JNH 4-20-12

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE UPDATE SERVICE

Title 1. Administrative Law

Supplement April 2, 2012

NOTE TO SUBSCRIBER: The previous update to Title 1 was Supplement March 5, 2012. Please be certain that those pages are filed in your Title volume(s) before inserting this update. The enclosed pages contain the legally adopted text of all rule changes published in the New Jersey Register as of April 2, 2012.

Remove the following pages:	**Insert the following pages:**
vii through ix	vii through ix
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1-25 through 1-30.1	1-25 through 1-30.1
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TITLE 1

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CERTIFICATION OF OFFICIAL TEXT
AND
LIST OF VALID PAGES

Title 1—Administrative Law

Supplement March 5, 2012

I, Laura Sanders, Acting Director and Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative Law, pursuant to the authority of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-7, do hereby supplement Title 1, Office of Administrative Law, of the New Jersey Administrative Code. The pages issued with this Supplement contain the text of all rule changes adopted and filed with the Office of Administrative Law and published in the New Jersey Register as of the date of this supplement.

The list of "Valid Title 1 Pages" following provides a means of determining whether this title contains the proper pages. Every page in Title 1, along with the page's current supplement date, is listed. A page is valid if the page number and supplement date on the list match the page number and "Supp." date at the bottom of the appropriate page.

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VALID TITLE 1 PAGES
(Current through March 5, 2012)

Agency had exclusive authority to decide contested cases. Application of County of Bergen, N.J., for Approval to Dissolve Bergen County Utilities Authority, 268 N.J.Super. 403, 633 A.2d 1017 (A.D.1993).

Utility dissolution proceeding was not "contested case". Application of County of Bergen, N.J., for Approval to Dissolve Bergen County Utilities Authority, 268 N.J.Super. 403, 633 A.2d 1017 (A.D.1993).

Local agency had authority to render final decision on application to dissolve county utilities authority. Application of County of Bergen, N.J., for Approval to Dissolve Bergen County Utilities Authority, 268 N.J.Super. 403, 633 A.2d 1017 (A.D.1993).

Limitations period for challenge to denial of tenure did not commence upon letter from college president agreeing with claim for tenure. Dugan v. Stockton State College, 245 N.J.Super. 567, 586 A.2d 322 (A.D.1991).

Shell fisherman did not have right to adjudicatory hearing on proposed coastal development by reason of his occupation. N.J.S.A. 12:5-1 et seq., 13:19-1 et seq., 52:14B-2(b), 52:14B-9. Spalt v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 237 N.J.Super. 206, 567 A.2d 264 (A.D.1989), certification denied 122 N.J. 140, 584 A.2d 213.

Lessees of shellfish bottoms were not entitled to adjudicatory hearing on proposed coastal development. N.J.S.A. 12:5-1 et seq., 13:19-1 et seq., 50:1-5 et seq., 52:14B-2(b), 52:14B-9. Spalt v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 237 N.J.Super. 206, 567 A.2d 264 (A.D.1989), certification denied 122 N.J. 140, 584 A.2d 213.

Residents near proposed coastal development did not have sufficient particularized property right to be entitled to adjudicatory hearing. N.J.S.A. 12:5-1 et seq., 13:19-1 et seq., 52:14B-2(b), 52:14B-9. Spalt v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 237 N.J.Super. 206, 567 A.2d 264 (A.D.1989), certification denied 122 N.J. 140, 584 A.2d 213.

Administrative Procedure Act does not establish right to hearing in those who otherwise do not have such right. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-9. Spalt v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 237 N.J.Super. 206, 567 A.2d 264 (A.D.1989), certification denied 122 N.J. 140, 584 A.2d 213.

Nonaggrieved third parties did not have right to challenge coastal development under Coastal Area Facility Review Act or Waterfront Development Act. N.J.S.A. 12:5-1 et seq., 13:19-1 et seq. Spalt v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 237 N.J.Super. 206, 567 A.2d 264 (A.D.1989), certification denied 122 N.J. 140, 584 A.2d 213.

Procedural mode choice (rulemaking v. adjudication) turns on which is best suited to achieve goals and fulfill responsibilities of an agency in a given case (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.6 as N.J.A.C. 1:11-1.6). State Dep't of Environmental Protection v. Stavola, 103 N.J. 425, 511 A.2d 622 (1986).

Public utility ratemaking procedures, although quasi-legislative in origin, are conducted like quasi-judicial proceedings (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-6(a)3). Mortgage Bankers Association v. New Jersey Real Estate Commission, 102 N.J. 176, 506 A.2d 733 (1986).

Public utility ratemaking procedures, although quasi-legislative in origin, are conducted like quasi-judicial proceedings (cites former N.J.A.C. 1:1-6(a)3). Adjudicatory proceedings often involve disputed factual issues and require adversary proceeding for proper resolution (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.5(a)3). Shapiro v. Albanese, 194 N.J.Super. 418, 477 A.2d 352 (App.Div.1984).

Former N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.6 and 1.7 did not usurp the agency head's authority to decide what constitutes a contested case. In Re: Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 447 A.2d 151 (1982).

Rate schedule approval hearing, as a non-adjudicative proceeding, does not require a plenary hearing. New Jersey Builders Assn. v. Sheeran, 168 N.J.Super. 237, 402 A.2d 956 (App.Div.1979), certification denied 81 N.J. 293, 405 A.2d 837 (1979).

Denial of hearing in uncontested case affirmed. Camden County v. Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System, 97 N.J.A.R.2d (TYP) 105.

Order of remand signed by assistant director; valid. O.F. v. Hudson County Welfare Agency, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (DEA) 57.

SUBCHAPTER 3. COMMENCEMENT OF CONTESTED CASES; JURISDICTION OF THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1:1-3.1 Commencement of contested cases in the State agencies

(a) A contested case shall be commenced in the State agency with appropriate subject matter jurisdiction. A contested case may be commenced by the agency itself or by an individual or entity as provided in the rules and regulations of the agency.

(b) A request for a contested case hearing may not be filed with the Office of Administrative Law by the individual or entity requesting the hearing.

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
Inserted designation (a); and added (b).

Case Notes

New Jersey limitations for disputing individualized education plan did not bar reimbursement claim. Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., C.A.3 (N.J.)1994, 42 F.3d 149, rehearing and rehearing in banc denied.

1:1-3.2 Jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Law

(a) The Office of Administrative Law shall acquire jurisdiction over a matter only after it has been determined to be a contested case by an agency head and has been filed with the Office of Administrative Law or as otherwise authorized by law, except as provided by N.J.A.C. 1:1-17. The Office of Administrative Law shall not receive, hear or consider any pleadings, motion papers, or documents of any kind relating to any matter until it has acquired jurisdiction over that matter, except as provided by N.J.A.C. 1:1-17.

(b) When the Office of Administrative Law acquires jurisdiction over a matter that arises from a State agency's rejection of a party's application, and at the hearing the party offers proofs that were not previously considered by the agency, the judge may either allow the party to amend the application to add new contentions, claims or defenses or, if considerations of expediency and efficiency so require, the judge shall order the matter returned to the State agency. If the matter is returned to the agency and thereafter transmitted for hearing, the agency's response to any new contentions, claims or defenses shall be attached to the transmittal form required by N.J.A.C. 1:1-8.2.

(c) Matters involving the administration of the Office of Administrative Law as a State agency are subject to the

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authority of the Director. In the following matters as they relate to proceedings before the Office of Administrative Law, the Director is the agency head for purposes of review:

1. Disqualification of a particular judge due to interest or any other reason which would preclude a fair and unbiased hearing, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.12;

2. Appearances of non-lawyer representatives, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-5.4;

3. Imposition of conditions and limitations upon non-lawyer representatives, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-5.5;

4. Sanctions under N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.4 or 14.14 and 14.15 consisting of the assessment of costs, expenses, or fines;

5. Disqualification of attorneys, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-5.3;

6. Establishment of a hearing location pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-9.1(b); and

7. Appearance of attorneys pro hac vice pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-5.2.

Amended by R.1991 d.34, effective January 22, 1991.
See: 22 N.J.R. 3278(a), 23 N.J.R. 194(a).
Added (c)6.
Amended by R.1991 d.279, effective June 3, 1991 (operative July 1, 1991).
See: 23 N.J.R. 639(a), 23 N.J.R. 1786(a).
In (c)4: revised N.J.A.C. citation.
Amended by R.1996 d.133, effective March 18, 1996.
See: 27 N.J.R. 609(a), 28 N.J.R. 1503(a).
In (c)4 added fines.
Amended by R.2001 d.180, effective June 4, 2001.
See: 33 N.J.R. 1040(a), 33 N.J.R. 1926(a).
In (c)4, inserted "or 14.14" following "1:1-14.4"; added (c)7.
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (c)4, inserted "and 14.15".

Case Notes

State Department of Education, rather than administrative law judge, had jurisdiction to conduct due process review of responsibility for education of blind, retarded child. L.P. v. Edison Bd. of Educ., 265 N.J.Super. 266, 626 A.2d 473 (L.1993).

Agency, rather than Superior Court, was proper place for challenge to special education being provided to blind, retarded child. L.P. v. Edison Bd. of Educ., 265 N.J.Super. 266, 626 A.2d 473 (L.1993).

Administrative agencies enjoy a great deal of flexibility in selecting the proceedings most suitable to achieving their regulatory aims. A high degree of discretion in exercising that choice reposes in the administrative agency (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-2.2). Crema v. N.J. Dep't of Environmental Protection, 94 N.J. 286, 463 A.2d 910 (1983).

In petitioner's appeal from a denial of an instructional certification with endorsements in elementary and special education, the Commissioner and the Department of Education lacked jurisdiction over the college that declined to recommend her for certification; the college could not be ordered to recommend petitioner for certification because there was no statute, regulation, or case law to support such an action and, additionally, petitioner failed to show that the college acted in bad faith where she never satisfied the requirements for enrollment in the college. Glennon v. N.J. State Bd. of Examiners, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 7419-07, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 745, Final Decision (September 18, 2009).

Administrative Law Judge may only review an employee's discipline if the matter is transmitted by the Merit System Board; an ALJ does not have the authority to determine whether an appeal has been filed (adopting in part and rejecting in part 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 734). In re Small, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 3331-03, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1106, Final Decision (January 17, 2007).

Taxes paid to state, jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Law. Linden Disposal, Inc., v. Edison Township, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (EPE) 1.

1:1-3.3 Return of transmitted cases

(a) A case that has been transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law shall be returned to the transmitting agency if the transmitting agency head so requests in written notice to the Office of Administrative Law and all parties. The notice shall state the reason for returning the case. Upon receipt of the notice, the Office of Administrative Law shall return the case.

(b) A case shall be returned to the transmitting agency by the Clerk of the Office of Administrative Law if, after appropriate notice, neither a party nor a representative of the party appears at a proceeding scheduled by the Clerk or a judge (see N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.4). Any explanations regarding the failure to appear must be in writing and received by the transmitting agency head within 13 days of the date of the Clerk's notice returning the case. A copy of the explanation shall be served on all other parties. If, based on such explanations, the agency head believes the matter should be rescheduled for hearing, the agency head may re-transmit the case to the Office of Administrative Law, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-8.2.

(c) Upon returning any matter to the transmitting agency, the Clerk shall issue an appropriate notice to the parties which shall advise the parties of the time limit and requirements for explanations as set forth in (b) above.

(d) The agency head may extend the time limit for receiving explanations regarding the failure to appear when good cause is shown.

Amended by R.1989 d.605, effective December 18, 1989.
See: 21 N.J.R. 3207(a), 21 N.J.R. 3914(a).
Deleted language stating that an initial decision shall be entered returning the case.
Amended by R.1991 d.279, effective June 3, 1991 (operative July 1, 1991).
See: 23 N.J.R. 639(a), 23 N.J.R. 1786(a).
Added new subsections (b) and (c), recodifying original rule text as subsection (a).
Amended by R.1991 d.513, effective October 21, 1991.
See: 23 N.J.R. 1728(a), 23 N.J.R. 3133(a).
Explanation for failure to appear to be submitted within 13 days.

Case Notes

Case remanded from state superior court requires remand to Office of Administrative Law for determination of whether constitutional claims were within scope of remand order. R.D. v. Bernards Township Board of Education, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 481.

SUBCHAPTER 4. AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE TRANSMISSION TO THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1:1-4.1 Determination of contested case

(a) After an agency proceeding has commenced, the agency head shall promptly determine whether the matter is a contested case. If any party petitions the agency head to decide whether the matter is contested, the agency shall make such a determination within 30 days from receipt of the petition and inform all parties of its determination.

4. All parties and the agency shall be notified of any action taken under this section.

(b) Cases may not be placed on the inactive list to await an appellate court decision involving other parties unless the appellate decision is so imminent and directly relevant to the matter under dispute so that some reasonable delay would be justified.

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (a), substituted "demonstrates good cause" for "is mentally or physically incapable of proceeding or is with other just excuse unable to proceed without substantial inconvenience or inordinate expense"; in (a)4, substituted "All parties and the agency shall be notified" for "The Clerk shall notify all parties and the agency"; and in (b), inserted "so" preceding "that".

Cross References

Placement on inactive list pending disposition of charges. See, N.J.A.C. 1:19-9.1.

SUBCHAPTER 10. DISCOVERY

1:1-10.1 Purpose and function; policy considerations; public documents not discoverable

(a) The purpose of discovery is to facilitate the disposition of cases by streamlining the hearing and enhancing the likelihood of settlement or withdrawal. These rules are designed to achieve this purpose by giving litigants access to facts which tend to support or undermine their position or that of their adversary.

(b) It is not ground for denial of a request for discovery that the information to be produced may be inadmissible in evidence if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

(c) In considering a discovery motion, the judge shall weigh the specific need for the information, the extent to which the information is within the control of the party and matters of expense, privilege, trade secret and oppressiveness. Except where so proceeding would be unduly prejudicial to the party seeking discovery, discovery shall be ordered on terms least burdensome to the party from whom discovery is sought.

(d) Discovery shall generally not be available against a State agency that is neither a party to the proceeding nor asserting a position in respect of the outcome but is solely providing the forum for the dispute's resolution.

Amended by R.2004 d.287, effective August 2, 2004.
See: 36 N.J.R. 1857(a), 36 N.J.R. 3523(a).
Deleted former (d) and recodified former (e) as new (d).

Case Notes

Parents of mentally retarded individual were entitled to discovery of all information from Division of Developmental Disabilities concerning placement of individual. Mr. and Mrs. J.E. on Behalf of G.E. v. State Dept. of Human Services, Div. of Development Disabilities, 253 N.J.Super. 459, 602 A.2d 279 (A.D.1992), certification granted 130 N.J. 12, 611 A.2d 651, reversed 131 N.J. 552, 622 A.2d 227.

Disclosure of identity of purported "confidential source" who provided certain information which led to the filing of a complaint against respondent ordered by OAL judge. Div. of Gaming Enforcement v. Boardwalk Regency, 9 N.J.A.R. 274 (1986).

Parties are obliged to exhaust all less-formal opportunities to obtain discoverable material before invoking provisions for discovery practice (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-11.4). Div. of Consumer Affairs v. Acme Markets, 3 N.J.A.R. 210 (1981).

1:1-10.2 Discovery by notice or motion; depositions; physical and mental examinations

(a) Any party may notify another party to provide discovery by one or more of the following methods:

1. Written interrogatories;

2. Production of documents or things, including electronically stored information provided that a party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The party from whom discovery is sought shall demonstrate that the electronically stored information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost;

3. Permission to enter upon land or other property for inspection or other purposes; and

4. Requests for admissions.

(b) Any party may request an informal, nontranscribed meeting with witnesses for another party in order to facilitate the purposes of discovery as described in N.J.A.C. 1:1-10.1. The other party and his or her representative must be given notice and the opportunity to be present. Such meetings are voluntary and cannot be compelled. Failure to agree to such meetings will not be considered good cause for permitting depositions pursuant to (c) below.

