New Jersey (State) Commission of Investigation.
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REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION OF THE DRAFT PROVISIONS BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY STATE GOVERNMENT CASINO GAMBLING COMMITTEE.

The S.C.I. submits the following summary, with comments, suggestions and recommendations, of the proposed casino gambling legislation now before the Assembly State Government Committee. The review is presented with the sincere hope it will be considered by the Committee before it takes final action on the bill. It should be noted, understandably, that the time element has been such that this S.C.I. summary had to be compiled between Friday Midnight and today.

Much has been said in the last few days about who has or has not done this or that with respect to this legislation. The S.C.I. believes that the issue of casino gambling is of such overwhelming importance to the public peace, safety, and welfare, that it is no longer important who was late, who changed what provisions, or who made what recommendations. The only thing that is important is that the bill passed properly and effectively protects the public. It does none of us any good to be "right" if being "right" means that parts of this legislation could be made better or stronger. With that in mind, the State Commission of Investigation has attempted to offer a critique of the bill as it now stands to offer whatever assistance it can towards insuring that the provisions therein are effective. The Commission hopes the Committee will receive them in that spirit and will give such reconsideration to

the bill as is warranted in light of these suggestions.

Wherever the S.C.I. may differ with the Committee, the difference applies not in any personal vein but to the product, the prospective law that we believe will be so critical to the success of the new casino industry.

This interim review is submitted in two parts.

Part I applies to a tax issue which had not been reviewed in any final way by the Committee up through Friday night.

Part II is the S.C.I.'s analysis of actual draft revisions of the casino bill, as they appeared in galley proofs that were graciously made available to the Commission over the weekend. This overall analysis is presented with the hope that the S.C.I.'s original recommendations will be fully implemented. With all due respect to the Committee and its efforts, we wish to emphasize that there should be no sharp contrast between the legislation that the Committee eventually submits to the Legislature as a whole and the oft-repeated casino referendum campaign promises that casinos should and would operate under the "strictest statutory controls in the world."

PART I

AN ANALYSIS BY THE S.C.I. OF ISSUES RAISED

BY PROPOSED ART.11

Originally the State Commission of Investigation had indicated that it would not make recommendations on purely economic issues, including taxation. However, an examination of Art. 11 of the proposed casino gambling bill on revised tax provisions, presently before the Assembly State Government Committee, has raised a number of serious questions that the S.C.I. feels should be brought to the attention of the Committee.

The first and most important issue the S.C.I. raises is not a taxation question per se, but involves a reconsideration of §74 (d) and (e) of the proposed bill. These provisions provide for the confidentiality of certain financial and other information filed with or gathered by the new gambling commission.

The S.C.I. is aware that the Committee has already given consideration to these provisions and in fact that it gave additional review of these sections at the request of the N.J. Press Association. However, at the time of the Committee's earlier review, the S.C.I. had not received nor reviewed the draft provisions of Art. 11. The recommendations to be suggested herein are prompted by a review of that Article, and had not, therefore, been formulated on the earlier occasions.

Because the S.C.I. considers this situation to be of extreme importance to the overall public confidence in the adminiatration of casino gambling, it respectfully suggests that the Committee reconsider §74(d) and (e) based on the following comments:

Several aspects of Art. 11 raise a concern with respect to the confidentiality provisions cited above. Particularly, the provision calling for investment credits

or in the alternative, the "in lieu of property tax" relief, have generated this concern. As the S.C.I. understands these proposals, their intent is to encourage casino operators to invest and reinvest in Atlantic City by offering tax relief in return for these investments. The Commission further understands from the explanations given of these provisions when they were first released, that the tax relief given to the casino operator may involve upwards of several million dollars per casino, depending of course on each operator's level of investment and the profitability of his operations.

These tax proposals serve to underscore one of the constant themes, indeed the dominant theme, that has been heard since the referendum. That is, that casino operators need liberal operating provisions because they are being "forced" to make substantial investments in Atlantic City. Thus, they have lobbied long and hard for credit gambling, wide-open hours, and tipping, among other provisions. Now they seek tax relief, which in total dollar amounts may be the single biggest break they will get. This is in sharp contrast to the oft-repeated pre-referendum statements that casinos could and would operate under the strictest controls in the world.

