly illicit work stoppage. The ILA officials had refused to give evidence upon the ground of self-incrimination and the Commission, pursuant to its statutory powers, had granted the ILA officials immunity from prosecution under the laws of New York and New Jersey. However, the ILA officials persisted in their refusal, claiming that they had a constitutional right to refuse to testify because the Commission's grant of immunity extended only to state, and not to federal crimes and therefore did not afford them complete protection from prosecution.

The Supreme Court of the United States had previously ruled that a witness who had been granted immunity from state prosecution could not refuse to testify upon the ground of federal incrimination. In addition, the Supreme Court had also ruled in the case of *Feldman v. U. S.*, 322 U. S. 487 (1944), that it was constitutional for federal officials to use state immunity testimony in a federal prosecution. Accordingly, upon the basis of existing decisions, the refusal of the ILA officials to testify notwithstanding the Commission's grant of

immunity from state prosecution was contrary to established law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of certiorari to hear this case, thereby indicating a possible change in constitutional doctrine.

The paramount concern of the Commission was that the Supreme Court might enunciate a rule which would permit a witness in a State investigation to avoid testifying by claiming incrimination under federal law. In view of the pervasive nature of federal criminal laws, such as gambling and income tax laws, such a rule would in effect nullify state immunity statutes since the various states, notwithstanding a grant of immunity from state prosecution, would be powerless to compel the testimony of any witness who claimed federal incrimination. Accordingly, nothing less was involved in this case than the continued enforceability of every state immunity statute in the Country. Because of the widespread importance of the case to state law enforcement, Louis J. Lefkowitz, the Attorney General of the State of New York, and the District Attorneys Association of New York submitted briefs in support of the Commission's position.

The Commission's principal argument to the Supreme Court was that the Court should overrule its prior decision in the *Feldman* case and enunciate a new doctrine which would require a state witness who had been granted state immunity from prosecution to testify and at the same time prohibit federal officials from using such testimony directly or indirectly in any subsequent federal prosecution. This would be the most reasonable result because the witness would be protected since his testimony could not be used against him and the state immunity statutes would remain effective. In addition, the federal officials would not be prejudiced by such a rule since they would be free to develop their own independent evidence.

The Supreme Court accepted the Commission's argument and required the two ILA officials to testify in the Commission's investigation and stated that their testimony before the Commission could not be used against them in any subsequent federal prosecution.

The Waterfront Commission Act empowers the Commission to deny or revoke a registration or license to any person who knowingly or willingly advocates the desirability of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States by force or violence or who shall be a member of a group which so advocates knowing the purposes of such a group. During the past year, the Commission continued its

investigation into subversives on the waterfront. In the course of this investigation, a registered longshoreman falsely testified that he had never recruited anyone into the Communist Party and that he himself had never been a member of the Communist Party. The Commission, after an administrative hearing, revoked his longshoreman registration for such fraud, deceit and misrepresentation. The longshoreman sought review of the Commission's determination in the Courts. In *Skaricia v. Waterfront Commission*, 20 A. D. 2d 871 (1st Dept. 1964) the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld the Commission's determination revoking his longshoreman registration and dismissed his petition for review.

RESUME OF LITIGATION

Murphy and Moody v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U. S. 52 (1964).

The Supreme Court of the United States held that two ILA officials in a Commission investigation upon whom the Commission had conferred immunity from State prosecution could not refuse to testify upon the ground that their testimony would incriminate them under federal criminal law, but that any testimony which they would give could not be used against them in any subsequent federal prosecution.

In the Matter of the Application of Miro Skaricia v. The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 20 A. D. 2d 871, 248 N. Y. S. 2d 704 (1st Dept., 1964).

A determination of the Commission revoking a longshoreman's registration for fraud in denying in a sworn interview, among other things, that he was ever a member of the Communist Party and recruited people into the Communist Party was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York.

Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor v. Nicolo J. Collura, (unreported).