(c) Depositions upon oral examination or written questions and physical and mental examinations are available only on motion for good cause. In deciding any such motion, the judge shall consider the policy governing discovery as stated in N.J.A.C. 1:1-10.1 and shall weigh the specific need for the deposition or examination; the extent to which the information sought cannot be obtained in other ways; the requested location and time for the deposition or examination; undue hardship; and matters of expense, privilege, trade secret or oppressiveness. An order granting a deposition or an examination shall specify a reasonable time during which the deposition or examination shall be concluded. The parties may agree to conduct depositions without the necessity of filing a motion; however, the taking of any depositions shall not interfere with the scheduled hearing date.

(d) A party taking a deposition or having an examination conducted who orders a transcript or a report shall promptly,

without charge, furnish a copy of the transcript or report to the witness deposed or examined, if an adverse party, and, if not, to any adverse party. The copy so furnished shall be made available to all other parties for their inspection and copying.

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
Rewrote (a)2; and in (c), inserted the final sentence.

Case Notes

Under N.J.A.C. 1:1-10.2(c), there was good cause for compelling the deposition of a witness who had made allegations against a school principal and caused an Order to Show Cause to be issued by the Board of Examiners against the principal. Because the witness was not a party to the proceeding and the witness was unable to comply with the principal's counsel's request for an informal meeting, the deposition of the witness was warranted. In re Certificates of Kandell, OAL Dkt. No. EDE 09266-2005N; SBE No. 09266-05; SB No. 9-06, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 637, State Board of Education Decision (May 3, 2006).

Administrative agency discovery practice limits available methods of discovery on notice to written interrogatories, production of documents or things, property inspection, physical and mental examinations and requests for admissions (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-11.2). Depositions upon oral examination are available on motion for good cause shown (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-11.3). Div. of Consumer Affairs v. Acme Markets, Inc., 3 N.J.A.R. 210 (1981).

1:1-10.3 Costs of discovery

(a) The party seeking discovery shall pay for all reasonable expenses caused by the discovery request.

(b) Where a proponent of any notice or motion for discovery or a party taking a deposition is a State agency, and the party or person from whom such discovery or deposition is sought is entitled by law to recover in connection with such case the costs thereof from others, such State agency shall not be required to pay the cost of such discovery or deposition.

1:1-10.4 Time for discovery; relief from discovery; motions to compel

(a) The parties in any contested case shall commence immediately to exchange information voluntarily, to seek access as provided by law to public documents and to exhaust other informal means of obtaining discoverable material.

(b) Parties shall immediately serve discovery requests.

(c) No later than 15 days from receipt of a notice requesting discovery, the receiving party shall provide the requested information, material or access or offer a schedule for reasonable compliance with the notice; or, in the case of a notice requesting admissions, each matter therein shall be admitted unless within the 15 days the receiving party answers, admits or denies the request or objects to it pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-10.4(d).

(d) A party who wishes to object to a discovery request or to compel discovery shall, prior to the filing of any motion regarding discovery, place a telephone conference call to the judge and to all other parties no later than 10 days of receipt of the discovery request or the response to a discovery request. If a party fails without good reason to place a timely telephone call, the judge may deny that party's objection or decline to compel the discovery.

(e) The parties shall complete all discovery no later than 10 days before the first scheduled evidentiary hearing or by such date ordered by the judge.

Amended by R.1989 d.190, effective April 3, 1989.
See: 20 N.J.R. 2845(b), 21 N.J.R. 889(a).
In (c), clear specifications added on the result of a failure to respond to a request for admissions.
Petition for Rulemaking.
See: 35 N.J.R. 3965(a), 4331(a).
Amended by R.2004 d.95, effective March 15, 2004 (operative April 15, 2004).
See: 35 N.J.R. 4349(a), 36 N.J.R. 1355(a).
In (e), substituted "10 days" for "five days" following "no later than".
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (b), deleted "and notices and make discovery motions" from the end; rewrote (d); and in (e), deleted "at the prehearing conference" from the end.

1:1-10.5 Sanctions

By motion of a party or on his or her own motion, a judge may impose sanctions pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14 and 14.15 for failure to comply with the requirements of this subchapter. Before imposing sanctions, the judge shall provide an opportunity to be heard.

Amended by R.1991 d.279, effective June 3, 1991 (operative July 1, 1991).
See: 23 N.J.R. 639(a), 23 N.J.R. 1786(a).
Revised N.J.A.C. citation in rule text.
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
Inserted "and 14.15".

Case Notes

Administrative law judge has power to impose reasonable monetary sanctions on attorneys as representatives of parties. In re Timofai Sanitation Co., Inc., Discovery Dispute, 252 N.J.Super. 495, 600 A.2d 158 (A.D.1991).

Before administrative law judge could impose sanctions for violating discovery order, court was required to conduct evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact. In re Timofai Sanitation Co., Inc., Discovery Dispute, 252 N.J.Super. 495, 600 A.2d 158 (A.D.1991).

Sanctions; failure to comply with administrative discovery orders. In the Matter of Timofai Sanitation Co., 92 N.J.A.R.2d (OAL) 6.

Development application denied to petitioners for failure to meet minimum standards for seasonal high water table and wetlands buffer; waiver of strict compliance denied for failure to offer information to establish an extraordinary hardship, citing N.J.A.C. 1:1-11.2 (recodified as N.J.A.C. 1:11-8.3)-(Final Decision by the Pinelands Commission). Lavecchia v. Pinelands Commission, 10 N.J.A.R. 63 (1987).

Administrative law judge held to have discretion with regards to sanctions following a motion to compel discovery (cited former N.J.A.C. 1:1-11.6). 7 N.J.A.R. 206 (1984), reversed Docket No. A-3886-84 (App.Div.1986).

application pending the expedited hearing, or where a party applies for emergency relief under circumstances which do not permit an opposing party to be fully heard, the agency head may issue an order granting temporary relief. Temporary relief may continue until the agency head issues a decision on the application for emergency relief.

(f) When temporary relief is granted by an agency head under circumstances which do not permit an opposing party to be fully heard, temporary relief shall:

1. Be based upon specific facts shown by affidavit or oral testimony, that the moving party has made an adequate, good faith effort to provide notice to the opposing party, or that notice would defeat the purpose of the application for relief;

2. Include a finding that immediate and irreparable harm will probably result before adequate notice can be given;

3. Be based on the likelihood that the moving party will prevail when the application is fully argued by all parties;

4. Be as limited in scope and temporary as is possible to allow the opposing party to be given notice and to be fully heard on the application; and

5. Contain a provision for serving and notifying all parties and for scheduling a hearing before the agency head or for transmitting the application to Office of Administrative Law.

(g) Upon determining any application for emergency relief, the agency head shall forthwith issue and immediately serve upon the parties a written order on the application. If the application is related to a contested case that has been transmitted to Office of Administrative Law, the agency head shall also serve the Clerk of Office of Administrative Law with a copy of the order.

(h) Applications to an agency head for emergent relief in matters previously transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law shall not delay the scheduling or conduct of hearings, unless the presiding judge determines that a postponement is necessary due to special requirements of the case, because of probable prejudice or for other good cause.

(i) Upon determining an application for emergency relief, the judge forthwith shall issue to the parties, the agency head and the Clerk a written order on the application. The Clerk shall file with the agency head any papers in support of or opposition to the application which were not previously filed with the agency and a sound recording of the oral argument on the application, if any oral argument has occurred.

(j) The agency head's review of the judge's order shall be completed without undue delay but no later than 45 days from entry of the judge's order, except when, for good cause shown and upon notice to the parties, the time period is extended by the joint action of the Director of the Office of Administrative Law and the agency head. Where the agency head does not act on review of the judge's order within 45 days, the judge's order shall be deemed adopted.

(k) Review by an agency head of a judge's order for emergency relief shall not delay the scheduling or conduct of hearings in the Office of Administrative Law, unless the presiding judge determines that a postponement is necessary due to special requirements of the case, because of probable prejudice or for other good cause.

Case Notes

Student who was precluded from participating in graduation ceremonies following his suspension for possession of illegal drugs was not entitled to emergent relief because, although the student could show that he would be irreparably harmed by not participating, he failed to also show that he had the legal right to participate, that he had a likelihood of success on the merits of his underlying appeal, or that the balance of interests and equities under the circumstances rested in his favor (modifying 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 470). Nabel v. Bd. of Educ. of Hazlet, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 8026-09, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 841, Emergent Relief Decision (June 24, 2009).

Initial Decision (2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 464) adopted, which found that, while denial of attendance at graduation exercises generally did not constitute irreparable harm, the student may suffer irreparable harm if, after a plenary hearing, it was subsequently determined that he had, in fact, earned a passing grade in his eleventh-grade English class, as he contended. The Board did not deny that the student's class folder was missing, nor did it introduce the school's attendance records or so much as an affidavit or certification from the teacher or any other witness addressing the student's contentions; therefore, since it may yet be proven that the teacher made a promise to the student and/or that the student did earn a final passing grade, the denial of attendance would have, under the facts of this case, caused irreparable harm. Tomlin v. Bd. of Educ. of Lower Cape May Reg'l School Dist., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 4952-09, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 921, Emergent Relief Decision (June 22, 2009).

Parents of an autistic child, with severe language disorder and classified as preschool disabled, failed to satisfy all of the criteria for the granting of emergent relief relative to the change in speech therapy; however, as the board of education admitted that it had not provided the occupational therapy required by the child's IEP, the motion for emergent relief was granted as to those services. J.W. and E.W. ex rel. B.W. v. Tinton Falls Bd. of Educ., OAL DKT. NO. EDS 2200-08, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 165, Emergent Relief Decision (March 24, 2008).

Adult classified special education student with disciplinary problems was precluded from attending Senior Prom. P.P. v. Westwood Board, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (EDS) 165.

1:1-12.7 Disposition of motions

Disposition of motions which completely conclude a case shall be by initial decision. Disposition of all other motions shall be by order.

SUBCHAPTER 13. PREHEARING CONFERENCES AND PROCEDURES

1:1-13.1 Prehearing conferences

(a) A prehearing conference shall be scheduled in accordance with the criteria established in N.J.A.C. 1:1-9.1(d).

(b) The prehearing notice shall advise the parties, their attorneys or other representatives that a prehearing conference will cover those matters listed in N.J.A.C. 1:1-13.2 and that discovery should have already been commenced. At the time of the prehearing conference, the participants shall be prepared to discuss one or more alternate dates when the parties and witnesses will be available for the evidentiary hearing. The judge may advise the parties that other special matters will be discussed at the prehearing conference.

(c) In exceptional circumstances, the judge may, upon no less than 10 days' notice, require the parties to file with the judge and serve upon all other parties no later than three days before the scheduled prehearing conference, prehearing memoranda stating their respective positions on any or all of the matters specified in N.J.A.C. 1:1-13.2 set forth in the same sequence and with corresponding numbers or on other special matters specifically designated.

(d) A prehearing conference shall be held by telephone conference call unless the judge otherwise directs.

1:1-13.2 Prehearing order; amendment

(a) Within 10 days after the conclusion of the prehearing conference, the judge shall enter a written order addressing the appropriate items listed in (a)1 through 14 below and shall cause the same to be served upon all parties.

1. The nature of the proceeding and the issue or issues to be resolved including special evidence problems;

2. The parties and their status, for example, petitioner, complainant, appellant, respondent, intervenor, etc., and their attorneys or other representatives of record. In the event that a particular member or associate of a firm is to try a case, or if outside trial counsel is to try the case, the name must be specifically set forth at the prehearing. No change in such designated trial counsel shall be made without leave of the judge if such change will interfere with the date for hearing. If the name of a specific trial counsel is not set forth, the judge and opposing parties shall have the right to expect any partner or associate to proceed with the trial on the date of hearing;

3. Any special legal requirements as to notice of hearing;

4. The schedule of hearing dates and the time and place of hearing;

5. Stipulations as to facts and issues;

6. Any partial settlement agreements and their terms and conditions;

7. Any amendments to the pleadings contemplated or granted;

8. Discovery matters remaining to be completed and the date when discovery shall be completed for each mode of discovery to be utilized;

9. Order of proofs;

10. A list of exhibits marked for identification;

11. A list of exhibits marked in evidence by consent;

12. Estimated number of fact and expert witnesses;

13. Any motions contemplated, pending and granted;

14. Other special matters determined at the conference.

(b) Any party may, upon written motion filed no later than five days after receiving the prehearing order, request that the order be amended to correct errors.

(c) The prehearing order may be amended by the judge to accommodate circumstances occurring after its entry date. Unless precluded by law, a prehearing order may also be amended by the judge to conform the order with the proofs.

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In the introductory paragraph of (a), substituted "enter" for "prepare" and "addressing the appropriate items listed in (a)1" for "specifically setting out the matters listed in 1".

SUBCHAPTER 14. CONDUCT OF CASES

1:1-14.1 Public hearings; records as public; sealing a record; media coverage

(a) All evidentiary hearings, proceedings on motions and other applications shall be conducted as public hearings unless otherwise provided by statute, rule or regulation, or on order of a judge for good cause shown. Prehearing conferences and informal discussions immediately preceding the hearing or during the hearing to facilitate the orderly and expeditious conduct of the case may, at the judge's discretion, be conducted in public or in closed session and may or may not be recorded. Mediations and settlement conferences shall be held in closed session but may be recorded. All other proceedings in the presence of a judge shall be recorded verbatim either by a stenographic reporter or by sound recording devices. All discussions off the record, no matter how brief, except settlement discussions and mediations, shall be summarized generally for the record. The record of all hearings shall be open to public inspection, but the judge may, for good cause shown, order the sealing of the record or any part thereof.

(b) In considering whether to close a hearing and/or seal a record, the judge shall consider the requirements of due process of law, other constitutional and statutory standards and matters of public policy. The judge shall consider the need to protect against unwarranted disclosure of sensitive financial information or trade secrets, to protect parties or witnesses from undue embarrassment or deprivations of privacy, or to promote or protect other equally important rights or interests.

(c) When sealing a record, the judge must specify the consequences of such an order to all material in the case file including any evidence, the stenographic notes or audiotapes and the initial decision. The treatment of testimony or exhibits shall be on such terms as are appropriate to balance public and private rights or interests and to preserve the record for purposes of review. The judge shall also indicate what safeguards shall be imposed upon the preparation and disclosure of any transcript of the proceedings.

(d) All public hearings may be filmed, photographed and recorded, subject to reasonable restrictions established by the judge to avoid disruption of the hearing process. The number of cameras and lights in the hearing room at any one time may be limited. Technical crews and equipment may be prohibited from moving except during recesses and after the proceedings are concluded for the day. To protect the attorney/client privilege and the effective right to counsel, there shall be no recording of conferences between attorneys and their clients or between counsel and the judge at the bench.

Amended by R.1988 d.115, effective March 21, 1988.
See: 20 N.J.R. 127(a), 20 N.J.R. 642(a).
Added text to (d) "and the effective right to counsel".

Case Notes

Newspaper was entitled to a redacted copy of the ALJ's order in case involving teacher who allegedly committed sexual abuse against her students. Division of Youth and Family Services v. M.S., 73 A.2d 1191 (2001).

State Board of Examiners, Department of Education was required to balance the interests of protecting victims from potential harm and embarrassment against the press' access to public records and proceedings, when determining whether to release redacted copy of sealed order to newspaper. Division of Youth and Family Services v. M.S., 73 A.2d 1191 (2001).

Casino Control Commission is required to balance interests on application to seal a record. Petition of Nigris, 242 N.J.Super. 623, 577 A.2d 1292 (A.D.1990).