The potential magnitude of these concessions to the casino industry raised a fundamental issue that transcends whether the S.C.I. thinks that the resolution of any given issue was right or wrong; whether the Attorney General's Office takes a different view; or whether the Committee thought either or both agencies were off the mark.

Simply put is the question: Should the people of this State have the right to monitor the results of these concessions and to form their own independent, informed judgment as to the original need and the continuing need as time goes on for any or all of these concessions granted to the casino operators.

Experiences here and in Nevada suggest that governmental review alone will not be enough. Despite statements to the contrary by its public officials, Nevada is so heavily dependent upon the gambling industry that there is a real concern about the ability of that State to tighten up its controls in the face of industry resistance or its willingness to admit any lack of control. Here in New Jersey the same problem may well occur. Anyone who has watched the industry manuever as this proposed legislation began to be assembled, and then watched its intense, continuous and unrelenting lobbying for provisions favorable to its own interests, can have little doubt that once operations get rolling, these same industry pressures will continue to be brought to bear on the agencies charged with enforcing casino gambling.

The public's best protection in this regard is its right to know. It must have the facts with which to judge how this matter of far-reaching importance has been handled. The citizens of this state are entitled to judge more than just the performance of the various casino operators; they have an equal, if not greater, interest in judging the performances of its public officials in enacting and administering this new legislation.

Therefore, the S.C.I. asks why the people of this State should not have access to the pertinent -- we emphasize "pertinent" -- information concerning the casino operator's revenues, the taxes he pays on those revenues, and the investment credits received by him as a result of this legislation. Do not the citizens of this State have a right to know who is benefitting and to what extent from this legislation as it will be enacted by the Legislature?

To the extent that §74(d) denies access to that information to individual citizens and the public at large, the S.C.I. urges the Assembly committee give serious consideration to amending that provision. While there is no question th free access to information often leads to abuses, the larger values sought to be protected here must allow for what occasional abuses may occur.

The S.C.I. does not suggest that all financial information pertaining to a casino licensee's operations be made public. It recognizes that this is an area where there is a legitimate need for some amount of confidentiality. Clearly, for example, the operator's internal controls must be kept secret, and the provision to that effect is well taken. Similarly, the S.C.I.'s ; suggestions for requiring "bounced" checks to be reported to the gaming commission (see Commission Report, pg. 6-E) and for increased audit report requirements (see page 25-F) are adopted, there would be legitimate reasons to grant confidentiality to such reports. And there may well be other areas where confidentiality is appropriate.

However, certain basic information regarding the casino licensee's operations should be readily available to the public so that it can judge the effect of this legislation on the industry and on this State. This information could include the following:

1. The licensee's operating figures broken down into the following categories:

   (a) lodging revenues and expenses;

   (b) other non-gaming revenues and expenses;

   (c) table games revenues and expenses;

   (d) slot machines revenues and expenses.

2. The table games revenues and expenses should further be broken down into the following sub-categories:

   (a) specific time periods of play - such as midnight to 4 A.M.; 10 A.M. to 6 P.M., just as examples.

   (b) the amount of gaming expenses that are complimentary charge-offs.

3. With respect to check-cashing by the licensee:

   (a) the amount of checks actually deposited for collection (rather than redeemed by patron before departing);

   (b) The amount initially "bounced";

   (c) the amount ultimately uncollected.

4. With respect to taxes and credits:

   (a) the amount of gross revenues tax actually paid; and the amount of taxes that would have been paid without any credits;

   (b) the investment credit or "in lieu of" received by the licensee;

   (c) an itemized list of the improvements for which credit is sought, specifying with particularity the nature of the improvement, their individual costs, and the payees thereof.

These items of information will allow the public to assess the benefits flowing to each individual casino operator as a result of his obtaining a license from this State. This information will also offer some idea of the cost to the State to provide these operating incentives. Finally, item 4 is particularly important. The public will be down in Atlantic City if all goes as planned. It will be able to judge for

itself whether the claimed improvements measurably affect the quality and nature of the services offered to them by the licensees. Even more importantly, the public at large should be aware of whom the licensee is hiring or from whom he is purchasing when these improvement expenditures are made. The details of these expenditures will show whether licensees are using related companies to provide improvement goods or services, thus in effect taking money out of one pocket and putting it into another; whether the payee had an integral relationship to the passage of the referendum or of this legislation; whether the value of the goods or services is overstated; whether much of these investment credit expenditures go to firms located out of this State.

