STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Department of Law and Public Safety
DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL
25 Commerce Drive Cranford, N.J. 07016

BULLETIN 2158 September 27, 1974

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ITEM

STATE OF NEW JERSEY
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1. NOTICE TO WHOLESALERS - DIRECTIVE PERTAINING TO AMENDED REGULATIONS 34 and 39.

TO WHOLESALERS WHO SELL TO RETAILERS:

Enclosed is a copy of a notice of this date concerning amended Regulations No. 34 and 39.

If you wish to add an interest rate or late payment fee to retail accounts going into default for purchases made on or after October 1, 1974, you may do so under the following adopted policy:

(1) The fact must be set forth in your terms indicated in your wholesale to retail price filing. (We will accept amendments to these terms until September 5, 1974).

(2) Interest or late payment fee may not be more than 1% per month on the unpaid balance of delivery made on or after October 1, 1974.

(3) The fact that interest or late payment fee will be added to defaulted accounts must be set forth on your invoice.

(4) The calculation of the interest or late payment fee must be uniformly applied to all retailers by each manufacturer or wholesaler.

LEONARD D. RONCO
DIRECTOR

Dated: August 29, 1974

2. NOTICE TO RETAILERS - CONDITIONS RELATING TO ADDITION OF LATE CHARGE OR INTEREST ON PROSPECTIVE DEFAULTING ACCOUNTS - AMENDMENT TO STATE REGULATIONS 34 and 39 PROPOSED.

NOTICE TO ALL LICENSEES:

I have reviewed the record of the public hearing held by the Division on January 16, 1974, to consider proposed amendments to State Regulations No. 34 and 39, authorizing manufacturers and wholesalers to charge a late payment fee or interest on delinquent payments for purchases of alcoholic beverages by retailers, as published in the New Jersey Register of December 6, 1973.

The number of retailers on default for such late payments has increased approximately 25% during the past five years. This fact indicates a problem with respect to the control of undue credit expansion at the wholesale level of the industry.

In 1965 the Division established the Non-Delivery List believing that it would be the remedial measure to control future credit problems. However, it has failed to stem the tide.

To preserve the stability and maintenance of proper control of the industry and to maintain the effectiveness of Regulation No. 39, I have amended State Regulations No. 34 and 39 as heretofore proposed. The amendments, effective immediately, are as follows (additions indicated in bold face thus):

13:2-34.2(a) and (b). (First paragraph of Rule 2(a) of Division Regulation No. 34).

> Manufacturers and wholesalers of alcoholic beverages, other than malt alcoholic beverages intending to sell such alcoholic beverages to wholesalers, shall file with the Director not later than the fifteenth day of February, May, August and November of each year, to become effective for each respective subsequent quarter-annual period, price and discount listings as provided for and as limited in this Rule, containing as to each alcoholic beverage listed (1) its correct brand or trade name, (2) its nature and type, (3) its age and proof of alcoholic content when stated on the label, (4) the number of unit containers per case, (5) the capacity of each unit container, and (6) the wholesale bottle and standard case prices and, at the option of the manufacturer or wholesaler, the one-half and one-quarter standard case prices, which prices shall be individual for each alcoholic beverage and not in combination with any other alcoholic beverage. Said listing may contain a statement of any discount to be allowed. Said listing may also contain a statement of any late payment fee or interest to be charged when payment for deliveries is not made within the applicable credit period. Price and discount listings so filed with the Director shall be deemed to be a new filing for each succeeding quarter-annual period for which no new listing is thereafter timely filed with the Director. Manufacturers and wholesalers filing price and discount listings shall serve upon each wholesaler to whom they intend to sell

such alcoholic beverages a copy of such listings on or before the fifteenth day of the month of filing, or shall mail to each such wholesaler such a copy on or before the twelfth day of the month of filing, and shall file with the Director certification thereof on or before the last day for filing such listings.

13:2-34.2(i) and (j). (First paragraph of Rule 2(b) of Division Regulation No. 34).