The Supreme Court of New York granted a Commission motion to have a witness in an investigation of truck loading shake-downs arrested and confined until he complied with a Commission subpoena duces tecum.

William Donovan v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, New York Law Journal, August 1, 1963.

A proceeding to vacate a Commission order revoking a longshoreman's registration for seven separate instances of violent conduct and interference with the duties of a Commission investigator was dismissed and the Commission determination upheld.

Dominick Di Costanzo v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 243 N. Y. S. 2d 411 (1st Dept., 1963).

The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court confirmed a Commission determination suspending an individual's hiring agent license and longshoreman registration for committing an act of physical injury to a longshoreman on a pier.

Discussion of the U. S. Department of Labor Reports "Manpower Utilization—Job Security in the Longshore Industry"

Background To Reports

On September 30, 1962, upon termination of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect in the industry for the Port of New York as well as other Atlantic Coast ports and when a new contract was not agreed upon, the ILA followed its traditional policy of "no contract—no work," and a work stoppage occurred along the entire East and Gulf Coasts. In order to prevent a national emergency, President Kennedy immediately set in motion the mechanics for obtaining a Taft-Hartley injunction, to return the ports to work for the 80-day "cooling off" period.

The NYSA and ILA met again during the course of the "cooling off" period, but were unsuccessful in working out an agreement. A fundamental difference in opinion regarding the size of work gangs hopelessly divided the parties; management insisting upon a reduction in the gang size and labor just as vehemently insisting on the status quo. Still deadlocked at the termination of the restraining order in December, 1962, the longshoremen again went out on strike.

Because of the critical nature of the industry and the consequent effect of a strike upon the nation's economic health, President Kennedy, using the prestige of his office in an effort to end the strike, appointed a special three-man board to mediate the disagreement. The board included Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, as chairman, Theodore W. Kheel, a labor lawyer from New York, and James J. Healy, Professor of Economics at Harvard University.

Five days after its appointment, the Board hammered out a Memorandum of Agreement settling the strike, which was signed by the parties on January 20, 1963. Though the Board, in its recommendations for settlement, made no provision for reduction in the size of the work gang, it dictated, however, that a comprehensive study of this area be conducted by the U. S. Department of Labor for each East and Gulf Coast port. The study was to concentrate primarily upon such factors as manpower utilization and job security. Both labor and management agreed that the results of the studies would form the framework for negotiation of the next collective bargaining agreement.

The Department of Labor under the personal direction of Assistant Secretary of Labor James J. Reynolds launched upon the most extensive investigation and analysis of labor conditions ever undertaken in the longshore industry in this nation's history.

On July 1, 1964, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz released the report for New York, which was the first of what would eventually be 10 reports on East

and Gulf Coast ports. The others were published and released over a three months period, the last being the Port of Boston report in September, 1964.

It is not the purpose here to explore the specific findings of the Department of Labor as they relate to the purpose for which the reports were initiated, that is, to assist the parties in negotiating a new contract. It is rather our intention to compare the ports studied with special emphasis on the manner in which they have come to grips with the industry problem of oversupply of labor, and the concomitant ills such a condition carries with it.

Longshoring, historically, has been a casual industry. A student of the industry appraising its casual character in 1938 noted:

“On account of many and varied fluctuations in the shipping trade, it has always been the custom of the ship owners and stevedoring firms to engage their labor, or at least a large portion of it, each day as it is required and to dismiss it the moment it is no longer needed. The longshoreman is put to work only for the period the ship remains in port, unloading cargo. The greater the number of ships in port the greater the amount of work there is to be distributed. A delay in a ship's arrival means no work for a number of longshoremen. When the ship does arrive there follows a period of feverish activity, with long steady hours of labor in order that the ship may sail on time.”¹