Casino operators may well argue that their operating revenues and tax figures should not be made public; that they have a right of privacy. The fact is that they do not have any inherent or absolute right of privacy in this area. Whatever rights of privacy do exist in connection with taxes and financial reports are normally the results of legislative enactments. These enactments attempt to serve a general public policy - that an individual's, or a corporation's, financial affairs are normally no one else's concern. The S.C.I. submits that this general public policy does not and should not apply to the casino gambling industry. The public policy in this instance must be openess, not confidentiality and privacy.

Because of the long tradition of privacy accorded such information, we all hesitate when anyone suggests that financial information, especially tax matters, should be made public. Yet, it is hard to conceive of competing values that would defeat the public policy expressed above. Certainly, the casino licensee has a natural

desire not to have the public or his competitors know how well or how poorly he is doing. He also may feel certain information may be of value to his competitors, though obviously anyone in or familiar with an industry knows pretty much how everyone else in that industry operates in the first place. In fact, because of the lack of any sufficient countervalues and the strong public need to know, the State Commission of Investigation is tempted to recommend that in addition to making available the information outline infra in numbered paragraphs 1 - 4, that each operator's actual state tax return be made public. This is a regulated industry. The operator will be enjoying a special and unique privilege. His return is an accounting not only to the government, but to the public, of how he uses or abuses those privileges. When the Committee considers the rest of the recommendations made herein, it might well examine the possibility of also making the casino licensee's state tax returns public (this is as to the actual operators, and not individually licensed employees).

For essentially the same reasons that have been set forth with respect to financial matters and §74(d), the S.C.I. also recommends a re-examination of 74(e). The licensing process is most critical to the overall success of casino gambling. The public confidence in that process can be increased by full disclosure of the background information required to be supplied by the applicant. No public policy is served by keeping this license application information secret. The applicant will already be under a statutory requirement to supply such information accurately and completely. He risks sanctions and loss of license if he fails to do so; therefore the applicant does not need the encouragement of a confidentiality provision to insure compliance. On the other hand, full disclosure may serve to elicit from the public information regarding an applicant that might not otherwise be available to the gaming commission. Often it is only when one person makes a

statement of fact or circumstances, that another person will realize he has information that disputes or contradicts the veracity of the original statement, and come forward.

On the other hand, information supplied to the enforcement division by the public, the media and other governmental agencies should be kept confidential unless and until it is relevant to actual proceedings before the gaming commission. The investigative process is enhanced through the free flow of information unhampered by fear of disclosure, while at the same time individuals are protected from unwarranted and unfounded smears. This was one of the reasons for the two-tier system - to separate the adjudicatory function from the investigative function, since the one must operate in openness, while the other needs confidentiality to be effective.

Finally, though the State Commission of Investigation makes not substantive recommendations with respect to taxation of casinos, its review of Art. 11 raises several questions which the Assembly Committee should be aware of when it considers those provisions.

1. Why does an operator who reaches the $150 million investment level continue to receive investment credits <u>without</u> the need for further investment? Is not the purpose of the investment credits to encourage <u>additional</u> investment? See §143(b)(2).

2. Why is an investment in land on which improvements already exist entitle the operator to a tax credit? See §143(d). It should be noted that in the original draft proposals of Art. 11, this section, which was then numbered §142(c), read:

"For the purposes of determining eligibility for investment tax credit, investments means equity investments in land and real property on which improvements are made by the licensee . . . (emphasis added).

Will this lead to pure land speculation?

3. What other State agencies will receive monies out of the Casino Revenue Fund? See §144(b). Will the executive commission formed by executive order of the Governor receive such funds? Who decides who will get what funds?

4. Does §145(a)(1) and (2) mean that for up to 25 years, the only taxes the casino licensee may pay (depending on his profits) are at a maximum, his local real property taxes?

5. The explanation accompanying Art. 11 says the "in lieu of" option is irrevocable after being made. Section 145(a) talks in terms of a period of not more than 25 years, and §145(b) says the election may not be changed "during the term of the agreement".

6. Is failure to file a tax return made anywhere a specific ground for the suspension or revocation of the casino license? See §148, 149, 150.

(Set forth below is the State Commission of Investigation's analysis of the actual draft provisions of the casino bill, as they appear in galley proofs. In parenthesis are found references, where applicable, to discussion of certain points in the Commission's original report.)