Manufacturers and wholesalers of alcoholic beverages other than malt alcoholic beverages, intending to sell such alcoholic beverages to retailers, shall file with the Director not later than the twentieth day of February, May, August and November of each year price and discount listings as provided for and as limited in this Rule, containing as to each alcoholic beverage listed (1) its correct brand or trade name, (2) its nature and type, (3) its age and proof of alcoholic content when stated on the label, (4) the number of unit containers per case, (5) the capacity of each unit container, and (6) the wholesale bottle and standard case prices and, at the option of the manufacturer or wholesaler, the one-half and one-quarter standard case prices, which prices shall be individual for each alcoholic beverage and not in combination with any other alcoholic beverage. Said listing may contain a statement of any discount to be allowed; provided, however, that a discount allowed to a retailer shall not exceed one per centum (1%), to be allowed uniformly for payment in cash (including money order, certified check or a cashier's or treasurer's or similar bank officer's check, but excluding ordinary check) at or before delivery or within seven (7) days thereafter, to be applicable to the total purchase price of a single complete delivery of an entire purchase order exclusive of state sales tax, but not applicable to any retailer whose name appears on the Division's Default List in effect on the date of delivery. Said listing may also contain a statement of any late payment fee or interest to be charged when payment for deliveries is not made within the applicable credit period. Price and discount listings so filed with the Director shall be deemed to be a new filing for each succeeding quarter-annual period for which no new listing is thereafter timely filed with the Director.

13:2-37.1. (Rules 2(a) and 2(b) and the first paragraph of Rule 2(c) of Division Regulation No. 39).

For the purpose of this Regulation:

(a) A retail licensee shall be in default if he has failed to make payment for alcoholic beverages within the time prescribed by Rule 1 hereof.

(b) "Payment" means the full legal discharge of the debt and of any late payment fee or interest due thereon, by cash or its equivalent, including ordinary and recognized means for discharge of indebtedness excepting notes, pledges or other promises to pay at a future date and excepting credit memoranda issued for the purpose of circumventing these regulations. A check not promptly deposited

for collection or a check dishonored on presentation for payment shall not be deemed payment.

(c) "Payment in cash" means full legal discharge of a debt and of any late payment fee or interest due thereon, by delivery of cash, money order, certified check, or a cashier's or treasurer's or similar bank officer's check. Ordinary checks may not be accepted as payment of a defaulted account, or as payment for any alcoholic beverages delivered to a retailer who is at time of delivery listed on the Default List.

Leonard D. Ronco
Director

Filed with Secretary of State August 28, 1974

3. APPELLATE DECISIONS - PAITAKIS v. NEW BRUNSWICK ET AL.

Christ J. Paitakis, Appellant, v. City Council of the City of New Brunswick and Joyce Kilmer Bowling Corp. Respondents.	)	On Appeal CONCLUSIONS and ORDER

Maurer & Maurer, Esqs., by Barry D. Maurer, Esq., Attorneys for Appellant
J. Norris Harding, Esq., by Franklin F. Feld, Esq., Attorney for respondent City
Garrenger & Rosta, Esqs., by Robert Garrenger, Jr., Esq., Attorneys for Objector
David S. Piltzer, Esq., Appearing for the Division

BY THE DIRECTOR:

The Hearer has filed the following report herein:

Hearer's Report

On December 4, 1972, Conclusions and Order were entered in the within matter affirming the denial by respondent City Council of the City of New Brunswick (hereinafter Council) of appellant's application for place-to-place transfer of a plenary retail consumption license.

Thereafter, upon appeal taken from the Director's Conclusions and Order, the Superior Court, Appellate Division (A-1270-72, decided January 7, 1974) reversed and remanded this matter to the Director with the directive that he determine through investigative powers the "interrogation of Vincent Albert and Councilman Smith as to the relationship between them". The Director should then determine whether Councilman Smith was disqualified by reason of such relationship from participating in the consideration of appellant's application; and whether such participation tainted the action of the Council.

Relevant thereto, the Director's attention was called to a prior proceeding in the Superior Court, Law Division on complaint filed November 9, 1971 in which Court Tavern Inc. (the objector in the instant matter) brought action against Bernard Schrum, Building Inspector and the respondent City herein. In the pleadings of that matter, the respondent city had answered (5th paragraph of answer) that a defendant (present appellant) had complied with all the requirements "...pertaining to a liquor...transfer and that such license would be consistent with the general character and needs of the neighborhood and that its existence...would not be detrimental to the general welfare". As this response was diametrically contrary to that taken by the Council in the instant matter, the Director was also mandated to exercise his investigative power to ascertain the cause of the reversal of position by the Council.