Regardless of the terms of the parties' settlement agreement in a tenure proceeding, the underlying records in tenure matters were public documents unless sealed for good cause shown, and any determination by the Commissioner not to refer a matter to the Board of Examiners did not act to circumscribe the authority of that body to act independent of such referral, should it so wish, nor did it relieve the district of its responsibility to cooperate with the Board of Examiners in that eventuality. In re Tenure Hearing of Alvarez, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 736-09, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 839, Remand Order (September 4, 2009).

ALJ should have first considered sealing the record and ordering the parties not to disclose an informant's identity before finding that there was no way to safely protect the informant's identity. In re Smith, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 782-08 (CSV 4528-07 On Remand), 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1234, Remand Decision (October 8, 2008).

Public disclosure required of electric utility's settlement agreement. In Matter of Westinghouse Electric Corporation Motion for Protective Order. 92 N.J.A.R.2d (BRC) 73.

There is a presumption that all adjudicative proceedings were open to the public and that any deviation from this norm must be tested by a standard of strict and inescapable necessity. A case involving allegations of sexual misconduct could not, on its own, be sufficient to create the compelling circumstances necessary to seal the record (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.1). Sananman v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 5 N.J.A.R. 310 (1981).

1:1-14.2 Expedition

(a) Hearings and other proceedings shall proceed with all reasonable expedition and, to the greatest extent possible, shall be held at one place and shall continue, except for brief intervals of the sort normally involved in judicial proceedings, without suspension until concluded.

(b) The parties shall promptly advise the Clerk and the judge of any event which will probably delay the conduct of the case.

Case Notes

Hearings required to proceed with all reasonable expedition (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.2). Deck House, Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Architects, 531 F.Supp. 633 (D.N.J.1982).

1:1-14.3 Interpreters; payment

(a) Except as provided in (d) below, any party at his or her own cost may obtain an interpreter if the judge determines that interpretation is necessary.

(b) Taking into consideration the complexity of the issues and communications involved, the judge may require that an interpreter be taken from an official registry of interpreters or otherwise be assured that the proposed interpreter can adequately aid and enable the witness in conveying information to the judge.

(c) The judge may accept as an interpreter a friend or relative of a party or witness, any employee of a State or local agency, or other person who can provide acceptable interpreter assistance.

(d) In cases requiring the appointment of a qualified interpreter for a hearing impaired person pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:1-69.7 et seq., the administrative law judge shall appoint an interpreter from the official registry of interpreters. The fee for the interpreter shall be paid by the transmitting agency.

Amended by R.1989 d.159, effective March 20, 1989.
See: 20 N.J.R. 2845(c), 21 N.J.R. 749(b).
(d) added requiring appointment of interpreter for hearing impaired, transmitting agency to pay fee.
Amended by R.2002 d.198, effective July 1, 2002.
See: 34 N.J.R. 983(a), 34 N.J.R. 2309(a).
In (c), substituted "The" for "If all parties consent, the".

1:1-14.4 Failure to appear; sanctions for failure to appear

(a) If, after appropriate notice, neither a party nor a representative appears at any proceeding scheduled by the Clerk or judge, the judge shall hold the matter for one day before taking any action. If the judge does not receive an explanation for the nonappearance within one day, the judge shall, unless proceeding pursuant to (d) below, direct the Clerk to return the matter to the transmitting agency for appropriate disposition pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.3(b) and (c).

(b) If the nonappearing party submits an explanation in writing, a copy must be served on all other parties and the other parties shall be given an opportunity to respond.

(c) If the judge receives an explanation:

1. If the judge concludes that there was good cause for the failure to appear, the judge shall reschedule the matter for hearing; or

2. If the judge concludes that there was no good cause for the failure to appear, the judge may refuse to reschedule the matter and shall issue an initial decision explaining the basis for that conclusion, or may reschedule the matter and, at his or her discretion, order any of the following:

i. The payment by the delinquent representative or party of costs in such amount as the judge shall fix, to the State of New Jersey or the aggrieved person;

ii. The payment by the delinquent representative or party of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, to an aggrieved representative or party; or

iii. Such other case-related action as the judge deems appropriate.

(d) If the appearing party requires an initial decision on the merits, the party shall ask the judge for permission to present ex parte proofs. If no explanation for the failure to appear is received, and the circumstances require a decision on the merits, the judge may enter an initial decision on the merits based on the ex parte proofs, provided the failure to appear is memorialized in the decision.

Amended by R.1987 d.462, effective November 16, 1987.
See: 19 N.J.R. 1592(a), 19 N.J.R. 2131(b).
Added text in (a) "The judge may ... the requested relief."
Amended by R.1987 d.506, effective December 21, 1987.
See: 19 N.J.R. 1591(b), 19 N.J.R. 2388(b).
Substituted may for shall in (a).
Amended by R.1991 d.279, effective June 3, 1991 (operative July 1, 1991).
See: 23 N.J.R. 639(a), 23 N.J.R. 1786(a).
Amended failure to appear rules; recodified provisions of original subsection (c) as new rule, N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14.
Recodified original subsection to subsections (a) and (b), deleting original subsection (b). In (a), changed "10" to "one" day for time limit of receipt of an explanation for nonappearance. Added additional text to (a) and new (b)2. Added new subsection (c).
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (a), substituted "shall, unless proceeding pursuant to (d) below" for "may, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.3(b) and (c)", and inserted "pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.3(b) and (c)"; recodified (b)1 as (c); in the introductory paragraph of (c), deleted ", the judge shall reschedule the matter and may, at his or her discretion, order any of the following" from the end; added (c)1 and (c)2; deleted former (b)2; recodified former (c) as (d), and in (d), deleted "because of the failure to appear" preceding ", the party shall ask".

Case Notes

Although the parent failed to appear at an OAL hearing to determine whether her child was entitled to remain in the school district following allegations that the family no longer met the residency requirements, an order dismissing the parent's appeal and granting the district tuition costs for educating the child was reversed and the matter was remanded, especially in light of the parent's assertion — however incredible — that she did not receive notice of the scheduled hearing, as well as the suggestion that the student may have been the child of a homeless family and, consequently, entitled to attend school in the Board's district. L.E.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of West Orange, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 3787-09, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 919, Remand Decision (July 2, 2009).

Initial Decision (2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 656) adopted, which sanctioned a former police officer for failure to appear at two hearings in the amount of $1,513.46 for costs and attorney's fees; the appellant's failures to appear plus his abandoning another hearing constituted a failure to prosecute warranting dismissal. The ALJ had previously denied the appellant's request to place the matter on the inactive list pending disposition of his related federal civil rights case. In re Thompson, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 05511-06, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1138, Final Decision (October 24, 2007).

Initial Decision (2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 702) adopted, in which an employee's appeal was dismissed as a sanction for the employee's failure to appear for a scheduled hearing without good cause; it was reasonable to conclude that continuation of the matter would have resulted in additional expense and delay. In re Pearson, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 3949-03, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 772, Final Decision (August 23, 2006).

Initial Decision (2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 551) adopted, which concluded that dismissal of an senior correction officer's sexual harassment claim was necessary because the officer failed to appear at the scheduled hearing and the evidence demonstrated that, after the officer's complaint was made regarding the procedure and thoroughness of the harassment investigation, remedial actions had been taken to assure proper investigation of complaints, rendering the officer's complaint moot. In re Easley, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 4869-04, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1198, Final Decision (November 22, 2005).

Initial Decision (2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 394) adopted, which explained that the decision to permit an ex parte presentation of evidence is within the judge's discretion. Sheddan v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, OAL Dkt. No. RAC 2400-04, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1476, Final Decision (September 19, 2005).

Decision to permit an ex parte presentation of evidence in matter of State employee's removal was not arbitrary. White v. Department of Transportation, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (ETH) 1.

Salesperson's failure to file answer to order to show cause or to make appearance before New Jersey Real Estate Commission warranted license suspension. New Jersey Real Estate Commission v. Grennor. 92 N.J.A.R.2d (REC) 29.

1:1-14.5 Ex parte communications

(a) Except as specifically permitted by law or this chapter, a judge may not initiate or consider ex parte any evidence or communications concerning issues of fact or law in a pending or impending proceeding. Where ex parte communications are unavoidable, the judge shall advise all parties of the communications as soon as possible thereafter.

(b) The ex parte communications preclusion shall not encompass scheduling discussions or other practical administrative matters.

(c) Ex parte discussions relating to possible settlement may be conducted in the course of settlement conferences or mediations when all parties agree in advance.

(d) Where an agency or agency staff is a party to a contested case, the legal representative appearing and acting for

the agency in the case may not engage in ex parte communications concerning that case with the transmitting agency head, except for purposes of conferring settlement authority on the representative or as necessary to keep the agency head as a client informed of the status of the case, provided that no information may be disclosed ex parte if it would compromise the agency head's ability to adjudicate the case impartially. In no event may the legal representative participate in making or preparing the final decision in the case.

Amended by R.1988 d.78, effective February 16, 1988.
See: 19 N.J.R. 1761(b), 20 N.J.R. 385(a).

Adopted the codifying of the Supreme Court's ruling in In Re Opinion No. 583 of the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 107 N.J. 230 (1987).

Case Notes

In case construing N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.8(c), court held that while an administrative case is being heard at the OAL, the prosecuting DAG may consult ex parte with the head of the administrative agency to the extent necessary to keep the agency head, the client, reasonably informed. In the Matter of Opinion No. 583 of Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 107 N.J. 230, 526 A.2d 692 (1987).

1:1-14.6 Judge's powers in presiding over prehearing activities, conducting hearings, developing records and rendering initial decisions

(a) The judge may schedule any form of hearing or proceeding and establish appropriate location areas and instruct the Clerk to issue all appropriate notices.

(b) When required in individual cases, the judge may supersede any notice issued by the Clerk by informing the parties and the Clerk of this action.

(c) Depending on the needs of the case, the judge may schedule additional hearing dates, declare scheduled hearing dates unnecessary, or schedule any number of in-person conferences or telephone conferences.

(d) When required in individual cases, the judge at any time of the proceeding may convert any form of proceeding into another, whether more or less formal or whether in-person or by telephone.

(e) The judge may bifurcate hearings whenever there are multiple parties, issues or claims, and the nature of the case is such that a hearing of all issues in one proceeding may be complex and confusing, or whenever a substantial saving of time would result from conducting separate hearings or whenever bifurcation might eliminate the need for further hearings.

(f) The judge may establish special accelerated or decelerated schedules to meet the special needs of the parties or the particular case.

(g) The judge may administer any oaths or affirmations required or may direct a certified court reporter to perform this function.

(h) The judge may render any ruling or order necessary to decide any matter presented to him or her which is within the jurisdiction of the transmitting agency or the agency conducting the hearing.

(i) The judge shall control the presentation of the evidence and the development of the record and shall determine admissibility of all evidence produced. The judge may permit narrative testimony whenever appropriate.

(j) The judge may utilize his or her sanction powers to ensure the proper conduct of the parties and their representatives appearing in the matter.

(k) The judge may limit the presentation of oral or documentary evidence, the submission of rebuttal evidence and the conduct of cross-examination.

(*l*) The judge may determine that the party with the burden of proof shall not begin the presentation of evidence and may require another party to proceed first.

(m) The judge may make such rulings as are necessary to prevent argumentative, repetitive or irrelevant questioning and to expedite the cross-examination to an extent consistent with disclosure of all relevant testimony and information.

(n) The judge may compel production of relevant materials, files, records and documents and may issue subpoenas to compel the appearance of any witness when he or she believes that the witness or produced materials may assist in a full and true disclosure of the facts.

(*o*) The judge may require any party at any time to clarify confusion or gaps in the proofs. The judge may question any witness to further develop the record.

(p) The judge may take such other actions as are necessary for the proper, expeditious and fair conduct of the hearing or other proceeding, development of the record and rendering of a decision.

Case Notes

Where a confidential informant's statements served as evidence in a disciplinary action against a correction officer for engaging in an inappropriate relationship with an inmate, but the informant was not called as a witness during the hearing, the matter was remanded to allow the appointing authority to call the confidential informant as a witness; if the appointing authority did not call the confidential informant, the ALJ was authorized to act in its stead to take the testimony. In re Smith, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 4528-07, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 136, Remand Decision (January 30, 2008).

Record needed to be developed to facilitate review of ALJ's determination that a senior correction officer was improperly dismissed after he tested positive for marijuana because the expert's testimony was not transcribed and the parties offered conflicting interpretations of what the testimony was; the ALJ was authorized to take the expert's testimony to clarify the urine testing process, including appropriate cut-off levels, and the margin of error associated with such testing (remanding 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 140). In re Fuller, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 439-06, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1124, Remand Decision (November 8, 2007).

ALJ properly limited the evidence to whether a police officer was successfully re-trained, as required by a settlement agreement between the officer and the appointing authority arising out of a prior disciplinary matter; the allegations giving rise to the prior disciplinary proceeding did not need to be considered in determining whether the officer had fulfilled his obligations under the agreement (adopting 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 242). In re MacDonald, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 474-05, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1133, Merit System Board Decision (August 29, 2007).

Initial Decision (2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 246) adopted, in which an employee's appeal was dismissed as a sanction for the employee's failure to appear for a scheduled hearing without good cause; it was reasonable to conclude that continuation of the matter would have resulted in additional expense and delay. In re Thompson, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 3859-05, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1109, Final Decision (June 20, 2007).

In a dispute in which the appointing authority claimed that an employee lied about his education and military service, the Merit System Board remanded the matter and ordered the Administrative Law Judge to use its powers under N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.6 to take the testimony of witnesses, if necessary, in order to determine whether the documentary evidence offered by the appointing authority could be properly authenticated; the Board also stated that the employee should be compelled to testify and/or present evidence on remand to refute the charges. In re Anderson, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 2101-05 (CSV 4698-04 On Remand), 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1099, Merit System Board Decision (December 20, 2006).

Merit System Board authorized ALJ on remand to identify and take testimony of witnesses regarding chain of custody of drug specimen in the event the appointing authority did not call those witnesses. In re Brown, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 8874-04, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 892, Merit System Board Decision (October 20, 2006).

Initial Decision (2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 848) adopted, which determined that under N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.6 an administrative law judge properly dismissed a public employee's action seeking accidental disability retirement benefits because the employee had ample opportunity to litigate his case. It was reasonable to conclude that continuation of the current matter would result in additional expense and delay where the matter had been on the inactive list from April 2005 until January 2006, at the employee's request, because he was incarcerated, and the employee's counsel represented that he was unable to locate the employee after March 2006. In re Schnitzer, OAL Dkt. No. 1005-2003N, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 939, Final Decision (October 19, 2006).

Given the serious allegations against a Human Services Assistant that she pushed a patient into a chair and then struck the patient with a hairbrush, the Merit System Board ordered that it could not make a definitive decision as to whether removal was warranted without further testimony and ordered the appointing authority to call an additional witness; if the appointing authority failed to do so, the Administrative Law Judge was authorized to use her power to take additional testimony (remanding 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 951). In re Woart, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 4709-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 536, Remand Decision (April 26, 2006).

Although an appellant failed to timely comply with the ALJ's discovery schedule, the failure did not unduly prejudice the appointing authority since it received the appellant's answers to its interrogatories; consequently, the remedy of dismissing the appellant's appeal for his untimely submission was unduly harsh and the ALJ should have considered other possible sanctions, such as the counsel fees incurred by the appointing authority as a result of its motion to dismiss. In re Zorn, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 8501-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 633, Remand Decision (April 5, 2006).

Remand was necessary in order to allow a correction officer to provide the ALJ with documentary evidence that his absences from work were due to his daughter's illness; although it appeared that the appointing authority acted harshly in removing the officer, the ALJ's reversal of the appointing authority's penalty without the officer being requested to submit medical documentation was troubling. In re Bailey, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 4696-04, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1196, Remand Decision (July 27, 2005).