Part II

1. §3 - Why should anyone be permitted to apply on behalf of another person. There should always be individual accountability for any license application. (21-B)

2. §6 - This might be better worded "...in which authorized gambling games are to be conducted and restricted to." - to insure that there is no question that all games are limited to one casino room.

3. §12- This definition should be amended to read "...provides casino hotels..." to insure that service industry unrelated strictly to the casino operation itself are also covered. In fact, examples of these other industries should be included, such as "garbage haulers, vending machine operators, and food purveyors." This definition is critical to the operation of §92 - LICENSING AND REGISTRATION OF CASINO SERVICE INDUSTRY. (1-C et seq.)

4. §19- Should be amended to read "...wherein a casino is located." See comment No. 2 above.

5. §24- Should be reworded to read after patrons "and an allowance for all checks actually remaining uncollected after diligent and reasonable attempts to collect same, but such allowance shall not exceed 4% of the total of all sums." This is to avoid the possibility that the alternate 4% provision does not, as now worded, make any reference to "actually uncollected."

   NOTE: The S.C.I. does not express any judgment on the 4% bad check allowance. This language is suggested simply to avoid any statutory construction problems.

6. §29- This definition should be reworded to delete any reference to "primary purpose." Obviously, a casino will only provide complimentaries to get persons to come to Atlantic City in the hope that such persons will gamble. This primary purpose language will only cause legal arguments. Language similar to that found at pg. 14-E should be considered, with a dollar limitation if so desired.

7. §35- This definition should read after which "permits a casino licensee to begin gaming activities." The rest of that language should be deleted. The "efficient and prepared to entertain the public language" may give rise to patrons who feel they have been "taken" by a casino licensee to sue the State based on its certification that a licensee's operations are efficient. §96 clearly sets forth what the operation certificate means.

8. §36- This should include "the division" since it will be a party. (7-A)

9. §43- Will not complaints be filed with the Commission by the Division? (7-A)

10. §52- 1. The S.C.I. continues to recommend that no Commissioner serve more than one full term. This is particularly true of the Chairman (13-A and 14-A).

2. The S.C.I. continues to recommend against a full time Chairman. See discussion on pg. 14-A. He should be chosen by seniority rather than by the Governor.

11. §53- Again, the S.C.I. recommends against a chairman who will dominate the rest of the Commission (14-A).

12. §54- The S.C.I. cautions against an executive secretary who it appears will be second in power only to the Chairman, and will therefore be more powerful than the other four Commissioners. This position has all the appearances of a potential patronage position, especially if there is a powerful Chairman.

13. §58d-The S.C.I. has strong reservations about the financial disclosur statements that must be filed with the Attorney General. This Commission might endorse such provisions if the key members of all casino licensees and ancillary services were likewise required to provide such information.

14. §59- The S.C.I. remains concerned that insufficient sanctions are provided for conflicts of interest violations. A review of Art. 9 (specifically, §129) indicates that the only applicable sanction on a licensee as §61b is now worded is a fine - see §129 (5). This is totally inadequate. See ¶5 on pg. 25-A. A period of one month shoulc be inserted after "less than."

15. §62- Again, the S.C.I. cannot stress enough the inadequate sanctions, for the casino gambling industry, found in N.J.S. 52:13D-12 et seq. See discussion at 3-G et seq.

16. §63- Under the concept of the two-tier system advocated by the S.C.I., the Division and not the Commission, would have general responsibility for the implementation of this act. The Commission would have specific, limited authority of a quasi judicial nature. See discussion at 6-A. Accordingly, the provision of §63 must be reconsidered, particularly §63f, which should be deleted.

17. §63g-Unless some standards are set to guide the gaming commission so that it does not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the Division, this provision is objectionable and highly dangerous to proper enforcement of the law. The S.C.I. notes that great care was taken to spell out standards for the imposition of sanctions against a licensee - see §130 (more on same later). If §63 (g) is to be enacted at all, there must be guidelines limiting the Commission's intrusion into the Division's independence of action.

18. §64- The power to impose sanctions mentioned in this section seems to be substantially reduced by §129. At the very least, these two provisions are unclear as to their interaction. The Commission should have the power to impose fines, license limitations, and/or license suspensions and revocations for any violation of this Act by the licensee. This power should not be confused, as it is by §64 and §129, as well as §130. (1-G).