In consequence of the Court's directive, a supplemental hearing was held in this Division, wherein the Division was represented by a Deputy Attorney General who introduced testimony toward clarification of the issues. The appellant, respondent and objector were permitted to introduce relevant evidence and to cross-examine witnesses within the ambit mandated by the remand.

I

In its fifth separate defense to an action by the present objector herein against the building inspector relative to the prospective issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the Council responded that

> "the governing body finds Defendant Paitakis has complied with all the requirements of law pertaining to a liquor license transfer, that such license should be consistent with the general character and needs of the neighborhood and that its existence at such location would not be detrimental to the general welfare".

Court Tavern Inc. v. Schrum, et al (unreported A 758-71) - Respondent's answer - Fifth Separate Defense.

As the statement in such separate defense was diametrically contrary to the conclusions later reached by the Board, inquiry was directed toward an explanation of that apparent dichotomy. J. Norris Harding, then counsel for the governing body and now Judge of the Middlesex District Court, testified as to his recollection of the inclusion of that defense in the answer of the initial suit. In response to the question posed concerning the purpose of that fifth separate defense, Judge Harding explained:

> "What I was trying to say in my fifth separate defense and ultimate argument was, let us assume or let us concede that there is absolutely nothing wrong with the liquor license transfer, my whole argument is that it is not a matter for the Board of Adjustment to decide basically for two reasons:
>
> (1) The site of a liquor license is vested in by statute, it is vested in the city council, not in the Board of Adjustment.
>
> (2) What the Board of Adjustment was deciding was basically a rear yard variance and a parking variance, it had nothing to do with the use variance because the luncheonette and restaurant was perfectly proper under the then-city ordinance, so that if there had not been a problem of parking or a rear yard variance, it would never have been before the Board of Adjustment to begin with.
>
> What I was trying to do is take the aspects of the liquor license argument out of it and simply argue---I never got the chance to do it because subsequently the council changed its mind in the sense that I had anticipated perhaps that they were going to decide it one way, they actually did not".

Judge Harding further explained: "I wanted to concede for the purpose of this particular case that it would be granted, but I wanted to argue, whether it would be granted or not is not subject matter for an appeal from the Board of Adjustment".

It thus appears that the fifth separate defense did not represent, nor was it intended to be, a determination of the Council and consisted merely in a postulate upon which a separate defense could be pivoted.

II

The Court directed inquiry of Councilman Smith and of Vincent Albert, the objector, proceeded with testimony taken of them and of Lucene C. Rothfuss, a former part time secretary in the office of Councilman Smith. She related an incident which occurred while she was in Smith's office, where checks received in conjunction with a closing of title were not honored by the local bank. As it was nearing the bank closing hour, and Councilman Smith had issued numerous checks that were dishonored, he became distressed.

At that point, Vincent Albert, the owner of the Court Tavern next door, (and the objector to appellant's application herein), entered and learned of the difficulties. Albert thereupon, gave Mrs. Rothfuss a check in the amount of $1,400.00 which she deposited to insure that funds would be available in the Smith account to cover the outstanding checks.

She knew of no other business of like nature to have occurred before or after. However, she admitted that she was only a substitute employee while his regular secretary was out. She was employed by Smith in that capacity for about four months. During that period, she received telephone messages from Albert which he accepted for Smith in the Court Tavern; and Mrs. Rothfuss transmitted them to Smith.

Councilman John H. Smith testified that a phone extension had been established between his office and the kitchen of the tavern in the next building in 1966. That extension was removed after the matter sub judice was determined by the Director "... and the bad publicity (that resulted), and the possible conflict ...." There was no financial consideration involved in payment for the phone answering service; he insisted that this was an accomodation performed as a neighborly courtesy, since 1966.

He described his friendship with Albert, the objector, as similar to friendships he maintains with most other licensees in his community. He eats at the tavern frequently for lunch, on occasions he joins groups organized in Albert's tavern to attend baseball or other games. Additionally, he has been in Albert's company socially.

He described the overnight loan recounted by Mrs. Rothfuss as a mere accomodation and not something that was usual or regular. With respect to the matter of possible conflict of interest by his participation in the Council's consideration of the appellant's application, he considered that he voted on the appellant's application in the same manner as he voted on all other matters. He did not consider the objector's position to be crucial, and he made his determination for the reasons expressed in the resolution.