Respondent moved to bar counsel for petitioner because of alleged conflict of interest due to N.J.S.A. 52:13D-16(b) that prohibits members of the Legislature and their partner and employees from representing any person other than the State in connection with any cause or matter pending before a State agency. Cited N.J.A.C. 1:1-5.1 and 14.6(p), which authorize an administrative law judge to rule on the propriety of appearance of counsel. Held counsel was barred (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.7 and 3.9). Stone Harbor v. Div. of Coastal Resources, 4 N.J.A.R. 101 (1980).

1:1-14.7 Conduct of hearings

(a) The judge shall commence hearings by stating the case title and the docket number, asking the representatives or parties present to state their names for the record and describing briefly the matter in dispute. The judge shall also, unless all parties are represented by counsel or otherwise familiar with the procedures, state the procedural rules for the hearing. The judge may also permit any stipulations, settlement agreements or consent orders entered into by any of the parties prior to the hearing to be entered into the record at this time.

(b) The party with the burden of proof may make an opening statement. All other parties may make statements in a sequence determined by the judge.

(c) After opening statements, the party with the burden of proof shall begin the presentation of evidence unless the judge has determined otherwise. The other parties may present their evidence in a sequence determined by the judge.

(d) Cross-examination of witnesses shall be conducted in a sequence and in a manner determined by the judge to expedite the hearing while ensuring a fair hearing.

(e) When all parties and witnesses have been heard, opportunity shall be offered to present oral final argument, in a sequence determined by the judge.

(f) Unless permitted or requested by the judge, there shall be no proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, briefs, forms of order or other dispositions permitted after the final argument. Whenever possible, proposed findings or other submissions should be offered at the hearing in lieu of or in conjunction with the final argument.

1. When proposed findings or other submissions are permitted or requested by the judge, the parties shall conform to a schedule that may not exceed 30 days after the last day of testimony or the final argument or as otherwise directed by the judge.

2. When the judge permits proposed findings or other submissions to be prepared with the aid of a transcript, the transcript must be ordered immediately. The submission time frame shall commence upon receipt of the transcript.

3. Any proposed findings of fact submitted by a party shall not be considered unless they are based on facts proved in the hearing.

4. Any reference in briefs or other such submissions to initial and final decisions shall include sufficient information to enable the judge to locate the initial decision. This shall include either the Office of Administrative Law docket number, or a reference to New Jersey Administrative Reports or another published and indexed compilation or to the Rutgers Camden Law School website at http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal. A copy of any cited decision shall be supplied if it is not located in any published compilation or on the foregoing website.

Amended by R.2001 d.180, effective June 4, 2001.
See: 33 N.J.R. 1040(a), 33 N.J.R. 1926(a).
In (k)4, inserted "or 14.14" following "1:1-14.4"; added (k)7.
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
Deleted former (g); recodified former (h) through (m) as (g) through (*l*); in (i), substituted "(*l*)" for "(m)"; in (j)4, inserted "and 14.15"; in (k), substituted "(j)" for "(k)" and "(g)" for "(h)"; and in (*l*), substituted "(j)1" for "(k)1".
Amended by R.2008 d.151, effective June 16, 2008.
See: 40 N.J.R. 915(a), 40 N.J.R. 3617(a).
Added (m).

Case Notes

In employment discrimination case, Administrative Law Judge's denial of all fees for one of the employee's attorneys was not "law of the case," and the ALJ's subsequent modification of that ruling to allow payment for certain services was adopted by the Director; except for specified matters relating to the hearing itself, delineated in N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.10(j), any ruling of the ALJ is subject to review by the agency head at the conclusion of the case. Heusser v. N.J. Highway Auth., OAL Dkt. No. CRT 01863-98, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1071, Final Decision (August 30, 2005).

Granting of partial summary judgement is not effective until a final agency review has been rendered on an issue, either upon interlocutory review pursuant to a request by respondent or at end of the contested case (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-9.7 and 1:1-16.5). Kurman v. Fairmount Realty Corp., 8 N.J.A.R. 110 (1985).

Order of the Administrative Law Judge may be reviewed by the Commissioner of the Department of Education and by the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services whether upon the interlocutory review or at the end of special education case (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-9.7). A.N. v. Clark Bd. of Educ., 6 N.J.A.R. 360 (1983).

1:1-14.11 Ordering a transcript; cost; certification to court; copying

(a) Except as provided by (c) below, a transcript of any proceeding may be obtained by requesting the official court reporter or official transcription firm to prepare a transcript. The requesting party shall notify all other parties and the Clerk of the request. Unless the requesting party is the State or a political subdivision thereof, the request shall be accompanied by a reasonable security deposit not to exceed either the estimated cost of the transcript as determined by the preparer or $300.00 for each day or fraction thereof of the proceeding, the deposit to be made payable to the preparer. The reporter shall promptly prepare the transcript and shall file a copy with the Clerk at the time the original is delivered to the requesting party. The preparer shall bill the requesting party for any amount due for the preparation of the transcript and the copy or shall reimburse the requesting party for any overpayment.

(b) An unofficial copy of a sound recorded proceeding may be obtained by making a request to the Clerk accompanied by a blank standard cassette of appropriate length.

(c) When the preparation of a transcript is being requested for an appeal to court, whether the proceeding was sound or stenographically recorded, the request shall be made as follows:

1. For cases heard by an Administrative Law Judge, the request shall be made to the Clerk of the Office of Administrative Law;

2. For cases heard by an agency head, the request shall be made to the Clerk of that agency.

(d) All transcript preparation requests pursuant to (c) above for appeal to a court shall include one copy of the transcript for the Clerk and any additional copies required by R. 2:6-12. The form of the transcript request shall conform with the requirements of R. 2:5-3(a) and be accompanied by the deposit required by R. 2:5-3(d).

1. The Clerk shall promptly arrange for the preparation of the transcript. Upon completion of the transcript, the preparer shall bill the requesting party for any sum due or shall reimburse the requesting party for any overpayment and shall forward the original and any copies ordered pursuant to R. 2:6-12 to the requesting party. When the last volume of the entire transcript has been delivered to the appellant, the preparer shall forward to the Clerk the copy of the transcript prepared for the Clerk.

2. The Clerk shall transmit the transcript copy to the court and comply with the requirements of R. 2:5-3.

(e) For cases in which an agency possesses a transcript of the hearing being appealed, the request for copying under R. 2:5-3(a) shall be made to the Clerk of that agency. Upon receiving such a request, the Clerk shall make the existing transcript available to the appellant for reproduction for filing and service.

(f) Any transcript that is required by law to be filed with a Clerk shall be considered a public document which is available upon request for copying, as required by the Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 et seq.

(g) The following shall apply to all transcripts:

1. Transcripts must be prepared in accordance with State standards established by the Administrative Director of the Courts.

2. Unless a proceeding has been sealed, any person may request a transcript or a recording of the proceeding. However, if the person requesting a transcript or tape recording was not a party to the proceeding, the requester, when making the request, must also notify all parties of the request. If a party objects to the request, a written objection must be filed immediately with the Clerk and served on the requester and all other parties to the proceeding. This objection shall be reviewed by the judge who presided over the proceeding.

3. If a proceeding was sealed, only parties to the proceeding may request a transcript or a tape recording and the contents of the transcript or recording shall not be disclosed to anyone except in accordance with the order sealing the proceeding.

(h) Any party or person entitled by Federal statute or regulation to copy and inspect the verbatim transcript may arrange with the Clerk to review any transcript filed under (a) above and shall also be permitted to hear and receive a copy of any sound recorded proceeding pursuant to (b) above. All applications to obtain a transcript of any proceeding at public expense for use on appeal shall be made to the Appellate Court pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule R. 2:5-3 or in case of Federal appeals pursuant to applicable Federal Court Rules.

(i) Where the Division of Ratepayer Advocate is representing public interest in a proceeding and another party to the proceeding is entitled by law to recover the costs thereof from others, such other party shall obtain, pay for and furnish to the Ratepayer Advocate upon request the official transcript.

Amended by R.1990 d.68, effective February 5, 1990.
See: 21 N.J.R. 1181(b), 21 N.J.R. 3587(a), 22 N.J.R. 334(a).
In (a)-(c): Deleted language specifying that "any party, or person, with a legitimate need, may obtain" or "may request a transcript.".
In (a): Added sentence that the requesting party shall notify all other parties of the request. Established new rate for security deposit. Specified responsibilities of the preparer regarding transcripts and billings.
In (c): Revised section to include new rate for security deposit and added sentence, "The reporter shall bill ... for any overpayment".
Added new sections (d)-(h), recodifying old (d)-(e) as new (i)-(j).
In (j): Deleted sentence regarding payment for official transcripts by state agencies.
Amended by R.2002 d.198, effective July 1, 2002.
See: 34 N.J.R. 983(a), 34 N.J.R. 2309(a).
In (j), substituted references to Ratepayer Advocate for references to Public Advocate throughout.
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (g), substituted "Open Public Records Act" for "Right to Know Law".
Amended by R.2011 d.179, effective July 5, 2011.
See: 43 N.J.R. 701(a), 43 N.J.R. 1523(a).
Rewrote (a); deleted former (c); recodified former (d) through (j) as (c) through (i); in the introductory paragraph of (d), substituted "(c)" for "(d)"; and in (h), deleted "or (c)" following "(a)".

Case Notes

Inmate charged with prison drug trafficking not entitled to verbatim recording of disciplinary proceeding. Negron v. Department of Corrections, 220 N.J.Super. 425, 532 A.2d 735 (App.Div.1987).

Unofficial copy of the sound recording of Office of Administrative Law proceedings may not be substituted for the official hearing transcript, and will not be considered if so submitted. The Commissioner may not make additional findings of fact based on testimony for which no official transcript was provided. Strengthen Our Sisters v. Bd. of Educ. of West Milford, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 11097-08, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 733, Final Decision (July 8, 2009).

State Board of Education does not have the authority to waive or modify standards established by the Administrative Director of the Courts for the preparation of hearing transcripts or to reduce the deposit required by the Office of Administrative Law for the preparation of transcripts, or in the case at hand to require a local school board to share the cost of transcripts ordered by appellants challenging the school board's denial of their request to provide transportation for their children. T.F.S. ex rel. J.R.S. v. Bd. of Educ., South Brunswick Twnshp., OAL Dkt. Nos. EDU 6674-02 and EDU 10118-05; C Nos. 400-05 and 264-06; SB No. 36-06, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1490 (April 9, 2007).

Regulations governing administrative proceedings are clear in providing that a copy of a sound recording of a hearing obtained from the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) is "unofficial"; here, the tape purportedly contained testimony from another case, it was not a copy obtained from OAL, and appellant failed to demonstrate that the testimony on the tape was relevant to the conduct alleged in the instant charges. In re Tenure Hearing of McCullough, EDU No. 6702-03S; C No. 70-06; SB No. 12-06, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 929 (October 4, 2006).

Rule allows respondent an opportunity to obtain a transcript of proceeding (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.3). Div. of Motor Vehicles v. Exum, 5 N.J.A.R. 298 (1983).

1:1-14.12 Disqualification of judges

(a) A judge shall, on his or her own motion, withdraw from participation in any proceeding in which the judge's ability to provide a fair and impartial hearing might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where the judge:

1. Has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

2. Is by blood or marriage the second cousin of or is more closely related to any party to the proceeding or an officer, director or trustee of a party;

3. Is by blood or marriage the first cousin of or is more closely related to any attorney in the case. This proscription shall extend to partners, employers, employees or office associates of any such attorney;

4. Is by blood or marriage the second cousin of or is more closely related to a likely witness to the proceeding;

5. While in private practice served as attorney of record or counsel in the case or was associated with a lawyer who served during such association as attorney of record or counsel in the proceeding, or the judge or such lawyer has been a witness concerning the case;

6. Has served in government employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, advisor or material witness concerning the proceeding;

7. Is interested, individually or as a fiduciary, or whose spouse or minor child residing in the same household is interested in the outcome of the proceeding; or

8. When there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and decision, or which might reasonably lead the parties or their representatives to believe so.

(b) A judge shall, as soon as practicable after assignment to a particular case, withdraw from participation in a proceeding whenever the judge finds that any of the criteria in (a)1 through 8 above apply. A judge may not avoid disqualification by disclosing on the record the basis for disqualification and securing the consent of the parties.

(c) Any party may, by motion, apply to a judge for his or her disqualification. Such motion must be accompanied by a statement of the reasons for such application and shall be filed as soon as practicable after a party has reasonable cause to believe that grounds for disqualification exist. In no event shall the judge enter any order, resolve any procedural matters or render any other determination until the motion for disqualification has been decided.

(d) Any request for interlocutory review of an administrative law judge's order under this section shall be made pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.10(k) and (*l*).

Case Notes

Blind Administrative Law Judge was not required to recuse himself due to his inability to visually inspect a videotape. Division of Motor Vehicles v. Hall, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (OAL) 14.

Administrative law judge was not required to recuse himself. Ridings v. Maxim Sewerage Corp., 92 N.J.A.R.2d (OAL) 10.

Decision in criminal case involving substantive aspects of judicial disqualification provided no basis for collateral attack on issue of recusal of administrative law judge. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-27. In the Matter of the Tenure Hearing of John Fargo, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 172.

1:1-14.13 Proceedings in the event of death, disability, departure from State employment, disqualification or other incapacity of judge

(a) If, by reason of death, disability, departure from State employment, disqualification or other incapacity, a judge is unable to continue presiding over a pending hearing or issue an initial decision after the conclusion of the hearing, a conference will be scheduled to determine if the parties can settle the matter or, if not, can reach agreement upon as many matters as possible.

(b) In the event settlement is not reached, another judge shall be assigned to complete the hearing or issue the initial decision as if he or she had presided over the hearing from its commencement, provided:

1. The judge is able to familiarize himself or herself with the proceedings and all testimony taken by reviewing the transcript, exhibits marked in evidence and any other materials which are contained in the record; and

2. The judge determines that the hearing can be completed with or without recalling witnesses without prejudice to the parties.

(c) In the event the hearing cannot be continued for any of the reasons enumerated in (b) above, a new hearing shall be ordered by the judge.

(d) An order or ruling issued pursuant to (b) and (c) above may only be appealed interlocutorily; a party may not seek review of such orders or rulings after the judge renders the initial decision in the contested case.

Amended by R.2008 d.151, effective June 16, 2008.
See: 40 N.J.R. 915(a), 40 N.J.R. 3617(a).
Added (d).

1:1-14.14 Sanctions; failure to comply with orders or requirements of this chapter

(a) For unreasonable failure to comply with any order of a judge or with any requirements of this chapter, the judge may:

1. Dismiss or grant the motion or application;

2. Suppress a defense or claim;

3. Exclude evidence;

4. Order costs or reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, to be paid to the State of New Jersey or an aggrieved representative or party; or

5. Take other appropriate case-related action.

New Rule, R.1991 d.279, effective June 3, 1991 (operative July 1, 1991).
See: 23 N.J.R. 639(a), 23 N.J.R. 1786(a).
Amended by R.1996 d.133, effective March 18, 1996.
See: 27 N.J.R. 609(a), 28 N.J.R. 1503(a).
Added (b) through (d).
Recodified in part to N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.15 by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
Recodified (b) through (d) as N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.15.

Case Notes

Administrative law judge has power to impose reasonable monetary sanctions on attorneys. In re Timofai Sanitation Co., Inc., Discovery Dispute, 252 N.J.Super. 495, 600 A.2d 158 (A.D.1991).

Before administrative law judge (ALJ) could impose sanctions on attorneys, court was required to conduct evidentiary hearing. In re Timofai Sanitation Co., Inc., Discovery Dispute, 252 N.J.Super. 495, 600 A.2d 158 (A.D.1991).