Sociological questions aside, it is naturally the desire of management to have a supply of labor more than sufficient to handle peak activity on a given pier. However, experience has shown that an oversupply of labor means that employees cannot earn a living wage in the industry. It is self-evident that the larger the port is in terms of piers and the more decentralized it is geographically the more aggravated the casual labor problem becomes. Under the circumstances on an average or slow day when fewer men are necessary for the work at hand, a tremendous number of men would go unemployed. When there is a great pool of labor vying for too few jobs an unhealthy condition results. Unemployed men in competition with one another for the few jobs available may often fall victims to unscrupulous persons who are in control of hiring and may be forced to “kick back” wages in one form or another in order to obtain employment. Where under-employment exists, there is also present the opportunist who will gladly lend money at usurious rates of interest—the loanshark.

Under-employed men, seeking to make up wages lost from lack of work by winnings at gambling are ready customers for bookmakers and policy number peddlers.

Prior to the advent of the Commission in 1953, conditions in the Port of New York were typical of the situations described above. Each pier had its own excess labor supply. Because of the Port's size and numerous piers, the excess casual labor problem was that much more exaggerated. Available records

¹ Swanstrom, Edward E., *The Waterfront Labor Problem*, p. 22.

indicate that from October 1, 1951 to September 30, 1952, more than 51,000 longshoremen worked at one time or another in the Port. Peak employment, reached only about two days per week at that time, required the services of about 20,000 men.

The Department of Labor report indicates that from this huge pool of labor in 1951 about 17,850 worked less than one hundred hours, and more than 25,000 worked less than 700 hours, the collective bargaining agreement's minimum standards of eligibility for pension and welfare benefits.

The Department of Labor Surveys

The Department of Labor, upon the conclusion of its surveys of 10 East and Gulf Coast ports, describes present day conditions in the industry in this manner:

"While the degree of casualness varies from one port to another, every port studied (*with the exception of New York*) has a considerably larger work force than would be required even to meet peak demands. In some ports the total number of men who have some employment attachment in the industry is twice as high as the number of employees needed for a typical work day."¹ (Emphasis supplied.)

Using the collective bargaining agreement's criterion for pension and welfare benefits of generally 700 or 800 hours a year and accepting the men who had worked at least that amount of time as being the basic work force, the Department of Labor found:

"In nearly all of the ten ports studied, the basic work force, by this definition, is less than half the total of men hired in the year. In four ports more than three-quarters of the work force were employed less than 700 hours during the year. In nearly all of the ports studied the "under 100 hours" group, which would be considered "casual"—by any definition—constitutes from one-third to over half the work force. *By way of contrast, in the Port of New York . . . over one-half of the employees work more than 1,600 hours a year; over four-fifths of the employees work more than 700 hours a year; and the completely casual employees (working less than 100 hours) now represent only about 7 percent of all employees.*" (Emphasis supplied.)

How does one account for this remarkable stabilization of the work force in the Port of New York over the ten years prior to the Department of Labor report? Significantly, the beginning of improvements in the Port of New York coincides with the creation of the Waterfront Commission. Again, in the words of the Labor Department's reports:

"During the past ten years the work force in the Port of New York has changed from one of casual employment to one of relative stability, largely through changes in the hiring system. Since 1953 a register of

longshore workers has been maintained by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, a bi-state agency established by the governments of New York and New Jersey. Only men who are registered with the Commission may now be employed on the waterfront. The Commission also administers a decasualization program which removes from the register those workers who fail to meet fixed minimum work requirements during a given period. This program has reduced the supply of labor to levels more closely related to demand."

The Waterfront Commission, using the tools given to it by the Legislatures of New York and New Jersey, has regulated hiring to such a degree that it is now possible for the parties to discuss a guaranteed annual wage. It would appear from the Labor Department's reports that the remaining nine ports studied are in no way near such an advanced state of regularity in hiring practices or stability in the work force to permit this job security technique being applied to the same extent suggested for longshoremen in the Port of New York.