The objector, Vincent R. Albert, owner of the corporate stock of Court Tavern Inc., testified that the phone extension between his kitchen and Smith's office was a mere convenience. He has had similar connections with employment offices and other firms from time to time, and considered this service as an expression of friendship.

He explained that Smith is not an intimate friend; however, he admitted that Smith is a patron of his establishment almost each day. He recounted the incident of the loan to Smith's secretary. He happened to be in Smith's office when the problem arose, and he offered to come to Smith's aid because his bank was nearby. He did not feel that Smith was obligated to him in any way.

Mayor Aldrege B. Cooper, Jr., the mayor of New Brunswick, testified that, at the time of the adoption of the resolution denying appellant's application, he was president of the City Council. He had voted against appellant's application, and knew of Smith's connection with Albert. However, he did not feel that Smith's vote would be influenced by reason thereof.

Councilman George Henricks who testified at the prior hearing in this Division was recalled and questioned relative to his knowledge of any connection between Smith and Albert at the time of the vote. He admitted he knew that the two were friends, but did not know to what degree. He described a caucus meeting of the Council held before their vote on the resolution. There were five councilmen present; at an informal vote held in caucus, four members of the council voted against the application, and one in favor of it.

III

It is a well-established legal principle that a quasi-judicial action of a municipal body is rendered voidable by the participation of a member thereof, who is, at the time, subject to a direct or indirect private interest which is at variance with the impartial performance of his public duty. Aldom v. Roseland, 42 N.J.Super. 495, 501 (App. Div. 1956). This common law doctrine found its genesis as a necessary and compelling public policy. Ames v. Bd. of Ed. of Montclair, 97 N.J.Eq. 60; People ex rel. Schenectady Illuminating Co. v. Bd. of Sup'rs, 151 N.Y.S. 1012; Zell v. Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1956); Hochberg v. Freehold, 40 N.J. Super 276 (App. Div. 1956).

In Aldom, supra, the court defined a disqualifying interest:

> "...Basically the question is whether the officer by reason of a personal interest in the matter, is placed in a situation of temptation to serve his own purposes

> to the prejudice of those for whom the law authorizes him to act as a public official. And in the determination of the issue, too much refinement should not be engaged in by the Courts in an effort to uphold the municipal action on the ground that his interest is so little or indirect".

The relationship of Smith with Albert, although alluded to in the prior hearings in this Division, was not fully developed, as is now apparent by the evidence adduced at this hearing. It is quite evident that the two men enjoy a long established and close friendship, and a mutual interdependence. Albert has a daily patron in Smith who has a warmth generated by six years of message-taking by Albert. There can be no logical inference drawn of conclusion reached other than that there is a private loyalty which Smith owes to Albert. Hence the applicability of the rule, as stated in 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations, sec. 990, at p. 553, is pertinent: "The general rule as to the invalidity of a municipal contract in which an officer of the municipality is personally interest is of general application and is so inflexible that no inquiry into the good or bad intention of the officer or as to the fairness or unfairness of the contract is permitted...." and, to the same effect:

> "A public officer has the duty of serving the public with undivided loyalty, uninfluenced in his official actions by any private interest or motive whatsoever". S & L Associates, Inc. v. Washington Twp. 61 N.J. Super 312, 329 (App. Div. 1960).

From the reading of the controlling cases in New Jersey, I find that any participation by a member who has a disqualifying interest voids the action of the Council. A member who has a disqualifying interest must withdraw entirely from the case. To withdraw completely or entirely means precisely that. Highlands Tavern Owners Association v. Highlands, Bulletin 868, Item 11.

Courts in other States have adopted the rule that the mere membership on the council of one who has a personal interest in the matter to be judicially determined by the said council infects the action and spreads that infection to the whole body. New Jersey courts have not gone that far in determining the validity of such contracts or the legality or illegality of the Council's actions. Spar Enterprises, Inc. v. Somers Point et. al. Bulletin 1959, Item 1.

If the member of the municipal issuing authority who must abstain from any participation in the application proceeding does not, the proceeding is voidable on review. Pyatt v. Dunellen, 9 N.J. 548, 555 (1952).