Initial Decision (2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1031) adopted, which dismissed, for lack of prosecution, a school district employee's claim for reimbursement of full salary without loss of sick time for an injury allegedly sustained in the course of her employment; although the case was placed on inactive status awaiting a determination by the Division of Workers' Compensation as to whether the employee sustained a qualifying injury, the employee's compensation claim had been dismissed for lack of prosecution and the employee failed to offer any explanation or justification as why the education claim should not also have been dismissed, especially in light of the fact that more than eight years had elapsed since the filing of the education appeal. Green v. School Dist. of Jersey City, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 7401-00, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 639, Final Decision (January 29, 2009).

Even if the Merit System Board had jurisdiction to review the City's request that appellant pay the costs of the City's experts based on the

appellant's attorney's late arrival to the hearing before the ALJ, the facts would not support such a penalty, given the reasonable explanation of the late arrival; moreover, the Board would generally not penalize an appellant for the actions of his or her representative unless those actions were shown to be intentionally and flagrantly in violation of OAL rules and authorized by that appellant. In re Harris, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 11388-03, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1075, Merit System Board Decision (September 26, 2007).

Initial Decision (2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 414) adopted, finding that when discovery requests encompassed all aspects of the petition, the proper remedy under N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14 for failure to provide discovery was suppression of the petitioner's claim. L.A. and C.A. ex rel. P.M.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Port Republic, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 12031-06, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 521, Commissioner's Decision (July 18, 2007).

Parent's duplicative discovery requests did not warrant sanctions (adopting 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 263 as supplemented) (decided under former N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14(a) and (b), now N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14 and 1:1-14.15). R.O. ex rel. R.O. v. Bd. of Educ. of W. Windsor-Plainsboro School Dist., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 8827-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 575, Commissioner's Decision (June 28, 2006).

Respondent's answer and cross-petition dismissed for persistent discovery failures. Absolut Spirits Co., Inc. v. Monsieur Touton Selection, Ltd., OAL Dkt. No. ABC 4217-04, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 508, Final Decision (May 10, 2006), aff'd in part, and rev'd in part on other grounds, A-5453-05 (App.Div. Oct. 22, 2007) (unpublished opinion) (affirming dismissal of respondent's answer and cross-petition, but reversing the granting of affirmative relief to petitioner as an evidentiary hearing was necessary).

Initial Decision (2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 397) adopted, which ordered insurance producer's defenses stricken where, for almost seven months, the producer failed to respond to requests for discovery, failed to comply with the ALJ's order to comply with the discovery requests, and demonstrated a flagrant disregard for the rules and the OAL's orders. Bryan v. Bellissima, OAL Dkt. No. BKI 10040-2004S, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1154, Final Decision (August 30, 2005).

1:1-14.15 Conduct obstructing or tending to obstruct the conduct of a contested case

(a) If any party, attorney, or other representative of a party, engages in any misconduct which, in the opinion of the judge, obstructs or tends to obstruct the conduct of a contested case, the party, attorney, or other representative may be fined in an amount which shall not exceed $1,000 for each instance.

(b) Where the conduct deemed to obstruct or tending to obstruct the conduct of a contested case occurs under circumstances which the judge personally observes and which he or she determines unmistakably demonstrates willfulness and requires immediate adjudication to permit the proceedings to continue in an orderly and proper manner:

1. The judge shall inform the party, attorney or other representative of the nature of the actions deemed obstructive and shall afford the party, attorney or other representative an immediate opportunity to explain the conduct; and

2. Where the judge determines, after providing the party, attorney or other representative, an opportunity to explain, that the conduct does constitute misconduct and that the conduct unmistakably demonstrates willfulness, the judge shall issue an order imposing sanctions.

i. The order imposing sanctions shall recite the facts and contain a certification by the judge that he or she personally observed the conduct in question and explain the conclusion that the party, attorney or other representative engaged in misconduct.

(c) Where the conduct deemed to obstruct or tending to obstruct a contested case did not occur in the presence of the judge or where the conduct does not require immediate adjudication to permit the proceedings to continue in an orderly and proper manner, the matter shall proceed by order to show cause specifying the acts or omissions alleged to be misconduct. The proceedings shall be captioned "In the Matter of _____, Charged with Misconduct."

(d) In any proceeding held pursuant to (c) above, the matter may be presented by a staff attorney of the Office of Administrative Law, or by the Attorney General. The designation shall be made by the Director of the Office of Administrative Law. The matter shall not be heard by the judge who instituted the proceeding if the appearance of objectivity requires a hearing by another judge.

Recodified in part from N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14 and amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
Recodified former introductory paragraph of (b) as (a); in (a), substituted a period for "provided:"; recodified former (b)1 as introductory paragraph of (b); in introductory paragraph of (b), substituted a colon for ", the"; inserted designation (b)1; in (b)1, inserted "The" at the beginning and "and" at the end; in (b)2, inserted "and that the conduct unmistakably demonstrates willfulness" and substituted a period for "which" at the end; inserted designation (b)2i; and rewrote (b)2i and (c).

Case Notes

Administrative law judge has power to impose reasonable monetary sanctions on attorneys. In re Timofai Sanitation Co., Inc., Discovery Dispute, 252 N.J.Super. 495, 600 A.2d 158 (A.D.1991).

Before administrative law judge (ALJ) could impose sanctions on attorneys, court was required to conduct evidentiary hearing. In re Timofai Sanitation Co., Inc., Discovery Dispute, 252 N.J.Super. 495, 600 A.2d 158 (A.D.1991).

SUBCHAPTER 15. EVIDENCE RULES

1:1-15.1 General rules

(a) Only evidence which is admitted by the judge and included in the record shall be considered.

(b) Evidence rulings shall be made to promote fundamental principles of fairness and justice and to aid in the ascertainment of truth.

(c) Parties in contested cases shall not be bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence or any formally adopted in the New Jersey Rules of Evidence except as specifically provided in these rules. All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided herein. A judge may, in his or her discretion, exclude any evidence if its probative

Facts did not need to be proved by residuum of competent evidence, so long as combined probative force of relevant hearsay and relevant competent evidence sustained ultimate finding. Matter of Tenure Hearing of Cowan, 224 N.J.Super. 737, 541 A.2d 298 (A.D.1988).

Written, sworn statements of evidence to support charges against tenured, public high school teacher could be hearsay. Matter of Tenure Hearing of Cowan, 224 N.J.Super. 737, 541 A.2d 298 (A.D.1988).

Notwithstanding the admissibility of hearsay evidence, some legally competent evidence must exist to support each finding of fact (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.8(b)). In the Matter of Tanelli, 194 N.J.Super. 492, 477 A.2d 394 (App.Div.1984), certification denied 99 N.J. 181, 491 A.2d 686 (1984).

In an action by the New Jersey Higher Education Student Assistance Authority (NJHESAA) to garnish the wages of a student loan debtor, affidavits offered by the NJHESAA, which alone would not ordinarily satisfy the requirement of some competent evidence to support findings of fact in lieu of live testimony, were adequate because there would have been a cumulative effect of in-person testimony. NJHESAA v. Ascencio, OAL Dkt. No. HEA 0616-10, 2010 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 308, Final Decision (June 22, 2010).

Initial Decision (2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1112) adopted, which found that in a police officer's appeal from a determination of the State Health Benefits Commission (SHBC) denying his request for reimbursement of medical expenses for surgical procedures, the hearsay statements in petitioner's medical records, standing alone, were insufficient to support a finding in his favor. Absent competent medical testimony that the surgeries were medically necessary, petitioner could not establish entitlement to reimbursement under the SHBP for the services. In re Villano, OAL Dkt. No. TYP 11482-08, 2010 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 765, Final Decision (January 25, 2010).

Initial Decision (2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 791) adopted, which concluded that, although two reports from independent car repair businesses were admitted as hearsay evidence in a Lemon Law dispute, they were accorded little or no weight because their conclusions that the vehicle suffered from a nonconformity were not subject to cross-examination by the manufacturer. Ragusano v. Ford Motor Co., OAL Dkt. No. CMA 8077-08, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1050, Final Decision (October 10, 2008).

Initial Decision (2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1269) adopted, which determined that the record was bereft of credible, competent evidence that a representative of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System or the Division of Pensions and Benefits made any misrepresentation or provided misinformation to public employees on which they reasonably relied to their detriment that holiday pay would be creditable for purposes of calculating their pensions or told union members, union officials, or other public employees that the change in a union contract would retroactively allow holiday pay received prior to a contract amendment to be considered creditable salary. In re Segear, OAL Dkt. No. TYP 01500-06, TYP 03718-06, TYP 03719-06, TYP 03877-06, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1324, Final Decision (September 8, 2008).

Although parents who had articulated some very serious concerns about the extended school year for their nine-year-old emotionally disturbed son, presented and moved into evidence letters from providers of services to their son, those letters were hearsay because the writers were not available for cross-examination. While it is well established that hearsay is admissible in an administrative proceeding, some legally competent evidence had to support each ultimate finding of fact which did not occur in the immediate case. M.M. et al v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., OAL Dkt. No. EDS 9036-08, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 827, Final Decision (August 29, 2008).

Audiotaped statement of non-testifying female dancer admitted at hearing, but would not be used to impute actual knowledge of prostitution to ABC licensee's management because the licensee did not have the opportunity to cross-examine her. N.J. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. S.B. Lazarus, Inc., OAL Dkt. No. ABC 2309-07, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 342, Initial Decision (June 2, 2008).

In an automobile insurance cancellation case, the insurer's contention that water incursion could not cause a digital odometer rollback, presented only by hearsay evidence, could not be found as fact without legally competent evidence to support it, and the insurer's subsequent submission of affidavits attesting to the same bare conclusion did not cure the residuum rule deficiency. Nguyen v. NJ Re-Insurance Co., OAL Dkt. No. BKI 2981-06, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 309, Initial Decision (April 23, 2008).

Initial Decision (2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 202) adopted, which considered the out-of-court statements of a cognitively impaired victim

5. No person has a privilege that another shall not be a witness or shall not disclose any matter or shall not produce any object or writing but the judge presiding at the hearing in a contested case may not testify as a witness.

(b) A person is disqualified to be a witness if the judge finds the proposed witness is incapable of expression concerning the matter so as to be understood by the judge directly or through interpretation by one who can understand the witness, or the proposed witness is manifestly incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth. An interpreter is subject to all the provisions of these rules relating to witnesses.

(c) As a prerequisite for the testimony of a witness there must be evidence that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter, or has special experience, training or education, if such is required. Such evidence may be provided by the testimony of the witness. In exceptional circumstances, the judge may receive the testimony of a witness conditionally, subject to evidence of knowledge, experience, training or education being later supplied in the course of the proceedings. Personal knowledge may be obtained through hearsay.

(d) A witness may not testify without taking an oath or affirming to tell the truth under the penalty provided by law. No witness may be barred from testifying because of religion or lack of it.

(e) Testimony of a witness may be presented by telephone if, before the hearing begins, the judge finds there is good cause for permitting the witness to testify by telephone. In determining whether good cause exists, the judge shall consider:

1. Whether all parties consent to the taking of testimony by telephone;

2. Whether credibility is an issue;

3. The significance of the witness' testimony;

4. The reason for the request to take testimony by telephone; and

5. Any other relevant factor.

(f) Testimony of a witness may be given in narrative fashion rather than by question and answer format if the judge permits.

Amended by R.2008 d.151, effective June 16, 2008.
See: 40 N.J.R. 915(a), 40 N.J.R. 3617(a).
In the introductory paragraph of (e), deleted "all parties agree and" preceding "the judge" and inserted the final sentence; and added (e)1 through (e)5.

Case Notes

Construction code official authorized to determine particular fire code prevention requirements of building where building use deviates in any significant respect from building uses "specifically covered" by fire prevention subcode; hearing held by construction board of appeals was procedurally deficient. In the Matter of the "Analysis of Walsh Trucking Occupancy and Sprinkler System", 215 N.J.Super. 222, 521 A.2d 883 (App.Div.1987).

Except as otherwise provided by N.J.A.C. 1:1-15, by statute or by rule establishing a privilege, every person is qualified to be a witness (citing former N.J.A.C. 15.2(e)). De Vitis v. New Jersey Racing Commission, 202 N.J.Super. 484, 495 A.2d 457 (App.Div.1985), certification denied 102 N.J. 337, 508 A.2d 213 (1985).

Initial Decision (2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 202) adopted, which considered the out-of-court statements of a cognitively impaired victim as to the source of the injury to his jaw, though there was a question as to whether the victim understood truth from a lie; testimony of witnesses and exhibits corroborated the hearsay statements. In re Murphy, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 12287-07, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 604, Final Decision (April 23, 2008).

1:1-15.9 Expert and other opinion testimony

(a) If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony of that witness in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions or inferences as the judge finds:

1. May be rationally based on the perception of the witness; and

2. Are helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or to the fact in issue.

(b) If a witness is testifying as an expert, testimony of that witness in the form of opinions or inferences is admissible if such testimony will assist the judge to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue and the judge finds the opinions or inferences are:

1. Based on facts and data perceived by or made known to the witness at or before the hearing; and

2. Within the scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the witness.

(c) Testimony in the form of opinion or inferences which is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue or issues to be decided by the judge.

(d) A witness may be required, before testifying in terms of opinions or inference, to be first examined concerning the data upon which the opinion or inference is based.

(e) Questions calling for the opinion of an expert witness need not be hypothetical in form unless, in the discretion of the judge, such form is required.

(f) If facts and data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, those facts and data upon which an expert witness bases opinion testimony need not be admissible in evidence.

Case Notes

Adopting and modifying on other grounds Initial Decision (2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1070), which found the testimony of the manufacturer's witness to be lacking in foundation and not credible where the witness testified that the after-market installation of a snowplow on the consumer's truck could have been the cause of the vehicle's intermittent shutting down without warning; although the administrative rules give

an ALJ latitude in admitting evidence, an expert's opinion must still be based on factual evidence. Marago v. Daimler Chrysler Motors Co., OAL Dkt. No. CMA 8775-05, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1070, Final Decision (December 22, 2005).

1:1-15.10 Offers of settlement inadmissible

Offers of settlement, proposals of adjustment and proposed stipulations shall not constitute an admission and shall not be admissible.

1:1-15.11 Stipulations

The parties may by stipulation agree upon the facts or any portion thereof involved in any controversy. Such a stipulation shall be regarded as evidence and shall preclude the parties from thereafter challenging the facts agreed upon.

1:1-15.12 Prior transcribed testimony

(a) If there was a previous hearing in the same or a related matter which was electronically or stenographically recorded, a party may, unless the judge determines that it is necessary to evaluate credibility, offer the transcript of a witness in lieu of producing the witness at the hearing provided that the witness' testimony was taken under oath, all parties were present at the proceeding and were afforded a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

(b) A party who intends to offer a witness' transcribed testimony at the hearing must give all other parties and the judge at least 10 days notice prior to the commencement of the hearing of that intention and provide each with a copy of the transcript being offered.

(c) Opposing parties may subpoena the witness to appear personally. Any party may produce additional witnesses and other relevant evidence at the hearing.

(d) Provided the requirements in (a) above are satisfied, the entire controversy may be presented solely upon such transcribed testimony if all parties agree and the judge approves.

(e) Prior transcribed testimony that would be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under Evidence Rule 63(3) is not subject to the requirements of this section.

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (a), inserted "or a related"; in (b), substituted "10" for "five" and inserted "prior to the commencement of the hearing".

Case Notes

Although prior transcribed testimony that would be admissible under N.J.R.E. 804 is not subject to the requirements of N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.12, it was unclear why the complaining witness failed to testify at the Human Services Specialist's OAL disciplinary hearing; remand was necessary to give the appointing authority the opportunity to produce the witness, or, alternatively, for a determination as to whether the witness was in fact "unavailable" within the meaning of N.J.R.E. 804 such that her prior testimony at the departmental hearing could be used in the OAL proceeding (remanding 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 252). In re Caldwell, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 8952-05, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1174, Remand Decision (July 11, 2007).