Summary

In summary then, the longshore industry by its very nature, historically, generates a casual labor problem. This is a truth applicable to every port in the world. The casual labor problem brings with it corollary problems of low wages, degradation and destruction of the dignity of workers, and criminal influences of which society generally, and the longshoremen particularly, are the victims.

Since the common good is vitally involved in such problems, governments the world over have intervened when it became apparent that labor and management lacked either the will or the capacity to solve these problems unassisted.

In 1953, with the Port of New York reaching a crisis in its economic life, the Legislatures of New York and New Jersey by interstate compact created the Waterfront Commission to solve the problems and preserve the economy of the Port. The wisdom of the Legislatures has been recognized by the United States Department of Labor's recent manpower studies which acknowledges the superior position of the Port of New York when compared with other ports.

"The port of New York, as well as major ports in Western Europe, furnish ample evidence that suitable arrangements can be made in the longshore industry (notwithstanding its unique problems) to develop hiring and seniority arrangements which protect the interest of the basic, long-service work force and at the same time assure an adequate supply of workers to meet fluctuating demands."


It should be indicated at this point, that the Department of Labor also credits the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement as a major factor in the alleviation of the casual labor problem and the lifting of the wage level for long-term longshore employees. It must be remembered, however,

that the Commission's decasualization process had already been in effect for some five years and the work force had been reduced to about 27,000 men even before an agreement was reached by management and labor concerning seniority. Despite this agreement, seniority in the Port remained more or less a dead letter for the next four years.

Since the Department of Labor's reports are based upon statistics and data gathered during this period of little or no recognition of the seniority contract, it is obvious that seniority had contributed very little towards the economic betterment of longshoremen in the Port. It was not until 1963, as a result of numerous complaints by longshoremen that their seniority rights were not being recognized by either labor or management, that the Commission incorporated the seniority priorities in its hiring regulations, and seniority then became a reality.

In relation to the nine other ports studied, the Department of Labor has stated, "[a] solution to the excess labor supply, however, is an essential preliminary to the solution of other problems. * * * Unless the work force is stabilized, there can be no progress toward establishing reasonable job security * * *."

New York and New Jersey have found their solution to the problem through the creation of a bi-state regulatory agency—the Waterfront Commission. The Commission offers its experience to assist other ports in the solution of their manpower problems.



*Discharging
Australian Cargo*

WATERFRONT COMMISSION EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION CENTERS

Center and Location

Piers and Areas Covered

MANHATTAN

- 1 659 11th Avenue, Manhattan
- 2 455 West 16th Street, Manhattan
- 3 34 Renwick Street, Manhattan
- 4 15 Moore Street, Manhattan
- 5 15 Moore Street, Manhattan
- 15 15 Park Row

Piers 80-99 North River
Yonkers and Irvington

Piers 53-78 North River

Piers 18-52 North River

Piers 1-17 North River

Piers 4-68 East River

New York City
Commission Headquarters

BROOKLYN

- 6 32 Java Street, Brooklyn
- 7 385 Hicks Street, Brooklyn
- 8 120 Richards Street, Brooklyn
- 9 5504 Third Avenue, Brooklyn
- 14 37th and Marginal Streets,
Brooklyn

Long Island City, Greenpoint,
Williamsburg and Navy Yard
areas

Brooklyn Port Authority piers

Atlantic and Erie Basins,
Breakwater and Gowanus areas

Bush Docks and
Army Base areas

20th Street Pier, Green Dock area
and 39th Street Pier

STATEN ISLAND

- 10 22 Wave Street, Stapleton

Staten Island

NEW JERSEY

- 11 117 Tyler Street, Port Newark
- 12 Harborside Building
34 Exchange Place, Jersey City
- 13 60 Hudson Street, Hoboken