19. §66- The Commission should be limited to fact finding hearings to review the state of the industry. All investigatory activity should remain with the Division. See discussion starting at pg. 7-A.

20. §67- The S.C.I. strongly recommends an immunity provision much like that presently in force for public employees. That is, if a licensed person is involved, his refusal to answer should forfeit his license whether or not immunity is thereafter conferred upon him. The statute should also make it clear that if testimony is given, whether or not prusuant to immunity, it can be used in civil license proceedings against the witness.

21. §69c-Should be amended to make clear that the Division may propose regulations independently of the Commission (7-A).

22. §70f-"Odds" should be deleted. (11-D)

23. §70 m&l -The S.C.I. continues to recommend that any annual audit by an independent CPA not be left to the discretion of the CPA. These two provisions do go in that direction. However, the statute should make it clear that a standard audit report is not sufficient and that CPAs must make their work papers available to the Commission and the Division. See extended discussion of this problem starting at 12-F.

    These sections, or other sections, must clearly impose a requirement on all licensees that they keep their books and records in a designated office in this State, and that they be maintained for a minimum number of years, at least 5. No such provision appears in the proposed bill. See discussion of pg. 6-F.

24. §70o-The S.C.I. strongly recommends that no statute ever enacted by a Legislature of this State contain language that suggests that gaming is "an activity for adults conducted in an atmosphere of social graciousness."

25. §70p- The goals of this provision may be well-intended; however, it may be unconstitutional for the commission to define community standards. It may be constitutional for the commission to determine community standards after a fact-finding hearing.

26. §74(b)(d)(e) - See discussion of these sections contained in a separate proposal to the Assembly Committee. The S.C.I. strongly urges the removal of much of this confidentiality.

The S.C.I. also notes its disagreement with the provision that requires the approval of the Attorney General before any information may be released to another law enforcement agency. Such authority should lie in the hands of the Division Director.

27. §76(b)(1) - The following language should be added to the end - ",appear before the Commission at license hearings to oppose, recommend or otherwise advise the Commission on the granting of a license, and shall have the authority to take or defend appeals from all licensing decisions of the Commission, as the Division may deem appropriate."

§76(b)(4) - Should read instead "Initiate and prosecute disciplinary proceedings before the Commission, and to take or defend such appeals therefrom as the Division may deem appropriate."

These are intended to make clear the Division's power to act as a check on the Commission (7-A).

28. §76(b)(6) See comment No. 17. The reference to §63g is particularly inappropriate unless 63(g) is substantially modified or deleted.

29. §79 (a)(4) Should be amended to read "inspect, examine, and audit all books, records and documents pertaining to a licensee's operation under the provisions of this Act" to make clear the full authority of the Division to conduct unannounced, spot audits which are vital to the effective enforcement of this Act. (21-A).

30. §79(c) thru(f) - These sections should be deleted in their entirety. There should be no suggestion in this Act that the Division does not have the absolute right, in order to insure full compliance with the law, to conduct unannounced, warrantless inspections of a licensee's premises and records, as set forth in §79(a). These provisions can only serve to seriously undermine the vitality of those provisions in §79(a). Nevada does not have any such "administrative warrants", see Nev. Stat. 463.140.3

The S.C.I. believes that the State should assert its powers to conduct such inspections to the fullest, without retreating one step from them. If judicial review goes against the State, then, and only then, should provisions on administrativ warrants be adopted. See discussion at 9-F.

31. Art. 5-While on the powers of the Division, the S.C.I. wishes to make additional provisions that should be adopted:

1. The Division should have access to the State Grand Jury, or preferably, be empowered to empanel its own State Grand Jury. Under the present Criminal Justice Act, the new enforcement division may not be entitled to access to a State Grand Jury. Specific provisions should be adopted to this effect.

2. The Division should be specifically designated as the body to prosecute criminal violations of this Act, and to handle all appeals from same. It will have the inherent expertise and interest to promptly and vigorously present and prosecute such cases.

These provisions will enable the Division to coordinate civil and criminal investigations without undue duplication or overlapping of jurisdictions (17-A).