SUBCHAPTER 16. INTERVENTION AND PARTICIPATION

1:1-16.1 Who may apply to intervene; status of intervenor

(a) Any person or entity not initially a party, who has a statutory right to intervene or who will be substantially, specifically and directly affected by the outcome of a contested case, may on motion, seek leave to intervene.

(b) Persons or entities permitted to intervene shall have all the rights and obligations of a party to the proceeding.

Case Notes

Interested parties were entitled to relevant information on consideration of automobile insurance rates of Market Transition Facility. Matter of Market Transition Facility of New Jersey, 252 N.J.Super. 260, 599 A.2d 906 (A.D.1991), certification denied 127 N.J. 565, 606 A.2d 376.

Policyholders were "interested parties" with respect to access to information to be used by Department of Insurance on setting rates. Matter of Market Transition Facility of New Jersey, 252 N.J.Super. 260, 599 A.2d 906 (A.D.1991), certification denied 127 N.J. 565, 606 A.2d 376.

Initial Decision (2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 79) adopted, which concluded that where petitioner, who was denied a waterfront development permit, no longer owned the subject property and the successor owners had not responded to notification of the opportunity to seek leave to intervene, there was no longer a justiciable controversy; accordingly, the petitioner's appeal was moot and would be dismissed. Spalliero v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Land Use Regulation, OAL Dkt. No. ESA 8164-03, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 225, Final Decision (March 3, 2006).

Administrative law judge was without jurisdiction to compel joinder of third party in school district's placement dispute with parents. B.R. v. Woodbridge Board, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (EDS) 159.

1:1-16.2 Time of motion

(a) A motion for leave to intervene may be filed at any time after a case is initiated.

(b) If made before a case has been filed with the Office of Administrative Law, a motion for leave to intervene shall be filed with the head of the agency having jurisdiction over the case. The agency head may rule upon the motion to intervene or may reserve decision for action by a judge after the case has been filed with the Office of Administrative Law.

(c) If made after a case has been filed with the Office of Administrative Law, a motion for leave to intervene shall be filed with the judge or, if the case has not yet been assigned to a judge, with the Clerk of the Office of Administrative Law.

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (c), inserted "the judge or, if the case has not yet been assigned to a judge, with".

1:1-16.3 Standards for intervention

(a) In ruling upon a motion to intervene, the judge shall take into consideration the nature and extent of the movant's interest in the outcome of the case, whether or not the movant's interest is sufficiently different from that of any party so as to add measurably and constructively to the scope of the case, the prospect of confusion or undue delay arising from the movant's inclusion, and other appropriate matters.

(b) In cases where one of the parties is a State agency authorized by law to represent the public interest in a case, no movant shall be denied intervention solely because the movant's interest may be represented in part by said State agency.

(c) Notwithstanding (a) above, persons statutorily permitted to intervene shall be granted intervention.

Case Notes

Interested parties were entitled to relevant information on consideration of automobile insurance rates of Market Transition Facility. Matter of Market Transition Facility of New Jersey, 252 N.J.Super. 260, 599 A.2d 906 (A.D.1991), certification denied 127 N.J. 565, 606 A.2d 376.

Policyholders were "interested parties" with respect to access to information to be used by Department of Insurance on setting rates. Matter of Market Transition Facility of New Jersey, 252 N.J.Super. 260, 599 A.2d 906 (A.D.1991), certification denied 127 N.J. 565, 606 A.2d 376.

Large volume customers of a gas company were allowed to intervene in matter where Rate Counsel moved to dismiss petition to defer certain carrying costs. In the Matter of the Petition of South Jersey Gas Company for Authorization to Defer Carrying Costs, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (BRC) 139.

Telephone company's motion to intervene in proposed modification of a lease agreement between cable television operator and alternative competitive access provider granted. In the Matter of the Petition of Suburban Cablevision to Lease Excess Capacity, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (BRC) 125.

1:1-16.4 Notice of opportunity to intervene or participate

Where it appears to the judge that a full determination of a case may substantially, specifically and directly affect a person or entity who is not a party to the case, the judge, on motion of any party or on his or her own initiative, may order that the Clerk or any party notify the person or entity of the proceeding and of the opportunity to apply for intervention or participation pursuant to these rules.

Case Notes

Interested parties were entitled to relevant information on consideration of automobile insurance rates of Market Transition Facility. Matter of Market Transition Facility of New Jersey, 252 N.J.Super. 260, 599 A.2d 906 (A.D.1991), certification denied 127 N.J. 565, 606 A.2d 376.

Policyholders were "interested parties" with respect to access to information to be used by Department of Insurance on setting rates. Matter of Market Transition Facility of New Jersey, 252 N.J.Super. 260, 599 A.2d 906 (A.D.1991), certification denied 127 N.J. 565, 606 A.2d 376.

1:1-16.5 Alternative treatment of motions to intervene

Every motion for leave to intervene shall be treated, in the alternative, as a motion for permission to participate.

1:1-16.6 Participation; standards for participation

(a) Any person or entity with a significant interest in the outcome of a case may move for permission to participate.

(b) A motion to participate may be made at such time and in such manner as is appropriate for a motion for leave to intervene pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.2. In deciding whether to permit participation, the judge shall consider whether the participant's interest is likely to add constructively to the case without causing undue delay or confusion.

(c) The judge shall determine the nature and extent of participation in the individual case. Participation shall be limited to:

1. The right to argue orally; or
2. The right to file a statement or brief; or
3. The right to file exceptions to the initial decision with the agency head; or
4. All of the above.

Case Notes

The administrative law judge may determine the extent of participation once it is found a participant has a significant stake in the outcome. The Division of ABC granted participant status and allowed to file a brief (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.6(c)). Canal St. Pub v. City of Paterson, 6 N.J.A.R. 221 (1982).

SUBCHAPTER 17. CONSOLIDATION OF TWO OR MORE CASES; MULTIPLE AGENCY JURISDICTION CLAIMS; DETERMINATIONS OF PREDOMINANT INTEREST

1:1-17.1 Motion to consolidate; when decided

(a) As soon as circumstances meriting such action are discovered, an agency head, any party or the judge may move to consolidate a case which has been transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law with any other contested case involving common questions of fact or law between identical parties or between any party to the filed case and any other person, entity or agency.

(b) This rule shall apply to cases:

1. Already filed with the Office of Administrative Law;
2. Commenced in an agency but not yet filed with the Office of Administrative Law; and
3. Commenced in an agency and not required to be filed with the Office of Administrative Law under N.J.S.A. 52:14F-8.

(c) Upon transmitting the record, the agency with the predominant interest shall pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8 request an extension to permit the rendering of a final decision by the agency which does not have the predominant interest.

SUBCHAPTER 18. INITIAL DECISION; EXCEPTIONS; FINAL DECISION; REMAND; EXTENSIONS OF TIME LIMITS

1:1-18.1 Initial decision in contested cases

(a) When a case is not heard directly by an agency head, the judge shall issue an initial decision which shall be based exclusively on:

1. The testimony, documents and arguments accepted by the judge for consideration in rendering a decision;
2. Stipulations; and
3. Matters officially noticed.

(b) The initial decision shall be final in form and fully dispositive of all issues in the case.

(c) No substantive finding of fact or conclusion of law, nor any concluding order or other disposition shall be binding upon the agency head, unless otherwise provided by statute.

(d) All initial decisions shall be issued and received by the agency head no later than 45 days after the hearing is concluded unless an earlier time frame is mandated by Federal or State law.

(e) In mediations successfully concluded by initial decision, the decision shall be issued and received by the agency head as soon as practicable after the mediation, but in no event later than 45 days thereafter.

(f) Within 10 days after the initial decision is filed with the agency head, the Clerk shall certify the entire record with original exhibits to the agency head.

(g) Upon filing of an initial decision with the transmitting agency, the Office of Administrative Law relinquishes jurisdiction over the case, except for matters referred to in N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.2(c)1 through 5.

Amended by R.1987 d.462, effective November 16, 1987.
See: 19 N.J.R. 1592(a), 19 N.J.R. 2131(b).
Added text to (h) "except for matters ..."
Amended by R.1992 d.46, effective February 3, 1992.
See: 23 N.J.R. 3406(a), 24 N.J.R. 404(a).
Revised (d); deleted (e); redesignated existing (f)-(h) as (e)-(g).
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (d), deleted the last sentence.

Case Notes

Administrative Law Judge's finding of fact rejecting the conclusion of a witness, a firefighter for a local fire department and the team leader in the arson investigation unit, regarding the cause of the fire as "not persuasive" and relying instead upon the ALJ's own involvement in fire investigations and teaching a course on fire investigation, was totally improper; the witness was an expert witness, he had specialized knowledge and experience in fire investigations, he was on the scene of the incident as "suppression efforts were just being completed," he was a firsthand witness to the damage which he carefully reviewed to determine the cause, he took pictures of the damage at that time and contemporaneously recorded his observations in a report, his presence at the fire scene was to determine the cause, and he made a determination after reviewing the fire scene that the improper use of an extension cord in the bedroom, which improperly ran under the bed caster and a rug, caused the fire and burnt away the rug in that area, proceeding in a "classic V-pattern" toward the outlet, window, and air conditioner. Div. of Developmental Disabilities v. Cruz, OAL Dkt. No. HDD 777-2005S, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 524, Final Decision (June 22, 2007).

1:1-18.2 Oral initial decision

(a) The judge may render the initial decision orally in any case where the judge determines that the circumstances appropriately permit an oral decision and the questions of fact or law are sufficiently non-complex.

(b) The decision shall be issued, transcribed, filed with the agency head and mailed to the parties with an indication of the date of receipt by the agency head.

(c) In an oral decision, the judge shall identify the case, the parties, and the issue or issues to be decided and shall analyze the facts as they relate to the applicable law, and make findings of fact, conclusions of law and an appropriate order or disposition of the case. The decision shall include the statement at N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.3(c)12, and the judge shall explain to the parties that the decision is being forwarded to the agency head for disposition pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10, and that exceptions may be addressed to the agency head. The judge need not specifically include in the oral decision the other material required by N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.3(c) as long as it is otherwise contained in the record.

Amended by R.1996 d.57, effective February 5, 1996.
See: 27 N.J.R. 4039(a), 28 N.J.R. 813(a).
In (a) deleted "on the record before the parties" following "orally", and in (b) substituted "the conclusion of the hearing" for "rendering an oral decision".
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
Rewrote (b).

1:1-18.3 Written initial decision

(a) If an oral decision is not issued, the judge shall issue a written initial decision.

(b) The written initial decision shall be filed with the agency head and shall be promptly served upon the parties with an indication of the date of receipt by the agency head.

(c) The written initial decision shall contain the following elements which may be combined and need not be separately discussed:

1. An appropriate caption;
2. The appearances of the parties and their representatives, if any;

3. A statement of the case;

4. A procedural history and list of hearing dates;

5. A statement of the issue(s);

6. A factual discussion;

7. Factual findings;

8. A legal discussion;

9. Conclusions of law;

10. A disposition;

11. A list of witnesses and of exhibits admitted into evidence; and

12. The following statement: "This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by (the head of the agency), who by law is empowered to make a final decision in this matter. However, if (the head of the agency) does not so act in 45 days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10."

Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
Rewrote (b).
Amended by R.2009 d.112, effective April 6, 2009.
See: 41 N.J.R. 5(a), 41 N.J.R. 1391(a).
In (c)4, inserted "and list of hearing dates"; and in (c)11, inserted "witnesses and of".

Case Notes

Evidence that failed to particularize foundation failed to support decision that sergeant was totally and permanently disabled. Crain v. State Dept. of the Treasury, Div. of Pensions, 245 N.J.Super. 229, 584 A.2d 863 (A.D.1991).

Administrative law judge delayed petitioner's application to the DEP for approval of construction of a mobile home park. Petitioner may meet with DEP to formulate method of testing for nitrates acceptable to both parties within 30 days of order. Normally, once an initial decision is rendered, it is returned in its entirety to the agency for final disposition. The OAL would retain sufficient jurisdiction, with the permission of the agency, to resolve disputes arising out of the development and implementation of the testing program (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.3 and 4). Andover Mobile Home Park v. DEP, 4 N.J.A.R. 420 (1981).

1:1-18.4 Exceptions; replies

(a) Within 13 days from the date the judge's initial decision was mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the agency head. A copy of the exceptions shall be served on all other parties and the judge. Exceptions to orders issued under N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.2(c)4 shall be filed with the Director of the Office of Administrative Law.

(b) The exceptions shall:

1. Specify the findings of fact, conclusions of law or dispositions to which exception is taken;

2. Set out specific findings of fact, conclusions of law or dispositions proposed in lieu of or in addition to those reached by the judge;

3. Set forth supporting reasons. Exceptions to factual findings shall describe the witnesses' testimony or documentary or other evidence relied upon. Exceptions to conclusions of law shall set forth the authorities relied upon.

(c) Evidence not presented at the hearing shall not be submitted as part of an exception, nor shall it be incorporated or referred to within exceptions.

(d) Within five days from receipt of exceptions, any party may file a reply with the agency head, serving a copy thereof on all other parties and the judge. Such replies may address the issues raised in the exceptions filed by the other party or may include submissions in support of the initial decision.

(e) In all settlements, exceptions and cross-exceptions shall not be filed, unless permitted by the judge or agency head.

Amended by R.1987 d.462, effective November 16, 1987.
See: 19 N.J.R. 1592(a), 19 N.J.R. 2131(b).
(a) substantially amended.
Amended by R.1990 d.483, effective September 17, 1990.
See: 22 N.J.R. 2067(a), 22 N.J.R. 3003(b).
Change at (a) from ten to thirteen days.
Amended by R.1991 d.44, effective February 4, 1991.
See: 22 N.J.R. 3278(b), 23 N.J.R. 293(a).
In (a) and (d): deleted filing of documents with the Clerk and added text indicating which documents shall be filed with the judge.
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (d), substituted "may address the issues raised in the exceptions filed by the other party or may include" for "may include cross-exceptions or".

Case Notes

State Interscholastic Athletic Association regulation excluding males from female athletic teams did not violate federal equal protection, State Constitution, or statute prohibiting sex discrimination in education. B.C. v. Cumberland Regional School District, 220 N.J.Super. 214, 531 A.2d 1059 (App.Div.1987).

Within 10 days from the receipt of the judge's initial decision, any party may file written exceptions with the agency head and with the clerk (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.4). De Vitis v. New Jersey Racing Commission, 202 N.J.Super. 484, 495 A.2d 457 (App.Div.1985), certification denied 102 N.J. 337, 508 A.2d 213 (1985).

Error in failing to serve jockey in administrative proceeding was harmless. Moiseyev v. New Jersey Racing Com'n, 239 N.J.Super. 1, 570 A.2d 988 (A.D.1989).

Board's exceptions to an ALJ's January 8, 2009, decision were timely filed where the exceptions were faxed to the Commissioner's office on the last day upon which they could be received — January 22, 2009. B.A. ex rel. M.A.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Somerville, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 8740-07, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 730, Remand Decision (June 22, 2009).

Commissioner addressed petitioner's untimely exceptions to the Initial Decision; although the exceptions were filed more than 13 days after the decision, the petitioner was appearing pro se and attempted to timely file the exceptions, and N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) allows for time extensions "for good cause shown." Shedaker v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Land Use Regulation, OAL Dkt. No. ELU 10281-07S, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1416, Final Decision (December 8, 2008).

N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4 makes no provision for replies to reply exceptions, and thus they were not considered. El-Hewie v. Bd. of Educ. of Bergen County Vocational School Dist., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 7673-06, Commissioner's Decision (April 10, 2008).

In an appeal from an Administrative Law Judge's finding that dancers were petitioner's employees for purposes of unemployment and disability contributions, additional evidence not presented at the hearing could not be submitted as part of petitioner's exception, nor could it be incorporated or referred to within exceptions. West 22 Entertainment, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., OAL Dkt. No. LID 07169-05, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 149, Final Decision (January 16, 2008 (Issued).