Port Newark and Elizabeth Port
Authority piers

Jersey City and Bayonne areas


Hoboken, Weehawken and
Edgewater areas



NEW

11





YONKERS

QUEENS

1

WEEHAWKEN

MANHATTAN

6

HOBOKEN

2

3

13

12

15

JERSEY CITY

4/5

7

NEW JERSEY

8

ARK

14

UPPER
NEW YORK BAY

9

BAYONNE

BROOKLYN

10

RICHMOND

NEWARK BAY


**AREA SURVEY OF WATERFRONT HIRINGS AND SHIP DAYS BY EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION CENTERS,
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30th, 1964**

CENTER—AREA	1962-63	1963-64	INCR. OR DECR.	% CHANGE	% SHARE OF PORT OF EMPLOYMENT		SHIPDAYS
					1962-63	1963-64	
1—Piers 80-99 North River-Irvington-Yonkers.....	366,532	392,144	+ 25,612	+ 7.0	8.3	8.3	1,891
2—Piers 53-78 North River.....	508,707	485,210	— 23,497	— 4.6	11.5	10.3	1,520
3—Piers 18-52 North River.....	218,994	310,667	+ 91,673	+41.9	4.9	6.6	1,673
4/5 { Piers 1-17 North River } { Piers 4-68 East River }	254,437	235,253	— 19,184	— 7.5	5.8	5.1	1,133
Total—Manhattan.....	1,348,670	1,423,274	+ 74,604	+ 5.5	30.5	30.3	6,217
6—L. I. City-Greenpoint-Williamsburg-Navy Yard.....	92,752	95,190	+ 2,438	+ 2.6	2.1	2.0	1,017
7—Brooklyn Port Authority Piers.....	414,821	494,000	+ 79,179	+19.1	9.3	10.5	2,715
8—Atlantic & Erie Basins-Breakwater-Gowanus.....	607,056	616,604	+ 9,548	+ 1.6	13.7	13.1	3,594
9—Bush Docks—Army Base.....	628,112	518,297	—109,815	—17.5	14.2	11.0	3,366
14—20th St. Pier-Green Docks-39th St. Pier.....	273,426	494,564	+221,138	+80.9	6.2	10.6	2,524
Total—Brooklyn.....	2,016,167	2,218,655	+202,488	+10.0	45.5	47.2	13,216
10—Staten Island.....	103,226	91,071	— 12,155	—11.8	2.4	1.9	413
Total—Staten Island.....	103,226	91,071	— 12,155	—11.8	2.4	1.9	413
11—Port Newark-Elizabeth Port Authority Piers.....	441,750	512,645	+ 70,895	+16.1	9.9	10.9	3,663
12—Jersey City & Bayonne.....	158,580	154,611	— 3,969	— 2.5	3.6	3.3	1,112
13—Hoboken-Weehawken-Edgewater.....	353,065	304,620	— 48,445	—13.7	8.1	6.4	1,592
Total—New Jersey.....	953,395	971,876	+ 18,481	+ 1.9	21.6	20.6	6,367
TOTAL—PORT OF NEW YORK.....	4,421,458	4,704,876	+283,418	+ 6.4	100.0	100.0	26,213

DECASUALIZATION OF LONGSHOREMEN AND CHECKERS

		Num- ber Decasu- alized	Remain- ing Regis- trations
Peak Registration	May 22, 1955.....	—	38,693*
1st Decasualization	June 1, 1955.....	7,141	31,574*
2nd Decasualization	Oct. 27, 1955.....	5,115	27,284*
3rd Decasualization	Apr. 19, 1956.....	2,938	26,486*
4th Decasualization	Oct. 19, 1956.....	1,545	26,746*
5th Decasualization	May 3, 1957.....	1,695	28,928*
6th Decasualization	Oct. 23, 1957.....	1,775	31,056*
7th Decasualization	May 21, 1958.....	1,898	31,946*
8th Decasualization	Oct. 22, 1958.....	2,510	30,364
9th Decasualization	May 14, 1959.....	2,753	28,886
10th Decasualization	Oct. 29, 1959.....	1,667	28,928
11th Decasualization	May 11, 1960.....	1,807	28,355
12th Decasualization	Oct. 27, 1960.....	1,577	27,535
13th Decasualization	May 11, 1961.....	1,859	26,920
14th Decasualization	Oct. 26, 1961.....	1,536	25,754
15th Decasualization	May 10, 1962.....	1,498	25,758
16th Decasualization	Oct. 25, 1962.....	1,012	25,843
17th Decasualization	May 10, 1963.....	1,182	27,218
18th Decasualization	Oct. 22, 1963.....	1,523	25,997
19th Decasualization	Apr. 10, 1964.....	2,096	24,172