32. §82(d) (7)(8) - Much concern has been expressed about thepower of a publicly-traded corporation to force a stockholder to sell his stock to the corporation or otherwise dispose of it. The S.C.I. shares this concern, but feels that such "buy-out" provisions should be tested before abandoned. The original draft of these provisions seemed appropriate. The new draft as to publicly-traded corporations is of less value- when must the stockholder dispose of the stock? What if he doesn't - can the licensee be held accountable by the Commission?

33. §83- The S.C.I. notes its continued reservations about hotel/room requirements, <u>especially</u> if investment credits are adopted by the Legislature. Such credits might well be used to force substantial new investment in existing structures, thus doing away or reducing the need for a room number requirement.

34. §85(c)- As the S.C.I. understands this provision, where the casino license is held by a corporation, the listed persons associated with the corporation need only be "qualified" - not actually licensed. The Commission disagrees and strongly urges individual licensure. See extended discussion of this point starting at 17-B. This is especially true since the provisions of §85(c) carry over to holding companies, see §85(d).

35. §85(e)- The discussion in point No. 34 applies equally to non-corporate casino licensees - the individuals holding any interest must be licensed.

36. §86(f)- The S.C.I. urges that "career" offender" and "career offender cartel" be dropped and "has engaged in organized criminal activity or associated with persons who engage in organized criminal activities" be used instead. This is a readily-identifiable term. even if its use is no longer in vogue.

37. §88(a)- A renewal period of one year should be clearly stated.

38. §92(a)- This section is acceptable if (1) the definition of casino services is amended as explained in point 3; and (2) language is inserted after by the commission "after findings of fact as to specific firms, associations, or persons."

39. §92(c)- All but the first sentence should be deleted as no longer necessary, in light of items No. 3 and No. 38. If left in, they will confuse the issue.

40. §94(b)- The chairman's power should be limited to a temporary license, limited in time to two weeks or until the next regular Commission meeting.

41. §97 - The S.C.I. continues to advocate hours of operation limited to Noon to 4:00 a.m., 7 days a week. (12-D).

42. §99(a)(4)-The S.C.I. continues to urge that the approval of check cashing be removed from the cashier's cage and given to a separate and distinct department within the casino's operation. (8-E).

43. §100(c)- The S.C.I. repeats its very strong objection to any provision giving State employees control over any key to the drop boxes. This can only serve to cast suspicion on the enforcement agency whenever any irregularities occur with respect to drop boxes. Sufficient independent controls over drop box procedures have been provided for. This provision is totally unwarranted and should be deleted.

44. - The S.C.I. again repeats its recommendations that all table games and all slot machines have mechanical counters. (6 and 7-D).

45. §101(b)- The words after player should be deleted up through check, leaving unless in. See §101(b)(3).

46. §101(c)- The S.C.I. stands by its original recommendation (and that of the Attorney General's Office) that checks be required to be deposited within two banking days, unless the additional proposals it put forth with respect to check cashing are adopted. These two proposals were:

1. that all "bounced" checks be immediately reported to the Commission,

2. that after a person "bounces" a check, he be placed on a list which prohibits him from further check cashing, or endorsing or guaranteeing the checks of other persons until the Commission recieves written notification from either the player or the casino involved that the previous check has been made good.

The S.C.I. cannot stress enough that its main concern with credit is that there be no unreported collections of debts. The initial return of a bounced check does not serve to report anything. The debt might still be collected anyhow by the casino, without being recorded on its books. The only way to prevent this is to cut off the player involved until payment is acknowledged to the Commission. It is the high roller's ego and his desire to continue to be able to use checks that will be most effective in forcing reporting of subsequent payments of bounced checks.

The S.C.I. cannot understand why the Assembly Committee did not adopt these provisions when presented to it during the discussions on credit gambling. It also cannot understand the Attorney General's reluctance to endorse these procedures. Its view was that they will cause "too much paperwork." If too many checks are bounced, there exists a potential problem that the Commission should be on top of. If only a few are bounced, then there will be no large amount of paperwork. The Attorney General's position is especially hard to understand in light of its opposition to the S.C.I.'s suggestion to delete E.E.O.C. responsibilities from the gaming commission. Those responsibilities have a far greater potential for paperwork jams than do the bounced check reports.

Finally, the statute itself must contain requirements that the casino obtain and maintain adequate identification records concerning anyone cashing a check. The exact nature of these identification requirements can be left to the rule-making power of the Commission.