Because the Board did not file exceptions to the ALJ's June 6, 2007 decision until June 25, 2007, the exceptions were untimely and were not considered by the Commissioner. Kohn v. Bd. of Educ. of Orange Twp., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10582-06, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 532, Commissioner's Decision (July 19, 2007).

Because there was no indication that a letter to the Commissioner of Education "taking exception" to the Initial Decision was also served on either the Board of Examiners or the Administrative Law Judge, the Commissioner did not consider petitioner to have filed exceptions. Muench v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., State Bd. of Examiners, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 08369-06, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 96, Commissioner's Decision (January 9, 2007).

Exceptions are required to be filed within 13 days after the Initial Decision, including partial summary decisions, and although an end-date for filing exceptions was not specified in the order for extension, it was not reasonable to assume that the exception period could run until the date established for the Final Decision on the matter; in addition, the bases for many of licensee's exceptions were improper. Bakke v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, OAL Dkt. No. BKI 1168-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 985, Final Decision (May 24, 2006).

Respondent's Exceptions to the Initial Decision did not even come close to meeting statutory requirements where: (1) its motion to compel and for sanctions was heard by the ALJ on three separate occasions, but each time the respondent was warned that it should provide more complete discovery and was given additional time to comply, but each time it failed to do so; (2) the ALJ did not merely accept petitioner's representations about the inadequacy of respondent's discovery responses, but reviewed the interrogatory responses himself and thus did not reach his conclusion that the discovery provided was inadequate based on de minimis and conclusory data, as respondent suggested; (3) respondent failed to provide complete discovery although ordered by the ALJ to do so and its former counsel fully understood the consequences of a failure to do so; and (4) although respondent raised certain substantive claims, they became irrelevant due to respondent's own failure to comply with the ALJ's orders. Absolut Spirits Co., Inc. v. Monsieur Touton Selection, Ltd., OAL DKT. NO. ABC 4217-04, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 508, Final Decision (May 10, 2006).

Exceptions were not timely filed when they were addressed and directed to the Administrative Law Judge but not filed with the Commissioner of Education; instructions for the filing of exceptions were clearly set forth on the last page of the Initial Decision, and this was not a case of clerical error, where the exceptions were simply placed in an incorrect envelope. D.B.R. ex rel. N.R.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Morris, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 12060-04, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1147, Commissioner's Decision (August 18, 2005).

1:1-18.5 Motions to reconsider and reopen

(a) Motions to reconsider an initial decision are not permitted.

(b) Motions to reopen a hearing after an initial decision has been filed must be addressed to the agency head.

(c) Motions to reopen the record before an initial decision is filed must be addressed to the judge and may be granted only for extraordinary circumstances.

Case Notes

Commissioner's adoption of the administrative law judge's recommended decision had the effect of denying the request to reopen the record (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.4(e)). Dep't. of Labor v. Titan Construction Co., 102 N.J. 1, 504 A.2d 7 (1985).

Motion to reopen Lemon Law hearing at which respondent failed to appear was denied; respondent did not satisfy its burden of proving that it did not have actual notice of the hearing. Mitchell v. Hillside Auto Mall, OAL Dkt. No. CMA 05407-05, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1125, Final Decision (October 14, 2005).

1:1-18.6 Final decision; stay of implementation

(a) Within 45 days after the receipt of the initial decision, or sooner if an earlier time frame is mandated by Federal or State law, the agency head may enter an order or a final decision adopting, rejecting or modifying the initial decision. Such an order or final decision shall be served upon the parties and the Clerk forthwith.

(b) The agency head may reject or modify conclusions of law, interpretations of agency policy, or findings of fact not relating to issues of credibility of lay witness testimony, but shall clearly state the reasons for so doing. The order or final decision rejecting or modifying the initial decision shall state in clear and sufficient detail the nature of the rejection or modification, the reasons for it, the specific evidence at hearing and interpretation of law upon which it is based and precise changes in result or disposition caused by the rejection or modification.

(c) The agency head may not reject or modify any finding of fact as to issues of credibility of lay witness testimony unless it first determines from a review of a record that the findings are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or are not supported by sufficient, competent, and credible evidence in the record.

(d) An order or final decision rejecting or modifying the findings of fact in an initial decision shall be based upon substantial evidence in the record and shall state with particularity the reasons for rejecting the findings and shall make new or modified findings supported by sufficient, competent and credible evidence in the record.

(e) If an agency head does not reject or modify the initial decision within 45 days and unless the period is extended as provided by N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8, the initial decision shall become a final decision.

(f) When a stay of the final decision is requested, the agency shall respond to the request within 10 days.

Amended by R.2001 d.180, effective June 4, 2001 (operative July 1, 2001).
See: 33 N.J.R. 1040(a), 33 N.J.R. 1926(a).
Rewrote (b); added new (c) and (d), and recodified existing (c) and (d) as (e) and (f).

Case Notes

Refusal to grant nursing home an open-ended lease pass-through was protected by qualified immunity. Stratford Nursing and Convalescent

Center, Inc. v. Kilstein, 802 F.Supp. 1158 (D.N.J. 1991), affirmed 972 F.2d 1332 (3rd Cir. 1992).

Exercise of quasi-judicial function in application of state appellate court decision to specific years encompassed therein; judicial immunity from civil rights liability. Stratford Nursing and Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Kilstein, 802 F.Supp. 1158 (D.N.J. 1991), affirmed 972 F.2d 1332 (3rd Cir. 1992).

Commissioner has 45 days to affirm, modify or reverse an administrative law judge's decision (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.5(a)). Wichert v. Walter, 606 F.Supp. 1516 (D.N.J.1985).

The over one-year delay between the issuance of Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) summary order and the final decision in action seeking compensation for an under recovery incurred by solid waste utility due to use of interim rates was not in bad faith, or was inexcusably negligent, or grossly indifferent so as to automatically required the administrative law judge's initial decision to be deemed approved, where the subject matter of the administrative proceeding was very complex, involving many days of complicated testimony, and there was a voluminous record, which was made even more problematical by the utility ending its relationship with county utilities authority after the hearings. Penpac, Inc. v. Passaic County Utilities Authority, 367 N.J.Super. 487, 843 A.2d 1153 (App. Div. 2004).

Three month delay in providing findings and legal conclusions for decision itself untimely; equitable factor against reconsideration of administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision. Mastro v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 266 N.J.Super. 445, 630 A.2d 289 (A.D.1993).

Inherent power to reconsider decision. Mastro v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 266 N.J.Super. 445, 630 A.2d 289 (A.D.1993).

Initial decision of administrative law judge (ALJ) shall be "deemed adopted". Mastro v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 266 N.J.Super. 445, 630 A.2d 289 (A.D.1993).

Board of Trustees of Public Employee Retirement System failed to make showing justifying setting aside decision. Mastro v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 266 N.J.Super. 445, 630 A.2d 289 (A.D.1993).

Evidence that failed to particularize foundation failed to support decision that sergeant was totally and permanently disabled. Crain v. State Dept. of the Treasury, Div. of Pensions, 245 N.J.Super. 229, 584 A.2d 863 (A.D.1991).

Agency decision was not invalid for failure to include findings and conclusions within 45 day limit. DiMaria v. Board of Trustees of Public Employees' Retirement System, 225 N.J.Super. 341, 542 A.2d 498 (A.D.1988), certification denied 113 N.J. 638, 552 A.2d 164.

Civil Service Commission had no duty to review findings of administrative law judge prior to acceptance or rejection of judge's findings and recommendations (citing N.J.A.C. 4:1-5.4). In the Matter of Morrison, 216 N.J.Super. 143, 523 A.2d 238 (App.Div.1987).

Decision was affirmed despite the absence of findings in support of determination as required by N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.6 (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.5(b)). O'Toole v. Forestal, 211 N.J.Super. 394, 511 A.2d 1236 (App.Div.1986).

Within 45 days after the receipt of the initial decision, the agency head may enter an order or final decision adopting, rejecting or modifying the initial decision (former rule cited N.J.A.C. 1:16.4 and 16.5). De Vitis v. New Jersey Racing Commission, 202 N.J.Super. 484, 495 A.2d 457 (App.Div.1985), certification denied 102 N.J. 337, 508 A.2d 213 (1985).

ALJ's findings — that an employer's articulated reasons for selecting complainant for demotion and discharge as part of its reduction in force were mere pretext for discrimination based on complainant's Cuban origin — were supported by sufficient, competent, and credible evidence and the Director of New Jersey's Division on Civil Rights had limited authority to reject the ALJ's credibility determinations and factual findings; the ALJ justifiably determined that the employer's assertion that complainant was selected for transfer/demotion based on performance deficiencies was not credible. Luzardo v. Liberty Optical, OAL Dkt. No. CRT 03924-08, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 726, Final Decision (June 25, 2009).

Although complainant contended that the landlord told him that he would not rent his owner-occupied two-unit dwelling to complainant because complainant had two children, the landlord denied making the statement and the Director of New Jersey Division on Civil Rights had limited authority to reject the ALJ's credibility determinations and the factual findings that the landlord did not violate New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.; there was no basis to conclude that the ALJ's credibility determinations were arbitrary or were not based on sufficient competent evidence in the record. Almeida v. Moreira, OAL Dkt. No. CRT 01061-08, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 617, Final Decision (March 9, 2009).

In a disciplinary action against an employee for patient abuse, an ALJ's credibility determinations were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable where the findings were based on video surveillance, as well as the complaining witness's testimony, which was in stark contrast to what was observed on the tape (adopting 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 731). In re Cohan, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 481-07, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 558, Merit System Board Decision (March 26, 2008).

In age and sex discrimination case under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., brought by 68-year-old male adjunct professor, there was no basis in the record for rejecting the ALJ's emphatic conclusion that employer's witness, the department chairperson, was a compelling and credible witness, notwithstanding: (1) the fact that chairperson's testimony concerning the number of times professor announced his retirement might have been inconsistent with certain other evidence on that point; or (2) professor's argument that chairperson's testimony reflected "sexist attitudes." Although chairperson observed that many adjuncts were homemakers who wanted to teach only one day a week, this statement in no way reflected an intent to replace male adjuncts with females. Sergent v. Montclair State Univ., OAL Dkt. No. CRT 03318-05, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 958, Final Decision (December 24, 2007).

ALJ's conclusion, on conflicting evidence, that a cottage training technician was not guilty of patient abuse was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; the finding that the slapping sound was the result of a latex glove rather than the slapping of a patient was supported by competent evidence, given the ALJ's advantage of hearing, seeing, and assessing the credibility of the witnesses before him (adopting 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 468). In re Bice-Bey, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 8296-06, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1161, Merit System Board Decision (November 21, 2007).

Agency head may reject the Administrative Law Judge's determination to accord greater weight to one party's expert. ZRB, LLC v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Land Use Regulation, OAL Dkt. No. ESA 6180-04, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 921, Final Decision (July 2, 2007).

Commissioner overturned credibility determinations and legal findings of the ALJ and found that an applicant was disqualified from receiving certification as a nurse aide where the applicant provided a false answer on the criminal background investigation application. Pruette v. Dep't of Health & Senior Services, OAL Dkt. No. HLT 2118-06, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 783, Final Decision (August 17, 2006).

In a disciplinary action brought against a senior correction officer after his positive drug test for marijuana, discrepancies regarding other specimens and the container used to collect the officer's sample did not undermine the reasonable probability that the officer's specimen had not been altered in any important respect between collection and analysis; the ALJ's findings otherwise were unreasonable and contrary to the credible evidence in the record. In re Gonsalvez, OAL Dkt. No. CSV

8601-02, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1128, Final Decision (February 22, 2006), aff'd per curiam, No. A-4080-05T5, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1369 (App.Div. October 31, 2007).

Merit System Board refused to disturb an ALJ's reversal of the removal of a Human Services Assistant on allegations of patient abuse where the findings were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the ALJ's credibility determinations that the assistant would not have hit the patient and that the witness may not have actually seen what he believed he saw (adopting 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 328). In re Greene, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 8697-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 864, Merit System Board Decision (September 20, 2006).

In a disciplinary action against a correction officer recruit on claims that he made inappropriate sexual comments, exposed himself, and masturbated in front of a fellow recruit, the ALJ's determination that the complaining witness was not credible was unreasonable and contrary to the evidence in the record where the witness's account of the critical details of the incident remained consistent, and the minor inconsistencies cited by the ALJ regarding the precise words uttered by the recruit, his exact location during the masturbation, and the time of the witness's telephone call to her supervisor were of little consequence; additionally, the record was devoid of any reason why the complaining witness would

lie about what occurred during the shift in question. In re Royster, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 6360-04, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1087, Final Decision (December 7, 2005), aff'd per curiam, No. A-2435-05T5, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1260 (App.Div. April 19, 2007).

Strict standard in N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) and N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.6(c) for overturning the ALJ's credibility determination was not met as the ALJ's credibility determinations and conclusions were not in error or otherwise arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; therefore, the charges against the senior corrections officer for failing to stop a fellow officer from striking a juvenile inmate with a wooden object and failing to obtain proper medical attention for the inmate were properly dismissed and the 6-month suspension reversed. The ALJ determined that the appointing authority's direct evidence failed to establish the officer's presence in the dormitory area and/or his viewing of the assault by even a preponderance of the credible evidence, while the officer's testimony regarding the events of the night was sufficiently credible; moreover, there was no evidentiary support that the circumstances heard or witnessed by the officer were so unusual as to require him to come into the dormitory (adopting 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 230). In re Graham, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 0727-02, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1172, Merit System Board Decision (September 21, 2005).

After an initial decision by administrative law judge, the agency head may enter an order or a final decision adopting, rejecting or modifying the initial decision (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.5). Kurman v. Fairmount Realty Corp., 8 N.J.A.R. 110 (1985).

Granting of partial summary judgement is not effective until a final agency review has been rendered on an issue, either upon interlocutory review pursuant to a request by respondent or at end of the contested case (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-9.7 and 1:1-16.5). Kurman v. Fairmount Realty Corp., 8 N.J.A.R. 110 (1985).

1:1-18.7 Remand; procedure

(a) An agency head may enter an order remanding a contested case to the Office of Administrative Law for further action on issues or arguments not previously raised or incompletely considered. The order of remand shall specifically state the reason and necessity for the remand and the issues or arguments to be considered. The remand order shall be attached to a N.J.A.C. 1:1-8.2 transmittal form and returned to the Clerk of the Office of Administrative Law along with the case record.

(b) The judge shall hear the remanded matter and render an initial decision.

Case Notes

Administrative law judge without authority to refuse to comply with an order of remand of an agency head (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.5(c)). In Re Kallen, 92 N.J. 14, 455 A.2d 460 (1983).

Remand was appropriate and necessary, where the public interest would clearly not be served if the Racing Commission were compelled to determine trainer's suitability for license on incomplete record. Record indicated the evidence before ALJ was limited where: (1) no testimony was taken; (2) record did not indicate if burden of demonstrating suitability for license was placed on trainer as it should have been; and (3) it was not clear if trainer was given opportunity to prove his suitability for licensure. Height v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, OAL Dkt. No. RAC 06380-07, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1113, Final Decision (March 20, 2008).

Order of remand signed by assistant director; valid. O.F. v. Hudson County Welfare Agency, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (DEA) 57.

Order for remand by Director of agency rejected by administrative law judge since Department had ample opportunity to develop proofs at prior hearing; Director rejected ALJ's decision and reopened case (citing former N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.5). Cash Services, Inc., v. Dep't of Banking, 5 N.J.A.R. 103 (1981).

1:1-18.8 Extensions of time limits

(a) Time limits for filing an initial decision, filing exceptions and replies and issuing a final decision may be extended for good cause.