* These figures do not include craftsmen who were not required to be registered until May 27, 1957.



COMMISSION DETERMINATIONS

Year Ended June 30, 1964

	APPLICATIONS			REVOCATIONS				TOTALS
	Denied	Granted	Re-voked	Re-voked Leave to Reapply	Sus-pended	Repri-manded	Sus-pending Hearing	
Longshoremen.....	119	14	29	32	9	3	16	222
Checkers.....	25	2	10	1	1	1	3	43
Hiring Agents.....	—	—	1	—	2	1	—	4
Pier Superintendents...	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	4
Port Watchmen.....	22	—	3	1	1	—	5	32
Stevedores.....	—	23	—	—	2	—	—	25
Totals.....	<u>167</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>330</u>
Summary Proceedings								180

PETITIONS

	Denied	Granted	Totals
Petitions for Leave to Reapply.....	60	47	107
Petitions for Rehearing.....	3	1	4
Petitions to Withdraw.....	—	15	15
Petitions to Remove Ineligibility by Reason of Criminal Conviction.....	1	19	20
Totals.....	<u>64</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>146</u>

DIVISION OF LAW

Year Ended June 30, 1964

Applications investigated and processed.....	791
(The above figure includes applications for registration or license as longshoreman, checker, hiring agent, pier superintendent, port watchman and stevedore.)	
Formal hearings conducted and completed.....	318
Petitions for removal of ineligibility investigated and completed	23
Petitions for reconsideration investigated and completed.....	105
Investigations conducted and completed.....	529
Recent arrests investigated and completed.....	405
Probationary cases investigated and completed.....	92
Hearings ordered.....	298
Withdrawal, Legal Hold and Decasualization cases.....	228
Witnesses questioned.....	2,348

DIVISION OF INVESTIGATION Year Ended June 30, 1964

Investigations.....	4,998
Active Waterfront Commission Registrants arrested.....	361
Arrests by Waterfront Commission Investigators:	
a. Pilferage.....	62
b. Gambling.....	17
c. Other offenses.....	17

PORT WATCHING UNIT For Year Ended June 30, 1964

Applications for new pier guard licenses.....	196
Withdrawal of applications.....	148
Temporary Licenses Issued.....	183
Application for renewal of licenses.....	16
Physical Examinations Conducted by Waterfront Commission....	174
Qualifying Training Courses Offered.....	3
New Licensees completing the Qualifying course.....	141
Refresher courses offered.....	3
Licensees completing refresher courses.....	274
Total of summary hearings held.....	66
Referred to Legal Division for further action.....	5
Log books placed on Piers.....	247

COMPARISON OF EARNINGS OF PORT WATCHMEN

	<u>1954</u>	<u>1962a</u>	<u>1963a</u>
\$7,000 and over.....	5	162	214
\$6,000 to \$7,000.....	21	360	354
\$5,000 to \$6,000.....	137	328	277
\$4,000 to \$5,000.....	735	162	151
\$3,000 to \$4,000.....	546	131	127
Under \$3,000.....	1,977	517	577
Total Reported.....	<u>3,421</u>	<u>1,660</u>	<u>1,700</u>
Total Earnings.....	\$7,707,271	\$7,250,000	\$7,300,705
Total Hours Worked.....	4,400,903	2,997,933	2,919,134
% Hours Overtime.....	29.14	29.8	31.3
Average Annual Wage*.....	\$2,252	\$4,367	\$4,295

* Does not include fringe benefits.

a) Figures include supervisory security personnel required to be licensed under Waterfront Commission regulation effective January 1, 1960.