At such posture, it clearly appears appropriate for the Director to mold this appeal as if it were a direct and original application for a transfer of license. Blanck v. Magnolia, 38 N.J. 484 (1962).

It is, therefore, recommended that the Director consider the application of appellant as having been made to him in lieu of application to the issuing authority.

As noted in the Appellate Division decision,: Paitakis v. Council, A-1270-72, supra, the sole objector to the proposed transfer was an individual whose interest was that of a competitor. Neither his reasons, nor those advanced by the councilmen voting against the transfer being, limited as they were to the potential problems of parking and traffic, are in my judgment reasonably sufficient to warrant or require denial. I find, as a fact, that the appellant has established, by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that his application for the said transfer should be approved.

Accordingly, it is recommended that the action of the Council be reversed, and the Council be directed to grant the said transfer in accordance with the application filed therefor.

Conclusions and Order

Written exceptions to the Hearer's report with supportive argument were filed by the attorney for the Council, and a written answer thereto with supportive argument was filed by the attorney for the appellant within the time limited by Rule 14 of State Regulation No. 15.

The Council challenges the Hearer's finding that the Council's reasons for rejecting appellant's application were not "reasonably sufficient". Particular reference was made to the prior determination by the Hearer in his first report dated March 2, 1972, that the objections of the Council were valid and should be affirmed.

However, upon the remand by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court to this Division, the Hearer then found in an investigative hearing, that Councilman Smith was disqualified, by reason of his relationship with Vincent Albert, from participating in the consideration of appellant's application; and that such participation tainted the action of the Council. Cf. Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 1956).

Thus, the Hearer's earlier recommended affirmance of the Council's action was obviously based upon the postulate that the Council arrived at its determination uninfluenced by a conflicting interest. Therefore, the Hearer was limited in the final action to a determination of whether there was sufficient relevant evidence in the record to affirm the action of the Council. Based upon the limits of such review, the Hearer recommended, and the Director adopted his recommendation, that the Council's action should be affirmed.

However, at this hearing held pursuant to the remand of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, and, further, under the authority of N.J.S.A. 33:1-35, the Hearer then concluded that the action of the Council was, indeed, tainted, as stated hereinabove. He, thereupon, molded this application as if it were a direct application by the appellant to the Director, rather than the review of action by the Council, and considered it on its merits, without regard to the findings or conclusions of the Council. Cf. Blanck v. Magnolia, 38 N.J. 484 (1962).

The Hearer then examined the essential criteria required for the transfer of the said license. He found that the reasons for opposing said transfer were unsubstantial, and that the appellant has established by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that it is in the public interest that the application for transfer be granted.

Having carefully considered the entire record herein, including the transcript of the testimony, the exhibits, the Hearer's report, the exceptions filed with respect thereto, and the answer to the said exceptions, I concur in the findings and recommendations of the Hearer and adopt them as my conclusions herein.

Accordingly, it is, on this 16th day of July 1974,

ORDERED that the action of respondent Council in denying application of appellant for a place-to-place transfer to 57 Paterson Street, New Brunswick, be and the same is hereby reversed, and that the application of appellant herein, molded as if it were an application to the Division directly for a person-to-person and place-to-place transfer of the subject license, be and the same is hereby granted; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent City Council of the City of New Brunswick be and the same is hereby directed to approve the aforesaid person -to-person transfer of plenary retail consumption license held by Joyce Kilmer Bowling Corp., to appellant, and for premises 57 Paterson Street, New Brunswick, in accordance with the application filed therefor.

Joseph H. Lerner
Acting Director

4. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - SALE TO A MINOR - CHARGES DISMISSED.

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings against	)
Carmella Dombroski, Vincent P. Dombroski, Joseph M. Bondi t/a Al's Airport Inn 636 Bear Tavern Road Ewing Township PO West Trenton, N.J.	) CONCLUSIONS and ORDER
Holders of Plenary Retail Consumption License C-7, issued by the Township Committee of the Township of Ewing.	)

Samuel Leventhal, Esq., Attorney for Licensees
Carl A. Wyhopen, Esq., Appearing for Division

BY THE DIRECTOR:

The Hearer has filed the following report herein:

Hearer's Report

Licensees pleaded not guilty to a charge alleging that, on December 6, 1973, they sold, served and permitted the consumption of an alcoholic beverage in their licensed premises to Donald K ----, a minor, age 17.