(b) A request for extension of any time period must be submitted no later than the day on which that time period is to expire. This requirement may be waived only in case of emergency or other unforeseeable circumstances.

(c) Requests to extend the time limit for initial decisions shall be submitted in writing to the Director of the Office of Administrative Law. If the Director concurs in the request, he or she shall sign a proposed order no later than the date the time limit for the initial decision is due to expire and shall forward the proposed order to the transmitting agency head and serve copies on all parties. If the agency head approves the request, he or she shall within 10 days of receipt of the proposed order sign the proposed order and return it to the Director, who shall issue the order and cause it to be served on all parties.

(d) Requests to extend the time limit for exceptions and replies shall be submitted in writing to the transmitting agency head and served on all parties. If the agency head approves the request, he or she shall within 10 days sign and issue the order and cause it to be served on all parties. If the extended time limit necessitates an extension of the deadline for the final decision, the requirements of (e) below apply.

(e) If the agency head requests an extension of the time limit for filing a final decision, he or she shall sign and forward a proposed order to the Director of the Office of Administrative Law and serve copies on all parties. If the Director approves the request, he or she shall within ten days of receipt of the proposed order sign the proposed order and return it to the transmitting agency head, who shall issue the order and cause it to be served on all parties.

(f) Any order granting an extension must set forth the factual basis constituting good cause for the extension, and establish a new time for filing the decision or exceptions and replies. Extensions for filing initial or final decisions may not exceed 45 days from the original decision due date. Additional extensions of not more than 45 days each may be granted only for good cause shown.

Amended by R.1992 d.213, effective May 18, 1992.
See: 24 N.J.R. 321(a), 24 N.J.R. 1873(b).
Revised (c), (e) and (f).
Amended by R.2003 d.306, effective August 4, 2003.
See: 35 N.J.R. 1614(a), 35 N.J.R. 3551(a).
In (e), rewrote the last sentence.
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (d), deleted "with a proposed form of extension order" following "writing" and "and the Director of the Office of Administrative Law" following the second occurrence of "parties"; and in (f), deleted "set

forth the dates of any previous extensions," preceding "and establish", and substituted "for good cause shown" for "in the case of extraordinary circumstances".

Case Notes

Decision by ALJ recommending that college board of trustees follow its written procedures for denying reappointment to director of educational opportunity fund was "deemed adopted" by the board, where the board took no action to adopt, reject, or modify the ALJ's decision within 45 days, and did not seek an extension of time to do so within that period, there was no emergency justifying delay. Newman v. Ramapo College of N.J., 349 N.J.Super. 196, 793 A.2d 120.

Automatic approval of administrative law judge's recommendations was not applicable. Rollins Environmental Services (NJ), Inc. v. Weiner, 269 N.J.Super. 161, 634 A.2d 1356 (A.D.1993).

Provision for automatic adoption of administrative law judge's recommendations will not be literally enforced where agency head is not dragging his feet in issuing final decision. Rollins Environmental Services (NJ), Inc. v. Weiner, 269 N.J.Super. 161, 634 A.2d 1356 (A.D.1993).

It was proper exercise of discretion to grant nunc pro tunc extension of time for Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission (HMDC) to issue its final decision regarding intermunicipal tax-sharing obligations under Hackensack Meadowlands Reclamation and Development Act. Town of Secaucus v. Hackensack Meadowlands Development Com'n, 267 N.J.Super. 361, 631 A.2d 959 (A.D.1993), certification denied 139 N.J. 187, 652 A.2d 175.

Three month delay in providing findings and legal conclusions for decision itself untimely; equitable factor against reconsideration of administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision. Mastro v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 266 N.J.Super. 445, 630 A.2d 289 (A.D.1993).

Inherent power to reconsider decision. Mastro v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 266 N.J.Super. 445, 630 A.2d 289 (A.D.1993).

Initial decision of administrative law judge (ALJ) shall be "deemed adopted". Mastro v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 266 N.J.Super. 445, 630 A.2d 289 (A.D.1993).

Board of Trustees of Public Employee Retirement System failed to make showing justifying setting aside decision. Mastro v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, 266 N.J.Super. 445, 630 A.2d 289 (A.D.1993).

Challenge to extension of time under N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8 for the Commissioner to issue a ruling on an appeal was actually a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order, rather than a "motion for emergent relief"; interlocutory review of an administrative ruling may be granted in the interest of justice or for good cause shown, and petitioner failed to demonstrate good cause. Toddlertown Child Care Center v. Bd. of Educ. of Irvington, OAL Dkt. Nos. EDU 3041-07 and EDU 5430-07 (CONSOLIDATED), SB No. 35-07, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 974 (December 19, 2007).

Exceptions are required to be filed within 13 days after the Initial Decision, including partial summary decisions, and although an end-date for filing exceptions was not specified in the order for extension, it was not reasonable to assume that the exception period could run until the date established for the Final Decision on the matter; in addition, the bases for many of licensee's exceptions were improper. Bakke v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, OAL Dkt. No. BKI 1168-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 985, Final Decision (May 24, 2006).

Although an appellant's exceptions were untimely, his exceptions and the appointing authority's responses were both received prior to the matter being considered by the Board; consequently, good cause existed to accept the appellant's exceptions. In re Zorn, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 8501-05, 2006 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 633, Remand Decision (April 5, 2006).

SUBCHAPTER 19. SETTLEMENTS AND WITHDRAWALS

1:1-19.1 Settlements

(a) Where the parties to a case wish to settle the matter, and the transmitting agency is not a party, the judge shall require the parties to disclose the full settlement terms:

1. In writing, by consent order or stipulation signed by all parties or their attorneys; or

2. Orally, by the parties or their representatives.

(b) Under (a) above, if the judge determines from the written order/stipulation or from the parties' testimony under oath that the settlement is voluntary, consistent with the law and fully dispositive of all issues in controversy, the judge shall issue an initial decision incorporating the full terms and approving the settlement.

(c) Where the parties to a case wish to settle the matter and the transmitting agency is a party to the case, if the agency head has approved the terms of the settlement, either personally or through an authorized representative, the parties shall:

1. File with the Clerk and the assigned judge, if known, a stipulation of dismissal, signed by the parties, their attorneys, or their non-lawyer representatives when authorized pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-5.5(f); or

2. If the parties prefer to have the settlement terms incorporated in the record of the case, then the full terms of the settlement shall be disclosed in a consent order signed by the parties, their attorneys, or their non-attorney representatives when authorized pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-5.5(f). The consent order shall be filed with the Clerk and the assigned judge, if known.

(d) The stipulation of dismissal or consent order under (c) above shall be deemed the final decision.

Amended by R.1987 d.461, effective November 16, 1987.
See: 19 N.J.R. 1593(a), 19 N.J.R. 2131(c).
(b)1.-2. added to clarify that in those cases where the agency head, either in person or through counsel, has consented to the settlement terms.
Amended by R.1995 d.300, effective June 19, 1995.
See: 27 N.J.R. 1343(a), 27 N.J.R. 2383(a).
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In the introductory paragraph of (a), substituted "transmitting agency is not a party" for "agency head has not consented to the settlement terms"; and rewrote (c).

Case Notes

Emotionally disturbed child and his parent were "prevailing parties". E.P. by P.Q. v. Union County Regional High School Dist. No. 1, D.N.J.1989, 741 F.Supp. 1144.

Initial Decision (2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 798) adopted, which granted the appointing authority's motion to enforce a settlement in a nurse's disciplinary action where the nurse knowingly and voluntarily authorized her agent and representative to settle the matter and where her

reasons for rejecting the settlement at a later date did not involve coercion, deception, fraud, undue pressure, or unseemly conduct, but a mere change of heart; the fact that the settlement had not been signed was of no consequence where settlement agreements could be reached orally. In re Smith, OAL Dkt. No. CSV 6370-07, 2008 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 512, Final Decision (January 30, 2008).

Initial Decision (2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 261) adopted, which concluded that the terms of an unsigned "draft" agreement between a teacher and board of education constituted the terms of an agreed upon settlement that bound both parties, subject to approval by the Commissioner; the teacher's attorney had advised the school board that the settlement was acceptable, but the teacher objected to it. In re Tenure Hearing of Jones, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 8618-05S, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 494, Commissioner's Decision (August 9, 2007).

N.J.A.C. 1:1-19.1 does not require that respondent specifically state under oath that the settlement was voluntary. The ALJ may determine from the entirety of the sworn testimony (including certifications) of all the parties whether a voluntary settlement exists (decided under former version of rule). In re Tenure Hearing of Jones, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 8618-05S, 2007 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 494, Commissioner's Decision (August 9, 2007).

1:1-19.2 Withdrawals

(a) A party may withdraw a request for a hearing or a defense raised by notifying the judge and all parties. Upon receipt of such notification, the judge shall discontinue all proceedings and return the case file to the Clerk. If the judge deems it advisable to state the circumstances of the withdrawal on the record, the judge may enter an initial decision memorializing the withdrawal and returning the matter to the transmitting agency for appropriate disposition.

(b) When a party withdraws, the Clerk shall return the matter to the agency which transmitted the case to the Office of Administrative Law for appropriate disposition.

(c) After the Clerk has returned the matter, a party shall address to the transmitting agency head any motion to reopen a withdrawn case.

Amended by R.1990 d.71, effective February 5, 1990.
See: 21 N.J.R. 3589(a), 22 N.J.R. 334(b).
In (a): deleted language specifying the entering of an initial decision for withdrawals and added, "discontinue ... for appropriate disposition".
In (b): specified that Clerk shall return matter to agency which had transmitted the case to OAL.
In (c): deleted language referring to decision granting withdrawal.
Amended by R.1991 d.44, effective February 4, 1991.
See: 22 N.J.R. 3278(b), 23 N.J.R. 293(a).
In (a): deleted "in writing" from withdrawal procedure request.

Law Review and Journal Commentaries

Law Against Discrimination. Judith Nallin, 138 N.J.L.J. No. 15, 23 (1994).

Case Notes

Discharged employee's election to file national origin discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission pursuant to federal law precluded employee from bringing state court national origin discrimination claim after the EEOC determined that employee failed to demonstrate probable cause for administrative determination of discrimination. Hernandez v. Region Nine Housing Corp., 286 N.J.Super. 676, 670 A.2d 95 (A.D.1996).

Law Against Discrimination did not jurisdictionally prevent plaintiff from filing complaint in superior court after withdrawing her administrative complaint. Aldrich v. Manpower Temporary Services, 277 N.J.Super. 500, 650 A.2d 4 (A.D.1994), certification denied 139 N.J. 442, 655 A.2d 445.

SUBCHAPTER 20. MEDIATION BY THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1:1-20.1 Scheduling of mediation

(a) Mediation may be scheduled, at the discretion of the Director, when requested by the transmitting agency, or by all parties to a hearing or when requested by an agency with regard to a matter which has not been transmitted as a contested case. Mediation may be scheduled in any matter where the transmitting agency has a mediation program available to the parties to the case only upon request of the agency head for good cause and with the consent of the Director.

(b) When a request for mediation is granted, the Office of Administrative Law shall supply the parties with a list containing not less than six administrative law judges as suggested mediators. Each party may strike two judges from the list and the Office of Administrative Law will not assign any judge who has been stricken from the list to conduct the mediation. The Office of Administrative Law shall notify the parties of the assigned mediator.

New Rule, R.1999 d.413, effective December 6, 1999.
See: 31 N.J.R. 2290(a), 31 N.J.R. 2717(a), 31 N.J.R. 3999(a).
Former N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.1, Conduct of mediation, recodified to N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.2.
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (a), inserted "or when requested by an agency with regard to a matter which has not been transmitted as a contested case".
Amended by R.2008 d.151, effective June 16, 2008.
See: 40 N.J.R. 915(a), 40 N.J.R. 3617(a).
In the second sentence of (a), substituted "may" for "shall not" and inserted "only upon request of the agency head for good cause and with the consent of the Director".

1:1-20.2 Conduct of mediation

(a) Mediation shall be conducted in accordance with the following procedures:

1. Discovery to prepare for mediation shall be permitted at the discretion of the judge.

2. All parties to the mediation shall make available for the mediation a person who has authority to bind the party to a mediated settlement.

3. Parties may not use any information gained solely from the mediation in any subsequent proceeding.

4. Parties may not subpoena the mediator for any subsequent proceeding.

5. Parties may not disclose to any subsequently assigned judge the content of the mediation discussion.

6. Parties shall mediate in good faith.

7. Any agreement of the parties derived from the mediation shall be binding on the parties and will have the effect of a contract in subsequent proceedings.

(b) If any party fails to appear at the mediation, without explanation being provided for the nonappearance, the mediator shall return the matter to the Clerk for scheduling a hearing or for return of the matter to the agency and, where appropriate, the mediator may consider sanctions under N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.14.

(c) The mediator may at any time return the matter to the Clerk and request that a hearing be scheduled before another judge or that the matter be returned to the agency.

(d) No particular form of mediation is required. The structure of the mediation shall be tailored to the needs of the particular dispute. Where helpful, parties may be permitted to present any documents, exhibits, testimony or other evidence which would aid in the attainment of a mediated settlement.

(e) In no event shall mediation efforts continue beyond 30 days from the date of the first scheduled mediation unless this time limit is extended by agreement of all the parties.

Amended by R.1991 d.279, effective June 3, 1991 (operative July 1, 1991).
See: 23 N.J.R. 639(a), 23 N.J.R. 1786(a).
In (a)5, revised N.J.A.C. citation.
Recodified from N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.1 and amended by R.1999 d.413, effective December 6, 1999.
See: 31 N.J.R. 2290(a), 31 N.J.R. 2717(a), 31 N.J.R. 3999(a).
In (a), deleted a former 2, and recodified former 3 through 7 as 2 through 6. Former N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.2, Conclusion of mediation, recodified to N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.3.
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
Added new (a)1; recodified former (a)1 through (a)6 as (a)2 through (a)7; in (a)5, inserted "or for return of the matter to the agency" and "the mediator"; and in (a)6, inserted "or that the matter be returned to the agency".
Amended by R.2009 d.112, effective April 6, 2009.
See: 41 N.J.R. 5(a), 41 N.J.R. 1391(a).
Rewrote (a)3 and (a)4; added new (a)5 through (a)7; recodified former (a)5 through (a)7 as (b) through (d); and recodified former (b) as (e).

1:1-20.3 Conclusion of mediation

(a) If the transmitting agency is a party to the mediation, successful mediation shall be concluded by a mediation agreement.

(b) If the transmitting agency is not a party, successful mediation shall be concluded by initial decision. The initial decision shall be issued and received by the agency head as soon as practicable after the mediation, but in no event later than 45 days thereafter.

(c) If mediation does not result in agreement, the matter shall be returned to the Clerk for scheduling appropriate proceeding or for return to the transmitting agency.

Amended by R.1997 d.158, effective April 7, 1997.
See: 29 N.J.R. 282(a), 29 N.J.R. 1295(a).
In (c), inserted "or for return to the transmitting agency".
Recodified from N.J.A.C. 1:1-20.2 by R.1999 d.413, effective December 6, 1999.
See: 31 N.J.R. 2290(a), 31 N.J.R. 2717(a), 31 N.J.R. 3999(a).
Amended by R.2007 d.393, effective December 17, 2007.
See: 39 N.J.R. 2393(a), 39 N.J.R. 5201(a).
In (b), inserted the last sentence.

SUBCHAPTER 21. UNCONTESTED CASES IN THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1:1-21.1 Transmission to the Office of Administrative Law

(a) Any agency head may request under N.J.S.A. 52:14F-5(o) the assignment of an administrative law judge to conduct an uncontested case, including rule making and investigatory hearings. Public or investigatory hearings conducted pursuant to a rulemaking shall proceed in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(g). The agency head may make such a request by letter and by completing the applicable portions of an N.J.A.C. 1:1-8.2 transmittal form.