Wages increased from \$11.18 per day in 1954 to \$16.48 per day in 1962 and to \$17.08 per day in 1963. This is an overall increase of 52%. The average annual wage for port watchmen as indicated above shows an increase of 91%.

SOURCE: New York Shipping Association for fiscal year ending September 30, 1963.

PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & Co.

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

SEVENTY PINE STREET

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10005

ACCOUNTANTS' REPORT

The Commissioners

Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor:

We have examined the statement of cash receipts and disbursements of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor for the year ended June 30, 1964. Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

In our opinion, the accompanying statement of cash receipts and disbursements presents fairly the cash transactions of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor for the year ended June 30, 1964, on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Co.

New York, N. Y.

July 17, 1964

WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR

Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements, Year ended June 30, 1964

RECEIPTS:

Assessments on employers of persons registered or licensed by the Commission.....	\$2,257,713.38
Court fines and penalties.....	11,000.00
Interest on United States Treasury bills.....	10,460.40
Interest on badge deposit savings account.....	378.74
	<u>2,279,552.52</u>

DISBURSEMENTS:

Salaries.....	\$1,571,393.12	
Rentals.....	217,547.32	
Retirement, group insurance and social security taxes.....	104,480.64	
Special services and expense.....	73,476.18	
Communications.....	50,287.09	
Furniture, fixtures and equipment.....	46,702.22	
Carfares, auto expense and travel.....	36,161.50	
General office expenses.....	26,374.75	
Repairs and maintenance.....	25,061.12	
Printing.....	16,675.33	
Light, heat and power.....	16,522.66	
Insurance.....	16,270.45	
Seniority plan costs.....	15,379.05	
Miscellaneous overtime expense.....	14,117.07	
Leasehold alterations.....	896.75	
Badge deposits returned (net).....	471.00	
	<u>2,231,816.25</u>	

EXCESS OF RECEIPTS OVER DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE YEAR.....

	47,736.27	
Cash balance, June 30, 1963.....	30,337.75	
U. S. Treasury bills, at cost, which approximates market, June 30, 1963.....	198,536.00	
Cash in badge deposit savings account, June 30, 1963.....	9,455.00	
	<u>238,328.75</u>	
Excess of receipts over disbursement to June 30, 1964 represented by balances as below.....	<u>\$ 286,065.02</u>	

EXCESS OF RECEIPTS AND BALANCE OF FUNDS AT BEGINNING OF YEAR OVER DISBURSEMENTS—BALANCE OF FUNDS AT END OF YEAR, CONSISTING OF:

Cash in checking accounts.....	43,468.04	
Less taxes and other withholdings from employees.....	14,217.03	
	<u>29,251.01</u>	
Cash in badge deposit savings account.....	8,990.00	
United States Treasury bills, at cost, which approximates market.....	247,824.01	
	<u>286,065.02</u>	
	<u>\$ 286,065.02</u>	

**THE WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF
NEW YORK HARBOR 1963-1964**



JOSEPH KAITZ
Commissioner for New York

WILLIAM L. KIRCHNER, JR.
Commissioner for New Jersey

HOWARD E. FINNEY
Executive Director

WILLIAM P. SIRIGNANO
General Counsel to the Commissioners

CHARLES E. MCGEE
Secretary to the Commission

THOMAS F. JONES
Chief Investigator

JESSE O. LANGSTON
Director of Employment Information Centers

HAROLD X. MCGOWAN
Director, Division of Law

ROBERT M. HANSEN
Director of Licensing

SAMUEL P. LISMAN
Director of Administration

ANTHONY ANGELICO
Comptroller

JAMES J. DAVITT
Assistant to the Executive Director



15 PARK ROW, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10038



Modern communications techniques are used for law enforcement on the docks.