One of the essential elements required to be proved is the age of the minor alleged to be served. The minor did not appear at the hearing. The attorney for the Division stated that the alleged minor resides in Pennsylvania. A subpoena was served upon the minor by mail, although he is not amenable to legal service of subpoena.

The attorney for the Division requested that he be permitted to withdraw the complaint, without prejudice, and until such time as he acquires information which would enable him to proceed to a hearing on the charge.

The attorney for the licensees moved for a dismissal of the charge, with prejudice, contending that the licensees were put to the expense of preparation for hearing; that they were prepared to proceed; and, that the minor was one month short of attaining his majority at the time of the alleged violation.

No proof was elicited from the Division which would demonstrate that, if the Division's motion were granted or if the matter were to be adjourned, the minor would voluntarily appear and testify.

Under these circumstances, I recommend that the motion for dismissal of the subject charge with prejudice, made by the attorney for the licensees, be granted.

Conclusions and Order

No exceptions to the Hearer's report were filed pursuant to Rule 6 of State Regulation No. 16.

Having carefully considered the entire record herein, including transcript of the testimony, the argument of counsel and the Hearer's report, I concur in the findings and conclusions of the Hearer, and adopt his recommendation.

Accordingly, it is, on this 8th day of July 1974,

ORDERED that the charge herein be and the same is hereby dismissed.

JOSEPH H. LERNER
ACTING DIRECTOR

5. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER.

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings against	)	
LeSeul, Inc. t/a LeSeul 925 Springfield Avenue Irvington, N.J.,	)	SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
Holder of Plenary Retail Consumption License C-69, issued by the Municipal Council of the Town of Irvington.	)	

Teltser and Perle, Esqs., by Michael Riccardelli, Esq., Attorneys for Licensee

BY THE DIRECTOR:

On April 11, 1974 an Amended Order was entered herein suspending the subject license for the balance of its term, i.e., midnight June 30, 1974 commencing on Monday, June 17, 1974, with the additional provision that, in the event the said license is renewed for the 1974-75 licensing period, the suspension will remain in effect for the balance of that term, with leave granted to the licensee or any bona fide transferee of the license to apply, by verified petition, to the Director for lifting of the suspension, when the unlawful situation charged in this matter has been corrected, but, in no event, sooner than forty days from June 17, 1974.

The unlawful situation which resulted in the said suspension was set forth in charges (to which the licensee pleaded non vult), alleging that it failed to disclose that Ivanhoe in Irvington, Inc., had a personal interest in the said license; it further represented that no other persons were stockholders therein; and, further, that it failed to keep true books of account in connection with the licensed business. Re LeSeul, Inc., Bulletin , Item .

It appears from the verified petition submitted by the attorney for and on behalf of the licensee, that all of the stock of the corporate licensee herein was transferred on June 17, 1974 to Ivanhoe in Irvington, Inc. It further appears that an application is presently pending before the local issuing authority for a person-to-person transfer of the said license from the said licensee to Ivanhoe in Irvington Inc., t/a The Coronet, at the same premises.

The record discloses that the books and records have been maintained by Ivanhoe in Irvington, Inc. during the period of these proceedings.

It appearing that the unlawful situation has been corrected, I shall grant the petition requesting termination of the suspension, effective 2:00 a.m. Saturday, July 27, 1974.

Accordingly, it is, on this 26th day of July 1974,

ORDERED that the said suspension heretofore imposed in this matter be and the same is hereby terminated, effective 2:00 a.m. Saturday, July 27, 1974.

LEONARD D. RONCO
DIRECTOR

6. STATE LICENSES - NEW APPLICATIONS FILED.

Peter G. Tobia
t/a Toby's Beverage Service
218 Port Monmouth Road
Keansburg, New Jersey
Application filed September 16, 1974
for place-to-place transfer of State
Beverage Distributor's License SBD-47
from 24 Port Monmouth Road, Keansburg,
New Jersey.

Sea-Cliff Industries, Inc.
Monmouth Industrial Park
Route 34
Wall Township, New Jersey
Application filed September 25, 1974
for limited wholesale license.

Leonard D. Ronco
Director